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Recent Decisions
The Maryland Court of Appeals
I.

A.

COMMERCIAL LAW

A Different Outcome Under the Revised U C.C. ?

In Citizens Bank v. Maryland IndustrialFinishing Co.,' the Court of
Appeals interpreted certain provisions of Maryland's Commercial Law
Code, Article 3 regarding negotiable instruments.' The case involved
the use of a corporate indorsement 3 stamp by an employee who misappropriated funds by depositing checks payable to her employer into
her personal account.4
The specific issues presented by Citizens Bank were narrow. In a
case of first impression, the court held that a "forged indorsement" as
used in the Maryland Commercial Law Code5 was synonymous with an
unauthorized indorsement under section. 3-419 (1) (c). 6 The court
also held that the omission of a restrictive indorsement by an employee was sufficient to make the entire indorsement "unauthorized"
for purposes of a conversion action by the employer against the depositary bank.7 Thus, a depositary bank8 will be "strictly" liable for con1. 338 Md. 448, 659 A.2d 313 (1995).
2. Id. at 452-53, 659 A.2d at 314-15.
3. Commentators and courts vary on whether "endorsement" or "indorsement" is the
proper spelling. In this Note, I defer to Judge Goldberg of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit who explained that
[t]he P.E.G. stamp employed by banks stands for "Prior Endorsement Guaranteed." While the Uniform Commercial Code... frequently fails to provide clear
answers to questions in the area of negotiable instruments, it is unequivocal in its
insistence that indorsement is to be spelled with the letter "i." Bankers, who
claim to know much of such weighty matters, may insist on beginning with "e"
[because of] the bankers' understandable reluctance to stamp "Pay Any Bank
PIG" on the backs of checks they handle.
Perini Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, 553 F.2d 398, 401 n.1 (5th Cir. 1977).
4. Citizens Bank, 338 Md. at 453-58, 659 A.2d at 315-17.
5. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw I § 3-419 (1992).
6. Citizens Bank, 338 Md. at 458-59, 659 A-2d at 317-18.
7. Id. at 463-64, 659 A.2d at 320.
8. A depositary bank is the "first bank to which an item is transferred for collection
even though it is also the payor bank." MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW I § 4-105(a) (1992).
The name "collecting bank" is also used by some authorities for this concept, but more
commonly describes any of the intermediary banks through which the instrument passes
before the drawee bank, or payor bank, the one from which funds are ultimately collected,
is debited. See, e.g., id. § 4-104(d) (defining "collecting bank" as "any bank handling the
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version unless it can prove one or more of the defenses allowed under
section 3-419(3) that limit its liability. 9
This Note compares where the burden of loss falls under the
court's analysis in Citizens Bank, and where that burden would fall
under the revised version of Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial
Code (U.C.C.), which has not been adopted yet by the Maryland legislature.1" The Note concludes that Citizens Bank was decided properly
under existing law.
1. The Case.-Pauline Pagani, an employee of Maryland Industrial Finishing Company (MIFCO), was responsible for receiving
checks; marking file copies of invoices as "paid"; and recording check
numbers, dates, dates of receipt, and amounts paid on invoice file
copies.1 1 MIFCO instructed Pagani to indorse all checks received by
stamping the back with two stamps.1 2 The first stamp contained
MIFCO's corporate name and address; the other contained the words
"for deposit only."" Pagani was further directed to deposit the indorsed checks into MIFCO's account at Citizens Bank.1 4 Pagani was
also responsible for reconciling the corporate bank statement.15
In October or November 1989, MIFCO discovered discrepancies
in its accounts receivable. 6 When MIFCO's owner questioned Pagani
about the discrepancies, Pagani promised to implement a more rigorous filing system.' 7 In February 1990, after noticing additional disitem for collection except the payor bank"). A payor bank is defined as "a bank by which
an item is payable as drawn or accepted." Id. § 4-105(b).
9. Citizens Bank, 338 Md. at 453, 466 n.11, 659 A.2d at 315, 321 n.11. Section 3-419(3)
states that "a representative, including a depositary or collecting bank, who has in good
faith and in accordance with the reasonable commercial standards applicable to the business of such [bank] dealt with an instrument.., is not liable in conversion or otherwise to
the true owner beyond the amount of any proceeds remaining in his hands." MD.CODE
ANN., COM. LAw I § 3-419(3) (1992).
The court also held that after an employee has affixed the employer's indorsement,
the employee's subsequent actions do not affect whether the indorsement was authorized
or unauthorized. Citizens Bank, 338 Md. at 460, 659 A.2d at 318. Furthermore, the court
held that the scope of the employee's authority was a question of fact to be resolved on
remand. Id. at 465, 659 A.2d at 321. The employee's subjective intent was irrelevant. Id. at
461, 659 A.2d at 319.
10. The U.C.C. adopted its major revision to Articles 3 and 4 in 1990. This Note cites
to the 1995 U.C.C. because it is the most recent update.
11. Id. at 454, 659 A.2d at 315; see infra notes 130-132 and accompanying text (discussing the definition of "responsibility" under the revised U.C.C.).
12. Citizens Bank, 338 Md. at 454, 659 A.2d at 315.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 455, 659 A.2d at 315-16.
15. Id. at 456, 659 A.2d at 316.
16. Id. at 455, 659 A.2d at 316.
17. Id.
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crepancies, MIFCO contacted several customers and learned that
payments made by the customers were not reflected on MIFCO's
books."8
MIFCO then contacted Citizens Bank. 9 The bank confirmed
that the missing checks were deposited into Pagani's personal account, also at Citizens Bank."° Pagani deposited the checks using
blank deposit slips that she obtained at the bank's drive-up window. 2
She then filled out the deposit slips with MIFCO's name and her personal account number.2 2 Pagani admitted that she was not authorized
to deposit checks into her personal account, and that she did not always use the "for deposit only" stamp, even on some of the checks
deposited in the MIFCO account." Citizens Bank never questioned
24
the absence of the stamp containing the restrictive language.
MIFCO sued Citizens Bank and Pagani, alleging negligence, conversion, unjust enrichment, and constructive trust. 25 The trial court
held that despite the absence of the "for deposit only" stamp, the indorsements were actually authorized and therefore were not
forgeries.2 6
On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals held that Pagani's indorsements without the "for deposit only" stamp were unauthorized
because Pagani had authority to deposit only into MIFCO's account
but, in fact, had deposited checks into her personal account. 27 This
holding linked the two separate issues of what constitutes an unauthorized signature and what acts occurring after an indorsement is
made may make the indorsement invalid.28 Citizens Bank appealed,
29
and the Court of Appeals granted certiorari.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 456, 659 A.2d at 317.
22. Id., 659 A.2d at 316-17.
23. Id. at 457-58, 659 A.2d at 317.
24. Id. at 457, 659 A.2d at 317.
25. Maryland Indus. Finishing Co. v. Citizens Bank, 100 Md. App. 671, 674, 642 A.2d
317, 319 (1994), rev'd, 338 Md. 448, 659 A.2d 313 (1995).
26. Citizens Bank, 338 Md. at 457, 659 A.2d at 317. MIFCO was awarded $35,683.70 plus
$10,000 in punitive damages against Pagani. Citizens Bank, 100 Md. App. at 674, 642 A.2d
at 318.
27. Citizens Bank, 100 Md. App. at 683, 642 A.2d at 317, 323; Citizens Bank, 338 Md. at
458, 659 A.2d at 317.
28. Citizens Bank, 338 Md. at 460-61, 659 A.2d at 318-19; see infra notes 80-82 and accom-

panying text.
29. Citizens Bank, 338 Md. at 458, 659 A.2d at 317. The issues on appeal were: (1)
whether the trial judge properly found that there were no forged indorsements under MD.
CODE ANN., COM. LAW I § 3-419(1) (c), where the checks were stamp-indorsed with the
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2. Legal Background.a. Liability of a Depositary Bank.-Pice v. Nea 3 0 is recognized
as first having stated the theory that a cause of action may be brought
against a bank for losses sustained due to the bank's processing a
check to which it was not a holder."1 The logic of Price v. Neal is embodied in sections 3-417 and 4-208 of the U.C.C., which establish warranties made upon presentment and transfer.12 These warranties
allow banks in the processing chain to rely on the genuineness of signatures on the instruments they are handling, 3 and to allocate losses
in the event that an instrument is ultimately paid where the signatures
were not genuine.34
Under section 3-419, the depositary bank is liable without regard
to the depositary bank's negligence to the true owner of the check
when an instrument accepted by it for negotiation is fraudulent.3 5
However, the bank's liability will be limited to the amount of any proceeds remaining at the disposal of the depositary bank, if the bank
acted in good faith.3 6
This statutory provision is consistent with the common law before
the enactment of the U.C.C. In Cooper v. Union Bank, 7 the Supreme
Court of California noted that
an examination of the law existing prior to the enactment of
the Uniform Commercial Code reveals a nearly unanimous
agreement among the jurisdictions that the true owner of an
payee's name stamp, but without a restrictive indorsement stamp, by payee's employee,
who was expressly authorized to indorse checks with the name stamp; and (2) whether the
trial judge correctly found that where there were no forged indorsements as contemplated
by MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw I § 3-419, common-law negligence principles applied to re-

spondent's action against petitioner. Brief for Appellant at 2, Citizens Bank v. Maryland
Indus. Finishing Co., 338 Md. 448, 659 A.2d 313 (1995) (No. 103).
30. 97 Eng. Rep. 871 (KB. 1762).
31. Id. at 872; Timothy S. Fisher, Check FraudLitigation in Connecticut After the 1990 Revisions to the U.C.C., 68 CONN. B.J. 393, 401 (1994) (discussing banks' causes of action). Price
involved a suit by one bank against another. 97 Eng. Rep. at 871. "'Holder' means a
person who is in possession of a document of title or an instrument ...drawn, issued or
indorsed to him or to his order or to bearer or in blank." MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw I § 1201(20) (1992); see also infra notes 121-123 and accompanying text (discussing holdership).
32. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw I §§ 3-417, 4-208 (1992); see also Fisher, supra note 31, at
401 (discussing the policy established by Price v. Neat).
33. See MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw I §§ 3-417, 4-208; Fisher, supra note 31, at 401-02. See
generally JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 18-7, at 23136 (4th ed. 1995).
34. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAwI §§ 3-419, 4-208 (1992); see also Fisher, supra note 31, at
401-02 (discussing warranties made on presentment).
35. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw I § 3-419(3).

36. Id.
37. 507 P.2d 609 (Cal. 1973).
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instrument collected on a forged indorsement could recover
in a direct suit against a collecting bank even though the
bank had acted in good faith and with the highest degree of
care ....

38

Policy arguments for maintaining depositary bank liability are numerous. The depositary bank is the only bank with the opportunity to
confront the thief.5 9 Moreover, depositary banks are frequently solvent, convenient defendants for plaintiffs who are usually payees or
indorsers such as MIFCO. 4 ° A direct suit against the depositary bank
prevents numerous suits by and against the parties to the check and
the banks involved in processing the check.4" Additionally, banks can
insure against these losses and pass costs on to consumers.
Atlantic Trust Co. v. Subscribers to Auto InsuranceExchange42 sets out
what is still the general rule in Maryland as to depositary bank liability
for negotiating checks with forged or unauthorized indorsements:
"[A] bank is liable to a principal for the loss of funds resulting from
the honoring of checks payable to the principal and endorsed by the
" 4s
agent without authority.
b. Unauthorized and Forged Indorsements.--Both pre- and postU.C.C. law have treated indorsements made without authority in the
same way as forged indorsements.' Prior to the U.C.C.'s adoption,
former Article 13, section 44 stated that "[w]here a signature is
forged, or made without authority ... it is wholly inoperative, and no
right to retain the instrument . . . or to enforce payment thereof
against any party thereto, can be acquired through . . . such signa-

ture."4 5 The former section's goals are reflected in current section 3404(1) of the U.C.C., which makes unauthorized (including forged)
signatures "wholly inoperative" unless the person whose name is
signed is estopped from claiming forgery.' Prior to Citizens Bank, the
38. Id. at 616; see also Martin Co. v. Fidelity Bank, 218 Md. 28, 32-33, 145 A.2d 267, 26970 (1958) (discussing liability of a bank charging instruments with forged or unauthorized
signatures to a depositor).
39. WHirrE & SUMMERS, supra note 33, § 18-4, at 224; see also Fisher, supra note 31, at
401.
40. WHiTE & SUMMERS, supra note 33, § 18-5, at 225.
41. Fisher, supra note 31, at 401-02.
42. 150 Md. 470, 133 A.2d 319 (1926).
43. Id. at 474, 133 A.2d at 320 (citations omitted).
44. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 13, § 44 (1957); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw I §§ 1-201(43),

3-401 (1) (1992); infra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
45. MD. ANN. CODE art. 13, § 44 (1957).

46. Mn. CoDE ANN., COM. LAw I §§ 1-201(43), 3-404(1) (1992). Section 3-404 also
makes such a signature operable if it is ratified. Id. § 3-404(2); see also Martin Co. v. Fidelity
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Court of Appeals had not held that a forged indorsement and an indorsement made without authority were synonymous.4 7 Courts that
have considered the substance of the term "forgery" under section 3419 of the U.C.C. have rejected a strict dictionary interpretation.4 8
One court observed that "'[t]here is no substantial difference between an unauthorized endorsement and a forged endorsement, the
result being the same in so far as concerns the passing of title."' 4 9
Both unauthorized and forged indorsements prevent subsequent parties in the negotiation chain from enjoying the immunity to personal
defenses that accompanies holder in due course status.5 °
Under the U.C.C.'s transfer warranties, the drawee has a cause of
action against prior check handlers who did not have "good title to
the instrument" because of the forged indorsement.5 1 This is called
"suing upstream" with a cause of action based in old sections 3-417
and 4-207, which covered presentment and transfer warranties.5 2
Under the 1990 revisions " [e]ach party... between the thief and
the drawee bank will normally make an implied warranty, directly to
the drawee bank, that is 'entitled to payment."'5 3 The transfer warranty runs to transferees who are collecting banks and warrants that
Bank, 218 Md. 28, 32, 145 A.2d 267, 269-70 (1958) (deciding when the defense of forgery
or signature made without authority is available to a drawer on a drawee bank).
47. See supra text accompanying note 6.
48. Aema Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Hepler State Bank, 630 P.2d 721, 751 (Kan. Ct. App.
1981).
49. Id. at 725 (quoting Teas v. Third Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 4 A.2d 64 (NJ. 1939)).
The court continued, quoting Tear "The use of the word 'forged indorsement' as constituting a conversion under N.J.S. 12A.3-419 (1) does not preclude the finding of conversion
where the unauthorized signature does not constitute a forgery in the strict sense." Id.; see
2 R. ANDERSON, UNIroM COMMERCAL CODE 1034-35 (2d ed. 1971).
50. A holder in due course of an instrument is one who has taken the instrument for
value, in good faith, and without notice of any claim or defense against the instrument.
MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW I § 3-302 (1992). A holder in due course takes the instrument
free from all defenses except those enumerated, which include incapacity, duress, misrepresentation, and discharge in bankruptcy. Id. § 3-305.
51. Perini Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, 553 F.2d 398, 404 (5th Cir. 1977); see also MD. CODE
ANN., COM. LAW I §§ 3-417(1)(a), 4-207(1)(a) (1992). Section 3-417(1)(b) states: "[a]ny
person who obtains payment or acceptance of any prior transferor warrants to a person
who in good faith pays or accepts that... [hie has no knowledge that the signature of this
maker or drawer is unauthorized . . . ." Id. Section 4-207(1) (a) states,
Each customer or collecting bank who obtains payment or acceptance of an item
and each prior customer and collecting bank warrants to the payor bank or other
payor who in good faith pays or accepts the item that... [h]e has good title to
the item or is authorized to obtain payment or acceptance on behalf of one who
has good tide ....
Id. § 4-207(1) (a).
52. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw I §§ 3-417, 4-207; see a/so WHITE & SUMMERS, SUpra note
33, § 18-7, at 231-32.
53. WHrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 33, § 18-7, at 231.
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"all signatures ... are authentic and authorized." 54 After a payor bank
recredits its customer's account it will probably sue the collecting
bank under 4-208(a) (2), and the collecting bank would sue further
upstream under 4-207(a) (3).55
c. 1990 Revisions to U.C.C Article 3.-In 1990, the American
Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws promulgated a revised version of Article 3 that governs check fraud litigation.5 6 By June 1995, at least thirty-one states
had adopted the 1990 revisions.57 Maryland has not yet adopted the
1990 revisions, but historically has adopted major changes in uniform
58
law.
The 1990 revisions were adopted to "clarify the law and resolve
inconsistent interpretations among various courts" and to achieve substantive changes in the law of check fraud.5 9 One of the most significant changes is the adoption of a "shared loss scheme" that,
depending on the facts, would result in situations where (1) an employer could not sue a depositary bank for negotiating a check improperly indorsed by that employer's employee, or (2) the employer
54. Revised § 3-416(a) (1) states "[a] person who transfers an instrument for consideration warrants to the transferee and, if the transfer is by indorsement, to any subsequent
transferee that... all signatures on the instrument are authentic and authorized ...
U.C.C. § 3-416(a)(1) (1995).
55. Section 4-208(a) (2) of the U.C.C. states:
(a) If an unaccepted draft is presented to the drawee for payment or acceptance and the drawee pays or accepts the draft, (i) the person obtaining payment
or acceptance, at the time of presentment, and (ii) a previous transferor of the
draft, at the time of transfer, warrant to the drawee that pays or accepts the draft
in good faith that:
(2) the draft has not been altered ....
Id. § 4-208(a) (2) (1995).
Section 4-207(a) (3) provides: "(a) A customer or collecting bank that transfers an
item and receives a settlement or other consideration warrants to the transferee and to any
subsequent collecting bank that: ....
(3) the item has not been altered .... " Id. § 4207(a)(3) (1995).
56. Clark C. Johnson & Tonie M. Franzese-Damron, Uniform Commercial Code Revised
Article 3 and Amended Article 4: How Michigan Law Might Change, 74 MICH. B. J. 538, 538
(1995); Fisher, supra note 31, and 393.
57. Johnson & Franzese-Damron, supra note 56, at 538.
58. Interview with Irving Breitowitz, Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of
Law, in Baltimore, Md. (Sept. 13, 1995). A review of the General Assembly Subject Index
of Proposed Legislation shows that since 1990, no bill has been introduced in the General
Assembly seeking overall revision or revision of Article 3 of the U.C.C. now in effect in
Maryland.
59. Fisher, supra note 31, at 393.
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and bank would split the loss in proportion to each one's
negligence. 60
The introductory notes to the revised Article 3 make clear that
the revisions were intended to apply more readily than prior law had
to modem technologies and modem payment practices.6 1 Also noted
as a catalyst to revision was the need to bring Article 3 into compliance
62
with modern federal banking law.
Commentators have specifically criticized the revised sections 3405 and 3-420.3 The main criticism is that revised section 3-405 employs for the first time a comparative negligence scheme or loss allocation regime.6 4 Under revised section 3-405, loss may be allocated
between an employer whose employee has committed fraud and the
depositary bank, based on the degree of negligence committed by
both.6 5 A comparative negligence rule will require courts to "allocate
liability mathematically if it finds a defending bank failed to exercise
ordinary care.... Courts have rejected a comparative negligence concept under 1962 Articles 3 and 4."' The required weighing of evidence put on by the employer and the bank under section 3-405 adds
a dimension of uncertainty as to where liability will fall.6 7
3. The Court's Reasoning.-The Court of Appeals defined the issue in Citizens Bank as whether an agent's indorsements on checks payable to her principal were unauthorized for purposes of determining
conversion under section 3-419 "(1) when the agent indorsed ... with

an improper motive or later misappropriated the checks, or (2) when
the agent omitted restrictive language required by the principal to be
part of the indorsement. ' 88 The court found that the agent's subjec60. See infra notes 129-137 and accompanying text.
61. UNIF. COMM. CODE Revised Art. 3, 2 U.LA 7 (1991).
62. Id. at 299.
63. See, e.g., Henry J. Bailey, New 1990 Uniform Commercial Code: Article 3, Negotiable Instruments, and Article 4, Bank Deposits and Collections, 29 WILL1AMETrE L. REv. 409, 515 (1993)
(discussing the clarification of the 1962 U.C.C. by the 1990 U.C.C.). Bailey argues, among
other things, that the only deficiency with section 3-420 is "the absence of a provision on
when a cause for conversion accrues." Id.; see also infra note 64.
64. John J.A. Burke, Loss Allocation Rules of the Check Payment System with Respect to Forged
DrawerSignatures and Forged Indorsements: An Explanation of the Present and Revised UCC Articles 3 and 4, 25 UCC L.J. 318, 322-24 (1993); see also Bailey, supra note 63, at 487-91 (criticizing revised § 3-405).
65. U.C.C. § 3-405(b) (1995); Bailey, supra note 63, at 490 (discussing the inappropriateness of the tort concept of comparative negligence appearing in the U.C.C., a commercial law code).
66. Bailey, supra note 63, at 493.
67. Id.
68. Citizens Bank, 338 Md. at 452, 659 A.2d at 314. Citizens Bank was a 4-3 decision.
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tive motive at the time of indorsement and her later misappropriation
of the checks were irrelevant in determining whether her indorsements were authorized, and thus whether the bank could be held liable for conversion.6 9 Rather, the question of whether her
indorsements were authorized turned on whether her employer required the use of a restrictive indorsement, a question of fact for the
trial judge.7"
The majority introduced its analysis with the generally accepted
underlying premise regarding the transferability of title to a check:
Even though acting in good faith, a person who takes a check with a
forged indorsement is exercising "dominion and control" over a
check rightfully owned by another.7" Thus, the actor is liable for conversion.7" The language of section 3-419(1) (c) states only that "[a]n
instrument is converted when . . . it is paid on a forged indorse-

ment."73 In interpreting this language, the court held that a "forged"
indorsement is synonymous with an "unauthorized" indorsement.7 4
Pagani, the employee, had not "forged" an indorsement if "forged" is
interpreted by its strict dictionary definition.7 5 The Maryland Code
defines "unauthorized signatures" as including forged signatures.76
The issue to be decided becomes whether the indorsements Pagani
made were unauthorized.
Decisions from numerous other jurisdictions support the court's
holding. 77 In this case, if the indorsements were found to be unauthorized, the bank could be held liable for conversion. 78
69. Id. at 460-62, 659 A.2d at 318-19; see also infra text accompanying notes 79-82.
70. Citizens Bank, 338 Md. at 462-64, 659 A.2d at 319-20; see also infra notes 83-92 and
accompanying text.
71. Citizens Bank, 338 Md. at 452-53, 659 A.2d at 314-15 (quoting MD. CODE ANN., COM.
LAw I § 3-419 cmt. 3 (1992)).
72. Id. Conversion is defined as "[a]n unauthorized assumption and exercise of the
right of ownership over goods or personal chattels belonging to another, to the alteration
of their condition or the exclusion of the owner's rights." BLACK'S LAw DiCrnONARY 332
(6th ed. 1990).
73. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw I § 3-419 (1992).
74. Citizens Bank, 338 Md. at 458-59, 659 A.2d at 317-18; see also supra text accompanying note 6.
75. "Forgery" is defined, in pertinent part, as "[t]he false making or the material altering of a document with the intent to defraud. A signature of a person that is made without
the person's consent and without the person otherwise authorizing it." BLACK'S LAw DIG
TIONARY 650 (6th ed. 1990).
76. See infra text accompanying note 150.
77. See, e.g., Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y v. Okey, 812 F.2d 906, 908 (4th Cir. 1987); D &
G Equip. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 764 F.2d 950, 955 (3d Cir. 1985); Oswald Machine &
Equip., Inc. v. Yip, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 193, 196-97 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992); Fort Dodge Creamery
Co. v. Commercial State Bank, 417 N.W.2d 245, 246 (Iowa Ct. App. 1987).
78. Citizens Bank, 338 Md. at 463-64 & n.10, 659 A.2d at 320.
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The court then addressed the Court of Special Appeals's discussion regarding the effect of the unauthorized deposits." The court
agreed that Pagani was clearly unauthorized to deposit the checks into
her account, but found that it was a separate question as to whether
she had the authority to omit the restrictive indorsement.8 ° The court
explained:
It defies reason to allow an event that occurs after the indorsement to affect the validity of the indorsement. An indorsement is either valid or invalid at the time it is made; if
at that time, the agent has authority to indorse, the indorsement is authorized. The use to which the agent later puts
the check
does not affect the agent's authorization to in81
dorse it.
The court stated further that a valid indorsement is not dependent on
the agent's subjective motivation at the time the indorsement is
made.

82

The next issue addressed was whether the agent's failure to use
the restrictive indorsement stamp, when she was specifically directed
to by her principal, made an otherwise valid indorsement invalid. 8
The court noted three legally significant aspects to a restrictive indorsement. First, restrictive language limits the transferability of a
check. 84 Second, a bank's failure to adhere to a restrictive indorsement results in the bank being liable for conversion.8 5 Third, because
of the significance of restrictive language, "courts... conclude that an
agent who is authorized to do one is not necessarily authorized to do
the other."8 6 The court continued that if a restrictive indorsement is
required by the principal and is not used by the agent, because of the
legal significance of a restrictive indorsement, the entire indorsement
becomes unauthorized.8 7 The scope of Pagani's authority to indorse
was held to be a question of fact to be decided by the trial judge.8 8
79. See supra text accompanying notes 27-28.
80. Citizens Bank, 338 Md. at 460, 659 A.2d at 318.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 461, 659 A.2d at 319.
83. Id. at 462-63, 659 A.2d at 319-20 (citing MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw I § 3-206(3)
(1992)).
84. Id. at 461, 659 A.2d at 319.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 463, 659 A.2d at 320. In other words, an agent authorized to make restrictive
indorsements is not necessarily authorized to make unrestricted indorsements or vice
versa.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 465, 659 A.2d at 321.
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The court further commented that "[i]f we were to hold that the
omission of the restrictive language had no effect, we would essentially
place the principal-drawee's ability to recover entirely in the hands of
the agent under the circumstances presented in this case." 89 The ultimate result of this reasoning is that Citizens Bank will be liable for
conversion if (1) Pagani is found to have acted outside the scope of
her authority in not affixing restrictive indorsements,9" and (2) Citizens Bank cannot meet the burden of proof of the affirmative defense
allowed under section 3-419(3).91 The court remanded the case to
the trial court for the taking of additional evidence on these questions
2
of fact.

9

The dissenters' "quarrel [was] with what the majority deem[ed]
to be an unauthorized indorsement.""3 The dissent's argument
turned on what is required to make an instrument negotiable.9 4 The
Maryland Code defines "negotiation," in pertinent part, as "the transfer of an instrument in such form that the transferee becomes a
holder ....

if payable to bearer it is negotiated by delivery."9 5 The

dissent quoted section 3-204(2), which states that " [a]n indorsement
in blank... may contain a mere signature... [and] becomes payable
to bearer and may be negotiated by delivery alone until specially in89. Id. at 464, 659 A.2d at 320. The court continued:
The agent could choose to disregard the principal's instructions and fail to include the restrictive language .... thus precluding the principal from recovering
under a conversion theory. Or the agent could choose to indorse the checks...
with the restrictive language but nevertheless deposit them into the agent's own
account, thus permitting the principal to recover under a conversion theory because the bank violated the restrictive indorsements. This variance in outcomes
based entirely on the agent's obedience or disobedience is unjustifiable.
Id.
90. Id. at 462-63, 659 A.2d at 319-20.
91. Id. at 465 n.11, 659 A.2d at 321 n.11 (discussing the elements of the affirmative
defense available to Citizens); see also MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw I § 3-419(3) (1992). The
liability of a bank that can prove it has acted in good faith and in accordance with reasonable commercial standards is limited to that portion of the instrument proceeds still in the
bank's possession. Id.
92. Citizens Bank. 338 Md. at 465, 659 A.2d at 321.
93. Id. at 466, 659 A.2d at 321 (Bell, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 469, 659 A.2d at 323 (discussing that an instrument payable to order is made
negotiable if it is negotiated by delivery with any necessary indorsement); see also WHITE &
SUMMERS, supra note 33, §§ 18-4, 18-5, at 224-25 (discussing the policy behind Article 3's
narrow conception of negotiability). Section 3-104 provides that a negotiable instrument
must "(a) Be signed by the maker or drawer, and (b) Contain an unconditional promise or
order to pay... ; and (c) Be payable on demand or at a definite time; and (d) Be payable
to order or to bearer." MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW I § 3-104 (1992). Checks are negotiated
when they become bearer paper, i.e., when they are indorsed. Id. § 3-202.
95. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw I § 3-202(1).
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dorsed."9 6 The dissent reasoned that Citizens Bank became a holder
of the checks misappropriated by Pagani because the checks were payable to the bearer, and thus in negotiable form when the bank received them.9" The dissent concluded that, as a matter of law, Pagani
had authority to negotiate the checks, and therefore, Citizens Bank
was not liable for conversion because the indorsements were
authorized.9"
4. Analysis.-The decision in Citizens Bank confirms that a depositary bank will be liable under section 3-419 for proceeds paid out
as a result of an employee omitting the restrictive indorsement required by the employer when depositing checks payable to the employer.9 9 The three pivotal holdings of the court were decided based
on interpreting the Commercial Law Article, section 3-419.100 First,
the court decided the meaning of "forgery" under section 3-419.11
Second, it held that where a principal directs an agent to use a restrictive indorsement, omission of that language makes the entire indorsement unauthorized. °2 Finally, the court decided that if the
indorsements were unauthorized, the depositary bank would be liable
unless it proved the defenses allowable under section 3-419.l °s This
Note reviews the basis of the court's decisions on these points and
then applies the revised 1990 U.C.C. provisions to the facts in an effort to determine whether the court's conclusions would differ under
the new U.C.C. provisions.
In Citizens Bank, a customer deposited checks payable to her employer into her account with an indorsement that omitted certain restrictive language her employer required, 10 4 the customer withdrew
the funds from her account, and the drawee bank paid the checks
from the drawers' accounts when the various checks were presented
for payment.1 05 The Citizens Bank court was concerned with the ability
96. Citizens Bank, 338 Md. at 468, 659 A.2d at 322 (Bell, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 471, 659 A.2d at 323. "A restrictive indorsement is not, however, any part of
the 'necessary indorsement' for purposes of negotiation." Id. at 472-73, 659 A.2d at 324.
98. Id. at 473, 659 A.2d at 325.
99. Id. at 458, 659 A.2d at 317-18.
100. See supra notes 68-74, 81-87, 91 and accompanying text.
101. Citizens Bank, 338 Md. at 458-59, 659 A.2d at 318. The court also held that the act
by the agent of depositing the checks in a personal account did not result in conversion
liability of the depositary bank, Citizens Bank. Id. at 460-61, 659 A.2d at 318-20.
102. Id. at 463-64, 659 A.2d at 320.
103. Id. at 452-53, 659 A.2d at 314-15. The court also held that the scope of Pagani's

authority was a question of fact to be decided on remand. Id. at 465, 659 A.2d at 321.
104. The issue of whether the omission of the restrictive language was unauthorized was
held to be a matter of fact to be decided on remand. Id. at 321, 659 A.2d at 464.
105. See supra text accompanying notes 20-24.
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of the plaintiff to recover.1° After holding that the unauthorized
omission of restrictive language is sufficient to make the indorsement
itself unauthorized, the court stated "[i]f we were to hold that the
omission of the restrictive language had no effect, we would essentially
place the principal-drawee's ability to recover entirely in the hands of
the agent under the circumstances presented in this case."' °7 The
court confirmed that Maryland adheres to the prevailing view of
U.C.C. section 3-419 that depositary banks are liable for conversion
when paying in spite of an unauthorized indorsement 08 The court's
analysis and decision were in accordance with the decisions of the various jurisdictions that have interpreted section 3-419. The question
becomes one for the Maryland legislature. Does the current language
of section 3-419, even when properly interpreted by the Court of Appeals, achieve a result that is equitable and practical in today's business environment?' 0 9
a. Use of a Restrictive Indorsenent.-The Citizens Bank court
failed to address the basic concept of negotiability. A restrictive indorsement is used to dictate to subsequent holders the extent of negotiability of a check.' 10 A party may become a holder, and thus become
able to negotiate the instrument, without the restrictive indorsement."' This argument was raised by the dissent,"' and is left unanswered by the majority's opinion.
The dissent failed to acknowledge, however, that the real issue is
the scope of the employee's authority. If omitting of the "for deposit
only" language was within the scope of Pagani's authority, then the
absence of that language would not result in liability to Citizens Bank
because Pagani would be authorized to omit that language. As with
any other issue involving an assignment of duties to an agent, if the

106. Citizens Bank, 338 Md. at 463, 659 A.2d at 320.
107. Id. at 464, 659 A.2d at 320. The dissent answered this statement with "[t]he argument is curious inasmuch as the method an agent chooses to breach his or her duty to the
principal always impacts the principal's right to recover." Id. at 473, 659 A.2d at 325 (Bell,
J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 452-53, 659 A.2d at 314-15.
109. Many provisions of U.C.C. titles 3 and 4 were revised, most of which are not relevant to the discussion in this Note. The legislature would have many considerations to
address, beyond the scope of this Note, before adopting revised Tides 3 and 4.
110. Id. at 462, 659 A.2d at 319.
111. MD. CODE ANN., CoM. LAw I § 3-301 (1992); see also supra note 50.
112. See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
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action is within the scope of the agent's authority, the principal has
authorized the action and is bound by it."'
b. A Different Outcome Under the Revised UC.C.-Under the
1990 U.C.C. revisions, would the court's decision be the same on the
issue of the bank's liability for accepting a check on an unauthorized
indorsement? Sections 3-405 and 3-420 of the revised 1990 U.C.C. Article 3 change the rule set out in Atlantic Trust Co. v. Subscribers Auto
Insurance Exchange14 by shifting the burdens borne by depositary
115
banks and customers when an unauthorized indorsement is used.
This results in a greater variety of outcomes as to where liability will
finally lie.'

16

Revised section 3-420(a) states that "[a]n instrument is also converted if it is taken by transfer, other than a negotiation, from a person not entitled to enforce the instrument or a bank makes or obtains
payment with respect to the instrument for a person not entitled to
enforce the instrument or receive payment."" 7 The revision drops
the specific "forged indorsement" language used in Commercial Law
Article, section 3-419(1) (c).1 8 Comment one to revised section 3-420
states that "[t] his covers cases in which a depositary.., bank takes an
in
instrument bearing a forged indorsement."" 9 Holders and holders
20
due course are entitled to enforce instruments, as are others.1
113. See Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 30, 60 A.2d 423, 426 (1995) (holding that an
employer is liable for his employee's conduct when the employee was acting within the
scope of employment under the doctrine of respondeat superior). This means that the
employer could not look to third parties, i.e., the depositary bank, for recovery because the
employer would have to bear the loss created by the employee.
114. 150 Md. 470, 133 A.2d 319 (1926).
115. See infra notes 130-147 and accompanying text (discussing how revised § 3-405 affects the conversion liability analysis).
116. See infra notes 130-147 and accompanying text.
117. U.C.C. § 3-420 (1995). Section 3-201 of the revision defines "negotiation" as "transfer of possession, whether voluntary or involuntary, of an instrument by a person other
than the issuer to a person who thereby becomes its holder." See infra note 120 (defining
holder).
118. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw I § 3-419(1) (c) (1992). This sections states "[a]n instrument is converted when [i] t is paid on a forged indorsement." Id.
119. U.C.C. § 3-420 cmt. 1.
120. U.C.C. § 3-301(1995) states:
A " [p ] erson entitled to enforce" an instrument means (i) the holder of the instrument, (ii) a nonholder in possession of the instrument who has the rights of a
holder, or (iii) a person not in possession of the instrument who is entitled to
enforce the instrument pursuant to Section 3-309 or 3-418(d). A person may be a
person entitled to enforce the instrument even though the person is not the
owner of the instrument or is in wrongful possession of the instrument.
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Significantly, a payee who has not received delivery of an instrument may not maintain a conversion action against a depositary bank
because the payee never became a holder.1 2 1 The payee may become
a holder, and thereby gain standing to sue the depositary bank, if his
agent takes the check on his behalf. 22 This occurred in Citizens Bank,
where Pagani was responsible for receiving all checks on MIFCO's behalf,"' giving MIFCO standing to sue. Through Pagani's receiving
the checks payable to MIFCO, MIFCO became a holder in due course.
Pagani was never a holder, and therefore could not be a holder in due
course.12 4 Pagani also did not fulfill any other parts of the definition
of one entitled to enforce an instrument.12 Citizens Bank made payments on instruments to a person not entitled to enforce the instrument or receive payment, i.e., someone not a holder.1 26 Thus, under
the 1990 revision, Citizens Bank would still be liable for conversion.
The Citizens Bank court indicated that the bank may minimize its
liability by offering evidence of the defenses allowed under section 3419(3) "or any other defenses provided by the law."12 7 However,
under the revised U.C.C. section 3-420, the defenses of good faith and
commercially reasonable practices are not available to a depositary
Id.
The revised U.C.C. defines a holder, with respect to negotiable instruments, as "the
person in possession if the instrument is payable to bearer or, in the case of an instrument
payable to an identified person, if the identified person is in possession." Id. § 1-201 (20).
A holder in due course is the holder of an instrument if:
(1) the instrument when issued or negotiated to the holder does not bear such
apparent evidence of forgery or alternation or is not otherwise so irregular or
incomplete as to call into questions its authenticity; and
(2) the holder took the instrument (i) for value, (ii) in good faith, (iii) without
notice that the instrument is overdue or has been dishonored or that there is an
uncured default with respect to payment of another instrument issued as part of
the same series, (iv) without notice that the instrument contains an unauthorized
signature or has been altered, (v) without notice of any claim to the instrument
described in Section 3-306, and (vi) without notice that any party has a defense or
claim in recoupment described in Section 3-305(a).
Id. § 3-302(a).
121. Id. § 3-420(a) (ii); Johnson & Franzese-Damron, supra note 56, at 541 (discussing
the four most significant changes to § 3-419 under the revised § 3-420); see also supra note
31 (defining holder).
122. U.C.C. § 3-420(a) states: "An action for conversion may not be brought by ... a
payee or indorsee who did not receive delivery of the instrument either directly or through
delivery to an agent. ... " Id.
123. Citizens Bank, 338 Md. at 454-58, 659 A.2d at 315-17.
124. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
125. See supa note 120 and accompanying text.
126. Citizens Bank, 338 Md. at 457, 659 A.2d at 317; see supra text accompanying note 23.
127. Citizens Bank, 338 Md. at 465, 659 A.2d at 321 & n.11; see supra note 91 and accompanying text.
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bank such as Citizens Bank; conversion gives rise to strict liability. 12 1
Despite the lack of defenses under section 3-420, a defense pertinent
to Citizens Bank would arise under revised section 3-405.12' Revised
section 3-405 makes employers liable for forgeries by employees who
are responsible1 3 1 for significant accounting functions of the business,
except where the bank failed to follow commercially reasonable practices.13 1 Under revised section 3-405 (b), if an employer gives responsibility to an employee, and that employee makes a fraudulent
indorsement of the instrument, the indorsement is treated as the effective indorsement of the payee if made in the payee's name.1 3 2 The
revision requires a showing by the collecting or depositary bank that it
used ordinary care in processing the check.13 3 If the bank cannot
prove ordinary care, the person bearing the loss may collect from the
bank to the extent the bank's lack of ordinary care contributed to the
loss.' 3 4 The official comment to section 3-405 notes that where the

employee is the forger, an employer is in a better position to prevent
128. U.C.C. § 3-420(c) ("[A] representative, other than a depositary bank, who has in
good faith dealt with an instrument... is not liable in conversion ... beyond the amount
of any proceeds that it has not paid out."). Comment 3 to § 3-420 addresses the change
eliminating defenses available to the depositary bank, stating that "courts ... saw no reason
why a depositary bank should have the defense stated in [§ 3-419(3)] ....
The depositary
bank is ultimately liable in the case of a forged indorsement check because of its warranty
to the payor bank under [§] 4-208(a)(1).... The defense provided by § 3-420 (c) is limited
to collecting banks other than the depositary bank." Id. cmt. 3. This defense would not be
available to Citizens Bank as a depositary bank.
129. Id. § 3-405.
130. "Responsibility" is defined as "authority (i) to sign or indorse... on behalf of the
employer, (ii) to process instruments received by the employer for bookkeeping purposes,
for deposit ... or for other disposition . . . ." Id. § 3-405(a) (3). Additionally, § 3-405(b)
requires that the responsibility of the employee must be with respect to the instrument at
issue. See also WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 33 § 19-4, at 260.
131. U.C.C. § 3-405 cmt. 1; see alsoJohnson & Franzese-Damron, supra note 56, at 542.
Section 3-405(b) states in pertinent part:
a person who, in good faith . . . takes [an instrument] ... for collection, if an
employer entrusted an employee with responsibility with respect to the instrument, and the employee... makes a fraudulent indorsement of the instrument,
the indorsement is effective as the indorsement of the person to whom the instrument is payable it if is made in the name of that person. If the person... taking
[the instrument] or taking it for value or for collection fails to exercise ordinary
care... and that failure substantially contributes to loss resulting from the fraud,
the person bearing the loss may recover from the person failing to exercise ordinary care ....
U.C.C. § 3-405(b).
132. See supra note 131.
133. U.C.C. § 3-103(a) (7) (1995) (defining "ordinary care" as "observance of reasonable
commercial standards, prevailing in the area in which the person is located, with respect to
the business in which the person is engaged").
134. U.C.C. § 3-405(b). Official comment 2 to § 3-405 notes that a bank's negligence
was not a factor in the old § 3-405 as the bank had to prove only good faith. Id. cmt. 2.
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forgery, by carefully choosing employees, and to first catch the forgery
if it is committed."' 3 Thus, section 3-405 introduces the concept of
comparative negligence, splitting the loss on a percentage attributable
13 6
basis between the two wrongdoers.
In determining whether section 3-405 liability applies to an employer, there are two additional factors that could be considered by a
court. First, there may be an exception to liability for small businesses
where it would be impractical to spread out accounting responsibilities.13 7 Second, the depositary bank's permitting an otherwise authorized employee to deposit a corporate check into a personal account
may constitute prima facie evidence of a bank's failure to use ordinary
13 8
care.
In Citizens Bank, both of these factors would weigh against Citizens Bank being relieved of liability. First, MIFCO was a small, familyowned business with only seven employees.13 9 Pagani, the employee/
agent, had access to all accounting records and tools of MIFCO 1 ° and
fulfilled the necessary criteria to make her "responsible" under section 3-405(a)(3).41 Second, Pagani was able to misappropriate
checks by using deposit slips with her personal account number. 42
Admittedly, however, Pagani's superior did not review her work, especially bank reconciliations, until suspicions were aroused after the
owner incidentally reviewed the billing files. 43
Revised U.C.C. section 3-405 sets out scenarios to illustrate the
impact of the new language. The Citizen Bank case most closely resem135. Id.

136. Bailey, supra note 63, at 490. The comparative negligence provision has been criticized as a tort concept "that does not belong in a commercial law statute." Id.
In tort claims, Maryland does not recognize comparative liability. Harrison v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 442, 462-63, 456 A.2d 894, 904-05 (1983). This raises
the question of whether Maryland would substantially revise this portion of the U.C.C.
prior to adopting it. Other states that do not recognize the doctrine of comparative negligence have adopted § 3-405, including the comparative negligence, or "shared loss"
scheme. For example, although Illinois, Montana, and Pennsylvania do not recognize
comparative negligence, Carter v. Winter, 200 N.E.2d 528, 534 (Ill. App. Ct. 1964); Hughey
v. Fergus County, 37 P.2d 1035, 1038 (Mont. 1934); Karcesky v. Laria, 114 A.2d 150, 154
(Pa. 1955), all three states have adopted the revised U.C.C. § 3-405 without modifying the
shared loss scheme. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 810, para. 5/3-405 (Smith-Hurd 1993); MoNT.
CODE ANN. § 30-3-405'(1993); 13 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3405 (Supp. 1995).
137. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 33, § 19-3, at 243.
138. Fisher, supra note 31, at 410.
139. Citizens Bank, 338 Md. at 453, 659 A.2d at 315.
140. Id. at 454-55, 659 A.2d at 31516.
141. Id.; see also note 130 and accompanying text.
142. Citizens Bank, 338 Md. at 456, 659 A.2d at 316.
143. Id. at 455, 659 A.2d at 316.
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bles the scenario entitled "Case #4. 1 There, an employee's responsibilities include stamping the employer's blank unrestricted
indorsement on checks received by the employer. 4' 5 The employee
then deposits the checks in the employee's account.1 46 In this hypothetical, the result is that section 3-405 does not apply because there is
no forged indorsement.1 47 In the Citizens Bank case, if on remand
Pagani's indorsements were found to be unauthorized, Citizens Bank
could invoke a section 3-405 defense. This defense would characterize
Pagani as a "responsible" employee and would result in MIFCO having
to bear at least part of the loss.
c. Defining "Forgery."--There is no U.C.C. definition of "forHowever, the definition for purposes of Article 3 usage is a
well-settled U.C.C. principle. 4' 9 Maryland's Commercial Law Article
section 1-201(43) and the 1990 U.C.C. revisions define "unauthorized
signatures" as those "made without actual, implied or apparent authority and includes a forgery." 5 ° Official comment two to revised
section 3-406 characterizes unauthorized signatures as "broader in
gery."" 4

concept [than forged signatures] ... includ[ing] not only forgery but

also the signature of an agent which does not bind the principal
under the law of agency." 5 ' Thus, it may be argued that "forgery"
should be construed narrowly, as the scope of the definition of "unauthorized signatures" is clearly intended to be the broader of the two
categories. This clarification is sensible in light of the use courts have
made of the "unauthorized equals forgery" tool they have created.
The reasoning adopted by most courts for the inclusion of "unauthorized" indorsements under the category of "forged indorsements"
is found in the courts' consideration of the scope of the misappropriating agent's authority.1 52 In such cases, the agent usually has used or
144. U.C.C. § 3-405 cmt. 3 (1995).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
149. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw I § 1-201(43) (1992); U.C.C. § 1-201(43) (1995).
150. Id.
151. U.C.C. § 3-406 (1995). The dissent made this distinction noting "[w]hile every
forged signature necessarily is unauthorized... not every unauthorized signature is a forgery." Citizens Bank, 338 Md. at 467, 659 A.2d at 322 (Bell, J., dissenting).
152. Fort Dodge Creamery Co. v. Commercial State Bank, 417 N.W.2d 245, 246 (Iowa
Ct. App. 1987); Glenn L. Martin Co. v. Fidelity-Baltimore Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 218 Md.
28, 32, 145 A.2d 267, 270 (1958);Jones v. Van Norman, 522 A.2d 503, 506-507 (Pa. 1987).
But see Parton v. Robinson, 574 S.W.2d 679, 683 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978) (stating that an actual
forgery of another's name, not just an unauthorized signature, must exist for a conversion
action to stand).
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affixed the principal's indorsement and then misappropriated the
funds. Under a section 3-419 analysis, this reasoning makes sense.
Courts needed a way to provide compensation for employers to recover from those who, through their position of trust, misappropriated funds."1
Expanding "forgery" to include "unauthorized"
signatures that were not strictly forged allowed them to protect these
parties.
In a revised section 3-420 analysis, however, the court in Citizens
Bank would not have to determine the meaning of "forgery." The language of revised section 3-420 that would govern the conversion cause
4
of action refers to a person not entitled to enforce the instrument.1
The court would have to determine whether, under revised section 3420, Pagani was entitled to enforce the instrument. 1 55 If the 1990 revisions were operable in Maryland on remand, and if Pagani was determined to have acted outside the scope of her authority and thereby to
have converted the instruments, she would not be a holder,156 and
conversion liability under section 3-420 may fall on the shoulders of
the employer.
5. Conclusion.-The Citizens Bank court properly decided the
facts before it by adhering to established principles regarding the interpretation of section 3-419. While it stated its concern with the employer's recovery, its analysis was still typical of employee
misappropriation cases involving bank conversion liability. Application of the revised 1990 U.C.C. provision, not yet adopted in Maryland, would produce a different analysis by the court resulting in
more than one possible outcome. Under the current version of section 3-419, the court looked only to the bank's actions of accepting
and paying the instruments. On remand, the court will look at facts
going to the defenses of good faith and commercial reasonableness.
Under section 3-420 of the revised U.C.C., however, the court would
perform an extended analysis.
New section 3-405 would have an even greater impact on the
court's analysis than would the new section 3-420. If the employer was
found to have been negligent in its delegation to and supervision of
its employee, the bank would be insulated against liability. If, how153.
154.
155.
156.

See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 117-126 and accompanying text.
U.C.C. § 3-420(a) (1995).
WHrE & SUMMERS, supra note 33, § 17-3, at 153. A stolen order instrument will

have a forged indorsement and therefore the thief cannot become a holder because the
second criteria of holdership, "an instrument drawn, issued, or indorsed by him or to his
order," is not met. Id.
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ever, Citizens Bank was found to have failed to exercise ordinary care,
the damage sustained by MIFCO would be proportionately divided between it and Citizens Bank.
The revised U.C.C. sections discussed above would not be
adopted by Maryland in isolation, but as part of a larger statutory reform. Revised sections 3-405 and 3-420, used together, create more of
an incentive for businesses to engage in careful hiring practices and to
be diligent about their banking relations. These new sections also install another safeguard in the check-processing procedure without
placing a larger burden on the banks that would in turn inconvenience and burden customers. These revisions do not drastically
change existing law, but provide parties with the ability to place the
burden of monitoring banking relations on the party most interested
in those relations, the banking customer.
DRAGA

L.

DUBICK

1996]

MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS

II.

A.

549

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

Double Jeopardy and Drunk Driving: Imposing Civil and Criminal
Sanctionsfor the Same Offense

In State v. Jones,' the Court of Appeals considered whether the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment2 or Maryland common law barred the state from obtaining a criminal conviction for
driving while intoxicated against an individual whose driver's license
was previously suspended as a result of the same offense.3 The court
held that section 16-205.1 of the Maryland Transportation Article, the
provision authorizing suspension of a driver's license upon a driver's
failure to pass or refusal to take a blood or breath alcohol test, served
the legitimate remedial purpose of removing potentially dangerous
drivers from the Maryland highways. 4 Thus, the civil sanctions imposed by the statute did not constitute a punishment within the ambit
of the Double Jeopardy Clause.5 In so holding, the court affirmed the
general rule that the state may impose both criminal and civil sanctions based on the same offense and that civil sanctions will not be
viewed as punishment so long as they can be explained by remedial
purposes alone.
1. The Case.--On April 25, 1994, Ernest Jones, Jr. was arrested
for driving while intoxicated.6 A breathalizer test, administered with
Jones's consent shortly after the arrest, registered a blood alcohol content (BAC) of 0.27. 7 The results were well above Maryland's established legal limit of 0.10 for driving while intoxicated.8 On August 31,
1. 340 Md. 235, 666 A.2d 128 (1995), cert. denied, 116 S. CL 1265 (1996).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
3. Jones, 340 Md. at 240, 666 A.2d at 130.
4. Id. at 265, 666 A.2d at 142.
5. Id. at 243, 666 A.2d at 131.
6. Id. at 241, 666 A.2d at 130.
7. Id.
8. MD. CODE ANN., TRAsp. § 16-205.1 (Supp. 1995). Section 16-205.1 provides:
(a) (2) Any person who drives or attempts to drive a motor vehicle on a highway
or on any private property that is used by the public in general in this State is
deemed to have consented.., to take a test if the person should be detained on
suspicion of driving or attempting to drive while intoxicated, while under the
influence of alcohol ....
(b) No compulsion to take chemical test; consequences of refusal.-(1) Except

as provided in subsection (c) of this section, a person may not be compelled to
take a test. However, the detaining officer shall advise the person that, on receipt
of a sworn statement from the officer that the person was so charged and refused
to take a test, or was tested and the result indicated an alcohol concentration of
0.10 or more, the Administration shall:
(i) In the case of a person licensed under this title:
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1994, an administrative lawjudge suspended Jones's Maryland driver's
license for thirty days pursuant to section 16-205.1 of the Transportation Article. 9
On November 15, 1994, the district court found Jones guilty of
driving while intoxicated.' ° Jones appealed to the circuit court, arguing that to prosecute him for driving while intoxicated after his license already had been suspended for the same incident constituted
double jeopardy.1 1 Finding that the suspension ofJones's license was
"punishment," the circuit court dismissed the criminal action for driving while intoxicated because such action would have placed Jones in
jeopardy a second time, a violation of the Fifth Amendment.' 2 Subsequently, the Court of Appeals granted certiorari to consider whether
the administrative suspension of a driver's license constituted punishment within the ambit of the Double Jeopardy Clause or Maryland
common law, thereby precluding the state from bringing a subsequent prosecution for the crime of driving while intoxicated. 3
2. Legal Background.-The state's power to suspend a driver's license for refusing or failing a breath or blood alcohol test is granted
1. For a test result indicating an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or
more at the time of testing:
A. For the first offense, suspend the driver's license for 45 days; or
B. For a second or subsequent offense, suspend the driver's li-

cense for 90 days; or
2. For a test refusal:
A. For a first offense, suspend the driver's license for 120 days; or
B. For a second or subsequent offense, suspend the driver's license for 1 year;
(n) Modification of suspension.
(1) The Administration may modify a suspension under this section or issue
a restrictive license if:
(i) The licensee did not refuse to take a test;
(ii) The licensee has not had a license suspended under this section
during the past 5 years;
(iii) The licensee has not been convicted under § 21-902 of this article
during the past five years;
(iv) The licensee is required to drive a motor vehicle in the course of
employment;
(2) The license is required for the purpose of attending an alcoholic prevention or treatment program.
Id.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Jones, 340 Md. at 241, 666 A.2d at 131. For the text of § 16-205.1, see supra note 8.
Jones, 340 Md. at 241, 666 A.2d at 131.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 240,666 A.2d at 130.
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by section 16-205.1 of the Transportation Article.1 4 The court in Jones
held that section 16-205.1 did not implicate the Double Jeopardy
Clause because it did not impose punishment, but was instead a civil
sanction.1 5 Consequently, the suspension of a license had no effect
on the subsequent prosecution of the same driver for driving while
intoxicated. In response to several recent United States Supreme
Court decisions, 6 defense attorneys have begun to challenge this type
of holding, claiming that the suspension of a license constitutes a punishment, making a subsequent prosecution for driving while intoxicated a violation of the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause. 7
The vast majority of appellate courts that have reviewed this issue have
rejected the double jeopardy argument."' The Court of Appeals
granted review in Jones to determine this issue of first impression in
Maryland. 9
a. The DoubleJeapardy Clause.-The Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution provides, in relevant part, that no person shall "be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."2 °
In North Carolinav. Pearce,2 the Court held that the Double Jeopardy
Clause protects against three distinct abuses: a second prosecution
for the same offense after acquittal; a second prosecution for the same
offense after conviction; and multiple punishments for the same offense.22 The rationale underlying these protections is that the state
14. See supra note 8.
15. Jones, 340 Md. at 242, 666 A.2d at 131; see also In reJohn P., 311 Md. 700, 710, 537
A.2d 263, 268 (1988) (holding that double jeopardy was not implicated because loss of
custody or visitation rights was not a criminal prosecution); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v.
Brown, 308 Md. 219, 223, 517 A.2d 1111, 1112 (1986) (holding that lawyer's doublejeopardy claim was not applicable in a disciplinary proceeding that was not criminal); Attorney
Grievance Comm'n v. Anderson, 281 Md. 152, 155, 379 A.2d 159, 161 (1965) ("In order
for the double jeopardy provisions of the Fifth Amendment... to be applicable, it would
be necessary for this to be a criminal proceeding.").
16. See infra notes 25-50 and accompanying text.
17. Daniel T. Gilbert & John A. Stephen, Is Suspension of Drivers' Licenses in Jeopardy?,
PROSECUTOR, May/June 1995, at 24.
18. See, e.g., United States v. Bulloch, 994 F.2d 844 (8th Cir. 1993); State v. Zerkel, 900
P.2d 744 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995); State v. Nichols, 819 P.2d 995 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991);
Baldwin v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 422 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995); Freeman v. State, 611 So. 2d 1260 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (per curiam), review denied, 623 So.
2d 493 (Fla.), and cert.
denied sub norn. Lindeman v. Florida, 114 S.Ct. 415 (1993); State v.
Higa, 897 P.2d 928 (Haw. 1995); State v. Savard, 659 A.2d 1265 (Me. 1995); State v. Young,
530 N.W.2d 269 (Neb. App. 1995); State v. Kennedy, 904 P.2d 1044 (N.M. 1995); State v.
Strong, 605 A.2d 510 (Vt. 1992).
19. Jones, 340 Md. at 240, 666 A.2d at 130.
20. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
21. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
22. Id. at 717.
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should be prevented from making repeated attempts to convict or
punish someone for the same offense, thereby "subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity."23 The guarantee against
double jeopardy is considered so fundamental to the concept of justice that the Court, via the Fourteenth Amendment, made it binding
24
on the states.
b. DoubleJeopardy and Civil Proceedings.-When considering
double jeopardy and civil proceedings, the inquiry focuses on the protection against multiple punishments.2 5 In Helvering v. Mitchell 2 the
Court recognized that the Double Jeopardy Clause did not prohibit
Congress from imposing both a criminal and a civil sanction for the
same activity.2 7 Traditionally, the Court has accepted a legislative labeling of a statute as "civil" as conclusory with respect to its nonpunitive intent.28 Thus, a civil proceeding following or preceding a
criminal prosecution did not constitute punishment for double jeopardy purposes. 29
More recently, however, the Court has noted that the labels
"criminal" and "civil" should not, by themselves, be dispositive of
whether a particular sanction is remedial or punitive."0 Rather, "the
determination whether a given civil sanction constitutes punishment
...

requires a particularized assessment of the penalty imposed and

the purposes that the penalty may fairly be said to serve."3 ' If the
underlying purpose of a civil sanction cannot be explained as also
serving a remedial purpose, but instead can be explained only as retri23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957).
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794-96.(1969).
United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440 (1989).
303 U.S. 391 (1938).
Id. at 399.

28. See Breed v.Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 528 (1975) (stating thatjeopardy does not apply in
proceedings where only civil sanctions can be imposed because "the risk to which the
clause refers is not present in proceedings that are not essentially criminal").
29. Although the courts have chosen to disregard whether the civil proceeding occurs
before or after the criminal proceeding in analyzing the double jeopardy issue in license
suspension, there remains an important distinction: if a civil sanction imposed prior to the
initiation of criminal proceedings is determined to be punishment, the criminal prosecution must be abandoned. David S. Rudstein, Civil Penalties and Multiple Punishment Under
the DoubleJeopardy Clause: Some Unanswered Questions, 46 OKLA. L.REv. 587, 600-02 (1995).
However, if the civil sanction is imposed after a criminal prosecution, the civil sanction is
not automatically abandoned; the court can review the civil sanction and modify its severity
so that sanction remains consistent with the claimed remedial purpose. Haper, 490 U.S. at
448-49.
30. Halper, 490 U.S. at 447.
31. Id. at 448.

1996]

MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS

bution or deterrence,
the statute imposes punishment for double
32
jeopardy purposes.
In United States v. Halper, the government obtained a criminal
conviction against an individual for sixty-five violations of the criminal
False Claims Act."3 Subsequent to the conviction, the government
filed suit under the civil False. Claims Act, which authorized a $2000
penalty for each violation of the Act. 4 After finding that the actual
damages incurred by the government as a result of the false claims
were $585, the Court declared that the $130,000 fine sought bore no
rational relation to the government's claimed remedial purpose, compensation for damages and the costs of litigation." Thus, the statute
could not be fairly characterized as remedial, but could be explained
only as serving the goals of retribution or deterrence.3 6 Realizing that
this was the first time a civil statute had ever been held to impose
punishment, the Court emphasized that the rule announced was "one
for the rare case.., where a fixed-penalty provision subjects a[n] ...
offender to a sanction overwhelmingly disproportionate to the dam37
ages ... caused."
Subsequently, in Austin v. United States,38 the Court considered
whether a civil in rem forfeiture statute constituted punishment under
the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause. 3 9 In making its determination, the Court used the Halperdefinition of punishment to
determine whether sanctions imposed by the statute were punitive or
remedial.' The Court conducted a particularized assessment of the
forfeiture statute, focusing on the historical uses of forfeiture, the language of the statute, and evidence that Congress intended the statute
to be punitive.4 1 Ultimately, the Court concluded that the history, language, and intent of the statute indicated that the sanctions imposed
could be explained only as serving the punitive functions of retribu-

32. Id.

33. Id. at 437.
34. Id. at 438-40.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 448. The Court concluded that for the purposes of a double jeopardy analysis, any statute that was enacted primarily to serve the goals of retribution or deterrence
was punishment. Id.
37. Id. at 449.
38. 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
39. Id. at 2803.
40. Id. at 2806.
41. Id. at 2806-08.
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tion and deterrence.4 2 Thus, the civil statute constituted punishment
for the purposes of the Excessive Fines Clause.4"
In Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch,' the issue facing the
Court was whether a civil tax on illegal drugs, which taxed the drugs at
more than eight times their market value and was imposed after the
drugs were seized, constituted punishment for double jeopardy purposes.4 5 Acknowledging that a tax had never been held to violate the
Double Jeopardy Clause, the Court reiterated its holding in Halper
that legislative labels do not control the analysis.' Instead, the Court
applied the same particularized assessment analysis used in Austin,
and evaluated the drug tax in light of the traditional purposes of tax
statutes to determine whether the purposes served by the drug tax
were characteristic of a typical civil tax."
After comparing Montana's drug tax with other tax statutes, the
Court found that the drug tax was fundamentally different from taxes
that were imposed to raise revenue.4 s For example, the Montana drug
tax was conditioned on the commission of a crime, and the property
taxed was no longer in the possession of the person subject to the
tax." The Court concluded that the tax was "a concoction of anomalies, too far-removed in crucial respects from a standard tax assessment to escape the characterization as punishment for the purposes
5
of Double Jeopardy analysis."

0

3. The Court's Reasoning.--In State v. Jones, the Court of Appeals
questioned whether the suspension of Jones's driver's license under
section 16-205.1 could be "fairly" said to serve only a remedial purpose. 5 ' The court adopted a three-pronged test to evaluate the sanction imposed.5 2 First, the court conducted a historical analysis to
determine whether license suspension statutes generally have been
understood as remedial or punitive.5 3 Second, in light of this historical understanding, the court examined the language, structure, and
legislative intent of section 16-205.1 to determine whether it was con42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 2808.
Id. at 2803.
114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994).
Id. at 1941.
Id. at 1946.
Id. at 1947-48.
Id. at 1947.
Id.
Id. at 1948.
Jones, 340 Md. at 250, 666 A.2d at 135.

52. Id.
53. Id.
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sistent with similar statutes.5 4 Finally, anticipating that the statute
might serve both remedial and punitive purposes, the court prepared
to examine whether the statute could be justified by its remedial purpose alone. 55
a. The Historical Understanding of Similar Statutes.-The Jones
court found that license suspension statutes generally serve remedial
purposes.5 6 To support this conclusion the court noted the common
use of license suspensions to regulate public safety in a variety of professional arenas.5" Despite the "sting of punishment"58 people feel
when licenses are revoked or suspended, the court stated that the primary purpose of licensing is to protect the public from those people
whose conduct fails to meet minimum required standards.5 9
b. The Language, Structure, and Intent of Section 16-205.1.Jones argued that section 16-205.1 differed from similar license suspension statutes in that it was intended to have a punitive effect.6" He
based this argument on the fact that: (1) the suspension was conditioned upon the commission of a crime; (2) the statute provided no
basis for concluding that the accused driver is unsafe or that recidivism is likely; (3) the legislature intended the statute to have only a
punitive effect; and (4) that the maximum penalties are so high that
the section must be punitive.6 1 The court rejected each of these
arguments.
The court first noted that license suspension statutes, unlike tax
62
statutes, are commonly predicated on activities that are also illegal.
54. Id. at 254-62, 666 A.2d at 137-41.
55. Id. at 263-66, 666 A.2d at 142-43.
56. Id. at 251, 666 A.2d at 136 ("This conclusion is drawn from the purposes served by
licensing systems themselves, i.e., to protect the public from unscrupulous or unskilled
operators who would otherwise engage in licensed activity.").
57. Id. at 251-52, 666 A.2d at 136. Maryland requires licensing for a variety of professions. See, e.g., MD. CODe ANN., Bus. Occ. & PROF. §§ 2-301 (certified public accountancy),
3-302 (architecture), 4-301 (barbering), 5-301 (cosmetology), 6-301 (master electricians),
7-301 (forestry), 9-301 (landscape architecture), 10-206 (practice of law), 11-401 (pilotage), 12-301 (private detectives), 14-301 (engineering), 15-301 (land surveying), 16-301
(real estate appraising), 17-301 (real estate brokering).
58. Jones, 340 Md. at 250-51, 666 A.2d at 135.
59. Id. at 252, 666 A.2d at 136. The court noted further that in determining whether a
statute serves the purposes of punishment within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment,
the defendant's viewpoint on what constitutes punishment is immaterial. Id. at 250, 666
A.2d at 135; see also United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447 n.7 (1989) ("[F]or the
defendant even remedial sanctions carry the sting of punishment").
60. Jones, 340 Md. at 258, 666 A.2d at 139.
61. Id. at 254, 666 A.2d at 137.
62. Id. at 255, 666 A.2d at 137.
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Nevertheless, this alone did not make the statute punitive. 63 To the
contrary, the court concluded that license suspensions grounded on
criminal conduct were consistent with the remedial purpose of protecting the public from dangerous behavior.6
The court found Jones's second argument, that section 16-205.1
was punitive because it provided no basis for finding that he was an
unsafe driver, misplaced. "Nothing in the Double Jeopardy Clause requires that a statute operate with any specific degree of particularity."65 Thus, the question was not whetherJones was an unsafe driver,
but rather whether the statute could fairly be said to serve the remedial purpose of removing drunk drivers from the road.6 6 The court
stated that if the class of individuals who fail blood alcohol tests has a
higher probability of driving under the influence in the future, a statute that removed these potentially dangerous drivers from Maryland
highways clearly served the remedial purpose of protecting the public.6 7 Because Jones twice before had been arrested for DWI, the state
was reasonable in fearing that he would do it again.6"
Although it found no merit to Jones's argument that the General
Assembly intended section 16-205.1 to serve only punitive goals, the
court conducted an exhaustive analysis of the statute's history to support this conclusion.6 9 The court found that the legislative history of
the statute indicated that section 16-205.1 had a dual purpose: "the
punitive goal of deterring future offenders and the remedial goal of
removing suspected drunk drivers from the road."7"
Finally, the court dismissed Jones's contention that the sanctions
imposed by section 16-205.1 were so severe as to constitute punishment.7 1 Acknowledging that both Kurth Ranch7" and Halpe73 placed
great emphasis on the severity of the sanction in determining its character, the court was not persuaded that a forty-five day or one-year
suspension was "remarkably high."74 Balanced against the critical interest the state has in protecting its citizenry from dangerous drivers,
63. Id., 666 A.2d at 138; see infra note 97.
64. Jones, 340 Md. at 255, 666 A.2d at 138.
65. Id. at 256, 666 A.2d at 138.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 258-62, 666 A.2d at 139-41.
70. Id. at 262, 666 A.2d at 141.
71. Id.
72. See supra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
73. See supra notes 30-37 and accompanying text.
74. Jones, 340 Md. at 263, 666 A.2d at 141.
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the court believed that the temporary suspension of a driver's license
paled in comparison.7 5
c. Justifying Section 16-205.1 Solely by Its Remedial Purpose.-After concluding that section 16-205.1 was intended to serve both a punitive and a remedial purpose, the court focused on whether the
statute could be justified by its remedial purpose alone.7 6 The court
first rejected Jones's argument that the holding in Kurth Ranch required the court to find the sanction imposed by section 16-205.1 to
be punishment if any part of the sanction was intended to be punitive. 77 The court found that neither Kurth Ranch nor Austin dealt with
a statute serving a dual purpose, like section 16-205.1, and, therefore,
neither was controlling.7 8 The court instead looked to Halper to determine whether a dual purpose statute could be justified exclusively by
its remedial purpose.7 9
According to Halper,a dual purpose statute can be justified if the
sanction may fairly be said to be remedial."0 Recognizing that this test
was not exact science, the court balanced the forty-five day maximum
suspension imposed upon a driver who fails a blood or breath test
against the interest of the state in maintaining safe highways.8 "
Although this test involved an element of "rough justice," the court
concluded that there was a "reasonable connection" between the remedial purpose and the length of the license suspension. 2
4. Analysis.-In State v. Jones, the Court of Appeals determined
that the suspension of a driver's license authorized by a civil statute
did not constitute punishment as applied to a driver whose blood alcohol content exceeded the legal limit."' Consequently, the Fifth
Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause did not prevent the state from
pursuing a subsequent criminal conviction for driving while intoxicated.8 4 The court's decision represents a carefully reasoned applica75. Id.
76. Id., 666 A.2d at 142.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 264, 666 A.2d at 142.
79. Id. at 265, 666 A.2d at 142.
80. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989).
81. Jones, 340 Md. at 265, 666 A.2d at 142.

82. Id.
83. Id. at 240, 666 A.2d at 130.
84. Id. The court found it unnecessary to decide whether Maryland's common law
contained a double-punishment analysis similar to that used in Haper, Austin, and Kurth

Ranch because as between common-law double jeopardy protection and a state statute, the
statute would overrule the common law even if it were punishment. Id. at 266, 666 A.2d at
143.
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tion of the controlling legal principles governing the character of civil
sanctions and the Double Jeopardy Clause.
The court began its analysis by noting that the controlling federal
precedent did not provide a "tidy formulaic approach" to resolve the
problem.8 5 Halper,Austin, and Kurth Ranch reviewed civil statutes that
imposed sanctions of such disparity that the reasoning used to determine the nature of one could not be used to determine the outcome
of the others.8 6 However, in accordance with Halper,the court rightly
recognized its obligation to conduct a particularized assessment of the
penalty imposed and the purposes that the penalty may fairly be said
to serve. 7 In response, the court formulated a three-pronged approach that effectively executed the particularized assessment of section 16-205.1.88 First, the court evaluated the general nature of the
sanctions imposed by similar statutes.8 9 Next, the court examined the
language, structure, and intent of section 16-205.1 itself to determine
whether its purpose was consistent with similar statutes.90 And finally,
because the statute was found to serve multiple purposes, the court
considered whether the remedial purposes alone could justify the
statute. 9 1
Both Austin and Kurth Ranch stressed the importance of the historical understanding of similar provisions in determining whether a
certain civil sanction constituted punishment. 92 Taken together, Austin and Kurth Ranch demonstrate that section 16-205.1 should "be presumed to serve the purposes generally served by license
suspensions." 9 3 A review of license suspension statutes strongly supports the court's conclusion that they generally serve remedial purposes.94 Licensing is a common method of regulating a variety of
85. Id. at 249, 666 A.2d at 134.
86. See, e.g., State of New Mexico v. Kennedy, 904 P.2d 1044, 1055 (N.M. 1995) ("Just as
the 'compensation for loss' test is an inappropriate standard to apply for judging the punitive nature of a tax, it likewise is inappropriate for determining whether a nonmonetary
civil penalty such as administrative license revocation is punishment for double jeopardy
purposes.").
87. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989); see supranotes 30-37 and accompanying text.
88. Jones, 340 Md. at 250, 666 A.2d at 135.
89. Id.

90. Id.; see supra note 57.
91. Jones, 340 Md. at 250, 666 A.2d at 135.
92. Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1947 (1994); Austin v.
United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2810 (1993); see supra notes 44-50, 38-43 and accompanying
text.
93. Jones, 340 Md. at 251, 666 A.2d at 135.
94. See supra note 57.
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activities, programs, and occupations. 95 The underlying rationale is
that the public would be exposed to an intolerable risk of harm if
participants were permitted to perform below an acceptable standard. 96 The revocation or suspension of a license for violating the
terms upon which the license was granted protects the public from
those who are unfit to participate in a regulated activity.9 7 Even
though the person subject to a suspension or revocation may feel pun98
ished, the true purpose of these statutes is not punitive.
The second step of the court's analysis involved an examination
of the language, structure, and legislative intent of section 16-205.1.99
After scrutinizing these characteristics of the provision, the court accurately recognized that section 16-205.1 was consistent with the general nature of license suspension statutes.1 00 Despite ascertaining the
existence of both a punitive and a remedial purpose, the court found
that in both form and application, section 16-205.1 served the typical
goal of license suspension statutes: remedying the public safety
problems posed by persons engaged in hazardous activity. 10 1
Although it rejected Jones's arguments that section 16-205.1 was
different from the general nature of licensing statutes,1 °2 the court's
95. Jones, 340 Md. at 251, 666 A.2d at 136. The court noted the numerous and diverse

professions requiring licensing before practicing in Maryland. Id. at 251-52, 666 A.2d at
136; see supra note 57.
96. See State v. Zerkel, 900 P.2d 744, 753 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995) ("The rationale for this
system of regulation is that the public is exposed to an unacceptable risk of harm if the
activity or occupation is performed incompetently, recklessly, dishonestly, or with intent to
injure.").
97. Id.; see also United States v. Hudson, 14 F.3d 536, 541-42 (10th Cir. 1994) (stating
that disbarment of banking officials from further banking activities for mismanagement
and illegal operation of several banks was "a means of protecting the integrity of the banking system and the interests of the depositors"); United States v. Furlett, 974 F.2d 839, 844
(7th Cir. 1992) (holding that trading bar on commodities broker accused of fraudulent
commodities trading served to ensure integrity of the markets and thus was "remedial
rather than punitive"); Loui v. Board of Medical Examiners, 889 P.2d 705, 711 (Haw. 1995)
(holding that suspension of a doctor's medical license for one year after criminal conviction for attempted sexual abuse and kidnapping was "designed to protect public from unfit
physicians" and served "legitimate non-punitive governmental objectives").
98. See, e.g., State v. Savard, 659 A.2d 1265, 1268 (Me. 1995) ("Although we acknowledge that any suspension may have a deterrent effect on the law-abiding public, our analysis does not focus on that perspective. In the eyes of the defendant, even remedial
sanctions carry a 'sting of punishment.'"); State v. Strong, 605 A.2d 510, 513 (Vt. 1992)
("Although there is an element of deterrence to the summary suspension of an operator's
license, this element is present in any loss of a license or privilege and is not the primary
focus of this statutory scheme.").
99. Jones, 340 Md, at 254-62, 666 A.2d at 137-41.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 256-57, 262, 666 A.2d at 138-39, 141.
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recognition that section 16-205.1 served both a remedial and a deterrent purpose required an examination of the statute to determine
whether it could be justified by its remedial purpose alone.10 3 Jones
argued that the holding in Kurth Ranch required the court to view the
statute as punishment if any part of its purpose was punitive.10 4 The
court correctly noted that this was an incorrect interpretation of Kurth
Ranch.'0 Because the Supreme Court in Kurth Ranch found that the
drug tax involved in that case served only punitive purposes, that
Court did not even consider whether a dual purpose statute could be
justified by its remedial purpose alone. 10 6 However, the Court noted
that the mere existence of a deterrent purpose would not automatically render a sanction punishment. 10 7 Thus, the Court of Appeals
properly looked to Halperfor a framework for balancing the dual purposes of a statute to determine whether the sanctions constituted
punishment.10 8
The court examined the maximum forty-five day suspension penalty imposed for failing a blood alcohol test to determine whether it
bore a "rational relation" to the remedial purpose of protecting the
Maryland highways." 9 The court determined that there was a reasonable connection between the sanction imposed and the remedial purpose to be served; 110 this is the logical conclusion considering the
larger scope of the drunk driving problem. The temporary suspension of a license to drive may impose severe hardship on a driver,1 1
but the state's obligation to protect the highways from those who imperil the lives of other drivers justifies such a sanction. Whereas the
sanctions imposed in Halper,Austin, and Kurth Ranch were not even
remotely related to the remedial purposes claimed by the government, the suspension of the license of a drunk driver is directly related to protecting the public from people who drive drunk.
The existence of any sanction that threatens a person's ability to
function efficiently within society always will have an incidental deter103. Id. at 263, 666 A.2d at 142.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 263-64, 666 A.2d at 142-43.
106. Id. at 264, 666 A_2d at 142.
107. Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1946 (1994).
108. Jones, 340 Md. at 265, 666 A.2d at 142.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Section 16-205.1 grants some discretion to the administrative lawjudge (ALJ) when
imposing penalties under the statute. In exercising his discretion, the ALJ must weigh "the
adverse effect upon the petitioner's need to drive for employment or alcoholic prevention
purposes versus the State's need to maintain safety on the public highways." MD. CODE
ANN., TRANsP. § 16-205.1(n) (Supp. 1995).
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rent effect. However, where the primary purpose of the statute is to
exact a nonpunitive remedy, the corresponding deterrent effect
should not qualify the statute as punishment. 2 Thus, despite the
existence of an obvious deterrent purpose of keeping people from
drinking and driving, the court correctly concluded that section 16205.1 does not constitute punishment for the purposes of the Double
Jeopardy Clause.
5. Conclusion.-Jones is significant in that it developed a coherent framework to review the sanctions imposed by a civil statute to
determine whether they constitute punishment for the purposes of
applying the Double Jeopardy Clause. In determining that the suspension of a driver's license for failing a blood alcohol test did not
constitute punishment for double jeopardy purposes, the court properly recognized that the primary purpose of section 16-205.1 of the
Transportation Article was remedial: to protect the public from dangerous drivers. The result is consistent with controlling federal precedent and state public policy.
EDWARD

B.

J. KELLEY

Warrantless Searches: Extending the Exigent Circumstances Exception
to Evidence of Burglary
In Carrollv. State,' the Court of Appeals for the first time consid-

ered whether a sheriffs officer who was seeking an escaped convict
was justified, based upon evidence of a probable burglary, in making a
warrantless entry and search of an apartment at a residence the convict was known to have recently visited.2 The court held that the entrance was lawful under the exigent circumstances exception to the
warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment' because the officer
had probable cause to believe that a burglary was either in progress or
had recently been committed, and that the exigencies of the situation
permitted the officer to enter to conduct a warrantless search for the
112. See supra note 97.
1. 335 Md. 723, 646 A.2d 376 (1994).
2. Id. at 725-26, 646 A.2d at 378.
3. The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. CoNs-r. amend. W1.
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intruder and to protect the resident's property.4 In reaching its decision, the court was favorably influenced by the overwhelming weight
of persuasive authority that unanimously holds that evidence of a burglary at a residence justifies law enforcement officers in making a warrantless search. 5
The court's holding was prudently made under the facts of the
case, and is consistent with the reasoning of previous Maryland exigent circumstances decisions. Carrollgrants law enforcement officers
greater latitude to act when they perceive an emergency; this freedom
should save lives and aid in apprehending criminals. Nonetheless,
Carroll recognizes the potential for abuse of citizens' constitutional
rights that accompanies any expansion of police power. Therefore,
the court warned law enforcement officers not to take advantage of
the confidence and esteem that its holding obviously expresses in
them. Both the judicial system and law enforcement community must
remain vigilant to the possibility of abuse if they are to merit the public's faith at a time when distrust of law enforcement officers' methods
and motives is increasingly commonplace.
1. The Case.--OnJuly 24, 1992, Deputy First Class Mark Gonder
and two other officers of the Carroll County Sheriff's Department attempted to find and arrest Joe Hudson, an escapee from a work release program at a detention center.6 The officers went to an
apartment house in Eldersburg, Maryland, on the belief that Hudson
might be hiding there.' They learned from a resident, Terry Lynn
Penn, that Hudson had been there the previous evening at approximately 11:00 p.m., but since had left the premises.' Penn, who lived
in an upstairs apartment, then gave the officers permission to search
the entire residence, 9 which contained one other apartment
downstairs.10
Gonder noticed that the screen door to the rear apartment door
was open, that a pane of glass was missing from the door's window,
and that the door was open approximately two inches; this led him to
believe that someone had forcibly entered the apartment."1 He re4. Carroll, 335 Md. at 734, 646 A.2d at 382.
5. Id. at 731-34, 646 A.2d at 380-82; see infra notes 57, 60-62 and accompanying text.
6. Carrol 335 Md. at 727, 646 A.2d at 378; State v. Carroll, 97 Md. App. 234, 236, 629
A.2d 1247, 1248 (1993), affd, 335 Md. 723, 646 A.2d 376 (1994).
7. Carrol 335 Md. at 727, 646 A.2d at 378.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Carroll 97 Md. App. at 236-37, 629 A.2d at 1249.
11. Carroll 335 Md. at 727, 646 A.2d at 378.
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turned to Penn's apartment and asked her if the basement apartment
was secured. She responded that it was and that its occupant, Mike
12
Carroll, was away and would not be home for another day or two.
Gonder then went to the downstairs apartment, identified himself,
and entered the apartment while continuing to announce his presence.1 3 No one responded to Gonder, and he determined that the
apartment was unoccupied.1 4 Gonder did, however, observe several
marijuana plants growing in an area of the apartment. He did not
disturb this evidence, but left the apartment secured by another officer while he went to obtain a search and seizure warrant.' 5 The Circuit Court for Carroll County issued the warrant to the deputy sheriffs,
and they executed it that afternoon.' 6 The officers seized controlled
dangerous substances, paraphernalia, and firearms from Carroll's
apartment.

17

On August 27, 1992, Carroll was indicted in the Circuit Court for
Carroll County on charges of manufacturing a controlled dangerous
substance, possessing a controlled dangerous substance with intent to
distribute, maintaining a common nuisance, and possessing a controlled dangerous substance and drug paraphernalia in violation of
Maryland statutory law.' 8 Carroll filed a timely motion to suppress the
evidence seized by the Carroll County sheriff's deputies.' 9 At the suppression hearing, the sole facts considered were those set forth by
Gonder in the affidavit in support of the search and seizure warrant
executed at Carroll's residence. 20 Based upon these facts, the circuit
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id., 646 A.2d at 378-79.
15. Id.
16. Id., 646 A.2d at 379.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 726, 646 A.2d at 378. Carroll was charged in violation of MD. ANN. CoDE art
27, §§ 286, 287, and 287A (1992).
19. GarroI 335 Md. at 726, 646 A.2d at 378.
20. Id. In an attempt to create a conflict between the observations of the deputy sheriffs, Carroll presented the Court of Appeals with a supplemental report prepared by one of
the deputies who was present during the initial warrantless entry of his residence. Id. at
726 n.1, 646 A.2d at 378 n.1. The court refused to consider this supplemental report. Id.
at 727 n.1, 646 A-2d at 378 n.1. The court observed that although review of the decision to
issue a search warrant is normally confined to the four corners of the affidavit and the
warrant, the court here properly could have received evidence beyond the facts set out in
the affidavit because the claim was that the entry before the issuance of the search warrant
violated Carroll's Fourth Amendment rights. Id. at 726 n.1, 646 A.2d at 378 n.1. However,
at the motions hearing the parties in this case chose to rely solely on the affidavit and the
warrant. Id. Because the record at the suppression hearing is the exclusive source of facts
upon review, the Court of Appeals would not take this supplemental report into consideration. Id. (citing Lee v. State, 311 Md. 642, 648, 537 A.2d 235, 237 (1988)).
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court granted Carroll's motion to suppress.2 1 The State appealed,
and the Maryland Court of Special Appeals reversed the circuit court's
order and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Court of
Special Appeals held that the deputies' entry into Carroll's residence
was reasonable under the facts of the case.2 Carroll appealed, and
the Court of Appeals granted certiorari "to consider whether, under
the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement of
the Fourth Amendment, the Carroll County deputy sheriffs' belief
that a burglary recently had been committed in Carroll's home justified their warrantless entry into his home."23
2. Legal Background.-The Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures and
provides that no warrants shall be issued without probable cause.24
Justice Brennan, writing for the Supreme Court, observed in Welsh v.
Wisconsin 5 that "[i] t is axiomatic that the 'physical entry of the home
is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment
is directed.' 26 Therefore, a warrant issued by ajudicial officer is generally required before a search of a residence or seizure of property
located therein may be conducted by law enforcement officers. This
requirement is fundamental to the Fourth Amendment's protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures. 27 Nevertheless, this requirement is sometimes resented and ignored by police. Responding

21. Id. at 728, 646 A.2d at 379.
22. State v. Carroll, 97 Md. App. 234, 242, 629 A.2d 1247, 1251 (1993), aff],335 Md.
723, 646 A.2d 376 (1994).
23. Carro/ll 335 Md. at 725-26, 646 A.2d at 378.
24. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see supra note 3.
25. 466 U.S. 740 (1984).
26. Id. at 748 (quoting United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313
(1972)).
27. See, e.g., Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133 (1990) (observing that the general
rule is that warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable); Welsh, 466 U.S. at 748
(noting that a principal protection against unnecessary intrusions into private dwellings is
the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment imposed on government agents who
seek to enter the home to search or arrest); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980)
(stating that a basic principle of Fourth Amendment law is that searches and seizures inside a home made without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable); Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474-75 (1971) (observing that "a search or seizure carried out on
a suspect's premises without a warrant is per se unreasonable, unless the police can show
that it falls within one of a carefully defined set of exceptions based on the presence of
'exigent circumstances'");Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948) (noting that
the Fourth Amendment's protection requires that inferences drawn from evidence be
made by a neutral and detached magistrate); see also infra text accompanying note 29.
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to this disturbing trend, Justice Jackson emphasized in Johnson v.
United States28 that
[t]he point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not
grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable
men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring
that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached
magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in
the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime ....
When the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right
not
of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer,
29
by a policeman or government enforcement agent.
Accordingly, when law enforcement officers fail to secure a search
warrant when required, the judicially created exclusionary rule operthe use of evidence seized in violation of the Fourth
ates to suppress
30
Amendment.
The exclusionary rule was held enforceable against the states in
Mapp v. Ohio,3 ' thus requiring the states to provide protection against

unreasonable searches and seizures. 3 2 Therefore, the Court of Appeals follows the United States Supreme Court's general requirement
that a judicial officer issue a warrant before a police officer may execute a search or seizure,3 3 while it continues to evaluate constitutional
issues on a case-by-case basis.34
Implied in the warrant requirement, however, are legally recognized exceptions where a search warrant is not required.3 5 The un28. 333 U.S. at 10.
29. Id. at 13-14.

30. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (holding that exclusionary rule is
an essential part of both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and mandating that
states apply it to suppress evidence seized in violation of Fourth Amendment); Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383, 391-92 (1914) (holding that evidence seized by federal officials
in violation of Fourth Amendment may not be admitted in federal courts).
31. 367 U.S. at 643.
32. Id. at 655.
33. See, e.g., McMillian v. State, 325 Md. 272, 281, 600 A.2d 430, 434 (1992) (observing
that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable, subject only to a few specific exceptions); Davis v. State, 236 Md. 389, 395, 204 A.2d 76, 80 (1964) (noting Maryland's recognition of the general rule that a search of private premises should be pursuant to a legally
issued warrant), cert. denied 380 U.S. 966 (1965).
34. Riddick v. State, 319 Md. 180, 571 A.2d 1239 (1990). The court noted that "[w]hen
the question is whether a constitutional right, such as the one here, has been violated, we
make our own independent constitutional appraisal. We make the appraisal by reviewing
the law and applying it to the peculiar facts of that particular case." Id. at 183, 571 A.2d at
1240 (citation omitted).
35. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14-15 (1948). The Court observed that
"[t] here are exceptional circumstances in which, on balancing the need for effective law
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derlying rationale for these exceptions is that the Fourth Amendment
prohibits only those searches that are unreasonable.3 6 Thus, a search
warrant may be dispensed with in situations where a suspect consents
to a search, 37 a search is made incident to a lawful arrest, 8 contraband or evidence of a crime found in "plain view" is seized, 39 a search
is made of an automobile when law enforcement officers have probable cause to believe it contains evidence of criminal activity,4 0 or
where exigent circumstances dictate that a search and seizure be executed immediately without the delay attendant to obtaining a
41
warrant.
The Supreme Court has explored and defined the scope and nature of exigent circumstances in numerous cases. The Court upheld
the constitutionality of a warrantless search and seizure where the potential for destruction of evidence existed,4 and extended that rationale further to justify the imposition of an involuntary blood test on a
person suspected of driving under the influence of alcohol where delay would destroy evanescent evidence.43 Similarly, the Court excused
the need for a search warrant where officers in "hot pursuit" of a narcotics suspect followed her into her home,' and where officers in
"hot pursuit" of an armed bank robber, who posed a danger to human
life, entered a third person's residence into which the robber had just
fled.4 5
In Michigan v. Tyler,46 the Court distinguished between permissible and impermissible warrantless searches of a burning building by
enforcement against the right of privacy, it may be contended that a magistrate's warrant
for search may be dispensed with." Id.
36. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see supra note 3; Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991).
ChiefJustice Rehnquist, writing for the Court inJimeno, observed that "[t]he touchstone of
the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness. The Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all
state-initiated searches and seizures; it merely proscribes those which are unreasonable."
Id. at 250 (citations omitted).
37. Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 249; Doering v. State, 313 Md. 384, 401-02, 545 A.2d 1281, 128990 (1988).
38. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 334 (1990); Davis v. State, 236 Md. 389, 397, 204
A.2d 76, 81 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 966 (1965).
39. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326 (1987); Lebedun v. State, 283 Md. 257, 278, 390
A.2d 64, 73 (1978).
40. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 48 (1970); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132, 153-56 (1925).
41. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978); Lebedun, 283 Md. at 277, 390 A.2d at
73; Davis, 236 Md. at 395, 204 A.2d at 80.
42. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 37-41 (1963).

43. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966).
44. United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42-43 (1976).

45. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-300 (1967).
46. 436 U.S. 499 (1978).
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firefighters. Justice Stewart, writing for the Court, noted that a burning building constitutes exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless
entry, and that firefighters may seize evidence of arson found in plain
view during the course of fighting the fire.47 The Court held that fire
officials may remain in a building for a reasonable time after a fire has
been extinguished to investigate the cause of the blaze.' It found
warrantless entries made by fire officials in the light of morning following a late night fire reasonable, whereas warrantless entries made
days later were found unreasonable, and therefore unconstitutional.4 9
The Court of Appeals similarly has explored the limits of the exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. The court found that exigent circumstances justified a
warrantless entry where police, after finding an apparent homicide
victim in the defendant's backyard, entered his home in order to determine whether he had also been victimized.5" Likewise, the court
found warrantless entry of an apartment justified where police had
reason to believe that armed robbers were inside and that delay might
permit them to escape.5 1 Furthermore, the court has held that an
emergency situation justified the warrantless entry of a motel room by
a police officer in order to protect a rescue squad member treating a
drug overdose victim; the court determined that it was reasonable to
expect that illicit drug use and criminal activity had been occurring in
the room, that the rescue squad member could be in danger from the
occupants of the room, and that the delay inherent in obtaining a2
5
warrant could allow the destruction of contraband drug evidence.
Most recently, the court was satisfied that exigent circumstances existed when police entered a home they had reason to believe sheltered an injured person or suspect, based upon a report of a missing
47. Id. at 509.
48. Id. at 510.
49. Id. at 511. But see id. at 516-17 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that warrantless
entries made even days later were reasonable under the circumstances where the interior
of premises suffered substantial damage, could not be used, and its owner had made no
attempt to secure it).
50. Davis v. State, 236 Md. 389, 395-96, 204 A.2d 76, 80-81 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S.
966 (1965).
51. Nilson v. State, 272 Md. 179, 191, 321 A.2d 301, 307 (1974). The court in Nilson
observed that six factors were useful in determining the existence of exigent circum-

stances: (1) that a grave offense is involved, especially one involving violence; (2) that the
suspect is reasonably believed to be armed; (3) that there is a clear showing of probable
cause to believe that the suspect committed the crime involved; (4) that there exists strong
reason to believe the suspect is on the premises being entered; (5) the possibility that the
suspect might escape if not quickly apprehended; and (6) that the entry is made peaceably.
Id. at 188-89, 321 A.2d at 306.
52. Lebedun v. State, 283 Md. 257, 277, 390 A.2d 64, 73 (1978).
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person, an open front door, and blood on the floor near the entrance
3
to the house.

5

In contrast to these cases, the Court of Appeals refused to find
sufficient exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless search where
police seized a gun barrel found in the defendant's attic after he had
been arrested while hiding there. The mere suspicion that the defendant's sister, who was present in the house, might destroy this evidence before it could be seized pursuant to a warrant did, not justify
the search according to the court.5 4 Similarly, the court held that the
risk of destruction or removal of illegal drug evidence from a private
social club was insufficient to justify a warrantless entry where police
had earlier decided that the risk was not great enough to maintain a
constant surveillance of the club.55
The issue of whether law enforcement officers may enter a home
without a warrant to investigate a probable burglary was one of first
impression in Maryland, and has yet to be considered by the Supreme
Court.5 6 However, numerous state and federal courts have weighed

this issue and unanimously held that warrantless entries are justified
under the exigent circumstances exception when police have probable cause to believe that a burglary is either in progress or recently
57
has been committed.
53. Oken v. State, 327 Md. 628, 646, 612 A.2d 258, 266-67 (1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
1312 (1993).
54. Stackhouse v. State, 298 Md. 203, 219-20, 468 A.2d 333, 342 (1983). But see id. at
222, 468 A.2d at 343 (Smith,J., dissenting) (arguing that exigent circumstances did exist in
case where defendant's sister lied twice to police officers to prevent his arrest thereby making it reasonable to believe she would destroy evidence located on the premises that pertained to the crime he was accused of committing).
55. McMillian v. State, 325 Md. 272, 283-84, 600 A.2d 430, 435-36 (1992).
56. Carroll, 335 Md. at 731, 646 A.2d at 380.
57. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 9 F.3d 506, 509-10 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding that
exigent circumstances justifying warrantless entry into residence existed where police officers responded to report of burglary in progress, observed broken window and two individuals inside residence, person inside was unable to produce identification, and upon
entry, officers limited search to places where persons could be hiding), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 2690 (1994); Reardon v. Wroan, 811 F.2d 1025, 1029-30 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that
sufficient exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless entry of fraternity house
where officers received call reporting burglary in progress at the house during time of year
when students were on break and burglaries frequently occurred, and upon arrival a single
car was in the driveway and the door to the house was unlocked); United States v. VallesValencia, 811 F.2d 1232, 1235-36 (9th Cir.) (holding that officers had probable cause to
conduct warrantless entry to investigate probable ongoing burglary based on report by
neighbor of suspicious activities at a house whose owner the neighbor understood to be on
vacation, where officers found two trucks and a trailer in front of the house, saw two men
enter the house, and observed that screen on the lower floor appeared to be pried away
from the window and sliding glass door on the upper floor partially open), amended on other
grounds, 823 F.2d 381 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Singer, 687 F.2d 1135, 1144 (8th Cir.
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3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Carroll v. State,Judge Raker, writing
for the five-to-two majority, observed that the Fourth Amendment prohibits only unreasonable searches and recognized that a warrantless
search does not violate the Fourth Amendment when law enforcement officers encounter such exigent circumstances that there is a
"'compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant.' ' 5 8 The court reviewed its own exigent circumstances precedent

and that of the Supreme Court, and noted that neither court had yet
considered whether evidence of a probable burglary constituted exigent circumstances. 59 The court therefore referred to persuasive authority, and noted that "all" of the numerous state and federal
jurisdictions that had considered this issue had held that when police
reasonably believe that a burglary is either in progress or recently has
been committed, a warrantless entry is justified on the basis of exigent circumstances.' After examining the facts and reasoning of two
of such cases, 6 ' and Professor LaFave's treatise on search and
seizure, 62 the court adopted this extension of the exigent circum1982) (holding that even if defendants had legitimate expectation of privacy in residence,
exigent circumstances justified warrantless entry by police officer where neighbor told officer there were strangers in vacant residence, individual who could not explain his presence walked out of rear of residence, and pick-up truck was backed up to propped-open
rear door of the residence, and officer believed a burglary was in progress), adopted in
relevantpart on reh'g, 710 F.2d 431 (8th Cir. 1983); People v. Duncan, 720 P.2d 2, 5-6 (Cal.
1986) (holding that officer's warrantless entry of residence to investigate probable burglary
was reasonable when officer reasonably believed burglars were still inside residence by
presence of television and other property beneath an open window); Commonwealth v.
Fiore, 403 N.E.2d 953, 954-56 (Mass. App. CL) (holding that affidavit was sufficient to
support issuance of search warrant where affidavit recited that investigating officer received information concerning breaking and entering in dwelling house, that the investigating officers and other officers went to the house and found that a breaking had been
committed there, and that officer noticed quantity of hashish after entering the premises
to ascertain who owned the cottage), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 938 (1980); State ex reL Zander v.
District Court, 591 P.2d 656, 659 (Mont. 1979) (holding that warrantless entry and search
of defendant's house was justified where person had been observed under circumstances
indicating attempt at forced entry into house, when deputy found front door unlocked
after having been informed that no one was home and that door was always locked when
defendant was away). But see State v. Muir, 835 P.2d 1049, 1053 (Wash. App. 1992) (holding that in the context of exigent circumstances officers were not justified in making a
warrantless search to seek evidence of a burglary where there was no indication a suspect
was about to flee or evidence was about to be destroyed).
58. 335 Md. at 729, 646 A.2d at 380 (quoting Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509
(1978)).
59. Id. at 731, 646 A.2d at 380.
60. Id.; see supra note 57 and accompanying text. But see Muir, 835 P.2d at 1053, discussed supra note 57.
61. Fiore, 403 N.E.2d at 954-56, discussed supra note 57; Zander, 591 P.2d at 659, discussed supra note 57.
62. Professor LaFave notes:
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stances exception into Maryland law.6" The court held that "when law
enforcement officers have probable cause to believe that a burglary is
either in progress or has recently been committed, the exigencies of
the situation permit the officers to enter the premises without a war"64
rant to search for intruders and to protect an occupant's property.
The court warned, however, that law enforcement officers may not
create evidence of a burglary as a pretext to make a warrantless
search, and that such searches may not deviate from their original
purposes.6 5
The Canroll court then analyzed the facts of the case and held that
in their totality, they formed the basis of a finding of requisite probable cause and exigency to justify the officer's initial warrantless entry.6 6 The court reached this conclusion by rejecting Carroll's
argument that probable cause did not exist for the officers to believe
that a burglary had occurred or was in progress.6 7 Rather, the court
accepted the State's argument that the apparent break-in at the apartment gave the officers reasonable grounds to believe that either a
common-law burglary or a statutory housebreaking had occurred or
was in progress. 6 The court reasoned that this belief, combined with
the knowledge that an escaped convict recently had been at the resiPolice may also enter private property for the purpose of protecting the property
of the owner or occupant or some other person. One possibility is where the
police reasonably believe that the premises have recently been or are being burglarized. Thus, police entry is justified on the basis of a breaking and entering
call to police plus the discovery of an open door which bore evidence of being
pried open, of activation of a burglar alarm at those premises, of the observation
of lights on within and strange cars parked about a house whose occupants a
neighbor says are on vacation, and of a neighbor's report that strangers were seen
coming from a cabin in an area where many cabins had recently been broken
into.
2

WAYNE

R.

LAFAVE,

SEARCH AND

SEIZURE:

A

TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

§ 6.6(b), at 706-07 (2d ed. 1987) (footnotes omitted).
63. Carrol 335 Md. at 732-34, 646 A.2d at 381-82.
64. Id. at 734, 646 A.2d at 382. The court noted that in light of this holding, there was
no need to address the State's argument that the officers were acting pursuant to the "community caretaking function" exception to the warrant requirement, or that the contraband
in Carroll's apartment would have been discovered under the inevitable discovery doctrine. Id. at 740 n.5, 646 A.2d at 385 n.5.
65. Id. at 734-35, 646 A.2d at 382.
66. Id. at 739, 646 A.2d at 384.
67. Id. at 736-37, 646 A.2d at 383. The court affirmed its previous definition of probable cause as a "'non-technical conception of a reasonable ground for belief of guilt, requiring less evidence for such belief than would justify conviction but more evidence than
that which would arouse a mere suspicion.'" Id. at 735, 646 A.2d at 382-83 (quoting Doering v. State, 313 Md. 384, 403, 545 A.2d 1281, 1290 (1988)). For a more detailed discussion of probable cause, see infra note 102 and accompanying text.
68. Carro, 335 Md. at 737, 646 A.2d at 383.
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dence and that the apartment should have been secured, amounted
to "a compelling urgency to make a prompt inspection of the apartment," and justified the warrantless entry.6 9
Having approved of the initial entry and search of Carroll's apartment as reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the court next determined that the search was properly confined within the scope of
looking for an intruder. 70 Therefore, the officer's observation of the
growing marijuana was "proper grounds for a search warrant under
the plain view doctrine." 71 Accordingly, the court held that the search
warrant subsequently issued to the officers was valid, and the evidence
seized pursuant to the warrant was admissible at trial.72
Judge Bell, joined by Judge Eldridge, dissented from the court's
opinion, 73 not because of an objection to the majority's overall interpretation of the exigent circumstances exception, but rather because
of its application to the facts in Carroll Judge Bell acknowledged the
validity of the well-established exigent circumstances exception to the
warrant requirement, but observed that "[t]he exception is, however,
a narrow one since 'exigency implies urgency, immediacy, and compelling need." 4 He also emphasized that the burden of establishing
the existence of exigent circumstances, which he described as "a heavy
one, " 75 is on the government.7 6 He cautioned that "'no exigency is
cause to believe that a sericreated simply because there is probable
77
committed.'"
been
has
crime
ous
Judge Bell conceded that in reaching a determination of probable cause, inferences may be made by police officers, but he admonished that "speculation is not, and should not, be permitted." 7 3 He
maintained that the facts in Carrollprovided "no reasonable basis for
inferring that the burglary of the petitioner's premises had recently
occurred or was in progress," 79 and thus the sheriff's officer acted illegally as there was no exigency justifying his warrantless entry.8 0
69. Id. at 739, 646 A.2d at 384.
70. Id. at 739-40, 646 A.2d at 384-85.
71. Id. at 740, 646 A.2d at 385.

72. Id.
73. Id. at 741, 646 A.2d at 385 (Bell, J., dissenting).

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. (quoting Stackhouse v. State, 298 Md. 203, 212, 468 A.2d 333, 338 (1983)).
Id. at 741-42, 646 A.2d at 385-86.
Id. at 741, 646 A.2d at 385.
Id. at 742, 646 A.2d at 386 (quoting Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753 (1984)).
Id. at 745, 646 A.2d at 387.

79. Id. at 746, 646 A.2d at 388.

80. Id. at 748, 646 A.2d at 389. Judge Bell concluded his dissent powerfully by noting:
If, as the State argues, and the majority accepts, the facts of this case constitute a
sufficient basis for the establishment of exigent circumstances, then the urgency
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4. Analysis.-In Carroll v. State, the Court of Appeals issued a
three-part decision. First, the court held that when law enforcement
officers have probable cause to believe that a burglary is either in progress or recently has occurred, the officers are permitted under the
exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement of the
Fourth Amendment to enter a residence without a warrant to determine if the intruder is still present and to secure the occupant's property.8 Second, the court found that in light of the totality of the facts
in the instant case, the deputy sheriffs had sufficient probable cause
and exigency to enter Carroll's apartment without a warrant., 2 Finally, the court concluded that the search warrant subsequently issued
to the officers was valid and that the trial court improperly granted
Carroll's motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to that
83
warrant.
a. Maryland's Adoption of Burglary as an Exigent Circumstance.-The court's holding that evidence of a probable burglary satisfies the exigent circumstances exception is warranted by the weight
of persuasive authority reaching this conclusion, and is consistent with
the court's earlier interpretations of exigent circumstances. Notwithstanding the court's brief treatment of the subject,8 4 the holding is a
reasonable extension of Maryland law.
The weight and unanimity of persuasive authority that has held
that evidence of probable burglary constitutes exigent circumstances
is notable,8 5 but the better reason for adopting this approach in Maryland is the convincing rationale of these individual decisions. For example, in Commonwealth v. Fiore,86 officers who had received an
informant's tip that a housebreaking had occurred at a residence
where there were narcotics and guns, made a warrantless entrance

or emergency nature of exigency has been completely written out of the exception. In other words, the exception is now the rule. An exigency exists and
hence, entry into a home is permissible, whenever a police officer can surmise that
there probably has been a break-in at those premises. The officer need not show
or articulate a basis for believing it to have occurred recently, not to mention for
believing it to be in progress.
Id. at 748-49, 646 A.2d at 389.
81. Id. at 734, 646 A.2d at 382.
82. Id. at 739, 646 A.2d at 384.
83. Id. at 740, 646 A.2d at 385.
84. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
85. See supra note 57.
86. 403 N.E.2d 953 (Mass. App. Ct.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 938 (1980).
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into the residence and discovered hashish in a hole in the floor.8 7
The Appeals Court of Massachusetts noted that:
[i] t seems clear to us that a house break without more as set
out in the affidavit raises the possibility of danger to an occupant and of the continued presence of an intruder and indicates the need to secure the premises. In such circumstances
"[t] he right of the police to enter and investigate in an emergency without the accompanying intent to either search or
arrest is inherent in the very nature of their duties as peace
officers."""
This reasoning is logical and supports Deputy First Class Gonder's actions. Aware that an escaped convict had recently been at the residence, Gonder discovered evidence of a breaking. He then prudently
made an immediate entry into Carroll's apartment to determine
whether anyone inside had been injured. Had he merely secured the
apartment and sought a search warrant, the delay attendant to this
process could have exacerbated the injuries of any potential victims
inside. Further, Gonder acted in objective good faith by remaining
within the scope of his intended search; there was no indication in the
record that Gonder entered the apartment, or executed his search,
with an eye toward locating contraband.
Federal courts have applied reasoning analogous to FioreS. In
Reardon v. Wroan,89 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held
that exigent circumstances justified police officers' warrantless entry
into a university fraternity house where evidence of a burglary existed
at a time of year when most students were away from the campus, and
burglaries frequently occurred.9 ° Similarly, the Ninth Circuit included evidence of a burglary within the scope of exigent circum-

87. Id. at 954.
88. Id. at 954-55 (quoting United States v. Barone, 330 F.2d 543, 545 (2d Cir.), cert.

denied, 377 U.S. 1004 (1964)).
89. 811 F.2d 1025 (7th Cir. 1987).
90. Id. at 1029-30. The court concluded that the police officers
were faced with a call reporting a burglary in progress during a time of year when
the students were on break and burglaries were known to occur more frequently.
And when they arrived they found a single car in the driveway and the door to the
residence unlocked. Therefore . . . we conclude based on these facts that the
exigency requirement was satisfied as a matter of law.
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stances in United States v. Valles-Valencia,9 ' and the Sixth Circuit upheld

a warrantless entry by police in United States v. Johnson.92 In Johnson,
the police officers... had every reason to believe that a burglary was in progress ....

The circumstances confronting the

officers justified their warrantless entry into the residence because "[i]t would defy reason to suppose that [the officers]
had to secure a warrant before investigating, leaving the putative burglars free to complete their crime unmolested. It is
only 'unreasonable' searches
and seizures that the Fourth
93
Amendment forbids."
Given Gonder's observations of an unsecured apartment door where
there reportedly should have been a secured one, at a residence
where an escaped convict was known to have recently visited-and
might still be present-his warrantless entry does not merit the label
"unreasonable."
In addition to the convincing logic of persuasive case law, the rationale of previous Maryland cases finding exigent circumstances supports the inclusion of evidence of probable burglary within the scope
of exigent circumstances. In Davis v. State,94 the Court of Appeals
held a warrantless entry by police to be valid where police found a
homicide victim in the backyard of a residence and were able to see
the feet of another motionless person inside the home through a window.9" The court observed that:

[b]asic humanity required that the officers offer aid to the
person within the house on the very distinct possibility that
this person had suffered at the hands of the perpetrator of
the homicide discovered in the backyard. The delay which
would necessarily have resulted from an application for a
search warrant might have been the difference between life

91. 811 F.2d 1232, 1236 (9th Cir.), amended on other grounds, 823 F.2d 381 (9th Cir.
1987). Police responded to a report of strangers parked in front of a house whose occupants were known to be on vacation. Id. at 1235. The strangers could not adequately
explain their presence, a window showed signs of being pried open, and the police smelled
marijuana. Id. Suspecting that a burglary was underway, the police entered and seized
controlled substances. Id. The court determined that "[t] he circumstances known to the
officers supported probable cause to enter the building to learn what was happening." Id.
at 1236.
92.
93.
94.
95.

9 F.3d 506 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2690 (1994).
Id. at 509-10 (quoting United States v. Singer, 687 F.2d 1135, 1144 (8th Cir. 1982)).
236 Md. 389, 204 A.2d 76 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 966 (1965).
Id. at 395-96, 204 A.2d at 80.
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and death for the person seen exhibiting no signs of life
within the house.9 6
This rationale also applies to evidence of a burglary. Although the
danger to occupants within a burglarized home might not be as likely
as the situation in Davis where one homicide victim was already known
to exist, violent crimes reasonably can be expected to accompany a
burglary.9 7 In Oken v. State,9" the Court of Appeals upheld a warrantless entry and search of a house by police where they had reason to
believe an injured person or suspects may have been inside.9 9 It follows that officers encountering evidence of a burglary might also reasonably expect to find a suspect or persons injured by a burglar inside
a residence, and that the delay caused by obtaining a warrant could
prevent apprehending a burglar or preserving the life of the victim of
a violent attack.
b. The Court's Conclusion that Officers Had Probable Cause and
Exigency.-The legality of Deputy First Class Gonder's warrantless entry into Carroll's apartment depended on what he reasonably believed
at the time of entry, 0 ° and whether he had probable cause to believe
that there had been a recent, forcible entry into the apartment or to
believe an intruder was still inside the residence.10 1 The court repeated its previous definition of probable cause as a "'non-technical
conception of a reasonable ground for belief of guilt, requiring less
evidence for such belief than would justify conviction but more evidence than that which would arouse a mere suspicion."'"t0 Under this
96. Id. at 396, 204 A.2d at 80. The court also pointed to Wayne v. United States, 318
F.2d 205 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 860 (1963), in which Judge Burger emphasized
that "the business of policeman and firemen is to act, not to speculate or meditate on
whether the report is correct. People could well die in emergencies if police tried to act
with the calm deliberation associated with the judicial process." Id. at 212.
97. See supra note 88 and accompanying text; cf.Reed v. State, 316 Md. 521, 527, 560
A.2d 1104, 1107 (1989) (stating that intent element for burglary conviction can be inferred
from the circumstances of the case and opining that a "surreptitious or forceful" breaking
would more strongly suggest criminal intent than would a constructive breaking).
98. 327 Md. 628, 612 A.2d 258 (1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1312 (1993).
99. Id. at 646-47, 612 A.2d at 266-67.
100. Kerv. California, 374 U.S. 23, 40 n.12 (1963); McMillian v. State, 325 Md. 272, 282,
600 A.2d 430, 435 (1992).
101. Carroll 335 Md. at 735, 646 A.2d at 382.
102. Id., 646 A.2d at 383 (quoting Doering v. State, 313 Md. 384, 403, 545 A.2d 1281,
1290 (1988)). For a further treatment of the basis for probable cause, see Brinegar v.
United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949). Justice Rutledge, writing for the Court in Brinegar,
observed that "[iun dealing with probable cause, however, as the very name implies, we
deal with probabilities. These are not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act."
Id. at 175. Justice Rutledge observed that Chief Justice Marshall wrote that "'[i] t may be
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definition, and based on the totality of facts in the record, Gonder
reasonably determined that he had probable cause to believe that a
burglary was either in progress or had recently occurred in Carroll's
apartment.
First, assume that Deputy First Class Gonder believed Penn's account of events at the residence: that Hudson had been there but had
left, that Carroll was away for a few days, and that Carroll secured his
door when he went away."' 3 Armed with this knowledge, Gonder encountered an open apartment door with a missing pane of glass. At
this point, he could have reasonably believed that Hudson had broken
into Carroll's apartment unbeknownst to Penn, or that someone else
had broken into the apartment. Gonder also could have reasonably
believed that an intruder was still inside the apartment. Furthermore,
Carroll could have come home early without announcing his return to
Penn. Thus, Carroll might have been the victim of an attack inside his
apartment without Penn being aware of this occurrence. Therefore,
under this rationale, Gonder was justified in perceiving "more evidence than that which would arouse a mere suspicion"1" 4 and in concluding that he had probable cause to believe a burglary had been
committed in Carroll's apartment.
Had Gonder believed that Penn was lying to him, a conclusion he
would have been justified in reaching because she was a known acquaintance of his targeted fugitive, his actions appear even more reasonable. Gonder might have reasonably doubted the truthfulness of
any or all of Penn's account of events, and thus could have believed
that Hudson was still at the residence and that Carroll had never left.
In this case, Gonder also would have had sufficient probable cause to
believe that a burglary had taken place, and that the exigencies of the
added, that the term 'probable cause,' according to its usual acceptation, means less than
evidence which would justify condemnation; and, in all cases of seizure, has a fixed, and
well known meaning. It imports a seizure made under circumstances which warrant suspicion.'" Id. at 175 n.14 (quoting Locke v. United States, 7 Cranch 339, 348, 3 L. Ed. 364
(1813)). Justice Rutledge concluded that
[b]ecause many situations which confront officers in the course of executing
their duties are more or less ambiguous, room must be allowed for some mistakes
on their part. But the mistakes must be those of reasonable men, acting on facts
leading sensibly to their conclusions of probability. The rule of probable cause is

a practical, nontechnical conception affording the best compromise that has
been found for accommodating these often opposing interests. Requiring more
would unduly hamper law enforcement. To allow less would be to leave law-abiding citizens at the mercy of the officers' whim or caprice.
Id. at 176.
103. See supra notes 8-12 and accompanying text.
104. Doering,313 Md. at 403, 545 A.2d at 1290 (citing Sterling v. State, 248 Md. 240, 244,
235 A.2d 711, 714 (1967)).
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situation demanded that he enter and search for an intruder immediately, rather than merely securing the building and taking the time
necessary to obtain a search warrant.
In his dissent, Judge Bell criticized Gonder's determination that
he had probable cause to enter the apartment by noting that "[i] n the
case sub judice, there is no reasonable basis for inferring that the burglary of the petitioner's premises had recently occurred or was in progress."1 °5 Judge Bell based this assertion largely upon the information
that Penn imparted to the officers. He observed that:
[t]he petitioner's neighbor [Penn] told the police that the
petitioner was not present and was not expected back for at
least a day. From this, we know that the only basis upon
which the police could legitimately have entered the premises was to investigate an ongoing burglary, i.e., to determine
whether the burglar was still on the premises. Nobody being
at home, there was no reason to believe that anyone was in
need of assistance.' 0 6
This rationale credits Penn with omniscience concerning the movements of Carroll, and ignores Penn's motive to lie to protect her
friend Hudson. Judge Bell would require law enforcement officers to
put complete faith in a witness's statement. Such a restriction would
deny experienced officers the opportunity to reach their own reasonable conclusions based upon the totality of the circumstances surrounding an event, and would lead to an unworkable standard of
probable cause.
c. Impact of the Court's Decision.-The court's extension of
the exigent circumstances exception to include evidence of an ongoing or recently committed burglary will contribute to more efficient
law enforcement by enabling police to catch criminals who otherwise
might escape, and will save lives that could be lost without immediate
medical aid during the time it takes to obtain a warrant. The exigent
circumstances exception does not dispense with the prerequisite of
probable cause before a search may be conducted. Instead, it trusts
that a law enforcement officer, rather than ajudicial officer, will properly determine that probable cause exists in circumstances where immediate action is necessary to apprehend a criminal, protect property,
or save lives. By extending the exigent circumstances exception to

105. Carroll, 335 Md. at 746, 646 A.2d at 388 (Bell, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 747, 646 A.2d at 388 (emphasis added).
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include evidence of burglary, 10 7 the court opens the possibility that
evidence of other crimes also may become per se examples of exigent
circumstances. 108
Unfortunately, the court's holding in Carroll also could encourage police abuse of the exigent circumstances exception. Sadly, it
is far too believable that police might manufacture evidence of a recent or contemporaneous burglary as a pretext to making a warrantless entry and search of a premises when they doubt that a neutral and
detached magistrate would find sufficient probable cause to justify a
search. The court foresaw that such unjustified searches could occur
and warned against them,1°9 but the courts themselves must be the
final watchdog of police misconduct in cases of this nature. The Carroll court performed this duty by analyzing Gonder's actions prior to
and during the entry and search of Carroll's apartment. The court
noted that he returned to ask Penn questions to clarify the status of
the apartment door, that he announced his entrance into the apartment, and that he did not disturb the contraband evidence upon finding it, but instead obtained a search warrant authorizing him to seize
it. All of these actions are consistent with a police officer performing
his duties in good faith, without malice, and within the limited scope
of a search executed to find a burglar and secure property, rather
than an abusive search for contraband.
The specter of police misconduct raises an interesting paradox.
There is a sentiment shared by many in the American public, and fueled by news reports and portrayals in popular culture, that law enforcement officers cannot be trusted. 1 Yet others fear that crime is
107. Effective October 1, 1994, all unauthorized entries into dwellings in Maryland are
termed "burglary." Id. at 737 n.3, 646 A.2d at 383 n.3; see also MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 29,
30 (Supp. 1994).
108. But see Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984). In Welsh, the Court held that "an
important factor to be considered when determining whether any exigency exists is the
gravity of the underlying offense for which the arrest is being made ....
[A]pplication of
the exigent circumstances exception in the context of a home entry should rarely be sanctioned when there is probable cause to believe that only a minor offense ... has been
committed." Id. at 753.
109. Carro, 335 Md. at 734-35, 646 A.2d at 382. The court noted that "[w]e are mindful
that the responsibility of the police to investigate burglaries must be balanced against the
serious invasions of privacy such entries and searches entail. We further recognize that
courts must 'be vigilant to ensure that the rationale of protecting private property is not
employed as a subterfuge to seek out evidence of criminal conduct.'" Id. at 734, 646 A.2d
at 382 (citations omitted) (quoting People v. Gardner, 459 N.E.2d 676, 681 (Ill. App. Ct.
1984)).
110. James Bovard, Abuse of Power: CongressHas Cause to Review Waco Tragedy, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., July 23, 1995, at Gl; Crossfire: L.A. Law (CNN television broadcast, Aug. 17,
1995); Brad Knickerbocker, Why 1992 Shooting in Idaho Has Become a Rallying Point, CHRIS-
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out of control in America, and that stronger police measures are necessary to combat this epidemic.1 1 1 Allowing law enforcement officers
greater latitude in reaching their own determinations of probable
cause under exigent circumstances allays the latter concern but offends the former. Nevertheless, officers need a workable and understandable standard to follow in circumstances such as those
encountered by Deputy First Class Gonder in Carroll. In situations
where even learned judges can differ on whether evidence of a burglary justifies a warrantless entry and search, such a bright line standard would contribute to more efficient, and constitutional, law
enforcement. The standard established by the court in Carroll,which
recognizes evidence of burglary as exigent circumstances while admonishing law enforcement officers not to abuse this privilege, satisfies that need and was providently adopted into Maryland law.
5. Conclusion.-In Carrollv. State, the Court of Appeals extended
Maryland's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence by holding that when
law enforcement officers have probable cause to believe that a burglary is either in progress or recently has been committed, the exigencies of the situation permit the officers to enter a premises without a
warrant to search for an intruder and to protect the occupants' property. 1 2 This extension is consistent with pre-existing Maryland Fourth
Amendment law, and was wisely adopted considering the overwhelming weight of persuasive authority that had previously reached this
conclusion. The court's decision should enable law enforcement officers to perform their duties more efficiently and confidently, which
obviously contributes to public welfare. However, the courts must remain vigilant to ensure that the police do not abuse this discretion,
further eroding public confidence in law enforcement.
ERic M. VEIT

T"AN SC. MONrOR, Sept. 5, 1995, The U.S. at 1; Robert Marquand & Daniel B. Wood,
Lessons Drawnfrom Simpson in Black, White, CHRISTIAN Sci. MoNrrOR, Oct. 5, 1995, The U.S.

at 1; Joseph D. McNamara, The Nation; Law Enforcement; America's Plague of Bad Cops, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 17, 1995 (Sunday, Home Ed.), at M2.
111. Stephen Braun & Judy Pasternak, A Nation with Peril on Its Mind; Crime Has Become
the Top Concern of Many People,L.A. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1994, (Home Ed.), at Al; Ellen Edwards,
Networks Make Crime Top Story; Survey Says Coverage FannedPublic's Fear,WASH. POST, Mar. 3,
1994, at Cl; Dan Morain & Daniel M. Weintraub, Wilson Crime Summit to Have Hard-Line
Focus, L. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1994 (Home Ed.), at A3; Margaret Talev, Community-Based Police
Program Takes Root; Police Chief Awaits Grant Money to Extend Program to Other Areas, TAMPA
TIuB.. Apr. 29, 1995, at 18.
112. 335 Md. at 734, 646 A.2d at 382.
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CONTRACTS

The ContinuingErosion of Maryland Choice of Law

In American Motorists Insurance Co. v. ARTRA Group, Inc.,1 the
Court of Appeals held that where an insurance policy excludes pollution coverage unless the damage is "sudden or accidental," a plaintiff,
alleging numerous discharges as a result of normal business operations over a period of years, may not recover on that theory.' ARTRA
also presented a complex choice-of-law issue because, although the
pollution occurred in Maryland, the parties entered into the insurance contract in Illinois.' The circumstances presented the Court of
Appeals with an opportunity to reconsider its adherence to the traditional doctrine of lex loci contractus.4
In a majority opinion written by Judge Chasanow, the court
adopted a limited renvoi5 exception to the doctrine of lex loci contractus
"to avoid the irony of applying the law of a foreign jurisdiction when
that jurisdiction's conflict of law rules would apply Maryland law."6
The court held that Maryland courts should apply Maryland substantive law instead of the foreign state's law when (1) Maryland has the
most significant, or at least a substantial relationship to the contract
issue, and (2) the state where the contract was formed would apply
Maryland law.' Under the facts in ARTRA, Maryland's existing choiceof-law rules called for the application of the doctrine of lex loci contractus, which would have required the court to apply Illinois substantive
law. However, if Maryland were also to apply Illinois choice of law
rules,8 those rules might have required application of Maryland law,9
resulting in an endless choice-of-law cycle. 1" In order to break this
1. 338 Md. 560, 659 A.2d 1295 (1995).
2. Id. at 593, 659 A.2d at 1311.
3. Id. at 563-64, 659 A.2d at 1296-97.
4. Id. at 573, 659 A.2d at 1301. The term is "[u]sed sometimes to denote the law of
the place where the contract was made, and at other times to denote the law by which the
contract is to be governed (i.e., place of its performance), which may or may not be the
same as that of the place where it was made." BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 820 (5th ed. 1979);
see also infra text accompanying notes 40-41.
5. "The 'doctrine of renvoi' is a doctrine under which court in resorting to foreign
law adopts rules of foreign law as to conflict of laws, which rules may in turn refer court
back to law of forum." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1167; see also infra text accompanying
notes 46-52.
6. ARTRA, 338 Md. at 579, 659 A.2d at 1304.
7. Id. at 577, 659 A.2d at 1303; see infra text accompanying note 79.
8. ARTRA, 338 Md. at 574, 659 A.2d at 1302.
9. Because ARTRA failed to preserve the issue on appeal, the court assumed for the
purposes of its opinion that Illinois choice-of-law rules would require application of Maryland law to the substantive issues in the case. Id. at 568-69, 659 A.2d at 1298-99.
10. Id. at 574, 659 A.2d at 1302.
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cycle, the court adopted a limited application of the doctrine of renvoi,
which it found preferable to "a total jettisoning of lex loci contractus."1 1
The court's adoption of renvoi represents a significant change in Marylandjurisprudence.1 2 In a similar situation ten years earlier, the court
created an exception to lex loci contractus without finding it necessary
to adopt the controversial doctrine of renvoi1 3
1. The Case.-In 1980 the Sherwin-Williams Company (SherwinWilliams) purchased a paint manufacturing factory located in Baltimore, Maryland, from ARTRA Group, Inc. (ARTRA).14 After Sherwin-Williams took over the factory, the Maryland Department of the
Environment discovered that hazardous waste from the factory's operations had contaminated both the soil and groundwater at the factory
site." When the Department of the Environment ordered SherwinWilliams to investigate and remedy the hazardous conditions, Sherwin-Williams filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland against ARTRA and other prior owners 16 seeking to
recover the cost of its investigation and clean-up.1 7 Sherwin-Williams
alleged that "numerous spills of hazardous substances and hazardous
wastes were released at the [s]ite during and as a result of regular
operations of the plant."18

ARTRA asked its insurer, American Motorists Insurance Company (American Motorists) to defend and indemnify ARTRA in the
suit. 9 ARTRA, its predecessors, and American Motorists all maintained their headquarters in Illinois, and the parties entered into the
11. Id. at 579-81, 659 A.2d at 1304-05. But see id. at 596-97, 659 A.2d at 1313 (Raker, J.,
dissenting) ("[I)t makes no 'sense' in the instant case to curtail Maryland's well-established
rule," by adopting the "often criticized and rejected doctrine of renvoi.").
12. See ARTRA Group, Inc. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 100 Md. App. 728, 736-37,
642 A-2d 896, 900 (1994) (explaining that the doctrine of renvoi was not accepted in Maryland), rev'd, 338 Md. 560, 659 A.2d 1295 (1995).
13. See Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. G.C. Zarnas & Co., 304 Md. 183, 189, 498 A.2d 605,
608 (1985) (creating an exception to lex lod contractuswhen application of foreign substantive law would be contrary to Maryland public policy).
14. ARTRA, 338 Md. at 563, 659 A.2d at 1296.
15. Id. at 564, 659 A.2d at 1296-97.
16. The court identified Baltimore Paint and Color Works and Baltimore Paint and
Chemical Corporation as prior owners. Baltimore Paint and Chemical Corporation later
merged with the ELT Corporation, which then changed its name to Dutch Boy, Inc. Dutch
Boy changed its name to ARTRA in 1981. Id. at 564 n.1, 659 A.2d at 1296 n.1.
17. Id. at 564, 659 A.2d at 1297.
18. Id.
19. Id. American Motorists issued a series of comprehensive liability policies to ARTRA
and its predecessors from April 1, 1976 through April 1, 1985, and also issued a Comprehensive Catastrophe Umbrella Policy to ARTRA, effective from 1976 to 1978, that contained similar pollution exclusion language. Id. at 564-65, 659 A.2d at 1297.
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relevant insurance policies there. 20 Each policy contained a pollution
exclusion limiting the scope of coverage, but the exclusion permitted
coverage for damage resulting from sudden and accidental
discharge.21
American Motorists refused to defend and indemnify ARTRA
and, in turn, filed a complaint for declaratory judgment in the Circuit
Court for Baltimore City, seeking a determination by that court that it
owed no duty to defend or indemnify ARTRA under the relevant policies. 22 ARTRA argued that "at a minimum, American Motorists owed
a duty to defend ARTRA in the Sherwin-Williams suit because the allegations of the Sherwin-Williams complaint gave rise to a potentiality of
coverage under the applicable policies." 2' ARTRA also filed a motion
to dismiss the declaratory judgment action, "arguing that key factual
issues determinative of the duty to indemnify were intertwined with
facts to be determined at trial."2 4 American Motorists then moved for
25
summary judgment.
The trial judge held that, notwithstanding that the parties had
entered into the relevant contract in Illinois, the court would apply
Maryland substantive law because Illinois choice-of-law rules required
the application of Maryland law and because Maryland recognized a
strong public policy regarding environmental issues.26 Relying on
Bentz v. Mutual Fire, Marine & Inland Insurance Co., the trial court
20. Id. at 564, 659 A.2d at 1297.
21. Id. at 564-65, 659 A.2d at 1297. The exclusion precluded coverage for "bodily injury or property damage arising out of the discharge, dispersal, release or escape of smoke,
vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals, liquids or gases, waste materials or other
irritants, contaminants or pollutants into or upon land, the atmosphere or any water
course or body of water." Id. The Comprehensive Catastrophe Umbrella Policy contained
similar exclusion language. Id.
22. Id. at 565, 659 A-2d at 1297. American Motorists had raised additional defenses
that were not preserved on appeal. Id. at 564 n.2, 659 A.2d at 1297 n.2. The declaratory
judgment action considered only the legal duties of American Motorists as to its policy
holder, ARTRA. Id. at 565, 659 A.2d at 1297. The merits of the Sherwin-Williams claim
against ARTRA were, therefore, not before the court. Id. at 565-66, 659 A.2d at 1297-98.
23. Id. at 565, 659 A.2d at 1297.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 566, 659 A.2d at 1297. American Motorists argued that the court should
apply the principle of renvoi and that the court should look to the entire body of Illinois
law, including Illinois choice-of-law rules, and decide if Illinois rules would require application of Maryland law to the underlying dispute because "Illinois conflict of law rules apply
the 'most significant contacts' test of Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws §§ 188 and
193." Id., 659 A.2d at 1297-98.
26. Id., 659 A.2d at 1298.
27. 83 Md. App. 524, 539-40, 575 A.2d 795, 802-03 (1990) (holding that the terms
"sudden" and "accidental" were not unclear within the context of a pesticide pollution
exclusion in the relevant insurance policy).
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found the terms "sudden" and "accidental" in the language of the pollution exclusions unambiguous. 8 The trial court found no potentiality for coverage under the applicable policies and granted American
Motorists' motion for summary judgment.2 9
On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals reversed."0 In so doing,
the court held that the trial court incorrectly decided both the issue of
choice-of-law 1 and potentiality of coverage.3 2 The Court of Appeals
granted American Motorists' petition for a writ of certiorari.3 3
2. Legal Background.a. Lex Loci Contractus and the Most Significant Relationship
Test.-In 1971, the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws adopted the
"most significant relationship test for resolving choice-of-law issues in
contract actions. " ' This modem approach to choice-of-law issues requires the application of the law of the state having the "most significant relationship" to the disputed contract issue. 5 Section 188 of the
Restatement states that "[tihe rights and duties of the parties with respect to an issue in contract are determined by the local law of the
state which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant rela28. ARTRA, 338 Md. at 566, 659 A.2d at 1298.
29. Id. at 566-67, 659 A.2d at 1298.
30. ARTRA Group, Inc. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 100 Md. App. 728, 742, 642
A_2d 896, 903 (1994), rev'd, 338 Md. 560, 659 A.2d 1295 (1995).
31. Id. at 736-37, 642 A.2d at 900. The court found that the doctrine of renvoi was not
accepted in Maryland, nor had Maryland accepted the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws § 193's significant relationship analysis. Id. Rather, the court held that Maryland
followed the doctrine of lex loci contractus and that the court therefore should look to the
substantive law of Illinois, but not to Illinois choice-of-law rules. Id. In so ruling, the court
reasoned that "[t]he party who seeks to overturn the general rule of lex loci contractus
bears a 'heavy burden' to establish that Maryland public policy is sufficiently strong to
warrant overriding the otherwise controlling law of another jurisdiction." In addition, the
court held that although the Maryland legislature had "expressed a strong public policy
regarding the protection of the land and citizens of Maryland from pollution ...Maryland
has no strong public policy regarding who pays for the clean-up." Id. at 738-39, 642 A.2d at
901. That issue, the court held, "is controlled by the contract between insured and insurer." Id. at 739, 642 A.2d at 901.
32. Id. at 740, 642 A.2d at 902 (holding that under either Maryland or Illinois law,
"there are allegations [in the Sherwin-Williams complaint] that at least some of the pollution at the site occurred under circumstances that might well be deemed to be 'sudden
and accidental'").
33. American Motorists Ins. Co. v. ARTRA Group, Inc., 336 Md. 354, 648 A.2d 464
(1994).
34. ARTRA, 338 Md. at 569, 659 A.2d at 1299; see also 16 Am.JUR. 2D Conflict of Laws
§ 83, at 140 n.89 (1979) (noting that preliminary drafts of the "most significant relationship" approach appeared as early as 1953).
35. ARTRA, 338 Md. at 570, 659 A.2d at 1299.
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tionship to the transaction and the parties." 6 In making this determination, courts should consider "the place of contracting, the place of
negotiation of the contract, the place of performance, the location of
the subject matter of the contract, and the domicil [sic] and place of
37
business of the parties."
The Restatement further narrows this test in section 193 in the context of fire, surety, and casualty insurance contracts, finding that the
state the parties understood to be the principal location of the insured risk will typically be the state with the most significant relationship.38 ARTRA and American Motorists agreed that Illinois employs
the "most significant relationship" approach.3 9
This modem test contrasts with the rule of lex loci contractus,
which requires the application of the law of the state in which the
parties entered into the contract.4' To understand lex loci contractus,
one must understand that a basic tension exists in choice-of-law disputes. Various commentators have discussed this tension:
[W] e are constantly confronted by a conflict between
the lexfori, that is, the law of the forum or place where relief
is sought, and what may in general terms be called the lex
loci, that is, the law of the place where the right was acquired
or the liability was incurred which constitutes the claim or
the cause of action. Under the traditional "territorial" approach to choice of law problems, the lex loci controls the
substantive rights of the parties, that is, all matters going to
the basis of the right itself, while the lex fori controls procedural and remedial matters.4 1
According to the Court of Appeals, the "most significant relationship" test of the Second Restatement "sacrifices some of the certainty,
simplicity, and predictability of the lex loci contractus rule in favor of a
rule which gives the jurisdiction with the strongest interest in the litigation the most control over the outcome of the litigation."4'
Notwithstanding the increasing popularity of the "most significant re-

36.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF CONFLICT OF LAws §

188 (1971).

37. ARTRA, 338 Md. at 570, 659 A.2d at 1300.

§ 193 (1971).
39. ARTRA, 338 Md. at 571, 659 A.2d at 1300.
40. Id. at 570, 659 A.2d at 1300; see also supra note 4.
41. 16 AM. Jug. 2D Conflict of Laws § 5 (1979).
42. ARTRA, 338 Md. at 570, 659 A.2d at 1300.
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
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lationship" test, Maryland courts prior to ARTRA45 instead adhered to
the doctrine of lex loci contractus,4 albeit not without exceptions. 45
b. Renvoi.-Where a court chooses to apply the law of the
foreign jurisdiction, the question arises whether the court should apply only the applicable substantive law, also known as the "internal
law," or the "whole law" of the foreign jurisdiction, including foreign
choice-of-law.
The general view is that where a question comes before a
court which, according to the law of the forum as to conflict
of laws, is to be determined by the law of another jurisdiction, the question is determined by the law of such other jurisdiction applicable to the precise question; the law of such
other jurisdiction as to conflict of laws is not taken into
consideration."
The French word "renvoi" means to "send back" or "remit."4 7 The
Court of Appeals noted that courts may have created the renvoi doctrine in response to the "harshness" of traditional choice-of-law principles. 4 According to the doctrine, where a forum court's choice-of-law
rules calls for the application of the substantive law of a foreign jurisdiction, the forum court may apply the whole law of the foreign juris49
diction, including the foreign jurisdiction's choice-of-law rules.
Applying renvoi, when a forum state determines that the foreign
jurisdiction's choice-of-law rules would require the application of the
forum's law, a reference back by the forum to its own laws is called a
remission. 5° A transmission occurs when the choice-of-law rules of the
foreign jurisdiction would instead refer the forum court to a third jurisdiction.5 1 The Court of Appeals noted that "renvoi could have the
43. Id. at 572, 659 A.2d at 1301.
44. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hart, 327 Md. 526, 529, 611 A.2d 100, 101 (1992); Kramer v.
Bally's Park Place, Inc., 311 Md. 387, 390, 535 A.2d 466, 467 (1988).
45. ARTRA, 338 Md. at 581, 659 A.2d at 1305 (explaining that Maryland has "refused to
apply the law of the place of contracting where to do so would violate some strong public
policy of Maryland" or where the parties include a choice-of-law provision within the contract); see National Glass Inc. v. J.C. Penney Properties, Inc., 336 Md. 606, 615, 650 A.2d
246, 250 (1994).
46. 16 Am.JuR. 2D Conflict of Law § 4 (1971).
47. ARTRA, 338 Md. at 574, 659 A.2d at 1301.
48. Id.(citing Rhoda S. Barish, Comment, Renvoi and the Modem Approaches to Choice-ofLaw, 30 Am.U. L. REv. 1049, 1061-62 (1981)).
49. Barish, supra note 48, at 1062.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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danger of creating an endless cycle." 5 2 Prior to ARTRA, Maryland
courts refused to adopt the doctrine of renvoi.5 s
3.

The Court's Reasoning.a. Illinois Law or Maryland Law?-ARTRA failed to preserve
on appeal the issue of whether an Illinois court would apply Maryland
law given the facts of the case.' Consequently, the ARTRA court proceeded under the assumption that Illinois choice-of-law rules would
dictate the application of Maryland law to the substantive issues of the
case.5 5 Before the Court of Special Appeals, ARTRA had "acknowledged that the trial judge 'ruled that Illinois would apply Maryland
law for purposes of conflict of law analysis in interpreting issues of
coverage' and American Motorists agreed with the trial judge's finding, contending that 'Illinois would apply the law of Maryland in
resolving the declaratory judgment case."'56 The Court of Special Appeals also assumed that Illinois's choice-of-law rules would require the
application of Maryland law.5 7 In its petition for certiorari, American
Motorists acknowledged that the trial court had found that "Illinois
choice-of-law rules would lead to the application of Maryland law."5"
ARTRA failed to challenge this holding. 59
b. Sudden and Accidental. After deciding that Maryland law
would apply, the Court of Appeals turned its attention to American
Motorists' claim that the Court of Special Appeals had incorrectly
held that (1) American Motorists had a duty to defend ARTRA, and
(2) such duty could not be determined in a declaratory judgment action.6" The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Court of
52. ARTRA, 338 Md. at 574, 659 A.2d at 1302.

53. ARTRA Group, Inc. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 100 Md. App. 728, 736, 642
A.2d 896, 900 (1994), rev'd, 338 Md. 560, 659 A.2d 1295 (1995).

54. ARTRA, 338 Md. at 568-69, 659 A.2d at 1299.
55. Id., 659 A.2d at 1298. But see id. at 597, 659 A.2d at 1313 (Raker, J., dissenting)
(arguing that Illinois would not have applied Maryland law in this case).
56. Id. at 568, 659 A.2d at 1299.
57. ARTRA, 100 Md. App. at 738, 642 A.2d at 901; see Diamond State Ins. Co. v.
Chester-Jensen Co., 611 N.E.2d 1083, 1095 (I1. App. Ct. 1993) ("While ...section [193]
does not preclude considerations of other factors in a choice of law analysis, the 'location
of the insured risk will be given greater weight than any other single contact in determining the state of applicable law provided that the risk can be located, at least principally in a
single state.'") (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 193 cmL b
(1971)); see also KNS Cos. v. Federal Ins. Co., 866 F. Supp. 1121, 1125 (N.D. Ill.
1994)
("Although KNS is an Illinois-based corporation... the assertedly insured risk has its situs
in Indiana, and Diamond State calls for the application of Indiana law.").
58. ARTRA, 338 Md. at 568, 659 A.2d at 1299.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 581-82, 659 A.2d at 1305.
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Special Appeals, finding that the trial court had ruled correctly on
both issues.6 1
Pursuant to Lloyd E. Mitchel4 Inc. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 62 the

Court of Appeals in ARTRA interpreted the terms of the contract according to their "customary, ordinary, and accepted meaning." 63 The
court reviewed Bentz v. Mutual Fire, Marine & Inland Insurance Co.,' in
which the Court of Special Appeals discussed the meaning of the
terms "sudden" and "accidental" in the context of a pollution exclusion contained in an insurance contract.' That court found that the
terms were clear within the context of the applicable policy.
The
Bentz court explained that a "sudden and accidental" exception to a
pollution exclusion precludes coverage unless the discharge, rather
than the resultant injury, is both sudden and accidental.6 7 The Bentz
court held that the policy must be read as a whole to determine the
meanings of its terms.6 " Relying on Bentz and "numerous other
cases," 69 the Court of Appeals in ARTRA held that long-standing business activities that result in pollution are not "sudden and accidental"
events for which such policies would provide coverage. 7" In addition,
after considering ARTRA's allegations in the underlying complaint,
the court found that Sherwin-Williams had clearly based its claim on
damage alleged to have resulted from "the cumulative effects of nu61. Id. at 582, 659 A.2d at 1305-06.
62. 324 Md. 44, 595 A.2d 469 (1991).
63. ARTRA, 338 Md. at 582, 659 A.2d at 1306 (quoting Mitchell, 324 Md. at 56, 595 A.2d
at 475).

64. 83 Md. App. 524, 575 A.2d 795 (1990).
65. ARTRA, 338 Md. at 583-84, 659 A.2d at 1306-07 (citing Bentz, 83 Md. App. at 533-36,
575 A.2d at 799-801).
66. Bentz, 83 Md. App. at 537, 575 A.2d at 801.
67. Id. at 538, 575 A.2d at 802.
68. Id., 575 A.2d at 801-02 (quoting American Motorists Ins. Co. v. General Host Corp.,
667 F. Supp. 1423, 1429 (D. Kan. 1987), affd, 946 F.2d 1482 (10th Cir.), vacated in part on
other grounds, 946 F.2d 1489 (10th Cir. 1991).
69. ARTRA, 338 Md. at 586, 659 A.2d at 1308; see American Motorists, 667 F. Supp. at
1423; see also U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Morrison Grain Co., 734 F. Supp. 437, 446 (D.
Kan. 1990) ("To divorce 'sudden' of its temporal component would eviscerate it of any
independent meaning or force."), affd, 999 F.2d 489 (10th Cir. 1993); Shell Oil Co. v.
Winterthur Swiss Ins. Co., 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 815, 841 (Ct. App. 1993) ("We cannot reasonably call 'sudden' a process that occurs slowly and incrementally over a relatively long time
....");Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co. v. Belleville Indus., 555 N.E.2d 568, 572 (Mass.
1990) ("For the word 'sudden' to have any significant purpose, and not to be surplusage
when used generally in conjunction with the word 'accidental,' it must have a temporal
aspect to its meaning, and not just the sense of something unexpected."), cert. denied, 502
U.S. 1073 (1992).
70. ART7A, 338 Md. at 590, 659 A.2d at 1310.
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merous releases" occurring in the regular course of business over a
period of years.71
The Court of Appeals also disagreed with the holding of the
Court of Special Appeals that American Motorists' duty to indemnify
72
ARTRA could not be determined in a declaratory judgment action.
The Court of Appeals found that, because the "allegations of the underlying complaint cannot be read to assert that the polluting activities alleged were . . . 'sudden and accidental,'" no potentiality of
coverage existed.7" The court found that no issues remained to be
determined at trial relating to American Motorists' duty to indemnify
74
ARTRA.
c. Choice of Law.-The court did not, however, rely on Maryland precedent regarding the choice-of-law issue. Absent a choice-oflaw provision in an agreement, Maryland courts previously applied the
rule of lex loci contractus75 in contract disputes, recognizing only a public policy exception.7 6 Because American Motorists and ARTRA entered into their contract in Illinois, a Maryland court, under its
existing choice-of-law rules, normally would apply Illinois law under
lex loci contractus.7 7 Instead, the court, using the renvoi theory, chose to
adopt all of Illinois law, including Illinois choice of law, which would
apply the "most significant relationship" test, resulting in the application of Maryland law. 7' Pursuant to this exception,
Maryland courts should apply Maryland substantive law
to contracts entered into in foreign states' jurisdictions in
spite of the doctrine of lex loci contractus when:
71. Id. at 590-92, 659 A.2d at 1310-11.
72. Id. at 593, 659 A.2d at 1311.
73. Id. at 593-94, 659 A.2d at 1311.
74. Id. at 594, 659 A.2d at 1311; see also Aema Casualty & Ins. Co. v. Cochran, 337 Md.
98, 112, 651 A.2d 859, 866 (1995) (explaining that an insured may establish a potentiality

of coverage if the "insured demonstrates that there is a reasonable potential that the issue
triggering coverage will be generated at trial"); Brohawn v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 276 Md.
396, 407, 347 A.2d 842, 850 (1975) (explaining that an insurer's obligation to defend its
insured under a contract provision is determined by the allegations in the complaint;

where the plaintiff alleges "a claim covered by the policy, the insurer has a duty to
defend").
75. ARTRA, 338 Md. at 573, 659 A.2d at 1301.
76. See supra note 45.
77. ARTRA, 338 Md. at 574, 659 A.2d at 1302.
78. Id. at 576, 659 A.2d at 1303. The court justified its holding in part on the ground
that Maryland should seek to prevent forum shopping when the place of contracting would
have applied Maryland law had suit been filed in that jurisdiction. Id. at 577, 659 A.2d at
1303.
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1) Maryland has the most significant relationship, or, at
least, a substantial relationship with respect to the contract
issue presented; and
2) The state where the contract was entered into would not
apply its own substantive law, but instead would apply Maryland substantive law to the issue before the court."
By creating another exception to lex loci contractus, the court sidestepped "the intriguing question of whether Maryland's traditional lex
loci contractus test should be abandoned in favor of one of the 'modem' most significant relationship tests." ° The court noted "growing
support" for substituting the "most significant relationship" test for lex
loci contractus "in light of modem technology,"8 ' but instead simply
opted not to apply lex loci contractus where Maryland has a substantial
relationship to the issues presented, if the foreign jurisdiction would
itself apply Maryland law. 2
In reaching its decision, the court reasoned that Maryland courts
prefer to apply Maryland law.8" When Maryland courts decline to apply Maryland law to a contract entered into in a different state, they
do so not because they "deem the law of the other state preferable,
but because their preference for Maryland law is outweighed by considerations of simplicity, predictability and uniformity."8 4 The court
reasoned that if the state where the contract was made would apply
Maryland law, however "simplicity, predictability, and uniformity

79. Id.
80. Id. at 569, 659 A.2d at 1299.
81. Id. at 579-80, 659 A.2d at 1304-05. The court stated that "[w]ith modem technology and modem business practices, the place of contracting becomes less certain and more
arbitrary ....
'In these days of multistate insurers, multistate insureds, and instantaneous
interstate transmission of voice and document, it is not easy to identify a state of contracting.'" Id. at 580, 659 A.2d at 1305 (quoting Johnson Matthey, Inc. v. Pennsylvania
Mfrs. Ass'n Ins. Co., 593 A.2d 367, 372 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991). See generaly 16 AM.
JUR. 2D Conflict of Laws § 83 (1979).
82. ARTRA, 338 Md. at 579, 659 A.2d at 1304.
83. Id. at 578, 659 A.2d at 1303-04. The court stated:

It is axiomatic that Maryland law is Maryland law because our courts and legislature believe the rules of substantive law we apply are the best of the available

alternatives. From this fundamental principle, it is safe to assume our courts
would prefer to follow Maryland law unless there is some good reason why Maryland law should yield to the law of a foreign jurisdiction. Our own substantive law

is not only more familiar to and easier for Maryland judges to apply, but there has
been a legislative or judicial determination that it is preferable to the available

alternatives.
Id.
84. Id.
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would be better achieved if Maryland courts followed the conflict of
law rule of the place of contracting and apply Maryland law.""5
The court explained that its holding that lex loci contractus "must
yield" to a modem approach when the state where the contract was
entered into would apply Maryland law was not a total abandonment
of lex loci contractus.86 The court found that its objectives would best
be accomplished by a limited application of renvoi.a7 Where the forum and the foreign jurisdiction would each apply the law of the
other, "it would seem that the balance should tip in favor of the jurisdiction with the most significant contacts or.. . for ease of application
and to prevent forum shopping, the law of the forum should be
applied."88

The court added that Maryland courts ordinarily apply Maryland
substantive law and that there is no good reason to apply the substantive law of a foreign jurisdiction if that jurisdiction would also have
applied Maryland substantive law to the contract.8 9 The Court of Appeals employed this same reasoning ten years earlier in Bethlehem Steel
Corp. v. G.C. Zarnas & Co. 9 ° In that case, the court adopted the public
policy exception without discussing renvoi.
In her dissent, Judge Raker criticized the majority for adopting
renvoi,9 argued that the decision "will lead to uncertainty, confusion,
and unpredictability,"9 2 and expressed her preference for a "solid,
predictable rule."9" Judge Raker also suggested that Illinois would
have applied its own law in this dispute.9 4
85. Id. at 578-79, 659 A.2d at 1304. The court rejected ARTRA's argument that "failure

to apply a strict lex loci contractus test in the instant case would be unfair because ARTRA
allegedly had some expectation that Illinois law would govern these insurance contracts."
Id. at 577, 659 A.2d at 1303.
86. Id. at 579, 659 A.2d at 1304. The court observed that
"[m]any states using the traditional rules simply have not switched over to a more
modern approach ....Even if a state has recently reaffirmed its commitment to
a traditional approach, giving some deference to how the case would have been
decided in another concerned court improves interstate relations by demonstrating respect for the foreign jurisdiction's whole law."
Id. at 579 n.5, 659 A.2d at 1304 n.5 (quoting Barish, supra note 48, at 1075-76).
87. Id. at 579, 659 A.2d at 1304.
88. Id. at 575-76, 659 A.2d at 1302.
89. Id. at 576, 659 A.2d at 1303.
90. 304 Md. 183, 498 A.2d 605 (1985).
91. ARTRA, 338 Md. at 596, 659 A.2d at 1313 (Raker, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 597, 659 A.2d at 1313.
93. Id. at 596, 659 A.2d at 1313.
94. Id. at 597, 659 A.2d at 1313; see supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
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4. Analysis.a. Sudden and Accidental.-The Court of Appeals agreed
with the trial court's reliance on Bentz for a definition of the terms
"sudden" and "accidental" in the policy's pollution exclusion.9 5 The
trial court determined that the word "sudden" meant quick or instantaneous, as defined in Bentz.9 In contrast, the plaintiff in ARTRA alleged that "the pollution occurred over the course of many years, i.e.,
not instantaneously or quickly."9 7 For this reason, the trial court correctly concluded that "American Motorists had no duty to defend or
indemnify ARTRA in the Sherwin-Williams action." 98 This holding
clearly was consistent with Maryland precedent 9n as well as that of numerous other jurisdictions. 10 0 The question remains, however,
whether a Maryland court instead should have interpreted the pollution clause pursuant to Illinois precedent,0 1 in adherence to lex loci
contractus.
b. Lex Loci Contractus or the Most Significant Relationship
Test?-Maryland consistently has applied the traditional "territorial"
approach 0 2 of the First Restatement of Conflict of Laws, which is based
95. ARTRA, 338 Md. at 584, 593, 659 A.2d at 1307, 1311.
96. Id. at 566-67, 659 A.2d at 1298.
97. Id. at 585, 659 A.2d at 1307.
98. Id.
99. See Bentz v. Mutual Fire, Marine & Inland Ins. Co., 83 Md. App. 524, 538, 575 A.2d
795, 801-02 (1990).
100. See, e.g., Ray Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 974 F.2d 754, 768 (6th Cir. 1992)
(holding that allegations of continuing pollution on a regular basis could not be considered sudden); A. Johnson & Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 933 F.2d 66, 75 (1st Cir.
1991) ("Mere speculation ... that any individual instance of disposal, including leaks,
occurred 'suddenly' cannot contradict a reasonable reading of the allegations that the entire pattern of conduct was not a 'sudden and accidental' occurrence."); United States
Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Star Fire Coals, Inc., 856 F.2d 31, 34 (6th Cir. 1988) ("We do not
believe that it is possible to define 'sudden' without reference to a temporal element that
joins together conceptually the immediate and the unexpected."); Sylvester Bros. Dev. Co.
v. Great Cent. Ins. Co., 503 N.W.2d 793, 797 (Minn. Ct. App.) (holding that when pollution is alleged to have occurred over a long period of time, individual instances of pollution may not be isolated to provide occurrences that are "sudden"), review denied (Minn. Ct.
App. 1993).
101. ARTRA, 338 Md. at 565, 659 A.2d at 1297 ("Illinois law holds the pollution exclusion at issue to be ambiguous.").
102. See Hauch v. Connor, 295 Md. 120, 123-24, 453 A.2d 1207, 1209 (1983) (rejecting
the position of the Restatement and adhering "to the rule that the substantive tort law of the
state where the wrong occurs governs"); White v. King, 244 Md. 348, 352, 223 A.2d 763, 765
(1966) (explaining that when lex lod contractushas been challenged, "this Court has consistently followed the rule").
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on the vested rights theory.10 3 Although sometimes characterized as
antiquated, 10 4 the "territorial" approach has some support in recent
commentary.' 0 5 Its traditional justification is that it affords the parties
certainty and probability as to what law will govern, yet it has been
08
criticized as being illogical, 0 6 rigid, 0 7 and filled with uncertainty.1
The First Restatement approach also has been labeled "jurisdiction-selecting," 10 9 although courts do recognize exceptions to the rule in certain circumstances.1 1 ° Nevertheless, Maryland's loyalty to lex loci
contractus keeps it among the shrinking majority of jurisdictions that
continues to follow that rule."
A number of states, however, have abandoned lex loci contractus in
favor of the "most significant relationship" test of the Second Restate103. DAVID H. VERNON ET AL., CoNFLIcr OF LAWS: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS
§ 4.05, at 217-18 (1990) ("The theory ...held that foreign law could never operate outside
the territory of the foreign sovereign. Rather, the forum's use of foreign law could be
explained in terms of the forum's enforcement of a right that had vested as a result of an
occurrence in the foreign jurisdiction.... The vested rights theory made it important to
determine when and where a particular right vested because the law of that place would
control the content of the right.").
104. ARTRA, 338 Md. at 569, 659 A.2d at 1299.
105. Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 329 (1990) ("In
contract cases, true conflicts should be resolved by applying the law chosen by the parties,
or, if no express choice is made, by applying whichever law validates the contract."); cf.
VERNON ET AL., supra note 103, at 384-85 ("Few of the current writers who favor a return to
territorial choice rules would advocate the discredited rules of the First Restatement. But
because no one has been able to offer alternative territorial choice rules that would work
any better, a better term for this group is probably 'anti-modernist.'").
106. See RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 332 cmt. c (1934) ("A difficult problem is
presented in deciding whether a question in a dispute concerning a contract is one involving the creation of an obligation or performance thereof. There is no distinction based on
logic alone between determining the creation of the contract and the rights and duties
thereunder on the one hand, and its performance on the other."); see a/so VERNON ET AL.,
supranote 103, at 229 (suggesting that the place of breach, by analogy to tort law, is "the
last event needed to generate liability" and may be logically "more consistent with the
vested rights theory").
107. Mayse v. Watson, No. E-85-8, 45499, 1985 WL 7613 at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 27,
1985) ("While [/ex loci contractus] rules provided uniformity in the law[,] the rigidity of the
rules has been subject to sharp criticism.").
108. Arthur Nussbaum, Conflicts Theories of Contracts: Cases Versus Restatemen 51 YALE L.J.
893, 915-16 (1942) (Problems of uncertainty include "the determination of whether the
performance is sufficient, whether there is an excuse for non-performance, whether a
breach has occurred, and whether there is a right to damages for a breach. Now, contract
litigation most frequently revolves around these points . . . ."); see also supra note 81.
109. VERNON ET AL., supra note 103, at 219 ("[T]he First Restatement rules are not concerned with which substantive rule is 'better,' or the parties' intentions, or policy; rather,
they are concerned only with identifying a particular event and the jurisdiction (state) in
which that event occurred.").
110. See supra note 45.
111. ARTRA, 338 Md. at 581, 659 A.2d at 1305.
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ment.11 Section 188 suggests factors to consider when determining
which state has the "most significant relationship."' 1 3 These factors
include: (1) the place where the contract was made; (2) the place
where the contract was negotiated; (3) the place where the contract
was performed; (4) the location of the subject matter of the contract;
and (5) the domicile and place of business of the parties." 4 Like all
choice-of-law rules in the Second Restatement, section 188 rules must be
applied in light of the principles articulated in section 6,11 namely
(1) the needs of the interstate and international systems, (2)
the relevant policies of the forum, (3) the relevant policies of
other interested states and the relative interests of those
states in the determination of the particular issue, (4) the
protection ofjustified expectations, (5) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law, (6) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and (7) ease in the
6
determination and application of the law to be applied.'
Whereas the FirstRestatement based choice-of-law rules on the theory of vested rights, the Second Restatement is "more thematic or doctrinal than its predecessor"; however, the Second Restatement retains a
presumption of territoriality. 1 7 The "validity and effect" of certain
types of contracts are determined by the law of the state where that
contract is "located," "unless the values stated in [s] ection 6 point to a
different solution.""' Although the Second Restatement approach
might ultimately produce "the more equitable result" in a particular
case by considering factors in addition to territoriality, "it has the de-

112. Id. at 572, 659 A.2d at 1301; see, e.g., St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Lexington Ins. Co.,
78 F.3d 202, 205 (5th Cir. 1996) (explaining that Texas applies the "most significant relationship" test); Reliance Ins. Co. v. Mast Construction Co., 1996 WL 139572 (10th Cir.
1996) (explaining that Utah applies the "most significant relationship" test); Security Ins.
Co. v. Kevin Tucker & Assocs., Inc., 64 F.3d 1001, 1005 (6th Cir. 1995) (stating that Kentucky follows the "most significant relationship" test).
113. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFUCT OF LAws § 188, at 575 (1971).
114. Id.
115. Willis L.M. Reese, The Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws Revisited, 34 MERCER L.
REv. 501, 516 (1983).
116. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLCT OF LAws § 6 (1971).
117. Reese, supra note 115, at 514 ("People naturally think in terms of territoriality, and
so have the courts. To ignore its significance is to turn one's back on the past and to
ignore a vital factor that underlies the field."); VERNON ET AL., supra note 103, at 359 ("Restatement (Second)'s typical reference to the 'place of most significant relationship' is
generally accompanied by a presumption that a traditionally-selected jurisdiction will
govern.").
118. Reese, supra note 115, at 513-14.
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cided disadvantage of producing limited precedential guidelines for
cases that will follow later."' 1 9
It may be the case that "[b ] oth the First and Second Restatements
of Conflicts failed to provide generally acceptable approaches to analyzing and resolving cases involving choice-of-law questions.' 2 The
First Restatement relied on arbitrarily selected "contacts as determinative," while the Second Restatement provided "a long list of presumptions" that the courts have largely ignored. 12 1 It is fair to say that, at a
minimum, the Second Restatement serves as more of a statement of val1 22
ues than a restatement of current law.
This would suggest that a clearer and more honest approach
might be that of "interest analysis." This approach to choice of law
bases the power of a state to legislate more on its "sphere of legitimate
governmental interest" than "on its territory." 12' Endorsed by the
United States Supreme Court, 2 4 "interest analysis" does not require
the forum to balance its interests with those of the foreign jurisdiction.
Rather, the Supreme Court has held, with "fair consistency,"
that "a state with a legitimate interest in applying its own law [may] do
so," even though a foreign state may have an equal or superior interest. 1 26 Some have criticized the approach as being defectively biased
in favor of state residents.'22 Despite the fact that the Court of Appeals discussed at length the "modern" approach of the Second Restatement,1 28 the ARTRA court adopted instead a form of "interest
9
12

analysis."

The Court of Appeals held that Maryland courts should apply
substantive Maryland law in contract disputes when the foreign jurisdiction would apply Maryland law, and when "Maryland has the most
significant relationship, or, at least, a substantial relationship with respect to the contract issue presented."'3 0 Thus, if Maryland has a sub119. Mayse v. Watson, No. E-85-8, 45499, 1985 WL 7613, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 27,
1985).
120. Joseph William Singer, A Pragmatic Guide to Conflicts, 70 B.U. L. REv. 731, 735
(1990).
121. Id. at 735-36.
122. See Reese, supra note 115, at 516.
123. VERNON ET AL., supra note 103, at 299.
124. Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
125. VERNON ET AL., supra note 103, at 299.
126. Id. at 299-300.
127. Id. at 354.
128. ARTRA, 338 Md. at 569-71, 659 A.2d at 1299-1300.
129. SeeVERNON ET AL., supra note 103, at 299 ("Interest analysis is probably the methodology of most pervasive influence on courts today.").
130. ARTRA, 338 Md. at 579, 659 A.2d at 1304.
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stantial interest, Maryland law will be applied even in a case when a
foreign jurisdiction has a more substantial interest. This approach is
pure interest analysis.'
Although the court did mention the factors suggested by the Restatement to determine the "most significant relationship,"' 32 it did not
discuss the principles listed in section 6 that are the "central theme or
theory" around which the Restatement provisions "revolve."13 3 Moreover, the court stated that, under the circumstances of ARTRA, "Maryland's adherence to lex loci contractus must yield to a test such as
Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws Section 188,"' 134 rather than
unequivocally identifying the court's approach as that of the
Restatement.
At least one writer has suggested that Maryland began to adopt
the doctrine of "interest analysis" years ago.13 3 The Court of Appeals
declined the opportunity presented by ARTRA, however, to provide
guidelines to the lower courts as to when interest analysis should be
applied. Finally, the court remained silent as to whether Maryland
courts should apply the same exception, under similar choice-of-law
circumstances, to the doctrine of lex loci delicti'3 6 in torts cases.
c. Renvoi.-The theory of renvoi provides that the court of
the forum state must take into account the whole law of the other
jurisdiction, including its rules as to choice-of-law, even if that law is
the law of the forum.' 37 Brainerd Currie, a sponsor of "interest analysis," argued that forum law should always apply in a true conflict situation13 8 because "assessment of the respective values of the competing
legitimate interests of two sovereign states, in order to determine
which is to prevail, is a political function of a very high order ...that
should not be committed to courts in a democracy."' 3 9 Injustifying its
131. See supra text accompanying notes 123-126.
132. ARTRA, 338 Md. at 570, 659 A.2d at 1300 (emphasis added).
133. Reese, supra note 115, at 516.
134. ARTRA, 338 Md. at 579, 659 A.2d at 1304.
135. See Note, Hauch v. Connor-Beginning a Transition in Maryland Conflict of Laws Doctrine?, 43 MD. L. Ray. 204, 223 (1984) ("In Hauch v. Connor the Court of Appeals
[f]ocus[ed] on public-policy considerations of the kind central to interest analysis.").
136. The term means "[t]he law of the place where the crime or wrong took place."
BLACK'S LAW DIcnONARY 820 (5th ed. 1979).

137. Note, Hauch v. Connor, supra note 135, at 223.
138. See EUGENE F. SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAws § 2.6, at 17 (1st ed. 1982)
("A 'false conflict' exists when the potentially applicable laws do not differ or when, upon
examination, one law-by its own terms or underlying policies-is not intended to apply to
a situation such as the one in issue.").
139. Brainerd Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 DUKE LJ.
171, 176 (1959).
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use of the renvoi doctrine, the Court of Appeals explained that Maryland's courts and legislature "prefer" Maryland law.14 However, in
order to apply its own "preferred" internal law in cases such as ARTRA, it necessarily must "prefer" the choice-of-law rules of the foreign
jurisdiction to its own. 4 ' The court held that because "simplicity, predictability, and uniformity would be better achieved," the preference
was justified.' 4 2 Alternatively, "[]udges [take] an equivocal stance,
generally rejecting the renvoi while employing it in a variety of particular situations."14' Renvoi is therefore often discussed as an "escape device" that "courts use to avoid the traditional rules."'"
The FirstRestatement did not approve of renvoi in contract cases.1 4
In spite of this, "traditionalist courts occasionally resorted to the concept to escape the place of making rule." 14 6 In contrast, according to
the Second Restatement, a court appropriately uses renvoi "[w]hen the
objective of the particular choice-of-law rule is that the forum reach
the same result on the very facts involved as would the courts of another state."' 4 7 This clearly is not the case in ARTRA. Maryland law
would reach the exact opposite result of the interpretation of pollution clauses that both parties attribute to Illinois. 4 Another circumstance in which the Second Restatement recommends renvoi is when the
forum state "has no substantial relationship to the particular issue or
the parties and the courts of all interested states would concur in selecting the local law rule applicable to this issue."' 4 9 This too is clearly
not the case in ARTRA. The court applied renvoi precisely because
Maryland had "the most significant relationship, or, at least, a substantial relationship with respect to the contract issue presented." 15 ° In
other words, the court adopted a limited form of renvoi1 5 1 in stark

140. ARTRA, 338 Md. at 578, 659 A.2d at 1303-04.
141. See Erwin N. Griswold, Renvoi Revisited 51 HARv. L. REv. 1165, 1177 (1938).
142. ARTRA, 338 Md. at 179, 659 A.2d at 1304.
143. Larry Kramer, Return of the Renvo, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 979, 981 (1991).
144. Id.
145. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 7 (1934).
146. VERNON ET AL., supra note 103, § 4.13(4).
147. Id.
148. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text. CompareOutboard Marine v. Liberty
Mut. Ins., 607 N.E.2d 1204, 1217-20 (Ill. 1992) (finding the terms "sudden and accidental"
to be ambiguous and holding that ambiguous terms are to be construed in favor of the
insured).
149. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFUCT OF LAWS § 8 (1971).
150. ARTRA, 338 Md. at 579, 659 A.2d at 1304.
151. Id. at 574, 659 A.2d at 1302.
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opposition to the FirstRestatement 52 and applied the doctrine in a situ15
ation not endorsed by the Second Restatement. 3
Inherent problems arise when courts apply renvoi to cases such as
ARTRA. First, it is illogical, because if "we refer to all the law, including conflicts rules, we are apparently on a merry-go-round" of circularity.1 54 Second, Maryland courts must now determine which choice-oflaw approach the foreign jurisdiction would have used; a difficult task
because many states are currently in transition from the traditional to
the modem approach. 5 5 If a Maryland court determines that the foreign jurisdiction uses the "most significant relationship" approach, it
must then determine the degree of consideration the foreign jurisdiction would extend to each factor, including the place of contracting. 156 Also, if the court determines that the foreign jurisdiction
employs lex loci contractus, it must then determine how the foreign jurisdiction would itself determine lex Joci 157
Finally, the issue presents a problem of a more theoretical nature.
It takes two jurisdictions to dance the renvoi tango, a reference and a
remission. What is the result when the foreign jurisdiction does not
recognize renvoi? If Maryland has truly chosen in ARTRA to recognize
all of Illinois law, including Illinois choice-of-law, is it not also necessary for Maryland to determine whether Illinois recognizes the doctrine of renvoi, or whether Illinois abandoned renvoi just as it
abandoned lex loci contractus? The fact that Illinois might have applied
Maryland law if the action had been brought in Illinois does not necessarily mean that Illinois would remit a reference from Maryland.

152. See supra text accompanying note 146.
153. See supra text accompanying note 147.
154. Griswold, supra note 141, at 1167. Griswold states, in answer to the question
whether a court should stop after the first or second reference,
It may promptly be conceded that there is no logical basis for choosing between
the first and second [approaches] ....
[Where we face] an endless series of
references, there is no logical reason for stopping after the second reference (or
"accepting the renvor); it would be just as "logical" to stop after the third reference or the seventeenth. But by the same token, it is no more "logical" to stop
after the first reference. It may or may not be expedient to stop there for one
reason or another, but a solution reached on this ground cannot be accorded the
accolade of logic.
Id. at 1177.
155. See supra note 112.
156. See supra text accompanying notes 114-116.
157. See supra notes 106-108 and accompanying text (discussing the uncertainty of that
determination).
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The most recent Illinois case discussing
renvoi seems to indicate that
15 8
Illinois now rejects that doctrine.
5. Conclusion.-In addition to placing the burden of making difficult inquiries on Maryland courts, ARTRA will impact Maryland law
in other ways. Maryland courts that would have approved of the abandonment of lex loci contractus in favor of a modem approach will now
have an incentive to determine that the foreign jurisdiction would not
apply its own substantive law, in order to "accept" the reference back
to Maryland under the doctrine of renvoi. By creating another exception to lex loci contractus in ARTRA rather than abandoning the doctrine, the current status of Maryland choice of law is that Maryland
rejects the "most significant relationship" test unless a Maryland court
determines that Maryland itself has the "most significant
relationship."

15 9

In ARTRA, the Court of Appeals bypassed the opportunity to
modernize and clarify its choice-of-law approach. Although neither of
the Restatements provides a paradigm of certainty or predictability of
outcome, contract parties at least should be certain which approach a
Maryland court would likely employ when faced with such a dispute.
If the Court of Appeals prefers interest analysis it should openly express that preference. The court then should prefer Maryland choiceof-law rules to those of foreign jurisdictions and reference only the
internal, or substantive law of the foreign jurisdiction. Because of the
problems inherent in renvoi, the court should apply this controversial
doctrine only in the limited situations recommended by the Second
Restatement,160 if at all. "In this way, it is said, we do not have to worry
'
about how to get off the merry-go-round, for we never get on it. "161
JOHN

R.

CATIZONE

158. See Aurora Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 268 N.E.2d 552, 555 (Ill. App. CL 1971) (citing
authorities critical of the doctrine); see also Folk v. York-Shipley, Inc., 239 A.2d 236, 239-40
(Del. 1968) (holding that Delaware follows renvoi only in suits subject to the UCC); Maroon v. Indiana Dep't of Mental Health, 411 N.E.2d 404, 413 (Ind.Ct. App. 1980) ("[W~e
agree the doctrine is not, and should not become, a part of our law."); Pfau v. Trent Aluminum Co., 263 A.2d 129, 137 (N.J. 1970) (finding a "false conflict" and refusing to apply
foreign choice of law); Rescildo v. R.H. Macy's, 187 A.D.2d 112, 114 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993)
("[W]e decline to accept the doctrine of renvoi with its circuitous route of return .... ");
AM. JUR. 2D Conflict of Laws § 4 (1979) ("The doctrine of renvoi has been repudiated by
many American authorities.").
159. See supra text accompanying note 79.
160. See supra text accompanying note 147.
161. Griswold, supra note 141, at 1167.
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A.

CRIMINAL LAW

Mandatory Sentencing: Moving Toward JudicialDiscretion

In Jones v. State,' the Court of Appeals considered whether a defendant who is convicted of more than one violent crime resulting
from a single incident is entitled as a matter of law to have Article 27,
section 643B(c) 2 mandatory sentencing imposed upon a conviction
carrying the greatest statutory penalty, thereby resulting in the shortest term possible under the statute.3 The court held that a defendant
was not entitled to the shortest penalty because a sentencing judge has
the discretion to choose any one of the qualifying convictions upon
which to impose the statutory penalty required under section
643B(c).' In reaching its conclusion, the court looked to statutory
construction to ascertain the intent of the legislature as well as the
principle of broad judicial discretion in sentencing.
This Note will review the legal background of the Jones decision
with attention to the development of the mandatory provision, the
application of its sentencing provisions, and the history ofjudicial discretion in sentencing. This Note concludes that the court's construction provides a compromise between mandatory sentencing and the
judicial discretion that historically has been afforded the trial judge.
The Jones holding implies that, although mandatory sentencing will
remain in place, Maryland courts may broadly construe such statutes
to allow for more judicial discretion.
1. The Case.-Duane Thomas Jones was convicted of three
crimes arising out of a single incident that occurred on March 15,
1991.' The victim, the part owner of a small company that sells perfumes door-to-door, testified that at his request she went to the de1. 336 Md. 255, 647 A.2d 1204 (1994).
2. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 643B(c) (1992). Section 643B(c) mandates that
[a]ny person who (1) has been convicted on two separate occasions of a crime of
violence where the convictions do not arise from a single incident, and (2) has
served at least one term of confinement in a correctional institution as a result of
a conviction of a crime of violence, shall be sentenced, on being convicted a third
time of a crime of violence, to imprisonment for the term allowed by law, but, in
any event, not less than 25 years. Neither the sentence nor any part of it may be
suspended, and the person shall not be eligible for parole except in accordance
with the provisions of Article 31B, § 11. A separate occasion shall be considered
one in which the second or succeeding offense is committed after there has been
a charging document filed for the preceding occasion.
Id.
3. Jones, 336 Md. at 257, 647 A.2d at 1205.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 258, 647 A.2d at 1205.
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fendant's home to sell perfume, at which time the crimes of second
degree rape,6 second degree sexual offense,' and robbery, occurred. 9
Jones was subsequently convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court for
Baltimore County.' 0 Because Jones previously had been convicted in
two separate criminal cases in 1989,11 the State served him with notice
of its intention to seek a mandatory minimum penalty under section
643B(c).

12

Jones admitted that the statutory prerequisites for the imposition
of a mandatory minimum penalty were met; however, he argued that
section 643B(c) was ambiguous regarding the crime upon which the
mandatory twenty-five year penalty should be imposed. 13 Jones argued that because the statute did not specify upon which crime the
mandatory penalty should be imposed, the statute was subject to the
rule of lenity. 14 Jones argued that the rule of lenity required that the
section 643B(c) mandatory penalty of twenty-five years without the
possibility of parole be applied to the conviction that would result in
the minimum term possible under the statute." Because both the
convictions of second degree rape and second degree sexual offense
carried a possible term of twenty years, and the robbery conviction
only carried a possible term of ten years,' 6 Jones sought to have the
mandatory penalty imposed upon either the second degree rape or
second degree sexual offense conviction, thereby shortening the maximum term to which he could be sentenced from sixty-five years to
fifty-five years.17
The trial judge rejected Jones's argument and sentenced him to
twenty years on the second degree rape conviction and twenty years
on the second degree sexual offense, to run concurrently with the
rape sentence.' The judge imposed the 643B(c) mandatory twentyfive year sentence upon the robbery conviction, increasing the term
6.
7.
8.
9.

MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 463 (1992).
Id. § 464A.
Id. § 486.
Jones v. State, No. 197, slip op. at 1-3 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Nov. 12, 1993) (per

curiam).
10. Jones, 336 Md. at 258, 647 A.2d at 1205.
11. Id. Jones previously had been convicted of robbery and burglary and served a term
of confinement in a correctional facility. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id at 258-59, 647 A.2d at 1205-06.
14. Id. See infra note 31 and accompanying text for discussion of the rule of lenity.
15. Jones, 336 Md. at 259, 647 A.2d at 1205-06.
16. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 463(b), 464A(b), 486 (1992).
17. Jones, 336 Md. at 259, 647 A.2d at 1206.
18. Id.
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for the conviction from ten to twenty-five years, to run consecutively
with the rape sentence. 9
Jones appealed, arguing that section 643B(c) was ambiguous and
therefore should be construed to impose the shortest sentence possible.2" In an unreported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision."' The Court of Special Appeals held
"that when more than one conviction arising from a single episode
qualifies as the third conviction of a crime of violence, the determination of the crime to which the mandatory sentence will be imposed
rests within the discretion of the trial court." 2 The Court of Appeals
granted certiorari to resolve the issue of whether a sentencing judge
may select any one of the qualifying convictions to serve as the third
conviction for the purposes of the imposition of the section 643B(c)
23
penalty.
2.

Legal Background.-

a. Development of the Mandatory Sentencing Provision.-The
General Assembly enacted mandatory sentencing laws under Article
27, section 643B, "[for] the purpose of providing new and different
alternatives for dealing with aggressive and violent offenders." 24 Section 643B(c) specifically provides that an individual who has previously been convicted on two separate occasions of a crime of violence
and has previously served at least one term of confinement shall be
sentenced, upon conviction of a third violent crime, to a mandatory
sentence not less than twenty-five years without the possibility of suspension or parole.2 5 Since its enactment, Maryland courts repeatedly

19. Id.
20. Id. at 260, 647 A.2d at 1206.
21. Id.
22. Id. (citingJones v. State, No. 197, slip op. at 21 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Nov. 12, 1993)
(per curiam)).
23. Id.
24. Act of May 26, 1977, ch. 678, 1977 Md. Laws 2723.

25. See supra note 2 for the statutory language in pertinent part.
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have found section 643B(c) to withstand constitutional scrutiny,
have found it difficult to apply.

27

6

but

The Maryland courts consistently have relied on established rules
of statutory construction in order to determine legislative intent and
have ruled to effectuate such intent. 28 The courts have used the plain
meaning rule, which dictates that the words of the statute should be
given their common and everyday meaning. 9 When such a reading
does not give a complete insight into legislative intent, the court
should examine other sources.3 0 If, after this analysis, ambiguity still
remains, criminal statutes are subject to the rule of lenity, which re3
quires such statutes to be read to favor the defendant. '
26. See Minor v. State, 313 Md. 573, 584-86, 546 A.2d 1028, 1033-34 (1988) (holding
that a 25-year sentence without the possibility of parole was not unconstitutionally disproportionate); Stanley v. State, 313 Md. 50, 90-91, 542 A.2d 1267, 1286-87 (1988) (holding
imposition of a 25-year sentence without the possibility of parole did not violate the Eighth
Amendment), appeal after remand, 85 Md. App. 92, 582 A.2d 532 (1990), cert. denied, 322
Md. 240, 587 A.2d 247 (1991); Teeter v. State, 65 Md. App. 105, 118-19, 499 A.2d 503, 50910 (1985) (holding that the multiple offender statute did not constitute cruel and unusual
punishment and did not violate due process or equal protection), cert. denied, 305 Md. 245,
503 A.2d 253 (1986); Bryan v. State, 63 Md. App. 210, 219, 492 A.2d 644, 648 (holding that
mandatory sentencing under § 643B (c) did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment),
cert. denied, 304 Md. 296, 498 A.2d 1183 (1985).
27. See Garrett v. State, 59 Md. App. 97, 115, 474 A.2d 931, 940 (discussing the statute's
need for legislative clarification), cert. denied, 300 Md. 483, 479 A.2d 372 (1984); Calhoun v.
State, 46 Md. App. 478, 489, 418 A.2d 1241, 1249 (1980) (holding that § 643B(c) permits
the imposition of only one mandatory sentence), affd, 290 Md. 1, 425 A.2d 1361 (1981).
The court in Calhoun noted that "[t]he draftsmanship of the statute is patently inartful.
Any change, however, must be left to the legislature." Id. at 489-90, 418 A.2d at 1249.
28. See, e.g., Mustafa v. State, 323 Md. 65, 73, 591 A.2d 481, 485 (1991) (stating that a
court's goal is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent); Jones v. State, 311 Md. 398,
405, 535 A.2d 471, 474 (1988) ("The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain
and effectuate legislative intent."); Hawkins v. State, 302 Md. 143, 147, 486 A.2d 179, 181
(1985) (same).
29. Kaczorowski v. Mayor of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 513, 525 A.2d 628, 632 (1987)
(discussing the plain meaning rule); see also State v. Thompson, 332 Md. 1, 6-7, 629 A.2d
731, 734 (1993) (stating that if the words of the statute are clear and unambiguous, the
court need not go further).
30. Kaczorowski, 309 Md. at 515, 525 A.2d at 632-33. The court stated:
[courts] may and often must consider other "external manifestations" or "persuasive evidence," including a bill's title and function paragraphs, amendments that
occurred as it passed through the legislature, its relationship to earlier and subsequent legislation, and other material that fairly bears on the fundamental issue of
the legislative purpose or goal, which becomes the context within which we read
the particular language before us in a given case.
Id.
31. See Harris v. State, 331 Md. 137, 145, 626 A.2d 946, 950 (1993) (stating that penal
statutes must be construed in favor of the defendant); see alsoJones, 336 Md. at 275, 647
A.2d at 1214 ("Where a statute is ambiguous and the legislative intent is in doubt, the
courts are inclined toward the construction most favorable to the accused.") (quoting
Belman v. State, 332 Md. 207, 213, 586 A.2d 1281, 1284 (1991)); Monoker v. State, 321 Md.
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b. Application of the Mandatory Sentencing Provision.--Overthe
last fifteen years, Maryland courts have used statutory construction to
determine the proper application of section 643B(c). In Hawkins v.
State,32 the Court of Appeals stated that the purpose of the statute is
"to protect the public from assaults upon people and injury to property and to deter repeat offenders from perpetrating other criminal
acts of violence under the threat of an extended period of confinement."3 3 With this purpose in mind, Maryland courts have construed
the statute to determine guidelines for applying the mandatory penalty, and the legislature has amended the statute to clarify its
requirements.
In Calhoun v. State,'M one of the first cases to apply section
643B(c), the Court of Special Appeals, using the plain meaning rule,
held that the statute permits only one mandatory sentence without
the possibility of parole. 5 Two years later, the legislature amended
the language of the statute to clarify the meaning of the requirement
that the defendant must have been previously convicted on two separate occasions.3 6 In Loveday v. State,37 the Court of Appeals stated that
once the statutory requirements were met, there was "no discretion in
the trial court" and the mandatory penalty of twenty-five years without
parole or suspension must be imposed.3 8 The court then decided a
series of cases that clarified the statutory requirements. In Garret v.
State,3 9 the Court of Special Appeals held that the prerequisite two
214, 222, 582 A.2d 525, 529 (1990) (stating that the rule of lenity prohibits a court from an
interpretation that increases a defendant's penalty "'when such an interpretation can be
based on no more than a guess as to what [the legislature] intended'") (quoting Landner
v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 178 (1958)).
32. 302 Md. 143, 486 A.2d 179 (1985).
33. I& at 148, 486 A.2d at 182; see also Minor v. State, 313 Md. 573, 576, 546 A.2d 1028,
1029 (1988) (discussing the penological objectives behind section 643B(c) "to protect our
citizens from violent crime and to expose these criminals to a prolonged rehabilitative
process").
34. 46 Md. App. 478, 418 A.2d 1241 (1980), affd, 290 Md. 1, 425 A.2d 1361 (1981).
35. Id. at 488-89, 418 A.2d at 1248-49.
36. In 1992, the legislature amended § 643B(c) by adding the phrase a "separate occasion shall be considered one in which the second or succeeding offense is committed after
there has been a charging document filed for the preceding occasion." MD. ANN. CODE
art. 27, § 643B(c) (1992); see also infra note 100 and accompanying text (noting possible
motivations for the enactment of the amendment).
37. 296 Md. 226, 462 A.2d 58 (1983).
38. Id. at 236-37, 462 A.2d at 63; see also State v. Taylor, 329 Md. 671, 676-77, 621 A.2d
424, 426-27 (1993) (holding that where a defendant is convicted of two violent crimes for
which there is a finding of merger, sentences imposed on both crimes should be vacated
and the mandatory sentence must be imposed).
39. 59 Md. App. 97, 474 A.2d 931, cert. denied, 300 Md. 483, 479 A.2d 372 (1984).
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convictions must precede the commission of the third crime.4 0 In
Muir v. State,4 1 the Court of Appeals expanded the mandatory sentencing provision by holding that a previous conviction for a crime of violence in a general court-martial tribunal of the United States Army
was satisfactory under the statute and that the defendant's juvenile
status at the time of the previous offenses did not preclude the use of
such offenses for the purpose of mandatory sentencing.42 In Teeter v.
State,43 the Court of Special Appeals determined that where the predicate crimes were committed outside the state, the State must prove
that each crime would have constituted a crime of violence under section 643B. 4 However, where any crime listed under the statute is
shown, no additional proof of violence is necessary.4 5
c. Judicial Discretion.-Mandatory sentencing statutes have
been a topic of debate in the legal community.' Maryland is just one
of many jurisdictions to enact mandatory sentencing provisions 47 and
has, in fact, enacted more than one.4" Mandatory sentencing, by its
nature, provides no discretion at the trial level once the statutory requirements have been satisfied. In Maryland, however, the Court of
Appeals has recognized that "the awesome responsibility of imposing

40. Id. at 118, 474 A.2d at 941.
41. 308 Md. 208, 517 A.2d 1105 (1986).
.42. Id. at 216-17, 517 A.2d at 1110. The court recognized the jurisdictional and other
similarities and differences between military and civil justice and determined that the legislature intended general court-martial convictions, for offenses enumerated in § 643B(a),
to satisfy the statutory requirements for the imposition of mandatory sentencing. Id. at
214-16, 517 A.2d at 1108-10. The court also determined that to discount predicate violent
offenses committed as a juvenile would "thwart the legislative purpose of protecting the
public and deterring the commission of violent offenses." Id. at 218, 517 A.2d at 1110.
43. 65 Md. App. 105, 499 A.2d 503 (1985), cert. denied, 305 Md. 245, 503 A.2d 253
(1986).
44. Id. at 115-16, 499 A.2d at 508.
45. Id. at 117, 499 A.2d at 509. The court determined that although daytime housebreaking with the intent to steal does not necessarily require violent means, it is still considered a violent crime because it is enumerated under the statute as a predicate offense for
mandatory sentencing. Id, at 116-17, 499 A.2d at 508-09.
46. See infra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
47. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-5-9 (1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4214 (1987 & Supp.
1994); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:529.1 (1992 & Supp. 1995); Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-83
(1972); see aLso Montone v. State, 308 Md. 599, 607-12, 521 A.2d 720, 723-26 (1987) (comparing Maryland's habitual offender statute with statutes of other jurisdictions).
48. For examples of other mandatory sentencing provisions and their treatment by the
courts, see State v. Thompson, 332 Md. 1, 629 A.2d 731 (1993) (construing MD. ANN. CODE
art. 27, § 286(c) (1992));Jones v. State, 324 Md. 32, 595 A.2d 463 (1991) (construing MD.
ANN. CODE art. 27, § 286(d) (1) (1987 & Supp. 1990)); Malcolm v. State, 314 Md. 221, 550
A.2d 670 (1988) (construing MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 286(b) (2) (1982 & Supp. 1985)).
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[a] sentence is within the exclusive domain of the trial judge."4 9 The
judge is "'vested with virtually boundless discretion"' 5 ° in order to best
carry out the objectives of sentencing.5 1 Such discretion is evidenced
by the limited access to appellate review in Maryland for sentencing
challenges.5 2
The Court of Appeals recognized judicial discretion within the
mandatory sentencing context in Taylor v. State.5" The Court of Appeals, in reviewing an earlier Court of Special Appeals decision,' determined that where a defendant was convicted of a third violent
offense that would be subject to life imprisonment notwithstanding
the mandatory sentencing provision, the judge has the discretion to
impose a sentence of life imprisonment and suspend all but twentyfive years or more thereof, if he so chooses.5" The Court of Appeals,
after applying maxims of statutory construction, found the language
of the statute to be ambiguous and therefore ruled in favor of
leniency.'

49. Johnson v. State, 274 Md. 536, 538, 336 A-2d 113, 114 (1975).
50. State v. Dopkowski, 325 Md. 671, 679, 602 A.2d 1185, 1189 (1992) (quoting Logan
v. State, 289 Md. 460, 480, 425 A.2d 632, 642 (1991)).
51. The objectives of sentencing are punishment, deterrence, and rehabilitation. Id.
52. Id. at 680, 602 A.2d at 1189. Appellate review is only recognized in three cases:
"'(1) the sentence may not constitute cruel and unusual punishment or otherwise violate
constitutional requirements; (2) the sentencingjudge may not be motivated by ill-will, prejudice or other impermissible considerations; and (3) the sentence must be within the statutory limitations [if any there be].'" Id. (quoting Teasley v. State, 298 Md. 364, 370, 470
A.2d 337, 340 (1984)).
53. 333 Md. 229, 234, 634 A.2d 1322, 1324 (1993).
54. Id. at 236, 634 A.2d at 1325 (discussing Leggett v. State, 79 Md. App. 170, 556 A.2d
289, cert. denied, 317 Md. 70, 562 A.2d 718 (1989)). In Legget, the Court of Special Appeals
addressed a factually similar case to Taylor in which the defendant was convicted of first
degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole under the statute. Leggmt, 79 Md. App. at 171-72, 556 A.2d at 289. The issue involved interpretation of the
phrase in the statute mandating the imposition of a sentence of imprisonment for "the
term allowed by law, but not less than 25 years." See id.at 176, 556 A.2d at 292. The
defendant argued that the court failed to exercise its discretion to impose another sentence, but the Court of Special Appeals declared that trial court had no discretion. Id. at
174-77, 556 A.2d at 291-92. The Court of Appeals, interpreting the same portion of the
statute in Taylor,disagreed and stated a "more lenient reading of the statute is preferable
to that put forth by the Court of Special Appeals in Legget." Taylor, 333 Md. at 236, 634
A.2d at 1325.
55. Taylor, 333 Md. at 237, 634 A.2d at 1326.
56. Id. at 236-37, 634 A.2d at 1325-26. The court held that it was within the discretion
of the trial judge to impose the maximum sentence or to impose a life sentence and suspend all but 25 years or more of the sentence. Id. at 237, 634 A.2d at 1326. Because the
sentencing judge in this case believed that he had no choice but to impose the maximum
sentence, life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, the court vacated the sentence and remanded the matter for resentencing. Id.
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3. The Court's Reasoning.-The Court of Appeals in Jones held
that where a defendant is convicted, from a single incident, of multiple violent crimes, any one of which would satisfy the statutory prerequisites for the imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence under
section 643B(c), the trial judge has the discretion to decide upon
which crime of violence to impose the penalty." In so ruling, the
court relied heavily upon statutory construction and legislative intent
to determine that the statute was not ambiguous.58 The court noted
that judges have always been given broad discretion with respect to
sentencing decisions and similarly should be given the same discretion within the prescribed boundaries of section 643B(c).
Writing for the majority, Judge Raker explained that "the goal of
statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent."6 0 She further explained that to achieve this goal, the first step is
to examine the language of the statute.6 1 If the common and everyday meaning of the words of the statute are clear and unambiguous,
the court will give effect to the statute as it is written. 62 The court then
addressed the rule of lenity, which states that "'the Court will not interpret a... criminal statute so as to increase the penalty that it places
on an individual when such an interpretation can be based on no
more than a guess as to what [the Legislature] intended.' 6 3 Judge
Raker then qualified the use of the rule of lenity as a "maxim of statutory construction which serves only as an aid for resolving an ambiguity .. . [that] may not be used to create an ambiguity where none
exists."' She further explained that the rule of lenity is the last step
in statutory construction15 and "isreserved for cases where, '[a]fter
57. Jones, 336 Md. at 257, 647 A.2d at 1205.
58. Id. at 260-65, 647 A-2d at 1206-09.
59. Id. at 264-65, 647 A.2d at 1208-09.
60. Id. at 260, 647 A.2d at 1206 (citing Mustafa v. State, 323 Md. 65, 73, 591 A.2d 481,
485 (1991);Jones v. State, 311 Md. 398, 405, 535 A.2d 471, 474 (1988)).
61. Id. at 261, 647 A.2d at 1206.
62. Id., 647 A.2d at 1206-07 (citing Dickerson v. State, 324 Md. 163, 170-71, 596 A.2d
648, 651 (1991); Kaczorowski v. City of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 515, 525 A.2d 628, 633
(1987); Hawkins v. State, 302 Md. 143, 147, 486 A.2d 179, 181 (1985)).
63. Id., 647 A.2d at 1207 (alteration in original) (quoting Ladner v. United States, 358
U.S. 169, 178 (1958)); see also Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971) (stating that
"ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of
lenity").
64. Jones, 336 Md. at 261, 647 A.2d at 1207 (citing Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S.
333, 343 (1981); Dillsworth v. State, 308 Md. 354, 365, 519 A.2d 1269, 1274 (1987)).
65. Id. "[T]he rule of lenity 'comes into operation at the end of the process of construing what [the Legislature] has expressed, not at the beginning as an overriding consideration of being lenient to wrongdoers. That is not the function of the judiciary.'" I&.
(second alteration in original) (quoting Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 589
(1961)).
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"siez[ing] everything from which aid can be derived," the Court is
"left with an ambiguous statute,"' containing a 'grievous ambiguity or
uncertainty. '66
Turning to the case at bar, the court began construction of the
mandatory sentencing provision under section 643B(c) by examining
the plain language of the statute.6 7 After reviewing the statutory prerequisites for the imposition of the twenty-five year sentence,6 8 the
court relied on past precedent to conclude that "[o]nce the predicate
requirements for imposition of the § 643B (c) penalty have been established, a sentencing judge has no choice but to impose the mandatory
minimum penalty upon the third crime of violence conviction."69
The Jones court found section 643B(c) to be unambiguous and
found no merit to Jones's argument for the application of the rule of
lenity.7 ° The court noted that the statute clearly states that a third
conviction of a violent crime mandates imposition of the section
643B(c) penalty. 71 The court explained that any of Jones's crimes,

committed in isolation, would have satisfied the prerequisites under
the statute, thereby mandating the imposition of the twenty-five year
penalty. 72 Therefore, had Jones committed only robbery, it would
have been clear that the sentencing judge would have had no choice
but to impose the section 643B(c) penalty on that crime. 73 The court
determined that the conviction of additional crimes of violence did
not change the fact that the robbery conviction still qualified as a
third violent crime under the statute.74

The court also rejected Jones's argument that the conviction of
additional crimes should entitle him to a proportionately more lenient sentence. 75 The court examined the purpose of section 643B(c),
66. Id. at 262, 647 A.2d at 1207 (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting
Staples v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1793, 1804 n.17 (1994)).
67. Id.
68. Id. The court summarized the statute stating that section 643B(c)
provides that a defendant who has twice before been convicted of crimes of violence and served at least one term of confinement in a correctional institution as
a result thereof is subject, upon a conviction a third time of a crime of violence, to
the imposition of the mandatory twenty-five year minimum sentence upon that
third crime of violence conviction.
Id.
69. Id. (citing State v. Taylor, 239 Md. 671, 675, 621 A.2d 424, 426 (1993); Loveday v.
State, 296 Md. 226, 236-37, 462 A.2d 58, 63 (1983)).
70. Id., 647 A.2d at 1207-08.
71. Id. at 263, 647 A.2d at 1208.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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stating that "'[i]t would be illogical to permit a criminal to reduce
proportionally the enhancement of his or her punishment by committing additional and more serious crimes of violence during the incident in which the victim is robbed. ' "7 6
The court further examined the purpose and legislative intent of
the mandatory sentencing provision. The court concluded that the
statute was intended to provide "'new and different alternatives for
dealing with aggressive and violent offenders,"' 7 7 as well as "to provide
warning to those persons who have previously been convicted of criminal offenses that the commission of future offenses will be more
harshly punished."7" The statute also was intended to deter repeat
offenders by imposing the mandatory penalty upon those who disregard the warning, and to protect society from such violent repeat
offenders.7 9
The court relied on the historical discretion granted to sentencing judges to conclude that the legislature never intended to prevent
judges from selecting the conviction upon which to impose the
mandatory penalty. 0 The court noted that Maryland trial court
judges, in order to effectuate the objectives of sentencing-punishment, deterrence, and rehabilitationS-must be given the discretion
to evaluate the facts and circumstances of each case before them. 2
The majority then concluded that because the sentencing judge has
the discretion to impose the mandatory penalty upon any of the qualifying convictions, it was proper for the judge to impose the section
643B (c) penalty upon Jones's robbery conviction.8 3
Judge Bell's dissent, in which Judge Eldridge joined, argued that
the rule of lenity should apply because the plain language of section
643B(c) is ambiguous and the legislative intent is unclear.8 4 He con76. Id. at 264, 647 A.2d at 1208 (quotingJones v. State, No. 197, slip op. at 18 (Md. CL

Spec. App. Nov. 12, 1993) (per curiam)).
77. Id. (quoting Act of May 26, 1977, ch. 678, 1977 Md. Laws 2723).
78. Id.
79. Id. (citing Gargliano v. State, 334 Md. 428, 442-45, 639 A.2d 675, 682-83 (1994);
Jones v. State, 324 Md. 32, 38, 595 A.2d 463, 466 (1991); Minor v. State, 313 Md. 573, 576,
546 A.2d 1028, 1029 (1988); Hawkins v. State, 302 Md. 143, 148, 486 A.2d 179, 182 (1985);
Garrett v. State, 59 Md. App. 97, 118, 474 A.2d 931, 941, cert. denied, 300 Md. 483, 479 A.2d
372 (1984)).
80. Id. at 265, 647 A.2d at 1209. The court stated that "trial court judges are vested

with broad discretion in the exercise of the 'awesome responsibility of imposing sentence'
on criminal defendants." Id. (quoting Johnson v. State, 274 Md. 536, 538, 336 A.2d 113,
114 (1975)).
81. Id.
82. Id. (citing Johnson, 274 Md. at 540-42, 336 A.2d at 115-16).
83. Id. at 265-66, 647 A.2d at 1209.
84. Id. at 266, 647 A.2d at 1209 (Bell, J., dissenting).
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tended that because section 643B(c) is silent on the issue, it is not
clear upon which of the qualifying convictions the mandatory penalty
should be imposed. 85 He argued that while statutory construction
should begin with the plain words of the statute, a court may not "add
or delete words in order to give the statute a meaning not evident by
the words actually used."86 Judge Bell also argued that legislative intent was not helpful because while the legislature intended to deal
more harshly with recidivist criminals, their intentions did not reflect
ajudgment as to which conviction the penalty should be applied when
there are multiple qualifying convictions.8 7 He disagreed with the majority's holding that the legislature intended to leave the decision to
the discretion of the trial judge because, he argued, if that had been
the case, the legislature would have so provided in the statute.8 8
Judge Bell argued that the legislature enacted section 643B(c) with
the intention that "a three time loser" be punished more harshly, in
the form of a mandatory minimum twenty-five year sentence, without
the possibility of suspension or parole.8 9 Examining past precedent,
he noted that the court has recognized that when an offense carries a
sentence greater than the mandatory penalty, ajudge may have discretion to give the sentence proscribed, leaving the portion of the sentence that is not enhanced subject to suspension and parole.9" Judge
Bell distinguished the case at bar as "not an exercise of discretion...
but a manipulation of the mandatory portion of the sentence itself'
that resulted in a sentence that might have been more harsh or lenient than the legislature intended.9 1 In a case of multiple convictions,
application of the statute to any of the convictions would have served
the purpose of treating the defendant more harshly; however, which
conviction was chosen might have affected the severity of the overall
sentence.92 He concluded that because the statute is itself ambiguous
and the legislative intent is unclear, the statute should have been con93
strued in favor of the defendant.
4. Analysis. -The Jones court held that it is within the discretion
of the trial judge to select any of the available crimes upon which to
85. Id. at 267, 647 A.2d at 1210.

86. Id. (citing State v. Thompson, 332 Md. 1, 7, 629 A.2d 731, 734-35 (1993)).
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 270-71, 647 A.2d at 1211-12.
Id. at 271, 647 A.2d at 1212.
Id. at 272, 647 A.2d at 1212-13.
Id. at 272-73, 647 A.2d at 1213.
Id. at 273, 647 A.2d at 1213.
Id. at 274-75, 647 A.2d at 1214.
Id. at 275, 647 A.2d at 1214.
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impose the section 643B(c) mandatory sentence.94 In its decision, the
court recognized the judicial discretion that has always been afforded
to judges in sentencing, and at the same time used maxims of statutory construction to support its decision and to conform with legislative intent. The court provided a compromise between the
constraints enforced by mandatory sentencing provisions and the judicial discretion historically given the sentencing judge. As precedent,
Jones will stand as a decision not for mandatory sentencing, but rather
for recognizing and reinforcing judicial discretion for trial judges in
sentencing decisions.
a. Past Frustration with Section 643B(c).-The Jones decision
marks a trend favoring reliance upon statutory construction and allowing greater discretion for sentencing judges within the mandatory
sentencing framework. Such construction may be the result of a conflict between the legal community's objection to mandatory sentencing,95 and support of enhancement penalties, which have both gained
public support 96 and passed constitutional scrutiny.97 From the outset, however, courts have been frustrated with the language of section
643B(c) and have consequently struggled with the language of the
statute to define what is actually required and how it is to be applied.
Such frustration was openly noted by the Court of Special Appeals in
Calhoun v. State,9" in which the court concluded its opinion by stating,
"The draftsmanship of the statute is patently inartful. Any change,
however, must be left to the legislature." 99 The Calhoun opinion is
peppered with footnotes questioning the statute's application to future scenarios not addressed by the language of the statute.'
The
94. Id. at 257, 647 A.2d at 1205.
95. See Book Note, Determinate Sentencing and JudicialParticipationin Democratic Punishment, 108 HARv. L. REV. 947 (1995) (reviewing Lois G. FORER, A RAGE TO PUNISH: THE
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF MANDATORY SENTENCING (1994) (discussing judicial criti-

cisms of mandatory sentencing)).
96. See Thomas R. Goots, "AThug in PrisonCannot Shoot Your Sister": Ohio Appears Ready
to Resurrect the HabitualCriminalStatute-WillIt Withstand an Eighth Amendment Challenge?,28
AKRON L. REv. 253 (1995) (discussing the history, support, and criticism of mandatory
sentencing); James Wootton, Truth in Sentencing-Why States Should Make Violent Criminals
Do Their Time, 20 U. DAYTON L. REv. 779 (1995) (discussing public support for mandatory
sentencing and the pressure it places upon the legislature).
97. See supra note 26 and accompanying text for discussion of constitutional scrutiny
of mandatory sentencing provisions.
98. 46 Md. App. 478, 418 A.2d 1241 (1980), affd, 290 Md. 1,425 A.2d 1361 (1981); see
also supra text accompanying notes 34-35.
99. Calhoun, 46 Md. App. at 489-90, 418 A.2d at 1249.
100. The Calhoun court questioned two scenarios, both of which became the subject of
later cases. At the time of Calhoun, the statutory language only provided that the defendant have two prior convictions. The court questioned the interpretation of the terms "sep-
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Calhoun court concluded that "[t]hese discrepancies and variations
are indicative of the need for legislative clarification of this statutory
enactment."10' For the next ten years, as different scenarios arose, the
courts struggled to determine the proper guidelines for the trial
court. 10 2 More recently, however, the Court of Appeals has shifted
away from a construction of the statute that provides a definite answer
for the trial courts, and instead has interpreted the statute to leave
room for judicial discretion within mandatory sentencing.
b. The New Trend Toward Judicial Discretion.-TheJones decision continues a trend that began one year earlier in Taylor v. State.'
The Taylor court considered the statutory language of section
643B (c), which mandates that a judge must impose a sentence of "imprisonment for the term allowed by law, but in any event, not less than
25 years. Neither the sentence or any part of it may be suspended,
and the person shall not be eligible for parole .... ,,
The court
could not determine from the plain language of the statute whether
the phrase "the sentence" referred to the "term allowed by law," or
whether it referred only to the twenty-five year minimum sentence immediately preceding the phrase.' 0 5 The court tried to discern the legarate occasions," and invited the General Assembly to clarify the statute. Id. at 490 n.5, 418
A.2d at 1249 n.5. The legislature did in fact do so, but not before the Court of Special
Appeals considered the issue in Lett v. State, where the court determined that two separate
convictions that were consolidated at trial and entered the same day did not constitute
separate occasions for the purpose of the statute. 51 Md. App. 668, 679-80, 445 A.2d 1050,
1057, cert. denied, 294 Md. 442 (1982). The Let case was decided on June 2, 1982, and the
clarifying amendment was signed by the governor on May 25, 1982 and became effective
on July 1, 1993. See Garrett v. State, 59 Md. App. 97, 116-17, 474 A.2d 931, 940, cert. denied,
300 Md. 483, 479 A.2d 372 (1984) (discussing the need for legislative clarification and
review of the Lett decision).
The Calhoun court, while discussing the illogical effect of allowing more than one
mandatory sentence, noted that under § 643B(c), a life sentence without the possibility of
parole could be imposed when such a sentence is the "term allowed by law." Calhoun, 46
Md. App. at 489 n.4, 418 A.2d at 1248 n.4. The Court of Appeals was faced with this
scenario in Taylor v. State and addressed what is mandatory for the sentencing judge when
the sentence allowed by law is greater than the mandated 25-year penalty. 333 Md. 229,
235-36, 634 A.2d 1322, 1325 (1993).
101. Calhoun, 46 Md. App. at 490 n.5, 418 A.2d at 1249 n.5.
102. See supra notes 26-56 and accompanying text for discussion of past decisions.
103. 333 Md. 229, 634 A.2d 1322 (1993); see also supra notes 53-56 and accompanying
text.
104. MD. ANN. CODE. art. 27, § 643B(c) (1992).
105. Taylor, 333 Md. at 235-36, 634 A.2d at 1325. The court debated whether the language in § 643B(c) meant that only the 25-year mandatory sentence was not subject to
suspension and parole, or if the term allowed by law for the specific crime committed
(which in this case was first degree murder carrying a sentence of life imprisonment) was
not subject to suspension or parole. Id.
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islative intent and determined that the statute was ambiguous with
respect to the limitation on parole eligibility and the judge's ability to
suspend the sentence, and therefore applied the rule of lenity.' 6 Accordingly, the court construed the statute to require only that twentyfive years must be served without parole or suspension, and to provide
the sentencing judge the discretion to impose any additional sentence
107
beyond the mandatory penalty.
The Jones decision is similar to the decision in Taylor in that both
allowed judicial discretion; however, Jones can be distinguished from
Taylor in the way the court reached its conclusion. The Jones court
looked at the plain meaning of the statute to determine that, if the
defendant had been convicted of robbery alone, there would be no
question that the mandatory sentence applied.10 Therefore, the
court concluded that the legislature intended to give the trial judge
discretion when there is more than one qualifying conviction.' 9
However, as noted by Judge Bell in his dissent, the statute is silent on
what to do when there is more than one qualifying conviction, and
there is nothing to indicate that the legislature even considered this
scenario. 1 0 While the Taylor court determined the actual language of
the statute to be ambiguous, it is significant that, in contrast, the Jones
court determined the statute to be unambiguous on an issue that was
not addressed by the statute. The Jones court engaged in the exercise
of statutory construction with deference to the legislature, but, in fact,
used the legislature's silence as an affirmation of judicial discretion.
Still, Jones and Taylor are consistent in that, by relying on judicial discretion, they both allow for a great range in the maximum possible
sentence under the mandatory sentencing provision."'
106. Id. The court noted that "[t] he dual purposes of public protection and deterrence
do not require conversion of every life imprisonment sentence into a sentence of life imprisonment without parole; both purposes are sufficiently served by 25 years' mandatory
imprisonment without parole." Id. at 236, 634 A.2d at 1325. The court further noted such
a lenient reading of the statute is preferable because "an enhanced punishment statute is
'highly penal, [it] must be strictly construed.'" Id. at 237, 634 A.2d at 1325-26 (alteration
in original) (quotingJones v. State, 324 Md. 32, 38, 595 A.2d 463, 466 (1991)).
107. Id. at 236-37, 634 A.2d at 1325-26. Judge Bell dissented, arguing that the majority
created ambiguity where none existed and that "[w] hen the sentence 'allowed by law' is a
specific sentence that necessarily is greater than 25 years imprisonment, it is that greater
sentence that must be imposed and which cannot be suspended, in whole or part." Id. at

240, 634 A.2d at 1327 (Bell, J., dissenting).
108. Jones, 336 Md. at 263, 647 A.2d at 1208.
109. Id. at 264-65, 647 A.2d at 1208-09.
110. Id. at 270-71, 647 A.2d at 1211-12.
111. The court in both cases was careful to rule in a way that did not provide trial courts
with a specific answer as to how to rule when these situations arise in the future. In Taylor,
the court stated it was construing the statute in favor of leniency, which in effect provided
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c. Policy Impact on Mandatory Sentencing.-The discretion
now afforded to a sentencing judge who must impose a section
643B(c) mandatory sentence may significantly affect the sentence a
defendant receives."' The Court of Appeals has stated that the purpose of the mandatory provision "is to protect the public from assaults
upon people and injury to property and to deter repeat offenders
from perpetrating other criminal acts of violence under the threat of
an extended period of confinement.""' The aforementioned discretion, however, likely will allow for variations in the imposition of
mandatory sentences, thereby undermining the deterrent effect of the
statute. There will no longer be an element of predictability concerning the criminal sanction to which a repeat offender will be subject
under a mandatory provision. In addition, there may be a lack of uniformity in sentencing among the courts because judges are given discretion rather than guidance as to how to apply the statute.
The Court of Appeals has recognized that "[f]undamental fairness dictates that the defendant understand clearly what debt he must
pay to society ....
If the punishment is clear, the defendant can
begin to conform."" 4 If a potential repeat offender infers that there
that judges could use their discretion to provide either a harsher or more lenient sentence
depending on the case. 333 Md. at 237, 634 A.2d at 1326. Similarly, in Jones, the court did
not determine that the statute required interpretation of either the harshest or most lenient sentence, but instead left it for judicial discretion. 336 Md. at 265, 647 A.2d at 1209.
112. Section 643B(a) enumerates the crimes to which the statute applies and provides
in pertinent part:
"[C] rime of violence" means abduction; arson; burglary; daytime housebreaking
under § 30(b) of this article; kidnapping;, manslaughter, except involuntary manslaughter; mayhem and maiming under §§ 384, 385, and 386 of this article; murder; rape; robbery;, robbery with a deadly weapon; sexual offense in the first
degree; sexual offense in the second degree; use of a handgun in the commission
of a felony or other crime of violence; an attempt to commit any of the aforesaid
offenses; assault with intent to murder; assault with intent to rape; assault with
intent to rob; assault with intent to commit a sexual offense in the first degree;
and assault with intent to commit a sexual offense in the second degree.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 643B(a) (1992); see also Bryan v. State, 63 Md. App. 210, 217-18,
492 A.2d 644, 647-48 (discussing possible sentences for violent crimes enumerated under
§ 643B(a)), cart. denitd, 304 Md. 296, 498 A.2d 1183 (1985).
113. Hawkins v. State, 302 Md. 143, 148, 486 A.2d 179, 182 (1985); see aLso Garrett v.
State, 59 Md. App. 97, 115-18, 474 A.2d 931, 940-41 (discussing the purpose of general
mandatory provisions for both "deterrence/reform and secure and lengthy removal from
society" and deciding to infer a legislative intent for deterrence), cert. denied, 300 Md. 483,
479 A.2d 372 (1984).
114. Robinson v. Lee, 317 Md. 371, 379-80, 564 A.2d 395, 399 (1989); see aLso Gargliano
v. State, 334 Md. 428, 444, 639 A.2d 675, 682-83 (1994) ("[T]he means for achieving such
deterrence is the provision of fair warning to previous offenders that if they continue to
commit criminal acts after having had the opportunity to reform after one or more prior
contacts with the criminal justice system, they will be imprisoned for a considerably longer
period of time than they were subject to as first offenders.").
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is latitude in the maximum mandatory sentence under section
643B(c), the deterrent effect may be negated. Nonetheless, this argument does not account for sentencing judges' historic discretion to
effectuate the objectives of punishment, deterrence, and rehabilitation. 115 While the statute takes into account past convictions and time
served, judicial discretion similarly always has required that "[a] sentence should be premised upon both the facts and circumstances of
the crime itself and the background of the individual convicted of
committing the crime."'16 Allowing judicial discretion, while still retaining the mandatory provision, will allow the judge not only to account for the statutory requirements of the mandatory sentence, but
also to consider other factors that may play a role in determining
whether a more lenient or more harsh sentence is required. 1 7
The Jones decision represents a compromise, but stands for the
proposition of judicial discretion. 1 8 The Maryland courts have continually tried to interpret the statute to determine what is mandatory,
and in Jones the Court of Appeals interpreted section 643B(c) to allow
for judicial discretion in a situation where the statute is otherwise silent. 9 The court found that the intent of the legislature was to provide the sentencing judge with discretion, and the court will most
12 0
likely interpret the statute in a similar manner in the future.
115. Johnson v. State, 274 Md. 536, 540, 336 A.2d 113, 115 (1975) (stating that ajudge is
given broad latitude in order to impose what is necessary in order to accomplish the goals
of sentencing).
116. Id.
117. For example, the sentencing judge in Jones explained why the mandatory sentence
should be applied to the robbery conviction, thereby giving the defendant the greater
maximum sentence:
There is no question that this was a very evil thing that you did. And it was not
spontaneous. It was something you had thought about. And you actually executed a plan to get this victim who is out trying to make a living into your
"clutches," so-to-speak. You're a very dangerous person, and that's the way I'm
going to treat this case.
Appellant's Brief at 39, Jones v. State, 336 Md. 255, 647 A.2d 1204 (1994) (No. 2) (citing
excerpt from the sentencing proceeding of Oct. 16, 1992). After reading the sentence
imposed, the judge reiterated the objectives that motivated the sentence: "You will be a
very old man when you get out ofjail, if you change yourself when you get out ofjail at all,
but at least you have the chance to do that in your later years. You've earned that disposition by your conduct." Id. at 40.
118. Jones has since been cited as precedent for allowing judicial discretion by the Court
of Special Appeals in Keirsey v. State, No. 1515, slip op. at 13 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Sept. 1,
1995) (citing Jones, 336 Md. at 265, 647 A.2d at 1209).
119. See supra notes 110-111 and accompanying text for a discussion of the interpretation of this statutory silence.
120. The Jones decision may be another invitation to the legislature to intervene if the
true legislative intent has not been carried out. The court repeatedly has noted the statute's inadequacy and invited the legislature to clarify the language. See supra notes 98-101
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5. Conclusion.-Jones holds that trial judges are to be given discretion to choose upon which crime of violence to impose a section
643B(c) mandatory penalty, when there are multiple qualifying convictions. 1 1 This is consistent with the court's recent trend toward judicial discretion and its deference to legislative intent. Jones is unique,
however, in its assumption of legislative intent in a situation in which
the statute is silent. The decision reflects a compromise that provides
deference to the legislature in requiring the judge, at a minimum, to
stay within the confines of the established requirements of the statute,
while also allowing for judicial discretion in a situation upon which
the statute is silent. In the future, mandatory sentences will remain a
topic of debate. Unless the legislature responds to the court's construction of section 643B (c), situations unaccounted for by the statute, like the one in Jones, will continue to arise and the court again will
be required to attempt to construe the legislative intent behind the
statute.
TASHINA GAUHAR

B.

The Necessity of Inquiry into Racial Bias in Voir Dire

In the wake of the Rodney King and O.J. Simpson trials, jury racial bias has become a fast-growing topic of social and legal debate. In
Hill v. State,1 the Court of Appeals rendered a decision aimed at combating racially biased juries. The court reversed the conviction of an
African-American Baltimore resident convicted of drug possession on
the ground that the trial court failed to question prospective jurors on
issues of racial prejudice. This decision extends the rights of criminal
defendants far beyond federal constitutional and nonconstitutional
protections and sends a resounding message that racism will not be
tolerated by Maryland courts. The decision constitutes a positive step
forward in the protection of the criminal defendant's right to an impartial jury and thereby enhances the integrity and fairness of Maryland's criminal justice system.
1. The Case.-One late November evening in 1991, Baltimore
City police officer Barron Burch approached Andrew Hill in connecand accompanying text for examples ofjudicial invitations to the legislature to reform the
statute. Because the legislature has declined to do so, it may have intended to allowjudges
to impose the sentences that they believe to be best suited under the situations that arise,
so long as they keep within the already stated confines of the statute.
121. Jones, 336 Md. at 257, 647 A.2d at 1205.
1. 339 Md. 275, 661 A.2d 1164 (1995).
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tion with a reported armed robbery.2 Hill fit the description of the
suspect: an African-American male in the 2100 block of Booth Street
dressed in blue jeans and a blackjacket 3 Officer Burch also had been
informed that the suspect carried a gun.4 Burch placed Hill against
his cruiser and conducted a pat-down search, but recovered no
weapon.5 He then questioned Hill about the contents of a box labeled "Dominoes" that Hill held in his possession.6 Hill explained
that the box did in fact contain a set of dominoes.' Unconvinced,
Burch seized the box, opened it, and found fourteen vials of cocaine
inside. 8 The State subsequently charged Hill with possession of cocaine and possession with the intent to distribute.9 Officer Burch,
who is white, served as the State's only witness at Hill's trial in the
Circuit Court for Baltimore City.' 0 During jury selection, Hill requested that the court propound the following question to the venire:
You have taken note, the defendant is African-American.
Both sides to this case, and certainly the court want to make
it abundantly clear to you that the racial background of the
defendant is not to be considered against him in any way. It
is imperative that the defendant be judged only upon the
evidence or lack of evidence, without any regard whatever to
whether he is African-American or white. If there is in your
background any experience, or attitude, or predisposition,
or bias, or prejudice, or thought that will make it more difficult for you to render a verdict in favor of this defendant
because of his race, then I ask that you raise your hand."
The trial court refused Hill's request, but did allow prospective jurors
to answer whether they knew of "anything that would keep [them]
from giving a fair and impartial verdict [and] whether any member
12
knew of any reason why he or she should not serve on the jury.
When the trial concluded, the jury returned a guilty verdict on both
charges. 3 Hill appealed.' 4
2. Id. at 277, 661 A.2d at 1165.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.

8. Id.
9.Id.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Id.
Id. at 277-78, 661 A.2d at 1165.
Id. at 278, 661 A.2d at 1165.
Id.
Id.
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In the Court of Special Appeals, Hill argued that the trial court
erred by refusing to question the venire about possible racial bias."
The State countered that Hill failed to preserve his argument at
trial. 6 According to the State, Hill not only failed to raise an objection to the court's decision on the voir dire issue, but he also subsequently "expressed satisfaction with the impaneled"jury.17 The Court
of Special Appeals held that even if Hill had properly preserved the
argument, the lower court was not required to grant Hill's request to
question jurors on potential racial bias.1 " The court reasoned that
state court precedent' 9 required Maryland courts to grant such requests only when "the complainant and the witnesses for the State are
of different race than the defendant" and when "the crime involves
victimization of another person and the use of violence."2" The court
concluded that Hill's crime, possession with the intent to distribute,
did not qualify as a crime of violence and, therefore, did not "fairly"
generate the issue of racial bias."' Thus, the Court of Special Appeals
22
held that the trial court had not erred by refusing Hill's request.
Hill appealed, and the Court of Appeals granted certiorari.23
2. Legal Background.-The development of Maryland law with
respect to voir dire examination of racial bias began in 1959 with
Brown v. State. 4 In Brown, the Court of Appeals held that a trial
court's failure to elicit information as to possible racial bias among
prospective jurors constituted reversible error where the defendant
was charged with the shooting death of a white police officer.2 5 Following Brown, Maryland courts issued a number of decisions that
broadened the scope of Brown.26 The decision of the Court of Ap15. Hill v. State, No. 1183, slip op. at 7-8 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Apr. 26, 1994).
16. Id.at 8.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. (citing Holmes v. State, 65 Md. App. 428, 501 A.2d 76 (1985), rev'd on other
grounds, 310 Md. 260, 528 A.2d 1279 (1987)).
20. Id.

21. Id.
22. Id.
23. 336 Md. 405, 648 A.2d 991 (1994).

24. 220 Md. 29, 150 A.2d 895 (1959).
25. Id. at 32-36, 150 A.2d at 896-97.
26. See Bowie v. State, 324 Md. 1, 11, 595 A.2d 448, 453 (1991) (holding that in a
capital case trial court erred by refusing to propound voir dire question relating to possible
bias); Humphreys v. State, 227 Md. 115, 118, 175 A.2d 777, 778 (1961) (finding that voir
dire questions pertaining to racial bias were appropriate where an African-American man
was charged with raping a white woman); Contee v. State, 223 Md. 575, 581, 165 A.2d 889,
893 (1960) (holding that refusal to question jurors about racial bias in trial of an AfricanAmerican man charged with raping a white woman constituted reversible error).
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peals in Hill continued this trend. In formulating this body of law,
Maryland courts, including the Court of Appeals in Hill, have often
looked to federal law as a point of reference or for guidance. Consequently, this Note will first briefly examine the development of federal
law on this issue.
a. Federal Constitutionaland NonconstitutionalRequirements.Presently, when a heightened risk of racial bias exists, two standards
govern voir dire in federal criminal trials. The first standard stems
directly from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 7 The second standard derives from the Supreme Court's supervisory authority over the lower federal courts.2 8 The United States
Supreme Court first addressed the issue of questioning prospective
jurors about racial bias in the landmark case of Aldridge v. United
States.29 In Aldridge, an African-American defendant, charged with the
murder of a white police officer,3" asked the court to pose a question
to prospective jurors designed to uncover possible racial biases against
African-Americans.' The trial court refused the defendant's request,
finding the question "improper." 2 The jury subsequently convicted
the defendant and sentenced him to death."
The Supreme Court, persuaded by "widespread sentiment"
among the states that "such inquiries be allowed," reversed.' The
Court held that the discretion a court exercises in questioning prospectivejurors is "subject to the essential demands of fairness." 5 In so
ruling, the Court rejected the lower court's finding that the mere fact
that African-Americans enjoyed equal "privileges and rights under the
law" eliminated the need for voir dire inquiry into racial bias. 6 The
27. Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524 (1973). The Fourteenth Amendment states
in pertinent part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
28. Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182 (1981).
29. 283 U.S. 308 (1931).
30. Id. at 309.
31. Id. The Court's opinion in Aldridge does not indicate the precise question or questions requested by the defendant or if the defendant merely asked the trial court to propound its own question with respect to racial bias. See id. at 310-11.
32. Id. at 310.
33. Id. at 309.
34. Id. at 313.
35. Id. at 310.
36. Id. at 314.
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Court found the "civil privileges of the [N]egro," or even the existence of a predominantly unbiased community, irrelevant to the issue
at hand. 7 What matters, the Court held, is the "bias of the particular
jurors who are to try the accused." 8 The Court reasoned:
If in fact, sharing the general sentiment, [prospective jurors]
were found to be impartial, no harm would be done in permitting the question; but if any one of them was shown to
entertain a prejudice which would preclude his rendering a
fair verdict, a gross injustice would be perpetrated in allowing him to sit. Despite the privileges accorded to the
[N] egro, we do not think that it can be said that the possibility of such prejudice is so remote as to justify the risk in forbidding the inquiry. And this risk becomes most grave when
the issue is of life and death.3 9
Furthermore, the Court rejected arguments that racial bias questions would act as a detriment to "the administration of the law" in
federal courts." To the contrary, the Court reasoned that prohibiting
questions designed to elicit "disqualifying prejudice" would serve only
to "bring the processes of justice into disrepute."4" The Court did
hold, however, that trial courts possessed "broad discretion as to the
questions to be asked" and were not required to grant specific requests as to the form questions should take or the number of questions that should be asked.4" Significantly, the Aldridge Court did not
ground its holding in either constitutional or statutory language.4 3
(i) Federal ConstitutionalRequirements.-The Supreme Court
established the federal constitutional standard for voir dire examination on racial bias in two cases, Ham v. South Carolina4 and Ristaino v.
Ross.4 5 In Ham, an African-American defendant alleged that law enforcement officers framed him with charges of marijuana possession
in retaliation for his participation in civil rights activities.' Recognizing that its decision in Aldridge did not expressly rest on constitutional
grounds, 47 the Court held that where a state creates a "statutory
37. Id.
38. Id.

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. (footnote omitted).
Id. at 314-15.
Id. at 315.
Id. at 310.
Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 526 (1973).
Id. at 524.
424 U.S. 589 (1976).
Ham, 409 U.S. at 525.
Id. at 526.
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framework for the selection of juries," the Fourteenth Amendment
requires trial courts to "interrogate the jurors upon the subject of racial prejudice" in circumstances such as those in the Ham case.4" In
support of this ruling, the Court reasoned that the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause helps preserve the "essential demands of fairness," that the Aldridge Court suggested served as the basis for its holding.4" The Court further explained that the Fourteenth
Amendment was adopted primarily to prevent states from "invidiously
discriminating on the basis of race."5"
Three years later, in Ristainov. Ross,"1 the Court limited the reach
of Ham.5" A jury convicted Ross and two other African-American defendants of armed robbery, assault, battery, and attempted murder"
after the trial court refused to question prospective jurors on whether
they believed that "a white person is more likely to tell the truth than
an African-American person."5 4 Ross had based his request solely on
the ground that he and the alleged victim, a white security guard,
were of different races.55 The Supreme Court granted certiorari for
the purpose of answering two questions.5 6 First, the Court considered
whether Ham constitutionally entitled Ross to have racial bias questions propounded to prospective jurors.5 7 Second, the Court decided
whether Ham required that the trial court propound such questions
whenever a confrontation exists between persons of different races or
ethnic origins in a criminal trial.58
The Court answered in the negative to both of these questions. 59
The Court found that while Ham recognized that "some cases may
present circumstances" that require courts to question prospective jurors about racial prejudice, it did not "announce a requirement of
universal applicability."6 ' Rather, the Court held that the Ham decision "reflected an assessment of whether under all of the circumstances presented there was a constitutionally significant likelihood
that, absent questioning about racial prejudice, the jurors would not
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 527.
Id. at 526.
Id. at 526-27.
424 U.S. 589 (1976).
Id. at 597-98.
Id. at 590.
Id. at 590 n.1.
Id. at 591.
Id. at 590.

57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 595-96.

1996]

MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS

be as 'indifferent as [they stand] unsworn.' ' 6 ' Thus, the Ristaino
Court made clear that only when "special circumstances" exist is racial
bias questioning constitutionally required.6" The Court held that the
facts of Ham presented just such circumstances.65 The nature of the
defendant's allegations and his reputation as a civil rights activist, the
Court reasoned, was "likely to intensify.. . prejudice." 64 Thus, racial
issues were "inextricably bound up with the conduct of the trial."6 5 To
the contrary, the Court found that no "special circumstances" existed
in Ristaino.6 6 The mere fact that the victim of an alleged crime and
the defendant are of different races, the Court held, did not automatically generate a constitutionally protected right to voir dire examination for racial bias.6 7 Significantly, however, the Court stated in dicta
that "the wiser course generally is to propound appropriate questions
designed to identify racial prejudice if requested by the defendant."6 8
Under its supervisory power, the Court stated that it "would have required as much of a federal court faced with the circumstances
69
here."
(ii) Federal Nonconstitutional Requirements.-Following Ham,
considerable dissension arose among the lower federal courts as to an
appropriate nonconstitutional standard.7 0 Several circuit courts of appeal established a per se rule of reversible error whenever a trial judge
failed to grant a defendant's request for a voir dire racial bias inquiry, 7 while others required reversal only in cases likely to "have ra61. Id. at 596 (quoting CoKE ON LITTLETON 1556 (19th ed. 1892)).
62. Id. at 594.
63. Id. at 596.
64. Id. at 597.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. Nine years later, the Court modified its position for cases involving capital offenses. Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28 (1986). The Court held that a "capital defendant
accused of an interracial crime" does have a constitutional right "to have prospectivejurors
informed of the race of the victim and questioned on the issue of racial bias." Id. at 36-37.
The Turner Court reasoned that capital cases may be set apart from others because "the
range of discretion entrusted to ajury in a capital sentencing hearing [provides] a unique
opportunity for racial prejudice to operate but remain undetected." Id. at 35. The Court
stated that given the finality of the death sentence and the "minimally intrusive" manner in
which the risk of racial prejudice may be eliminated, a capital defendant is entitled to voir
dire questioning on the issue of racial bias. Id. at 37. Where voir dire is inadequate, however, the Court held that the sentence of death need only be vacated. Id. It is not necessary, the Court held, that the defendant be granted a retrial "on the issue of guilt." Id.
68. Ristaino, 424 U.S. at 597 n.9.
69. Id.
70. Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 187 (1981).
71. Id.
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cial overtones or involve racial prejudice." 72 The Supreme Court
addressed the controversy in 1981 in Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 73 a
case involving a defendant of Mexican descent convicted of helping
Mexican aliens gain unlawful entry into the United States. 74 The trial
court had refused the defendant's request that the court ask prospective jurors if they would be affected by or take into consideration the
defendant's race or ancestry when evaluating the case.7 5 In a plurality
opinion, the Court affirmed. 76 The facts of Rosales-Lopez, the Court
held, did not give rise to a federal nonconstitutional right to voir dire
77
examination on racial bias.
Justice White's opinion in Rosales-Lopez explained that the failure
to honor a defendant's request for voir dire inquiry into racial bias
constitutes "reversible error" under a nonconstitutional standard
"only where the circumstances of the case indicate that there is a reasonable possibility that racial or ethnic prejudice might have influenced the jury."78 Examination as to racial bias, he reasoned, is not
automatic.7 9 Adding substance to the "reasonable possibility standard," Justice White held that Aldridge and Ristaino taken together
"fairly imply that federal trial courts must make such an inquiry when
requested by a defendant accused of a violent crime and where the
defendant and the victim are members of different racial or ethnic
groups."8 ° Justice White recognized that other circumstances also
could give rise to the need for a racial bias inquiry, but that these
decisions rest "primarily with the trial court, subject to case-by-case
review by the appellate courts.""1
b. The Development of Maryland Law.-Three years after the
Supreme Court's decision in Aldridge, the issue of voir dire examination of prospective jurors on issues of racial bias arose in Maryland in
Lee v. State. 2 In Lee, an African-American defendant sentenced to
death for first degree murder appealed his conviction in part on the
72. Id. at 187-88.
73. Id. at 182.
74. Id. at 184.
75. Id. at 185.
76. Id. at 194.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 191. The Court found that both of its prior decisions in Aldridge and Ristaino
involved circumstances that suggested that "there was a 'reasonable possibility' that racial
prejudice would influence the jury." Id. at 192.
79. Id. at 191.
80. Id. at 192.
81. Id.
82. 164 Md. 550, 165 A. 614 (1933).
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ground that the trial court refused to ask prospective jurors if they
regarded African-Americans as their "social equal" and whether they
would "believe a colored man's story just as quickly as a white
man's?"8 3 The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding the questions themselves improper.8 4 The court looked to persuasive state court authority that upheld the qualification of white jurors serving in cases
involving African-American defendants, even when those jurors harbored feelings of racial superiority or did not believe in the "social
equality" of the two races.8 5 As to whether prospective jurors would
just as readily believe an African-American as a white, the court found
the question "too general." 6 Significantly, though, the Lee court recognized the question posed in Aldridge as "proper,""7 thus suggesting
by implication that a criminal defendant had some right to voir dire
examination of racial bias.
The Court of Appeals addressed the issue head-on twenty-six
years later in Brown v. State."8 In Brown, a Dorchester County jury convicted an African-American defendant of the shooting death of a
white police officer.8 9 At trial, the court refused Brown's request that
the venire answer questions about possible "prejudice against a Negro."90 This time, however, the Court of Appeals reversed. 91 In so
ruling, the court adopted the same position taken by a Connecticut
state court.92 In State v. Higgs,93 the Supreme Court of Connecticut
held that where "any likelihood [exists] that some prejudice is in the
juror's mind which will even subconsciously affect his decision of the
case, [the defendant] should be permitted questions designed to uncover that prejudice."94 To this same end, the Brown court also em83. Id. at 556, 165 A. at 617. The trial court did, however, permit the question "Do you
have feeling against colored people?" Id. The Court of Appeals held that the fact that
jurors had answered this question in the negative should have provided sufficient assurance to the defendant that jurors would weigh witness credibility with impartiality. Id. at
557, 165 A. at 617.
84. Id. at 556, 165 A. at 617.
85. Id.
86. Id.

87. Id.
88. 220 Md. 29, 36, 150 A.2d 895, 898 (1959).
89. Id. at 32-33, 150 A.2d at 896-97.
90. Id. at 33, 150 A.2d at 897. One of the questions Brown requested that the court ask
the venire was: "Can you, without bias or prejudice, pass your verdict in this case solely on
the evidence produced from the witness stand without regard to the race, creed or color of
the Defendant?" Id. at 34, 150 A.2d at 897.
91. Id. at 39, 150 A.2d at 900.
92. State v. Higgs, 120 A.2d 152 (Conn. 1956).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 154.
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braced the reasoning of Aldridge, and emphasized the Supreme
Court's position that the relevant issue was "not .

.

. the dominant

sentiment of the community and the general absence of disqualifying
prejudice, but ...the bias of the particular jurors who were to try the
accused."9" The court reasoned that "unless bias is inquired into beforehand, its existence ordinarily will not become known since the
verdict cannot be impeached."9 6 Consequently, the court held that
"the failure to elicit from the jurors the essence of the information
sought by the appellant was reversible error. " "
One year later, in Contee v. State,9 8 the Court of Appeals expanded
Maryland law by holding that where racial issues were present, the
trial judge had a duty to frame a proper question, if the ones proposed by counsel were not in proper form. 99 In Contee, an AfricanAmerican defendant charged with raping a white woman asked the
court to question prospective jurors on several issues relating to racial
bias. 10 0 The court refused, finding the substance and form of the proposed questions "improper."' 01 Furthermore, the court did not afford
the defendant the opportunity to rephrase the questions and declined
to rephrase them on its own initiative."10 While agreeing on the impropriety of the questions,1" 3 the Court of Appeals held that the trial
court should have given the defendant "an opportunity either to
frame additional voir dire questions which might have been proper or
95. Brown, 220 Md. at 35-36, 150 A.2d at 898.
96. Id. at 36, 150 A.2d at 898.

97. Id.
98. 223 Md. 575, 165 A.2d 889 (1960).
99. Id. at 581, 165 A.2d at 893.
100. Id. at 579, 165 A.2d at 892.
101. Id. at 579-80, 165 A.2d at 892-93. The Contee court described these questions as
follows:
3. Whether any juror had ever "belonged to or been affiliated with any organization that had to do with segregation of the races?"
4. Whether any juror believed "in segregation?"

5. Whether any juror had "an opinion as to" the impropriety of "people of
the white race" having "sexual intercourse with people of the colored race?" and
if so "whether the opinion was adverse to the race" of the defendant, who was a
Negro?
6. Whether any juror would "believe a woman of the white race over the
statement of a man of the colored race?"
8. Whether any juror had "ever been involved personally or through close
family association in any criminal matter" concerning "the prosecution of a
colored man" for an act of violence?
Id.
102. Id. at 580, 165 A.2d at 892.
103. Id.
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104
to request a general one concerning racial prejudices or feelings."
Because the judge, "fully apprised of the essence of what the defendant was seeking ...failed to ask on its own motion, as it should have
done, a proper question," the denial constituted reversible error. 0 5
That same year, in Glaros v. State,"0 6 the Court of Appeals held that a
"general question as to bias against any race, creed or nationality"
asked by the trial court "eliminated the need to ask the specific ques-7
10
tion as to possible prejudice against" a defendant of Greek heritage.
Between 1961 and 1971, the Court of Appeals and the Court of
Special Appeals decided several more cases on the issue. In 1961, in
Humphreys v. State,10 8 the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of
an African-American defendant for the rape of a white woman. 0 9
During voir dire examination, the trial court asked a Wicomico
County jury four general questions designed to uncover possible racial
prejudice among the prospective jurors," 0 but refused to ask questions that specifically addressed situations where "a colored man is
charged with that offense against a white woman.""' The Court of
Appeals held that because prospective jurors had been informed prior
to voir dire that the trial involved the crime of rape, prospective "jurors could not [have] fail [ed] to understand ...that the case involved

104. Id., 165 A.2d at 893.
105. Id. The court concluded:
[F] rom the demeanor of the court disclosed by the colloquy between it and counsel at the bench, we are impelled to conclude... that the court had no intention
of making any inquiry as to whether the jurors could or would set aside the feelings he or she might have as to racial differences and fairly and impartially decide
the case solely on the evidence and the applicable law.
Id. at 580-81, 165 A.2d at 893.
106. 223 Md. 272, 164 A.2d 461 (1960).
107. Id. at 276, 164 A.2d at 463.
108. 227 Md. 115, 175 A.2d 777 (1961).
109. Id. at 124, 175 A.2d at 781.
110. Id. at 118-19, 175 A.2d at 778-79. For example, the court questioned prospective
jurors about (1) their ability to decide the case without regard to the race of the defendant; (2) whether they would decide a case differently if the defendant and the prosecuting
witnesses were of different races; (3) if they harbored racial prejudices against blacks that
might cause them to render a guilty verdict when they would not do so if the defendant
were white; and (4) whether they thought they could give a black defendant as impartial a
trial as they would a white defendant. Id.
111. Id. at 119, 175 A.2d at 779. The defendant argued:
[l]t is not enough for a trial court to recognize and explore the possibility of
racial prejudice on the part ofjurors, but that in a case involving the rape of a
white woman, charged to one of the Negro race, it should be further recognized
that such bias or prejudice is likely to be greater ....
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the rape of a white woman by a Negro defendant" when answering the
2
court's more general racial bias questions.1
Ten years later, in Smith v. State,"' the Court of Special Appeals
applied the principles set forth in Brown and Contee to reverse the
armed robbery conviction of an African-American defendant.1 1 4 The
trial court refused to ask prospective jurors whether they harbored
any racial prejudice toward African-Americans that might affect their
"ability to pass fairly on the innocence of the accused." 1 5 A few
months later, in Tunstall v. State," 6 the court reversed two more
armed robbery convictions involving African-American defendants because the trial court refused to ask the venire if they would be "more
likely to believe a white witness rather than a Negro witness?" '1 7 Relying on Smith, the court held that the defendants were "entitled to have
excluded from the jury those persons who would believe the testimony
of one witness as true, in preference to another because of the pigmentation of the skin of the witness."118
Three years after the Supreme Court's decision in Ham, the
Court of Special Appeals began to limit the holdings of Brown and
TunstalL In Thornton v. State," 9 the court held that, just as the Ham
Court required voir dire examination into racial bias "only when there
is an element in the case which raises the possibility that racial considerations could play a role in the jury's deliberations," the language of
Maryland case law similarly suggests that such questioning is required
only when "racial prejudice may be a factor because of the facts of the
case."' 2 ° In so ruling, the court pointed to language in Humphreys that
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 120, 175 A.2d at 779.
12 Md. App. 130, 277 A.2d 622 (1971).
Id. at 134, 277 A.2d at 624.
Id. at 131, 277 A.2d at 623.
12 Md. App. 723, 280 A.2d 275 (1971).
Id. at 726-27, 280 A.2d at 277.

118. Id. at 727, 280 A.2d at 277. Curiously, however, the court's opinion offered no
specific factual reasons as to why the circumstances warranted such questioning, other
than the fact that the defendants had requested it. Id. Moreover, unlike earlier cases, the
opinion failed to identify the race of the victim and other state witnesses. Id.
119. 31 Md. App. 205, 355 A.2d 767 (1976). In Thornton, a Prince George's County jury
convicted an African-American defendant of receiving stolen goods. Id. at 206, 355 A.2d
767. Thornton appealed the verdict on two grounds: (1) the trial court failed to ask potential jurors if they would "not believe a witness because that witness was black"; and (2)
the State presented insufficient evidence to show that the defendant had received stolen
goods while in the state of Maryland. Id., 355 A.2d at 768. The court reversed the defendant's conviction on the second ground, but went on to address the issue of voir dire inquiry
as to racial bias. Id. at 207, 355 A.2d at 768.
120. Holmes v. State, 65 Md. App. 428, 438, 501 A.2d 76, 81 (1985), rev'd on other
grounds, 310 Md. 260, 528 A.2d 1279 (1987).
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recognized a right to racial bias examination when "prejudice... may
be a factor in determining a prospective juror's attitude toward a particular defendant"1 2 1 and in Contee when the case "is likely to have
racial feelings in the community where it is to be tried,"
aroused some
122
respectively.
The Thornton court also explained that its holding in Tunstull,
which failed to articulate specific reasons for requiring racial bias ex12
amination, did not create an absolute right to such questioning. 1
The court held that "to the extent that Tunstall 'announce[d] a requirement of universal applicability' . . . we limit it as the Supreme
Court limited Ham."1 24 The court stated further that, "[i]n doing so,
we qualify that holding for precedential purposes to conform to limitations implicit 2in the holdings of the Court of Appeals in Humphreys
and in Contee."1 1
While Thornton limited the right to voir dire racial bias examination to cases involving special circumstances where "prejudice may be
a factor,"1 26 the court did not articulate what specific factual situations
would appropriately constitute a "special circumstances" case. 127 This
question remained unanswered until 1985 when the Court of Special
Appeals decided Holmes v. State,12 8 a case involving an African-American defendant convicted of the attempted murder of his former white
employer.1 29 After reviewing the factual situations presented in prior
Maryland cases from Brown to Thornton, the court concluded that
"prejudice may be a factor because of the facts of the case when the
complainant and the witnesses for the state are of a different race
and the crime involves victimization of another
than the defendant,
13 0
person."
Six years later in Bowie v. State,13 1 the Court of Appeals accepted
the criteria set forth in Holmes.13 2 In Bowie, the trial court refused the
request of an African-American murder defendant that the venire be
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Thornton, 31 Md. App. at 213, 355 A.2d at 772.
Id. at 214-15, 355 A.2d at 772.
Id. at 219, 355 A.2d at 775.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 219-20, 355 A.2d at 775.
Id. at 220, 355 A-2d at 775.

127. Id.
128. 65 Md. App. 428, 501 A.2d 76 (1985), rev'd on other grounds, 310 Md. 260, 528 A.2d
1279 (1987).
129. Id. at 431, 501 A.2d at 77.
130. Id. at 438-39, 501 A.2d at 81.
131. 324 Md. 1, 595 A.2d 448 (1991).
132. Id. at 15, 595 A.2d at 455.
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questioned on issues of racial bias.1 33 Applying Holmes, the court held
that the trial court patently "erred in refusing to inquire concerning
possible racial prejudice" because most of the State's witnesses and all
but one of the victims in Bowie were white and the crime involved the
"violent victimization" of another person.' 4 Significantly, however,
the Bowie court refused to follow the Supreme Court's holding in Turner that the failure to propound racial questions during voir dire in
s
capital cases merely required that a death sentence be vacated."
36
granted.1
be
must
trial
Rather, the Bowie court held that a new
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Hill v. State,'3 the Court of Appeals held that "under the circumstances" of the case, the trial court's
refusal to question the venire on racial or ethnic bias constituted reversible error.1 3 1 In so ruling, the court first reviewed the purposes
underlying Maryland's voir dire procedures, the nature and extent of
which "lie initially within the discretion of the trial judge." 3 9 Of paramount importance, the court held, is identifying "the existence of
cause for disqualification."1 40 The objective of voir dire is to select a
jury capable of deciding a case based solely on the facts, "'uninfluenced by any extraneous considerations.'"' 4 ' One method of ensuring that prospective jurors do not harbor disqualifying prejudices is to
question them directly on such subjects. 14 These questions are both
proper and required in Maryland, when directed toward "matter[s]
reasonably liable to unduly influence" a juror. 11 The right of a defendant to have jurors questioned on specific causes for disqualification, the court held, also is guaranteed by the Maryland Declaration of
133. Id. at 4-5, 595 A.2d at 449-50. Specifically, the defendant asked that the following
questions be read:
1. Most of the victims in this case are white and Mr. Bowie and his alleged
accomplices are black. Do you feel uncomfortable sitting on ajury where a black
man is accused of shooting and robbing several white individuals?

2. Have you or any of your family been a member of any organization with a
stated philosophy on race?
Id. at 11, 595 A.2d at 453.
134. Id. at 15, 595 A.2d at 455.
135. Id. at 16 n.8, 595 A.2d at 455 n.8.
136. Id.
137. 339 Md. at 275, 661 A.2d at 1169.
138. Id. at 285, 661 A.2d at 1169.
139. Id. at 278-80, 661 A.2d at 1166-67.
140. Id. at 279, 661 A.2d at 1166 (quoting McGee v. State, 219 Md. 53, 58, 196 A.2d 194,
196 (1959)).
141. Id. (citing Davis v. State, 333 Md. 27, 35, 633 A.2d 867, 871 (1993); Langley v. State,
281 Md. 337, 340, 378 A.2d 1338, 1339 (1977); Waters v. State, 51 Md. 430, 436 (1879)).
142. Id.
143. Id. (quoting Corens v. State, 185 Md. 561, 564, 45 A.2d 340, 343 (1946)).
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Rights."' Racial bias, the court found, ranks among those areas of
inquiry that have been identified in Maryland as mandatory subjects
of voir dire examination.

145

The Hill court observed clear parallels between federal and Maryland law in the development of a voir dire racial bias inquiry based on
a nonconstitutional standard. " The court adopted the Supreme
Court's position that the determination of a "nonconstitutional standard involves resolution of a conflict concerning the appearance of
justice" and how that conflict should be resolved "ordinarily should be
determined by the defendant." 47 Maryland "strike[s] a different balance," the court held, however, "when the trial court does not defer to
the defendant's preferred resolution."' 48 In so ruling, the court embraced the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Aldridge.'49 The court
stated that while it had not earlier adopted the Aldridge analysis in full,
held otherit would do so now. 15' To the extent that Maryland cases
51
wise, the court held that those cases were overruled.'
4. Analysis.-Hill clearly expands Maryland law on the examination of racial bias during voir dire. Where such questioning once was
limited to cases involving both racial confrontation and crimes of violence or victimization, the Hill court extended the right to criminal
defendants involved in victimless or nonviolent crimes. The decision
also expands the rights of Maryland criminal defendants beyond those
conferred by the federal Constitution and also surpassed federal nonconstitutional standards. As a result of Hill, Maryland criminal defendants no longer must meet the burdensome "special
circumstances" test as enunciated in Thornton and Rosales-Lopez.
a. Restoring Aldridge. -Justice Stevens argued vigorously in
favor of a standard such as that announced in Hill in his dissenting
144. MD. CODE ANN., CONST., art. 21 (1981). The Maryland Declaration of Rights states:
[I]n all criminal prosecutions, every man hath a right to be informed of the accusation against him; to have a copy of the Indictment, or charge, in due time (if
required) to prepare for his defence; to be allowed counsel; to be confronted
with the witnesses against him; to have process for his witnesses; to examine the
witnesses for and against him on oath; and to a speedy trial by an impartial jury,
without whose unanimous consent he ought not to be found guilty.

Id.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Hid4 339 Md. at 280, 661 A.2d at 1167.
Id. at 283, 661 A.2d at 1168.
Id. at 283-84, 661 A.2d at 1168.
Id. at 284, 661 A.2d at 1168.
Id. at 285, 661 A.2d at 1169; see supra notes 29-43 and accompanying text.
Hi!/, 339 Md. at 285, 661 A.2d at 1169.
Id.
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opinion in Rosales-Lopez, 15 2 and he too looked to Aldridge for precedential support. 153 Although Aldridge and the state cases upon which it
relied all involved crimes that would have satisfied the contemporary
"special circumstances" test, 154 the Aidridge Court did not expressly
rely on this test to justify its holding. 5 5 Quite to the contrary, the
Aldridge Court reasoned that "the propriety of such an inquiry has
been generally recognized."15 6 As Justice Stevens observed, given the
Court's choice of language, it is not "surprising that the overwhelming
majority of Federal CircuitJudges who have confronted the question
. . . have interpreted Aldridge as establishing a firm rule entitling a
minority defendant to some inquiry of prospective jurors on voir dire
about possible racial or ethnic prejudice unrelated to the specific facts
1 57
of the case."
b. Restoring Fairness.-AsJustice Stevens observed in RosalesLopez, 5 ' the narrowly defined "special circumstances" test provides
only a limited solution to a complex problem. Racial bias, Justice Stevens argued,
can arise from two principal sources: a special relation to the
facts of the particular case, or a special prejudice against the
individual defendant that is unrelated to the particular case.
Much as we wish it were otherwise, we should acknowledge
the fact that there are many potential jurors who harbor
strong prejudices against all members of certain racial, religious, or ethnic groups for no reason other than hostility to
the group as a whole. Even when there are no "special circumstances" connected with an alleged criminal transaction
indicating an unusual risk of racial or other group bias, a
member of the Nazi Party should15 9not be allowed to sit in
judgment on a Jewish defendant.
The Court of Appeals's recognition that racial bias may infect criminal
trials not only because "special circumstances" exist in a particular
152. Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 201 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
153. Id.
154. Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308, 311-13 (1931); see supra text accompanying
notes 62-65.
155. A/dridge, 283 U.S. at 314 ("[The] question is not as to the civil privileges of the
negro, or as to the dominant sentiment of the community and the general absence of any
disqualifying prejudice, but as to the bias of the particular jurors who are to try the
accused.").
156. Id. at 311.
157. Rasales-Lopez, 451 U.S. at 201 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 196-97.
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case, but also because individual jurors often harbor racial and ethnic
biases regardless of the case, is a more realistic approach to resolving
the problem of racially biased juries. Clearly, the risk of individual
bias will not always be apparent to judges merely because of the nature of the crime involved.
Furthermore, Hill allows courts to address the more complex
forms of racism that pervade our society today. Specifically, contemporary racial and ethnic stereotypes are not always tied to issues involving violence and victimization. As Hill noted in his brief to the court,
"[t]he reality of race relations and the focus on black males as the
cause of the rampant drug problem in the 90's establishes, at the very
least, a 'reasonable possibility' that racial prejudice may infect a black
defendant's trial."1 6 ° The Hill decision allows Maryland courts the
flexibility to address racial and ethnic stereotypes in all their complexities and even as they develop over time.
c. Limited Drawbacks.-In Rosales-Lopez, the Supreme Court
viewed the most "significant conflict" raised by the issue of voir dire
questioning on racial bias to be "the appearance of justice" in federal
courts.1 6 1 The Court reasoned that "requiring an inquiry in every case
is likely to create the impression that justice in a court of law may turn
upon the pigmentation of skin [or] the accident of birth."1 6 Thus
trial judges, the Court reasoned, are "understandably hesitant to introduce such a suggestion into their courtrooms." This concern seems
somewhat exaggerated given that the clear message voir dire racial
bias questioning sends to both jurors and to the public is that racial
bias will not be tolerated in court proceedings. The extent to which
such questions draw race or ethnicity to the attention of jurors is
harmless. The racial or ethnic background of the defendant and witnesses inevitably will come to the attention ofjurors during the course
of the trial. It is difficult to image how the mere questioning ofjurors
on racial issues will, as the Thornton court feared, "rekindle a dormant
spark of prejudice."1 6
Concern more appropriately should be directed toward the consequences of not allowing racial bias examination on voir dire. Even
the Rosales-Lopez Court conceded that although it appreciated concerns that racial bias inquiry in every case might "create the impression 'that justice in a court of law may turn upon the pigmentation of
160.
161.
162.
163.

Brief for Petitioner at 15, Hill v. State, 339 Md. 275, 661 A.2d 1164 (1995) (No. 92).
Rosa/s-Lopez, 451 U.S. at 190.
Id. (quoting Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 596 (1976)).
Thornton v. State, 31 Md. App. 205, 220, 355 A.2d 767, 775 (1976).
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skin [or] the accident of birth, '""" also at stake is the "criminal defendant's perception that avoiding the inquiry does not eliminate the
problem, and that his trial is not the place in which to elevate appearance over reality." 6 5 Refusing to permit racial bias questions on voir
dire could send the message to defendants, prospective jurors, and
the public that racial bias will be tolerated, thus undermining the
credibility of Maryland's criminal justice system. More disturbing,
though, is the fact that the failure to propound racial bias questions to
jurors could lead to unfair verdicts. Given the possible cost to a defendant's liberty involved in criminal trials, unjust verdicts cannot be
tolerated.
d. Minimal Administrative Costs.-The new Hill standard
should impose only minimal administrative burdens on Maryland
courts. The Thornton court expressed concern that "considering the
amalgam of minorities which constitute" Maryland juries, if courts
were not "subject to a Ristaino limitation, a voir dire racial prejudice
inquiry would be mandated in every case. 1 66 At first glance, the Hill
decision suggests a potential for increased administrative costs, most
likely due to increased delays at trial. Realistically, however, delay will
be tempered by the fact that the nature and extent of voir dire still lie
within the discretion of the trial judge. 6 7 This includes broad discretion as to the form questions may take or the number of questions
that may be asked. 16' This much was acknowledged by the Supreme
Court in Rosales-Lopez when it stated that "concrete costs" of racial bias
examination on voir dire, which amounted to "some delay in the
trial," probably would be "slight." 6 9
5. Conclusion.--Clearly,the Hill decision will not produce such a
dramatic result as eliminating all racial and ethnic prejudice from
Maryland juries. After all, only jurors who are fully cognizant of their
own prejudices and who answer such questions truthfully will be excused from service. As the Court of Special Appeals stated in Thornton, "[t]o require a prospective juror under oath to say he is without
prejudice would indeed leave us with a dearth of honest venire persons or, possibly, only with jurors who are too insensitive to recognize
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Rosals-Lope, 451 U.S. at 190 (quoting Ristaino,424 U.S. at 596 n.8).
Id. at 191.
Thornton, 31 Md. App. at 216, 355 A.2d at 773.
Hil, 339 Md. at 278, 661 A.2d at 1166.
Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308 (1931).
Rosaes-Lope7, 451 U.S. at 190.
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their own biases."170 Given the complexities of race relations in today's society, many individuals harbor biases too subtle to consciously
detect. Even if one prospective juror is eliminated for admitted racial
or ethnic bias, however, the question will have been well worth the
asking.
LAURA

A. GIANTRIS

Granting TrialJudges Broad Discretion to Remove an ImpaneledJuror
In State v. Cook,1 the Court of Appeals held that a trial judge has
broad discretion to remove a seated juror from a criminal trial when
the cause for removal is for reasons particular to the individual juror,2
and not for characteristics the juror shares in common with a particular class of people.3 Absent exclusion of a class of persons, deference
will be given to a trial judge's determination to dismiss a seated juror
and replace thatjuror with an alternate.4 Deference to the trial judge
is proper due to the judge's presence at the trial, which provides the
judge with an opportunity to discern matters outside of the limited
record available to appellate courts. 5 The Court of Appeals held that
an appellate court should not substitute its judgment for that of the
trial judge and that reversible error will be found only upon a clear
showing of abuse of discretion or prejudice to the defendant.6
C.

1. The Case.-In July 1993, Harold Thomas Cook was convicted
in the Circuit Court for Harford County on charges of sexually abusing his stepdaughter from 1974 through 1977. 7 During the trial, the
victim testified as to the frequency of the abuse: "'I know to me it was
just every night. It was for sure every time that my Mom was away, my
Mom was at work, he was in my room. And it went on-there were
times that my Mom would be in bed and he would come in.'"' After
the State rested its case and shortly after the defense commenced its
case, the judge called a meeting in chambers to advise counsel of the
following note, which was sent to him by juror number six:9
170. Thornton, 31 Md. App. at 216, 355 A.2d at 773.
1. 338 Md. 598, 659 A.2d 1313 (1995).
2. Id. at 615, 659 A.2d at 1322.
3. See infra notes 40-51 and accompanying text.
4. Cook, 338 Md. at 620, 659 A.2d at 1324.
5. See infra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
6. Cook, 338 Md. at 620, 659 A.2d at 1324.
7. Id. at 600, 659 A.2d at 1315. Additional charges of sexual abuse of the victim's
younger sister were nolle prossed. I. at 600 n.1, 659 A.2d at 1315 n.1.
8. 1d at 601, 659 A.2d at 1315.
9. I&
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Your Onor [sic],
[The victim] stated her stepfather came into her bedroom every night. The mother & stepfather's bedroom right
next door. The mother was home in bed some times before
he got home from work. If he left there [sic] bedroom and
went into the stepdaughter[']s bedroom did the mother
know it?
Why not right next door?
'If so!' What for?
If the daughter was raped every night, was the mother having
sex with him? How often? Working a full time job and 2
nights on a part time job. 'Had to be a good man!' Strike that!
Remark. °
The State moved for the juror to be removed on the grounds that
he had reached a conclusion and was "not considering the remainder
of the evidence."1 1 The defense countered that the note, while unusual, was not improper and that the note's language, particularly the
statement "had to be a good man," did not imply a conclusion of innocence or guilt. 12 The trial judge took the matter under consideration
13
but did not remove the juror at that time.
The court addressed the issue again at the close of all evidence.
The trial judge questioned the juror and also allowed counsel to question the juror regarding the contents of his note.14 The juror told the
10. Id. (alterations in original).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 602, 659 A.2d at 1315.
13. Id, 659 A.2d at 1316.
14. Id. An excerpt of the juror's examination as reported in the Court of Appeals's
opinion is as follows:
COURT: You sent me a note this morning. I was wondering why you did that?
JUROR I feel we have gotten part of the evidence from the daughter, her statement and it was not followed up to the mother right there in the household.

COURT: Why did you send me a note?
JUROR. That is what the bailiff told me to do.
COURT: Only if you had questions that you wanted to ask questions of the wit-

ness, is that right?
JUROR That's right.

COURT: The witnesses were gone. This note came to me this morning. That
witness finished testifying yesterday.
JUROR: I didn't understand that they were dismissed of the hearing either.
COURT: Well, they finished testifying and other people testified, didn't they,
after they finished? I don't understand your remark. What was the purpose of
that remark in the second paragraph? They aren't questions; they are comments
aren't they?
JUROR. It's not meant as a comment .... I didn't mean it to be but it is, but

what was really on my mind, I could not see, I mean, I'm a parent also, what went
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court that he had sent the note because he believed that there were
certain questions related to the victim's testimony that should have
been asked of the victim's mother.1 5 The State asked the juror what
he had meant by the statement "had to be a good man." He answered
that he was referring to the defendant's physical health, and proceeded to describe his own past experience and the ill effects on his
16
health from the constant demand to perform sexual acts.
The State again moved for the juror to be dismissed.' The defense argued that the juror was merely expressing a desire to hear
from a witness again and that the "had to be a good man" comment
simply related his own experience to the facts of the case." Thejudge
dismissed the juror, stating his concern that the note's comment was a
"gratuitous evaluation of certain portions of the evidence" and that
"[t] here's a serious question in my mind whether this particular juror
has followed the instructions he was given . . . specifically to keep an
open mind throughout the entire case." 9 The juror was replaced
with an alternate before jury instructions and closing arguments were
given."0 Cook was found guilty on all counts."'
on in the household really; the daughter answered the questions that she was
asked about the household, different things but it was not followed up with the
same thing with the mother so that the mother could answer them. With them
being in the next room with one partition between them, that's what I couldn't
understand.
STATE: You made a statement in there that he is a good man or you're a good
man, do you remember that is one of the last things that you said, sir; and it's
underlined.
STATE: What was that intended for?
JUROR- It wasn't any definite remark or like a remark about that. What it was,
the man had to be in good health to be in this kind of shape, well-being, in good
shape to be in that kind of health. If a man is going to have sex with his daughter
or adopted daughter, he has got to be in good shape to provide his wife with what
she needs too.
One time when I got married I put myself in the same category. My wife
couldn't have children for 5 and a half years. For sixty days I had to be with my
wife every night. It was mighty hard and I lost weight and everything else on
account of it, and I was a young man. And it takes a strong adult and a good man
to continue on, because he is going to drop in health; his weight. I meant it
because of my circumstances that I was involved in.
Id at 602-04, 659 A.2d at 1316.
15. Id. at 603, 659 A.2d at 1316.
16. Id. at 603-04, 659 A.2d at 1316; see also supra note 14.
17. Cook, 338 Md. at 604, 659 A.2d at 1316.
18. 1&t
19. Id., 659 A.2d at 1316-17.
20. Id., 659 A.2d at 1317.
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Cook made a motion for a new trial alleging error in the dismissal
of the juror.2 2 The trial judge denied the motion, finding that the
juror's explanation of the note was "dubious."2 ' The judge cited a
lack of credibility on the basis of both the juror's explanation and on
his demeanor. 24 The Court of Special Appeals reversed, holding the
removal of the juror to be prejudicial error. 5 Relying on its earlier
holding in Stokes v. State,2 6 the Court of Special Appeals stated that
"once a jury has been selected and sworn, the accused maintains a
substantial right to have his case decided by the particular jurors selected to try him. '27 The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to consider a trial judge's discretion in a criminal trial to dismiss a seated
28
juror and replace him with an alternate.
2. Legal Background.-Juryselection for criminal trials is covered
under Rule 4-312 of the Maryland Rules of Procedure.2 9 The rule
provides for removal of ajuror for inability to continue" ° and removal
for cause upon the motion of a party.3 1 Rule 4-312(b) (3) states that
"[a]nyjuror... found to be unable or disqualified to perform a juror's duty, shall be replaced by an alternate juror in the order of selection."32 Rule 4-312(e) provides that "[a] party may challenge an
individual juror for cause. A challenge for cause shall be made and
determined before the jury is sworn, or thereafter for good cause
shown."3 3 The rule further provides that "[a] n alternate juror shall be
21. Id,
22. Id.
23. Id. at 605, 659 A.2d at 1317.
24. The judge explained,
I'll say now, if I didn't say it at that time, that I found [the juror's] explanation
[for the comments in his note] somewhat dubious; I guess is the best word.
I base that opinion not only on the words he used, but also by the way he
gave his explanation. He was, to me, somewhat at first hesitant and then came
across with an explanation for the reasons ... for his editorial comment in a way
that there was more to his answer than what he told us, and I gave it very little
credibility.
Id. (alteration in original).
. 25. Cook v. State, 100 Md. App. 616, 629, 642 A.2d 290, 296 (1994), rev'd, 338 Md. 598,
659 A.2d 1313 (1995).
26. 72 Md. App. 673, 532 A.2d 189 (1987); see also infra notes 59-61 and accompanying
text.
27. Cook, 100 Md. App. at 628, 642 A.2d at 296 (citing Stokes, 72 Md. App. at 683, 532
A.2d at 194).
28. Cook, 338 Md. at 600, 659 A.2d at 1315.
29. MD. R. 4-312.

30.
31.
32.
33.

MD.
MD.
MD.
MD.

&. 4-312(b)(3).
R. 4-312(e).
R. 4-312(b) (3).
R 4-312(e).
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drawn in the same manner, have the same qualifications, be subject to
the same examination, take the same oath, and have the same functions, powers, facilities, and privileges as a juror." 4
a. Juror Removal: Court of Appeals Decisions.-The removal
and replacement of a juror before the jury had been sworn was addressed by the Court of Appeals over eighty years ago in Bluthenthal &
Bickart v. May Co. 35 In Bluthentha4 the trial judge allowed plaintiff's
counsel to withdraw a peremptory challenge against one juror and use
it to strike another juror who, after taking his seat in the jury box, was
seen giving a nod of recognition to defendant's counsel. 36 The court
allowed the removal and replacement of the juror after 3the jury panel
had been selected but before the jury had been sworn.

The court held that the defendant suffered no injury by the juror
substitution, noting "it is not reversible error to exclude ajuror, even
for insufficient cause, if an unobjectionable jury is afterwards obtained.""s The court reasoned that unless it is shown that the jury
ultimately seated was not fair and impartial, the determination to remove and replace a juror is left to the discretion of the trial judge.3 9
In King v. State,4 ° the court held that the dismissal of a potential
juror because of characteristics that the juror holds in common with a
class of persons is reversible error.4" The defendant in King was
charged with simple possession and possession with intent to distribute marijuana.4" The trial court dismissed two prospective jurors
who, during voir dire, expressed a belief disfavoring the law that prohibited the use and possession of marijuana.4" The Court of Appeals
noted that a significant number of people believe that current criminal laws regarding marijuana should be changed." The court reasoned that "[s]uch a belief concerning a matter of debatable public
policy raises no presumption that those persons could not properly
apply the existing laws to the evidence."4 5 The court believed that
automatically excluding a large segment of the population from jury
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

MD. R.4-312(b)(1).
127 Md. 277, 96 A. 434 (1915).
Id. at 285, 96 A. at 438.
Id.
Id. at 285-86, 96 A. at 438.
Id at 286, 96 A. at 438.
287 Md. 530, 414 A.2d 909 (1980).
Id. at 539, 414 A-2d at 913.
Id, at 531-32, 414 A.2d at 910.
Id.
Id. at 536, 414 A.2d at 912.
Id
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service merely because of their beliefs is inconsistent with the objective that a jury should be drawn from a fair cross-section of the
community. 46
In Hunt v. State47 the court followed its reasoning in King, noting
that "[a] trial judge should not excuse prospective jurors for cause
simply because of the juror's abstract beliefs.""8 However, the Hunt
court found no error in the trial court's exclusion of a prospective
juror who was a cousin of the attorney who had represented the defendant on his first appeal. 49 The juror was not dismissed for his abstract beliefs, but rather for his personal relationship with an
interested party in the case.5" The Hunt court noted the holding in
Bluthenthal that an ultimately unobjectionable jury does not constitute
reversible error, but added that " [ t]his principle is applicable where,
as here, the reason for excusing the juror is related to the particular
juror and not to a general class of people."5 '
b. Juror Removal: Court of Special Appeals Decisions.-The line
of Court of Special Appeals cases dealing with juror dismissal evolved
from a standard of broad deference to a trial judge's determination to
dismiss ajuror into a standard of more limited discretion when ajuror
is removed for cause.5 2 In James v. State,5" the court stated that the
decision to remove and replace ajuror with an alternate is committed
to the sound discretion of the trial judge and will not be reversed
unless it is "arbitrary and abusive. " ' In McCree v. State,55 the court
found that "[a] juror may be struck for cause only where he or she
displays a predisposition against innocence or guilt because of some
bias extrinsic to the evidence." 56 In perhaps revisionist dicta, the
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 536-37, 414 A_2d at 912.
321 Md. 387, 583 A.2d 218 (1990), cen. denied, 502 U.S. 835 (1991).
Id. at 419, 583 A.2d at 233 (citing King, 287 Md. at 539, 414 A.2d at 913).
Id., 583 A.2d at 233-34.

50. Id.

51. Id. at 420, 583 A.2d at 234 (citing King, 287 Md. at 538, 414 A.2d at 913).
52. See infra notes 83-90 and accompanying text.
53. 14 Md. App. 689, 288 A.2d 644 (1972).
54. Id. at 699, 288 A.2d at 650 (finding no abuse of discretion in trial judge's dismissal
of a seated juror who allegedly failed to report her previous participation as a juror in a
criminal trial when questioned during voir dire).
55. 33 Md. App. 82, 363 A.2d 647 (1976). The McCree court found that the defendant
did not meet his burden of proving prejudice in the trial judge's failure to remove a prospective juror for cause because of her acquaintance with one of the witnesses. Id. at 98,
363 A.2d at 657. The court noted that the defendant used a peremptory challenge to
remove the juror. Id. Because the defendant did not use all the peremptory challenges
allotted to him, the trial judge's failure to remove the juror for cause would have been
harmless even if proven erroneous. Id.
56. Id.
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court in Tisdale v. State5 7 wrote: "[u]nsaid in James-unnecessary to be
said in James--is that, where the issue is disqualification of a juror for
cause, the court's discretion is necessarily more limited than where
the issue is the juror's ability to continue."5 8 Building upon both McCree and Tisdale, the court in Stokes v. State9 noted that once ajury has
been impaneled, "a defendant has a 'valued right to have his trial
completed by a particular tribunal"'60 and removal of ajuror is prejudicial to a defendant absent a showing of good cause.6 1
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Cook, the Court of Appeals considered the degree of deference to give to a trial judge who has removed
a seated juror.6 2 The court held that when a seated juror is dismissed
for reasons particular to that juror rather than for characteristics that
the juror shares with a particular class of people, an appellate court
must give deference to the trial judge's determination and not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court, absent an abuse of discretion or prejudice to the defendant.6"
The court first addressed the characterizations of juror dismissal
64
under the Maryland Rules as argued by Cook and by the State.
Cook argued that the State's request to remove the juror was a challenge for cause under Rule 4-312(e), requiring a showing of "good
cause."6' On the other hand, the State argued that the juror's removal was purely discretionary and therefore Rule 4-312(b)(3) pro57. 41 Md. App. 149, 157, 396 A.2d 289, 294 (1979) (finding that there was no error in
the trial judge making a telephone call to an absent juror outside of the presence of the
defendant to determine whether the juror would be able to return to the trial).
58. Id. at 156, 396 A.2d at 293 (citingJames v. State, 14 Md. App. 689, 288 A.2d 644
(1972)). The Tisdale court noted that the broader discretion allowed to a trial judge in
removing ajuror for inability to continue exists because such removal is an administrative
matter and "the issue is not so much one of fairness but of efficiency." Id. at 156-57, 396
A.2d at 293-94.
59. 72 Md. App. 673, 532 A.2d 189 (1987). In Stokes, ajuror was dismissed sua sponte
by the trial judge because the judge had wimessed the juror smiling at the defendant at
times and also because he saw the juror sleeping at other times. Id. at 675, 532 A.2d at 190.
The court found error in the trial judge's failure to make an inquiry of the juror regarding
her ability to continue. Id. at 680, 532 A.2d at 192. In reasoning that a trial judge necessarily has less discretion to remove a juror once the jury panel has been selected and sworn,
the Stokes court stated, "[a]lthough it is true that appellant cannot complain that the jury
which decided his fate was not a fair and impartial one, it was still not the same jury that
had been selected, with his approval, to decide his fate." Id at 682, 532 A.2d at 193.
60. Id. at 676, 532 A.2d at 190 (quoting Tabbs v. State, 43 Md. App. 20, 22, 403 A.2d
796, 798 (1979)).
61. Id. at 683-84, 532 A.2d at 194.
62. Cook, 338 Md. at 606, 659 A.2d at 1317.
63. Id. at 615, 659 A.2d at 1322; see also supra notes 40-51 and accompanying text.
64. Cook, 338 Md. at 606-07, 659 A.2d at 1318.
65. Id.; see also supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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vided the appropriate analysis.6 6 The Court of Appeals found that the
juror's removal did not warrant a new trial under either rule, but did
note that "good cause shown" under Rule 4-312(e) refers to the justification of the party challenging for cause and not to the standard of
review to be applied by an appellate court in considering a trial
67
judge's determination to remove a juror.
In holding that a trial judge's decision to remove ajuror is discretionary and "will not be reversed on appeal absent a clear abuse of
discretion or a showing of prejudice to the defendant," 68 the court
first concluded that dismissal and replacement of a juror is not reversible error where the reason for the juror's dismissal is related to that
particular juror and not to a class of persons. 69 The court reasoned
that the remedy sought by the defendant, a new trial, would result in a
new jury that is no fairer than the jury in the original trial. 71 When
removal occurs for reasons particular to the excluded juror, thatjuror
would not be on the jury in the new trial "nor would [the new jury]
contain any juror with characteristics similar to that which caused the
exclusion of the original juror."7 1 However, when ajuror is removed
because of characteristics shared with a class of persons, "upon retrial
the jury will represent a fair cross-section of the community and the
72
new jury may contain members of the originally excluded class."
66. Cook, 338 Md. at 606-07, 659 A.2d at 1318; see also supra note 32 and accompanying
text. Cook adopted the Court of Special Appeals's position that a trial court's discretion is
necessarily more limited when removing ajuror for cause under Rule 4-312(e) than when
ajuror is removed for inability to continue under Rule 4-312(b) (3). Cook, 338 Md. at 606,
659 A.2d at 1318; see also Cook v. State, 100 Md. App. 616, 626, 642 A.2d 290, 295 (1994),
rev'd, 338 Md. 598, 659 A.2d 1313 (1995).
67. Cook, 338 Md. at 607, 659 A.2d at 1318. This reasoning is contrary to the standard
employed by the Court of Special Appeals in reviewing a juror's dismissal, where the court
required good cause to be shown by the trial court itself. Cook, 100 Md. App. at 628-29, 642
A.2d at 296. The intermediate appellate court found prejudicial error based on its holding
in Stokes v. State, 72 Md. App. 673, 532 A.2d 189 (1987). Cook, 100 Md. App. at 629, 642
A.2d at 296. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Stokes
holding.
68. Cook, 338 Md. at 607, 659 A.2d at 1318.
69. Id. at 609, 659 A.2d at 1319; see also supra notes 40-51 and accompanying text.
70. Cook, 338 Md. at 609, 659 A.2d at 1319.
71. Id. The court stated:
A litigant who argues on appeal that he or she did not receive a fair trial without
the excused juror and seeks a new trial will have exactly what he or she got in the
first trial-a jury which will not contain the juror excused from the original trial
and is unlikely to contain anyjurors similar to the juror excused from the original
jury.
Id.
72. Id.
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The court noted that in Hunt v. State,7" " [w] e held that, even had
there been insufficient cause to excuse the potential juror, this would
not constitute reversible error if the jurors actually seated were unobjectionable."7 4 However, if there is insufficient cause in removing a
juror because of characteristics the juror holds in common with a class
of persons, a resulting and otherwise unobjectionable jury constitutes
reversible error.75 The Court of Appeals found no evidence that Cook
suffered any prejudice from the jury after the juror's dismissal and
replacement.76 It also found that the dismissal was for reasons particular to the specific juror.7 7
The court focused on the opportunity a trial judge has to directly
question ajuror and to witness ajuror's demeanor. 78 The court noted
a previous decision regarding a judge's discretion to declare a mistrial, stating, "We find that the rationale for providing such deference
in a trial judge's determination to exclude a potentialjuroror in deferring to a trial judge's decision regarding a motion for mistrial is
equally present in evaluating a trial judge's decision to excuse a seated
juror.

79

Thus, the court found that the record adequately supported the
trial judge's determination to remove the juror,8" deferring to the
trial judge's finding that, based on his observation of the juror's demeanor in answering the questions posed to him, the juror's explanation for his note was dubious.8" The court stated it would not
substitute its own judgment for that of the trial judge based on a cold
record. 2
73. 321 Md. 387, 583 A.2d 218 (1990), cert. denie4d, 502 U.S. 835 (1991).
74. Cook, 338 Md. at 608, 659 A.2d at 1319 (citing Hunt 321 Md. at 420, 583 A.2d at
234); see also supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
75. Cook, 338 Md. at 615, 659 A.2d at 1325; see also King v. State, 287 Md. 530, 538, 414
A.2d 909, 913 (1980) (finding that the dismissal ofjurors solely because of their disagreement with criminal marijuana laws erroneously excluded a significant segment of the population from jury service); see supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
76. Cook, 338 Md. at 610-11, 659 A.2d at 1320.
77. Id at 620, 659 A.2d at 1324.
78. Id at 615, 659 A.2d at 1322. The court stated, "'The judge is physically on the
scene, able to observe matters not usually reflected in a cold record .... [T]hejudge has
his finger on the pulse of the trial.'" Id. (quoting State v. Hawkins, 326 Md. 270, 278, 604
A.2d 489, 493 (1992) (upholding trial judge's denial of defendant's motion for mistrial
alleging prejudice in the testimony of two police officers who made indirect references to
the defendant taking a polygraph test)).
79. Id. (footnote omitted).
80. Id at 617, 659 A.2d at 1323.
81. Id at 616, 659 A.2d at 1322.
82. Id. at 617, 659 A.2d at 1323.
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In reversing the decision of the Court of Special Appeals, the
Cook court was critical of the intermediate court's apparent analogy to
double jeopardy principles in finding error in the removal of a seated
juror.83 The Court of Special Appeals had held that the "court's discretion is necessarily more limited" when dismissing a juror for
cause.8 4 Citing its earlier decision in Stokes v. State,85 the intermediate
appellate court reasoned that once a jury is sworn "a criminal defendant is entitled to have his case heard to completion by the chosen jury
the defendant believes may decide in his favor."8 6 The Stokes court
recognized a defendant's "'valued right to have his trial completed by
a particular tribunal."'8 7 The Court of Appeals noted that this idea
was borrowed from Wade v. Hunter,88 a Supreme Court opinion applying a double jeopardy analysis to the dismissal of an entire jury during
a court-martial proceeding. 9 The court found that the reasoning the
Court of Special Appeals drew from Wade incorrectly applied a double
jeopardy analysis to the removal of individual jurors because double
jeopardy principles should be limited to the dismissal of an entire
90

jury.

4. Analysis.-In Cook, the Court of Appeals held that a trial
judge has broad discretion to remove a seated juror.91 The court's
sound reasoning dispensed with the intermediate court's "apparent
comparison of double jeopardy principles" to the removal and replacement of an impaneled juror.92 The court found that deference
to the trial judge's decision provides the appropriate analysis of a
83. Id. at 614, 659 A.2d at 1321.
84. Cook v. State, 100 Md. App. 616, 626, 642 A.2d 290, 295 (1994) (quoting Tisdale v.
State, 41 Md. App. 149, 156, 396 A.2d 289, 293 (1979)), rev'd, 338 Md. 598, 659 A.2d 1313
(1995); see also supra notes 52-61 and accompanying text.
85. 72 Md. App. 673, 532 A.2d 189 (1987); see also supra notes 59-61 and accompanying
text.
86. Cook, 100 Md. App. at 626, 642 A.2d at 295.
87. Stokes, 72 Md. App. at 676, 532 A.2d at 190 (quoting Tabbs v. State, 43 Md. App. 20,
22, 403 A.2d 796, 798 (1979)).
88. 336 U.S. 684 (1949).
89. Cook, 338 Md. at 612, 659 A.2d at 1321 (citing Wade, 336 U.S. at 688). Wade involved the court-martial of an American soldier in Europe during World War II. The
Supreme Court found that military tactical considerations justified abandoning the first
court-martial proceeding and removing to another location for a second court-martial.
Wade, 336 U.S. at 692. Rejecting the petitioner's claim of double jeopardy, the Court
stated that "a defendant's valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal
must in some instances be subordinated to the public's interest in fair trials designed to
end in just judgments." Id. at 689.
90. Cook, 338 Md. at 614, 659 A.2d at 1321-22.
91. Id. at 615, 659 A.2d at 1322.
92. Id. at 614, 659 A.2d at 1321.
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seated juror's removal. The court rejected distinctions between prospective jurors and seated jurors,93 and between removal "for cause"
and removal for "inability to continue."9 4 The court gave clear guidance as to what constitutes abuse of discretion in the removal of a
seated juror. Furthermore, the court reasoned that it is unnecessary
to question specifically whether a juror has the ability to render a fair
and impartial verdict when removal is for reasons specific to the individual juror.95 The Cook opinion also suggests that while the record
on appeal should reflect some rationale for a juror's dismissal, the
deference given to determinations of trial judges suggests that the reason for a juror's removal need not be stated unequivocally.9 6
The Court of Appeals properly rejected the intermediate court's
reliance on Stokes v. State.9 7 A defendant's right to have his case heard
by a particular tribunal does not exclude alternate jurors as part of
that tribunal.9" The Cook court correctly refused to recognize that the
right to have a trial completed by a particular tribunal extends to the
replacement of a juror "with an alternate who has undergone the
same selection process as the seated jurors and has been present for
the entire trial."99 The Court of Appeals reasoned that expanding this
concept to the discretionary removal and replacement of a juror
would constitute an erroneous application of double jeopardy principles.' ° While jeopardy attaches once a jury has been impaneled," ° '
93. Id at 609, 659 A.2d at 1319; see also supra text accompanying note 79.
94. Cook, 338 Md. at 607, 659 A.2d at 1318; see also supranotes 64-67 and accompanying
text.
95. See infra notes 114-116 and accompanying text.
96. See infra notes 118-124 and accompanying text.
97. 72 Md. App. 673, 532 A.2d 189 (1987); see also supra notes 59-61 and accompanying
text.
98. See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
99. Cook, 338 Md. at 614, 659 A.2d at 1321-22 (citation omitted). The Maryland Rules
provide that "[a] n alternate juror shall be drawn in the same manner, have the same qualifications, be subject to the same examination, take the same oath, and have the same functions, powers, facilities, and privileges as a juror." MD. R.4-312(b)(1).
100. Cook, 338 Md. at 612-13, 659 A.2d at 1321; see also supra note 90 and accompanying
text. One commentator noted:
[U]nder such circumstances it could not be said that the defendant had been
more than once in jeopardy, since the same proceedings were had in the selection of the alternate jurors as in the case of the first 12, and all of them must be
regarded as members of the same jury.... The court pointed out that the essential attributes ofjury trial were number, impartiality, and unanimity, concluding
that if the code provision for alternate jurors did not affect any of these three
essential qualities it should be held that the section in question did not affect the
inviolability of the right of trial byjury .... "To hold, under these circumstances,
that a defendant is deprived of the right to a trial by ajury of 12 simply because
one of the 12 by whom the verdict is rendered may, throughout a part of the trial,
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the mere replacement of ajuror does not place a defendant in double
jeopardy "'because the unity of the original jury [is] not destroyed."' 1 °2 The court further noted that "while Cook has a light to a
fair and impartial jury, Cook does not have a right to ajury composed
of particular individuals.""0 ' A double jeopardy analysis is only appro10 4
priate when an entire jury has been discharged.
Not only did the court decline to analyze the Cook juror's dismissal as a removal for cause versus a removal for inability to continue, 0 5
it made the distinction moot as part of the trial judge's broad discretion.10 6 The rationale for deferring to a trial judge's determination
should not diminish simply because a party has made a motion for a
juror's removal as opposed to the court removing a juror sua
sponte. 10 7 Furthermore, the Cook court analogized the use of the deference rationale in juror removal scenarios to that of a trial judge's
discretion to grant a mistrial, 0 8 which "is a discretion that will rarely,
if ever, be disturbed on appeal." 10 9 Thus, the Cook holding gives great
discretion to a trial judge to dismiss a juror.
have sat and listened to the evidence as an 'alternate' and not as a regular juror,
would be to exalt a mere form above substance."
W.J. Dunn, Annotation, Constitutionality and Construction of Statute or Court Rule Relating to
Alternate or AdditionalJurors or Substitution of Jurors During Tria 84 A.L.R.2d 1288, 1293
(1962) (quoting People v. Peete, 202 P. 51, 66 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1921) (upholding the
constitutionality of a statute providing for the replacement of a seated juror with an alternate juror)).
101. See United States v. Join, 400 U.S. 470, 474-75 (1971).
102. Cook, 338 Md. at 614, 659 A.2d at 1322 (quoting People v.Johnson, 247 Cal. Rptr.
767, 773 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988)).
103. Id. In the context of peremptory challenges during jury selection, the Court of
Appeals wrote that "[ii t enables the [defendant] to say who shall not try him; but not to say
who shall be the particular jurors to try him." Turpin v. State, 55 Md. 462, 469 (1881).
104. Cook, 338 Md. at 614, 659 A-2d at 1321-22; see also supra note 90 and accompanying
text.
105. Removal of jurors for cause is covered by Rule 4-312(e); removal of a juror for
inability to continue, i.e., when ajuror is found unable or disqualified to perform his duty,
is covered by Rule 4-312(b) (3). See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
106. Cook, 338 Md. at 607, 659 A.2d at 1318. The court held that
when ajudge determines to remove ajuror and substitute an alternate juror for a
reason particular to that juror, whether the juror is removed based on the trial
judge's determination of the juror's unavailability or disqualification or based on
the judge's determination of some other cause for the removal of the juror, the trial
judge's decision is a discretionary one and will not be reversed on appeal absent a
clear abuse of discretion or a showing of prejudice to the defendant.
Id. (emphasis added).
107. See supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
108. Cook, 338 Md. at 615, 659 A.2d at 1322.
109. Buck v. Cam's Rugs, 328 Md. 51, 59, 612 A.2d 1294, 1298 (1992). The Buck court
did note that:
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However, an appellate court will overturn a trial judge's decision
upon a showing of abuse of discretion. ' The Cook court noted two
specific areas of discretionary abuse. The exclusion of ajuror because
of beliefs or characteristics the juror shares with a class of persons
constitutes one area of abuse."' Another potential abuse of discretion is the dismissal of a juror for bias that the juror may have formed
based upon evidence presented at trial." 2 Even under this category a
trial judge is still likely to exercise broad discretion in determining the
nature and degree of bias. In the context of removing a potential
juror, the court has stated "[t] he trial judge's factual determinations
about the extent of a juror's bias must be given deference.""'
Consistent with a trial judge's broad discretion in removing a
seated juror is the court's finding that no specific inquiry is required
of the juror before dismissal." 4 The Court of Appeals correctly rejected the intermediate appellate court's finding that the failure to
inquire into the ability of ajuror to render a fair and impartial verdict
constitutes reversible error. 11 5 The determination should be made
from the overall impression the judge gains through his presence at
the trial, not because of an answer or lack of an answer to a specific
question. A juror's answer as represented in a printed record may
belie the finding of the trial judge who, witnessing the juror's dea trial judge's discretion to grant or deny a new trial is not fixed and immutable;
rather, it will expand or contract depending upon the nature of the factors being
considered, and the extent to which the exercise of that discretion depends upon
the opportunity the trial judge had to feel the pulse of the trial and to rely on his
own impressions in determining questions of fairness and justice.
Id. at 58-59, 612 A.2d at 1298.
110. Cook, 338 Md. at 620, 659 A.2d at 1324.
111. Id. at 609, 659 A.2d at 1319.
112. Id. at 616, 659 A.2d at 1323. The court noted that the record in Cook supported a
finding that the juror was not dismissed for bias he formed based on the evidence
presented at trial, but rather for his inability to follow the instructions of the court. Id.
113. Hunt v. State, 321 Md. 387, 415, 583 A.2d 218, 231 (1990), cet. denied, 502 U.S. 835
(1991) (citation omitted).
114. Cook, 338 Md. at 617 n.5, 659 A.2d at 1323 n.5. However, if dismissal were for
reasons that the juror shared with a class of persons, a specific inquiry into the juror's
ability to reach a fair and impartial verdict would almost certainly be required. See King v.
State, 287 Md. 530, 539, 414 A.2d 909, 913 (1980); see also infra notes 116-117 and accompanying text.
115. Cook, 338 Md. at 617 n.5, 659 A.2d at 1323 n.5. The court stated:
Having already found the juror's answers to the court's inquiries "dubious," we do
not feel that it was necessary for the judge to pose such a question only to be
given another "dubious" answer. In dismissing the juror, the trial judge clearly
found that the juror could not reach a fair and impartial verdict. We will give
deference to such a finding.
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meanor, is in a better position to determine the credibility of the ju1 16
ror's answers.
The court's opinion does suggest that a more thorough inquiry
would be necessary if the removal of a juror could be construed as
striking a class of persons. Other grounds would be required to establish that the dismissal was for reasons particular to the juror. Questions about a juror's ability to render a fair and impartial verdict may
clarify what would otherwise appear to be removal based on class distinctions. 1 7 It is in this area that the court has limited the discretion
of the trial judge, providing a more workable and concrete standard
of review than merely asserting that a trial judge's discretion is more
limited when a juror is removed "for cause."
In citing several jurisdictions that follow the rule adopted by Cook,
the court quoted a definition of prejudice in the removal of ajuror as
one "without factual support, or for a legally relevant reason." 1 8 The
factual support required under the abuse of discretion standard of
review was labeled variously as "a reasonable cause,"1 '9 "aproper reason,"' 20 "an adequate basis," 12 1 and "some legitimate reason for discharge in order to avoid the appearance of being arbitrary in the face
of objection. ' 12 2 These tests suggest that when a seated juror is dismissed for reasons particular to that juror, minimal factual support in
the record for the trial judge's determination will be enough to with-

116. Id. at 615, 659 A.2d 1322 (quoting State v. Hawkins, 326 Md. 270, 278, 604 A.2d
489, 493 (1992)). In Cook, the State argued:
No particular litany is a necessary antecedent to this discretionary decision ....
[E]ven had the trial court inquired explicitly about the juror's ability to render a
fair and impartial verdict and even had the juror told the court that he could act
impartially, the court would not have been bound to leave the juror on the jury.
Brief of Petitioner at 17 n.4, State v. Cook, 338 Md. 598, 659 A.2d 1313 (1995) (No. 94110).
117. See King, 287 Md. at 539, 414 A.2d at 913 (excluding jurors merely for their abstract
beliefs regarding marijuana laws without further inquiry into their ability to render a fair
and impartial verdict was reversible error). The Kingcourt noted that had an inquiry been
made and had the jurors answered that they were unable to render a fair and impartial
verdict because of their beliefs, removal would bejustified. Id. at 537, 414 A.2d at 912; see
also supra notes 52-61, 83-90 and accompanying text.
118. Cook, 338 Md. at 618, 659 A.2d at 1323 (quoting United States v. Fajardo, 787 F.2d
1523, 1525 (11th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted)).
119. Id., 659 A.2d at 1324 (quoting Fajardo,787 F.2d at 1526).
120. Id. at 620, 659 A.2d at 1324.
121. Id. at 621, 659 A.2d at 1325.
122. Id at 619, 659 A.2d at 1324 (quoting Flath v. Madison Metal Servs., Inc., 570 N.E.2d
1218, 1226 (Il. App. Ct. 1991)).
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stand appellate court scrutiny. 123 Assuming that Cook has left little distinction between the removal of prospective jurors and the removal of
ambiguous
seated jurors, an appellate court likely would resolve 12an
4
record in deference to the decision of the trial court.
5. Conclusion.-In Cook, the Court of Appeals held that a trial
judge has broad discretion to dismiss a seated juror when the dismissal
is for reasons particular to that juror rather than for reasons that the
juror may hold in common with a class of people. The court effectively eliminated previous distinctions between prospective jurors and
impaneled jurors in reviewing a judge's discretionary decision to remove jurors. In deferring to the decision of the trial judge, the court
focused less on formal categorizations but instead emphasized a defendant's right to an impartial jury drawn from a fair cross-section of
the community. The court correctly stressed that the right to an impartial jury does not afford a defendant the right to any particular
juror.

12 5

TIMOTHY

P. MARTIN

D. Rejecting DoubleJeopardy as a Bar to Retrials of GreaterOffenses
In State v. Woodson,1 the Court of Appeals unanimously held that
following a mistrial, double jeopardy did not bar retrial of a greater
offense when it barred retrial of a lesser-included offense for lack of
manifest necessity in the mistrial declaration. 2 In reaching this conclusion, the court likened a declaration of mistrial without manifest
necessity to a nolle prosequi,3 and concluded that both acted as acquittals only for double jeopardy purposes and only as to those specific counts.4 This decision further reduces the applicability of double
jeopardy protection to cases in which the original trial involved an
adjudication on the merits.
1. The Case.-The State tried Thomas Woodson in the Circuit
Court for Prince George's County on charges of distribution of a con123. Early in its opinion, the Cook court dismissed "good cause" as the standard for reviewing a trial court's determination to remove a seatedjuror. Id. at 607, 659 A.2d at 1318;

see also supra note 67 and accompanying text.
124. See Grandison v. State, 305 Md. 685, 725, 506 A-2d 580, 600, cert. denied, 479 U.S.
873 (1986).
125. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
1. 338 Md. 322, 658 A.2d 272 (1995).
2. Id. at 338-39, 658 A.2d at 281.
3. See infra note 43.
4. Woodson, 338 Md. at 333-36, 658 A.2d at 278-79.
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trolled dangerous substance, possession of a controlled dangerous
substance with intent to distribute, possession of a controlled dangerous substance, and conspiracy to distribute a controlled dangerous
substance. 5 At the close of the trial, the judge granted Woodson's motion for judgment of acquittal on the conspiracy charge and sent the
three remaining charges to the jury.6
After deliberating, the jury informed the judge that it had
reached verdicts on two of the three counts.7 The court asked the jury
whether it had reached a verdict on the distribution charge, and the
jury informed the court that it found the defendant not guilty.' The
court then asked if the jury had reached a verdict on the possession
with intent to distribute charge, and the jury stated that it had not.9
The court stated that it would not inquire into the jury's verdict on
the possession charge until the jury was ready to return a verdict on
the possession with intent to distribute charge, and sent the jury out
for further deliberations." ° The jurors returned four hours later and
stated that they were deadlocked on the possession with intent to distribute charge. 1 The court then declared a mistrial on both the possession with intent to distribute charge and the possession charge,
without having inquired into the jury's verdict on the possession
charge. 12
After a new trial date was set for the remaining possession counts,
Woodson filed a motion to dismiss both counts on double jeopardy
grounds."i He argued that the judge's failure to take a verdict on the
possession charge amounted to an acquittal of that charge and barred
retrial for that offense. Thus, because of his "acquittal" of the lesser
offense of possession, the defendant argued that double jeopardy
barred retrial for the greater offense of possession with intent to distribute. 4 The court denied this motion, and in his second trial the
defendant was found guilty on both counts. 5
Following his convictions, Woodson renewed his motion to dismiss on double jeopardy and collateral estoppel grounds. 6 This time
5. Id. at 325, 658 A.2d at 274.
6.Id.
7. Id. at 325-26, 658 A.2d at 274.
8. Id.at 326, 658 A.2d at 274.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id., 658 A.2d at 274-75.
13. Id., 658 A.2d at 275.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 326-27, 658 A.2d at 275.
16. Id. at 327, 658 A-2d at 275.
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the judge granted the motion and dismissed the charges. 17 Thejudge
agreed with the defendant that the declaration of a mistrial without
manifest necessity as to the possession charge barred retrial on that
count as well as on the possession with intent to distribute count because it was the "same offense." 18 The State appealed this dismissal to
the Court of Special Appeals. 9 The State did not dispute that the
court below lacked manifest necessity to declare a mistrial on the possession count, but argued that manifest necessity existed on the possession with intent to distribute count because the jury had
deadlocked.2 ° The Court of Special Appeals disagreed with the State's
contention that double jeopardy could bar retrial on a lesser-included
offense while still allowing retrial on a greater offense. " Thus, the
court affirmed the dismissal, claiming that "to do otherwise would be
Thereafter, the Court of Appeals granted
fundamentally unfair."
certiorari to determine whether double jeopardy barred retrial of a
greater offense, on which the jury was deadlocked, after a court declared a mistrial on both the greater offense and the lesser-included
offense, on which the jury reached a verdict that the court refused to
hear.25
2. Legal Background.a. The Applicability of the DoubleJeopardy Clause.-The Double
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that "nor shall any person be subject for the same offence
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."2 4 The Supreme Court has
held that the "twice put in jeopardy" phrase actually encompasses
three distinct protections: (1) it protects against a second prosecution
for the same offense after acquittal; (2) it protects against a second
prosecution for the same offense after conviction; (3) and it protects
In Benton v.
against multiple punishments for the same offense.
Maryland,26 the Supreme Court held that these three protections,
17. Id.
18. Id.

19. Id.
20. Id. at 330, 658 A.2d at 276-77.

21. State v. Woodson, 100 Md. App. 97, 102, 639 A.2d 710, 713 (1994), rev'd, 338 Md.
322, 658 A.2d 272 (1995).
22. Id.

23.
24.
25.
26.

Woodson, 338 Md. at 327, 658 A.2d at 275.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.

North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969).
395 U.S. 784 (1969).
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guaranteed by the Double Jeopardy Clause, applied to the States
27
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Logically, in order for any subsequent prosecution or punishment of a defendant to be constitutionally barred on double jeopardy
grounds, a defendant first must be placed in original jeopardy. This
original jeopardy occurs when a defendant is put to trial or when the
trial commences.2s The Supreme Court has held that ajury trial commences when the jury is selected
and sworn.2 9 Thus, jeopardy attaches when a jury is impaneled. 0
b. The "Required Evidence" Test.-Distinct statutory or common-law offenses may be deemed the "same offense" for double jeopardy purposes. In Gavieres v. United States,3 ' the Supreme Court
adopted the "required evidence" test to determine whether distinct
statutory offenses fell within the "same offense" definition of the
Double Jeopardy Clause.12 Under this test, two distinct statutory offenses are deemed the "same offense" when both require proof of the
33
same facts or only one requires proof of an additional fact.

After Gavieres, the Supreme Court applied the required evidence
test in Blockburger v. United States3 4 and held that double jeopardy did
not bar the prosecution of two distinct statutory offenses based on one
illegal narcotics sale.3 5 The Court found that each of the two offenses,
though based on one transaction, required proof of an additional element and, therefore, that the two offenses were not the "same offense" for double jeopardy purposes.3 6 However, the Blockburgertest is
27. Id. at 787.
28. United States v.Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479-80 (1971); see also Blondes v. State, 273 Md.
435, 444, 330 A.2d 169, 173 (1975) ("The problem in particular cases is in determining
when a defendant is 'put to trial' or when 'the trial commences.'").
29. Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 466 (1973); Blondes v. State, 273 Md. 435, 444,
330 A.2d 169, 173 (1975).
30. Blondes, 273 Md. at 444, 330 A.2d at 173.
31. 220 U.S. 338 (1911) (holding that double jeopardy did not bar prosecution for
both statutory offenses of insulting a public officer and behaving in an indecent manner in
a public place even though the offenses were based on a single transaction).
32. Id. at 342.
33. Id. However, if each statute required proof of an additional fact, a single transaction could be considered to be two distinct statutory offenses. Id.
34. 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
35. Id. at 304.
36. Id. Since Blockburger, the required evidence test has been referred to as the BlockbuWger test. The Supreme Court expanded this test in Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990),
by adopting an additional "same conduct" test. Id. at 510. This test barred "a subsequent

prosecution if, to establish an essential element of an offense charged in that prosecution,
the government will prove conduct that constitutes an offense for which the defendant has
already been prosecuted." Id. However, this "same conduct" test was subsequently over-
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not completely determinative of whether a violation of the Double
Jeopardy Clause has occurred. 7
c. The Manifest Necessity of a MistriaL-In United States v. Pethe Supreme Court first declared that double jeopardy did not
necessarily bar retrial of the same offense following a mistrial. 39 The
Court reasoned that without an acquittal or conviction, the defendant's original jeopardy never terminated such that double jeopardy
protection would attach.4 0 The Court stated that "the law has invested
Courts ofjustice with the authority to discharge ajury from giving any
verdict, whenever, in their opinion, taking all the circumstances into
consideration, there is a manifest necessity for the act, or the ends of
public justice would otherwise be defeated."4 1
Thus, a fundamental double jeopardy doctrine developed
whereby defendants could be retried following a mistrial without their
consent only if that mistrial was of manifest necessity. Subsequent
cases have declared a hung jury the "prototypical example" of manifest necessity for a mistrial declaration.4"
rez,3 8

ruled in United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993), for lacking consistency with
Supreme Court precedent and lacking "constitutional roots." Id. at 2860.
Maryland consistently has used the Blockburger test in determining whether offenses
are the same for double jeopardy analysis. See, e.g., Snowden v. State, 321 Md. 612, 583
A.2d 1056 (1991) (holding that defendant's separate sentences for assault and battery and
robbery with a dangerous and deadly weapon were barred because they were the same
offense for double jeopardy purposes); Thomas v. State, 277 Md. 257, 353 A.2d 240 (1976)
(holding that defendant's conviction for misdemeanor charge of driving a vehicle without
the owner's consent and with the intent to temporarily deprive the owner of possession
barred defendant's subsequent prosecution under the unauthorized use statute because
the two charges were the same offense for double jeopardy purposes).
37. EliJ. Richardson, EliminatingDouble-Talk from the Law of DoubleJeopardy, 22 FIA. ST.
U. L. Ruv. 119, 127 (1994) ("By itself, Blockburger does not inform a court whether a double
jeopardy violation exists.... Even if the case involves 'same offenses' according to Blockburger,a double jeopardy violation might not exist because other considerations might turn
what otherwise would be a double jeopardy violation into a nonviolation.").
38. 22 U.S. 579 (1824).
39. Id. at 580.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See, e.g., Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 324 (1984) ("[W]e have constantly adhered to the rule that a retrial following a 'hung jury' does not violate the Double
Jeopardy Clause."); Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 672 (1982) ("While other situations
have been recognized by our cases as meeting the 'manifest necessity' standard, the hung
jury remains the prototypical example."); Wooten-Bey v. State, 308 Md. 534, 545-46, 520
A.2d 1090, 1095-96 (1987) (holding that a defendant may be retried on felony murder
charges following a mistrial due to a hung jury even after the defendant was acquitted of
premeditated murder, second degree murder, and manslaughter).
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d. ContinuingJeopardy.-As with manifestly necessary mistrials, nolle prosequis4" and convictions reversed on appeal have not
barred subsequent prosecutions on double jeopardy grounds. In
United States v. Ball,' the Supreme Court held that double jeopardy
did not bar reprosecution of a defendant whose conviction was reversed on appeal.4 5 Maryland similarly has held that nolle prosequis
entered without a defendant's consent, after jeopardy has attached,
do not bar subsequent prosecutions of "same offenses" under separate
charging documents.'
This was not always so. Initially, in Blondes v. State,4 7 the Court of
Appeals held that the entry of a nolle prosequi without the defendant's consent, after jeopardy had attached, barred subsequent prosecution of the defendant for the same offense because a nolle prosequi
operates as an acquittal.4 " However, just one year later in Bynum v.
State,49 the Court of Appeals noted the Blondes decision, agreed with
its proposition, yet distinguished it as applying to cases involving more
than one prosecution.5 ° In Bynum, the defendant argued that a nolle
prosequi on a simple robbery count precluded the State from trying
him on an armed robbery count in the same indictment.5 1 The Court
of Appeals disagreed because the two charges were brought against
the defendant in a single trial and "[d] ouble jeopardy is not suffered
unless a man is twice put to trial."5 2 This differential treatment, between single and subsequent trials, was soon abolished by the Maryland courts.55
In Hunter v. State,54 the Court of Special Appeals held that the
nolle prosequis of several counts of an indictment, after jeopardy had
attached, did not bar subsequent prosecution of the defendant in a
second trial on the remaining counts after a manifestly necessary mistrial was declared as to those counts in the original trial.55 The Court
43. A nolle prosequi is a "'declaration of record from the legal representative of the
government, that he will no further prosecute the particular indictment or some designated part thereof.'" Ward v. State, 290 Md. 76, 83, 427 A.2d 1008, 1012 (1981) (quoting 2
BISHOP, NEw CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1387, at 1194 (2d ed. 1913)).

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

163 U.S. 662 (1896).
Id. at 671-72.
Ward v. State, 290 Md. 76, 84, 427 A.2d 1008, 1012-13 (1981).
273 Md. 435, 330 A.2d 169 (1975).
Id. at 443, 330 A.2d at 173.
277 Md. 703, 357 A.2d 339, cen. denied, 429 U.S. 899 (1976).
Id. at 705-08, 357 A.2d at 340-42.
Id. at 705, 357 A.2d at 340.
Id. at 707, 357 A.2d at 341.
See infra notes 54-61 and accompanying text.
38 Md. App. 111, 379 A.2d 432 (1977).
See id. at 117-18, 379 A.2d at 435.
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of Special Appeals first noted that the Bynum rationale should apply to
the facts at hand despite the departure from the single trial logic because "the single difference between Bynum and the subject case is
this: in Bynum the jury resolved the submitted issue; in the subject
case the jury was unable to agree and a mistrial followed." 56 The
Court of Special Appeals also relied on United States v. Perez5 7 and its
resolution that double jeopardy is not offended by the retrial of the
same offense following a manifestly necessary mistrial.5"
The Court of Appeals affirmed the Hunter extension of Bynum in
Ward v. State. 9 In Ward, the defendant objected, on double jeopardy
grounds, to a retrial following a postconviction reversal because the
offenses charged were the "same offenses" as those that the State had
earlier nolle prossed. Because the defendant was already "acquitted"
of those counts under the nolle prosequi, he argued, he could not be
retried.60 The Court of Appeals rejected this argument on the theory
that a nolle prosequi only discharges the defendant on the charging
document and "is not an acquittal or pardon of the underlying offense and does not preclude a prosecution for the same offense under
a different charging document or different count."61
The Court of Appeals in Ward dismissed the possibility of any limitations resulting from the Bynum and Blondes holdings. 62 As to
Bynum, the court reasoned that the language relating to a "single trial"
was not a limitation placed on the Bynum holding expressly, but a limitation unintentionally stated because of the facts of that case.6"
The Court of Appeals also limited the precedential value of
Blondes by stating that the real issue in that case was the attachment of
jeopardy in ajury trial. Any dicta as to the effect of a nolle prosequi
on double jeopardy, the court stated, "represented an inaccurate or

56. Id. at 114, 379 A.2d at 434.
57. 22 U.S. 579 (1824).
58. See Hunter, 38 Md. App. at 114-15, 379 A.2d at 434.
59. 290 Md. 76, 427 A.2d 1008 (1981). In Ward, the State nolle prossed two counts in
defendant's trial, after jeopardy had attached, and tried him on the remaining three. Id. at
79, 427 A.2d at 1010. The jury convicted the defendant on those three counts but this
conviction was overturned in a postconviction proceeding for lack of effective counsel. Id.
Thereafter, the State attempted to retry the defendant. Id.
60. Id. at 80, 427 A.2d 1010.
61. Id. at 84, 427 A.2d at 1012-13.
62. Id. at 96-100, 427 A.2d at 1019-21.
63. See id. at 97-98, 427 A.2d at 1019-20. In other words, the Bynum court had only
stated its holding so narrowly because it was not faced with a postconviction proceeding by
the defendant. Id.
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overbroad view of nolle prosequi and double jeopardy principles."'
By dismissing any problems created by dicta in Bynum and Blondes, the
Court of Appeals nullified the effect of a nolle prosequi, for double
jeopardy purposes, on other offenses.
e. Collateral Estoppel.-In Ashe v. Swenson,65 the Supreme
Court added another dimension to double jeopardy analysis by holding that the federal rule of collateral estoppel is embodied in the Fifth
Amendment's double jeopardy protection. 66 This rule bars relitigation of an issue of ultimate fact between the same parties when that
issue has been determined by a valid and final judgment. 67 Thus,
double jeopardy may bar both the relitigation of the "same offense" as
well as the relitigation of the same factual issue.
3. The Court'sReasoning.-In State v. Woodson,6" the Court of Appeals, in a unanimous decision, held that double jeopardy did not bar
retrial of the greater offense of possession with intent to distribute
even though the erroneous declaration of a mistrial as to the lesserincluded offense of possession barred that count from being retried.6 9
In determining whether the two separate offenses of possession and
possession with intent to distribute were the "same offense" for double
jeopardy purposes, the court applied the Blockburger "required evidence" test.7 0 Because the elements of possession were completely
subsumed within the elements of possession with intent to distribute,
and thus only one offense required proof of an additional fact, the
court declared the two offenses the "same offense" for double jeopardy purposes. 7 '
After finding that the two charged offenses were the "same offense," the court looked to the necessity of the mistrial declaration to
determine whether double jeopardy would bar the defendant's second prosecution. Using the Perez "manifest necessity" doctrine, the
court found that double jeopardy barred reprosecution on the posses64. Id. at 100, 427 A.2d at 1021. Despite this disapproving language, the Court refused
to overturn Blondes. Instead it noted that its "result is questionable" and limited it to its
facts. Id. at 100 n.21, 427 A.2d at 1021 n.21.
65. 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
66. Id. at 445.
67. Id. at 443.
68. 338 Md. at 322, 658 A.2d at 272.
69. Id. at 338-39, 658 A.2d at 281.
70. Id. at 328-29, 658 A.2d at 275-76. For an explanation of this test, see supra notes 31-

37 and accompanying text.
71. Woodson, 338 Md. at 329, 658 A.2d at 276.
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sion charge.7" The jury had actually reached a verdict on that count
and, thus, the judge had no necessity to declare a mistrial as to that
count. 73 However, the court found that manifest necessity existed for

the mistrial on the possession with intent to distribute count because
the jury was deadlocked, and deadlock is the prototypical example of
a manifestly necessary mistrial. 74 Thus, using the logic advanced by
Perez, double jeopardy did not bar retrial on the greater offense because the defendant's original jeopardy never terminated as to that
charge.75
Woodson argued that because the State was barred from retrying
him on the lesser offense of possession, the State also should be
barred from retrying him on the greater offense of possession with
intent to distribute, given that it was the "same offense" for double
jeopardy purposes.7 6 The Court of Appeals rejected this argument,
reasoning that the double jeopardy bar to reprosecution on the lesser
offense only operated as an acquittal for that charge but was not an
actual acquittal that would bar reprosecution of a separate offense.7 7
The court also rejected Woodson's argument that the bar to retrial of the possession charge collaterally estopped 78 retrial of the
greater offense, because a verdict was not delivered on the possession
count from which a factual finding in Woodson's favor could be inferred. 79 The "critical consideration" in the application of collateral
estoppel is whether a fact has been previously determined in a defendant's favor.8 0 Because no verdict was delivered on the lesser offense,
no judgment existed from which the court could infer a finding of
fact in favor of Woodson."' The court stated that neither procedural
adjudication represented an adjudication of not guilty or factual find82
ings in the defendant's favor.
The court's decision, however, was largely based on its analogy of
Because
Woodson's situation to one involving a nolle prosequi.
72. Id. at 329-30, 658 A.2d at 276.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 330, 658 A.2d at 277.
75. Id. at 337, 658 A.2d at 280.
76. Id. at 326-27, 658 A.2d at 275.
77. Id. at 336, 658 A-2d at 279.
78. " 'Collateral estoppel' ... means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once
been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit." Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970).
79. Woodson, 338 Md. at 331-32, 658 A.2d at 277.
80. Id. at 331, 658 A.2d at 277.
81. Id. at 331-32, 658 A.2d at 277.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 332-33, 658 A.2d at 278.
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Maryland case law clearly supports the proposition that a nolle prosequi does not operate as an acquittal except as to the specific count
nolle prossed, 4 the court found that the procedural bar to reprosecution of the lesser offense in Woodson did not bar continuing prosecution on other counts.8 5
4.

Analysis.-

a. The "Same Offense. "-The Court of Appeals correctly
found that the two offenses for which the defendant was convicted in
his second trial were the "same offense" for double jeopardy purposes
based on a proper application of the Blockburger "required evidence"
test.8 6 The offense of possession with intent to distribute requires
proof of an additional fact (intent to distribute) not required to prove
possession, while the possession offense does not require proof of additional facts. 7 Therefore, under the Blockburger test, both charges
are the "same offense" for double jeopardy purposes.
b. The Manifest Necessity of a Mistrial.-In Woodson, there was
no question that jeopardy attached at Woodson's first trial, as the jury
was not only selected and sworn, but heard the case and deliberated
on the charges."8 Yet, even if jeopardy attached and the two offenses
charged to Woodson in his first trial were the "same offense" for
double jeopardy purposes, reprosecution of those offenses would not
be barred if the mistrial declared in his first trial was of manifest necessity.8 9 This manifestly necessary mistrial exception to the Double
Jeopardy Clause has been recognized for over one hundred and fifty
years, and was properly applied by the Court of Appeals in Woodson.
There is little dispute that the mistrial declaration as to the possession with intent to distribute charge was manifestly necessary.
Hung juries have long been recognized as the "prototypical example"
84. See supra notes 47-64 and accompanying text.
85. Woodson, 338 Md. at 338-39, 658 A.2d at 281.
86. Id. at 328-29, 658 A.2d at 275-76. For an explanation of the Blockburger test, see
supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text.
87. Woodson, 338 Md. at 329, 658 A.2d at 276 ("[Elvery element of possession is also an
element of possession with intent to distribute."). Greater and lesser offenses are necessarily the "same offense" for double jeopardy purposes. See Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 169
(1977) ("Whatever the sequence may be, the Fifth Amendment forbids successive prosecution and cumulative punishment for a greater and lesser included offense."). However, as
the Brown Court acknowledged, exceptions may exist for retrial following a mistrial or following the reversal of a conviction. Id. at 165 n.5.
88. Woodson, 338 Md. at 325-26, 658 A.2d at 274.
89. See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
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of manifestly necessary mistrials.9" Furthermore, the judge did not
simply accept the jury's initial declaration of deadlock.9" When the
jury first announced its inability to reach a verdict on the possession
with intent to distribute charge, the judge sent the jurors back into
the jury room to attempt to reach a conclusion.92 However, after deliberating for four more hours, the jury was still at an impasse. 93 At
that point, the judge had no choice but to declare a mistrial.
There is also little dispute that the judge lacked manifest necessity to declare the mistrial as to the possession charge. In Arizona v.
Washington,9 4 the Supreme Court stated that there must be a high degree of necessity before a mistrial is declared.9 5 In Woodson, the judge
declared the mistrial on the possession charge without ever asking the
jury for its verdict on that count.9 6 The requisite high degree of ne-

cessity was clearly not present here because the judge was aware that
the jury had reached a verdict. He simply refused to take that verdict
because the jury had not reached a verdict on the greater offense.97
This hasty mistrial declaration did not meet the stringent necessity test
stated in Washingtonand was indisputably without manifest necessity.9 8
Therefore, the mistrial declaration as to the possession count was not
90. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. One commentator discussed the common sense of retrying a defendant following a hung jury as follows:
Intuitively the decision seems correct. Justice demands resolution of criminal
charges brought to trial; if a particularjury cannot agree to acquit or convict, it is
manifestly necessary that another jury must have the opportunity. Double jeopardy is not violated: first, because no prior conviction or acquittal exists; and
second, because the defendant was deprived of the "valued right to have his trial
completed by a particular tribunal" only because of that tribunal's inability to
complete the trial.
William S. McAninch, Unfolding the Law of DoubleJeopardy,44 S.C. L. Rav. 411, 478 (1993)
(discussing United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. 579 (1824)) (footnote omitted).
91. Woodson, 338 Md. at 326, 658 A.2d at 274.
92. Id. The judge also gave the jury an A//en charge before they went back in the jury
room for further deliberations. Id. An Allen charge is given to deadlocked juries to prod
them toward unanimity. STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 948 (4th ed. 1992). It admonishes jurors to decide for themselves but it also
states that "[ylou should listen, with a disposition to be convinced, to each other's arguments" and that the minority should question the reasonableness of their opinion in the
face of the opinion of the majority. Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1846).
93. Woodson, 338 Md. at 326, 658 A.2d at 274.
94. 434 U.S. 497 (1978).
95. Id. at 506.
96. Woodson, 338 Md. at 326, 658 A.2d at 274-75.
97. Id. The Court expressly did not decide whether a judge has a duty to inquire into
the jury's verdicts on all counts of a multi-count indictment when the jury deadlocks. Id. at
330 n.2, 658 A.2d at 276 n.2.
98. Id. at 329-30, 658 A.2d at 276. "[T]he State concedes that there was no manifest
necessity to declare a mistrial as to Count 3, the possession count, because the jury had
reached a verdict on that count. . .

."

Id.
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manifestly necessary, and double jeopardy barred reprosecution of
the defendant for the same offense in his second trial.
c. The Meaning of AcquittaL-In Woodson, the fundamental
dispute between the defendant and the State was the meaning of the
term "acquittal." Woodson hoped to invoke the double jeopardy protection against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal. 99 Because there was no dispute that the lesser and greater
offenses charged against Woodson were the same offense, the only
dispute was whether an original "acquittal" existed as to the lesser offense that would bar a second prosecution for the greater offense.
When deciding this issue of first impression,' 0 the Court of Appeals analogized the mistrial to a nolle prosequi. 1 1 Maryland case law
has recognized that nolle prosequis have little effect on prosecution of
other offenses under separate charging documents. This limited effect of a nolle prosequi is proper under the terms of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment because a second prosecution is
only barred for the same offense following a conviction or acquittal.'0 2
A nolle prosequi, by its own terms, is not a conviction or acquittal on
the merits of the charge, but merely a strategic decision made by the
prosecutor not to proceed on that charge. As noted in Jackson v.
State,103 "[i]t is not uncommon before submitting a case to the jury to
'tidy up' the issues to be submitted so as to simplify its deliberations.
10 4
Such housecleaning exercises in no way represent acquittals."
Similarly, the double jeopardy bar on the lesser offense in Woodson, due to the lack of necessity for the mistrial declaration, is not an
acquittal on the merits of the case. Instead, like a nolle prosequi, it is
a procedural bar placed on the judicial system so that defendants will
not be subject to numerous prosecutions for the same offense when a
decision can be reached in one original trial. Therefore, doublejeop99. See id. at 332, 658 A.2d at 277-78 (discussing the defendant's double jeopardy
argument).
100. See id. at 333, 658 A.2d at 278 (noting that neither the parties nor the court could
find any cases addressing the specific issue before the court).
101. See supra note 43. Interestingly, though it was never mentioned in Woodson, one
case suggests that the comparison of a mistrial to a nolle prosequi has historical roots. See
Ward v. State, 290 Md. 76, 86, 427 A.2d 1008, 1014 (1981) (discussing early American case
law on the double jeopardy effects of nolle prosequis). "The earlier opinions discussed
both circumstances together, viewing mistrial cases as authority in cases involving a nolle
prosequi, and vice versa." Id.
102. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969) (discussing the threefold
protection of the Double Jeopardy Clause).
103. 82 Md. App. 438, 572 A.2d 567 (1990), affd, 322 Md. 117, 586 A.2d 6 (1991).
104. Id. at 447, 572 A.2d at 571-72.

1996]

MARYLAND

COURT OF APPEALs

ardy should not hinder the State's ability to reprosecute counts, which
can be defined as the "same offense," that legitimately should be
reprosecuted.
In the instant case, the original jeopardy never terminated as to
the possession with intent to distribute charge because it ended in a
properly declared mistrial.10 5 The Double Jeopardy Clause requires
that either an acquittal or a conviction occur to terminate original
jeopardy, and "a trial court's declaration of a mistrial following a hung
jury is not an event that terminates the original jeopardy."'0 6 Therefore, the erroneous mistrial declaration as to the possession charge
should not affect the State's ability to retry the defendant on the possession with intent to distribute charge, tried in the same trial, because the original jeopardy as to the latter charge never terminated.
d. CollateralEstoppel.-Collateral estoppel bars relitigation of
an issue between the same parties once that issue has been deter0 7 Woodson
mined by a valid and final judgment."
argued that this
doctrine barred his retrial on the possession with intent to distribute
charge following the bar to reprosecution of the possession charge.' 0 8
This argument was flatly rejected by the Court of Appeals.'0 I Because
collateral estoppel requires a factual finding in the defendant's favor
based on a valid and final judgment, collateral estoppel cannot be
applied following a mistrial because mistrials do not establish any findings of fact.'
Thus, the defendant's mistrial as to the possession
charge cannot collaterally estop reprosecution on possession with intent to distribute.

105. Woodson, 338 Md. at 329-31, 658 A.2d at 276-77.
106. Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 326 (1984).
107. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970); supra notes 65-67 and accompanying
text. It is possible that even if the defendant had been outright acquitted of the possession
charge, double jeopardy would still not bar the reprosecution of the possession with intent
charge, following a mistrial, but that the doctrine of collateral estoppel would. See Mauk v.
State, 91 Md. App. 456, 478 n.11, 605 A.2d 157, 168 n.11 (1992). The Court of Special
Appeals noted that even a properly granted acquittal of a lesser offense would not require
an acquittal of the greater offense on double jeopardy grounds but rather on collateral
estoppel grounds. Id. ("[F]or the very reason that a properly granted judgment of acquittal on the lesser charge would establish, by definition, that the evidence was insufficient to
permit going forward on the greater charge.").
108. Woodson, 338 Md. at 327, 658 A.2d at 275.
109. Id. at 331-32, 658 A.2d at 277.
110. Butler v. State, 335 Md. 238, 266-67, 643 A.2d 389, 403 (1994) (discussing Maryland
cases dealing with the relevancy of a mistrial to findings of fact).
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In addition, the Supreme Court has held that the doctrine of collateral estoppel must be applied with "realism and rationality."1 1 1 It is
certainly not realistic or rational to believe that the jury found in the
defendant's favor as to the possession charge. The jury's verdict on
the possession charge was probably one of guilt, or the jury would not
have hung on the possession with intent to distribute charge."' Thus,
Woodson did not prove that the factual issue of his possession of a
dangerous controlled substance was actually and validly decided in his
favor such that the issue could not be relitigated in a subsequent pros1 13
ecution for the offense of possession with intent to distribute.
e. Manifest Necessity as to Multi-Count Indictments Unresolved by
Woodson.-One question left open by the Court of Appeals is the
double jeopardy effect of a mistrial declaration following a trial on a
multi-count indictment, when the jury deadlocks but does not specifically state that the deadlock is to all counts."' Following Woodson, it is
unclear whether a judge has a duty to inquire individually into each
count before declaring a mistrial. Indeed, the court expressly did not
reach this issue." 5 In Woodson, the judge knew that a verdict existed
as to one count but refused to accept it, causing the subsequent mistrial to be without manifest necessity. The dicta in Woodson suggests,
however, that no such duty of inquiry exists for a Maryland judge. 1 6
This issue likely will require further clarification from the court in the
future.
5. Conclusion.-In State v. Woodson," 7 the Court of Appeals
properly followed the trend in Maryland case law of applying the
double jeopardy bar to second prosecutions of separate offenses that
meet the "same offense" test only in cases in which the first offense
was tried and disposed of on the merits. By analogizing the double
111. See Ashe, 397 U.S. at 444 (noting that collateral estoppel should not be applied
rigidly).
112. "It is unlikely that the jury would have hung on the charge of possession with intent
to distribute if it had already concluded that Woodson was not guilty of possession." Woodson, 338 Md. at 332, 658 A.2d at 277.
113. The burden is on a defendant to prove that an issue has previously been decided in
another proceeding. See Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 350 (1990) (discussing the
burden of proof on a party attempting to use the doctrine of collateral estoppel).
114. Woodson, 338 Md. at 330 n.2, 658 A.2d at 277 n.2.
115. Id. ("We are, however, not holding in this case that the trial judge has a duty to
inquire as to whether the jury has reached or may be able to reach a verdict on each
individual count in a multi-count indictment when the jury announces that it is
deadlocked.").
116. Id.
117. 338 Md. at 322, 658 A.2d at 272.
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jeopardy effect of a mistrial without manifest necessity to a nolle
prosequi, the Court of Appeals held that reprosecution of a greater
offense following a necessary mistrial declaration was not barred when
double jeopardy precluded reprosecution of a lesser offense due to a
lack of manifest necessity for the mistrial declaration.1 1 The court
did not reach the question of how this decision will impact multicount indictments, but instead properly limited itself to the facts of
the case at bar.
STACY

A.

MAYER

E. Allowing Sentence Enhancement While a Prior Conviction Is on Appeal
In Whack v. State' the Court of Appeals held that a criminal conviction that is on appeal may be considered in imposing sentences
under two sections of the Maryland Code2 that provide for enhanced
penalties for individuals who previously have been convicted of crimes
involving dangerous substances.' In so doing, the court defined the
words "convicted" and "conviction" as referring to the "final judgment
and sentence rendered by a court pursuant to a verdict or plea of
guilty."4 Despite a sparse record of legislative intent, and ambiguity in
the language of the statutes,6 the court decided that application of the
rule of lenity'7 was not appropriate because the legislature's intent was
ascertainable.' The court also held that the two sentence-enhancing
118. Id. at 338, 658 A.2d at 281.
1. 338 Md. 665, 659 A.2d 1347 (1995).
2. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 286(c), 293 (1992 & Supp. 1994).
3. Whack, 338 Md. at 668, 659 A.2d at 1348. Article 27, § 286(c) specifies that a defendant who "previously has been convicted" of defined drug-related crimes be given a 10year minimum sentence without the possibility of parole. MD. ANN. CODE. art. 27,
§ 286(c). Article 27, §§ 286(c) and 293 allow ajudge to impose a sentence that is twice the
otherwise authorized sentence if the offense is a "second or subsequent offense." Id.
§§ 286(c), 293.
4. Whack, 338 Md. at 674, 659 A.2d at 1351 (quoting Myers v. State, 303 Md. 639, 645,
496 A.2d 312, 315 (1985)).
5. Id. at 680, 659 A.2d at 1354; see also id. at 685, 659 A.2d at 1356 (Bell,J, dissenting);
Gargliano v. State, 334 Md. 428, 441-42, 639 A.2d 675, 681 (1994) (noting that legislative
intent with regard to § 286 is not clear from legislative history).
6. Whack, 338 Md. at 675, 659 A.2d at 1351.
7. The rule of lenity provides that where there is ambiguity in the language of a statute concerning possible punishments, the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of the
defendant. BrAcK's LAW DicrioNAv 902 (6th ed. 1990).
8. Whack, 338 Md. at 683, 659 A.2d at 1355. The rule of lenity is reserved for cases
where it is impossible to discern the legislative intent and the court is "left with an ambiguous statute" containing a "grievous ambiguity or uncertainty." Id. at 674, 659 A.2d at 1351
(quotingJones v. State, 336 Md. 255, 262, 647 A.2d 1204, 1207 (1994)).
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sections could be used to increase sentences imposed on different
counts in the same criminal proceeding.9
1. The Case.-Whack called on the Court of Appeals to consider
two statutory provisions that provide for increased sentences for repeat offenders involved in drug-related crimes. Article 27, section
286(c)1 ° provides for a minimum ten-year sentence, without parole,
for an individual convicted of distributing or conspiring to distribute
specified controlled dangerous substances" if that person "previously
has been convicted" of the same or a similar crime.' 2 Article 27, section 293 allows ajudge to double the sentence and fine of an individual convicted of drug-related offenses if the "offense is a second or
subsequent offense."1 3
9. Id. at 683, 659 A.2d at 1355.
10. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 286(c) (1992 & Supp. 1994).
11. Id. Article 27, § 286(b)(1) specifies that anyone manufacturing, distributing, dispensing, possessing or conspiring to do any of these things in regard to Schedule I or II
narcotic drugs is guilty of a felony and is subject to imprisonment for not more than 20
years or a fine of not more than $25,000, or both. Id. § 286(b)(1). Article 27, § 286(b)(2)
provides a similar sentence and fine for individuals involved with specified non-narcotic
substances. Id. § 286(b) (2).
12. Id. § 286(c)(1). Section 286(c) provides in relevant part:
(1) A person who is convicted under subsection (b) (1) or subsection (b) (2)
of this section, or of conspiracy to violate subsection (b) (1) or (b) (2) of this section shall be sentenced to imprisonment for not less than 10 years if the person
previously has been convicted:
(i) Under subsection (b)(1) or subsection (b)(2) of this section;
(ii) Of conspiracy to violate subsection (b) (1) or subsection (b) (2) of this
section; or
(iii) Of an offense under the laws of another state, the District of Columbia,
or the United States that would be a violation of subsection (b) (1) or subsection
(b) (2) of this section if committed in this State.
(2) The prison sentence of a person sentenced under subsection (b) (1) or
subsection (b) (2) of this section, or of conspiracy to violate subsection (b) (1) or
subsection (b) (2) of this section or any combination of these offenses, as a second
offender may not be suspended to less than 10 years, and the person may be
paroled during that period only in accordance with Article 31B, § 11 of the Code
(providing for the parole of persons confined for treatment at the Patuxent
Institution].
Id.
13. Id. § 293(a) (1992). Section 293 provides in relevant part:
(a) Any person convicted of any offense under this subheading is, if the offense is a second or subsequent offense, punishable by a term of imprisonment
twice that otherwise authorized, by twice the fine otherwise authorized, or by
both.
(b) For purposes of this section, an offense shall be considered a second or
subsequent offense, if, prior to the conviction of the offense, the offender has at
any time been convicted of any offense or offenses under this subheading or
under any prior law of this State or any law of the United States or of any other
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On March 11, 1993, Larry Whack was convicted by a jury in the
Circuit Court for Prince George's County of four drug-related offenses.14 On April 1, 1993, he was sentenced to a total of eighty-five
years in prison, with twenty-five years to be served without parole.15
The issue before the Court of Appeals concerned the sentences imposed on counts two and fifteen of Whack's indictment. On count
two, conspiracy to distribute cocaine,1 6 the maximum sentence of
twenty years was doubled to forty years pursuant to section 293, and a
ten-year minimum sentence without parole was imposed, as provided
for in section 286(c). 17 On count fifteen, importation of twenty-eight
grams or more of cocaine, 1 8 the maximum penalty of twenty-five years
was doubled to fifty years in accordance with to section 293.19
A sentencing review panel later reduced these sentences. The
sentence on count two was reduced from forty years to twenty years,
the maximum allowed without enhancement. 20 The ten-year minimum sentence without parole, imposed pursuant to section 286(c),
remained. 2' The sentence on count fifteen was reduced from fifty
years to forty years.2 2 This left it enhanced by section 293.25
In imposing the enhanced sentences, the circuit court relied on
Whack's prior conviction on October 24, 1991, in the Circuit Court
for Cecil County, for possession with intent to distribute controlled
dangerous substances. 24 Whack was sentenced in that case on February 20, 1992. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the prior Cecil
Count/ conviction on November 27, 1992.25 The Court of Appeals
state relating to the other controlled dangerous substances as defined in this
subheading.
Id.
14. Whack, 338 Md. at 669, 659 A.2d at 1348. The charges against Whack included
conspiracy to distribute cocaine, importing cocaine into Maryland, the possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, and the use of a firearm in relationship with a drug trafficking crime. Whack v. State, No. 631, slip op. at 2 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Apr. 8, 1994) (per

curiam).
15. Whack, 338 Md. at 669, 659 A.2d at 1348.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id., 659 A.2d at 1349. After the sentencing review panel's reductions, Whack's total
sentence was reduced from 85 years to 65 years, with 25 years to be served without parole.
Id. at 669 n.2, 659 A.2d at 1349 n.2.
24. Id. at 670, 659 A.2d at 1349.
25. Whack v. State, 94 Md. App. 107, 615 A.2d 1226 (1992), cart. denied, 330 Md. 155,
622 A.2d 1196 (1993).
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denied certiorari on April 21, 1993,26 twenty days after Whack was sen27
tenced on the charges in Prince George's County.
At sentencing in Prince George's County, the trial judge rejected
the argument that because Whack's earlier conviction was on appeal,
it was not final and could not be used as a basis for imposing enhanced sentences.28 The Court of Special Appeals, in an unreported
opinion, sided with the trial court.' The court also held that the trial
court could apply both sentence-enhancing sections to Whack's sentence.3 o The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to decide whether a
prior conviction that is on appeal can serve as a predicate for the imposition of enhanced punishment under sections 286(c) and 293 and
whether both provisions may be used to enhance a sentence in the
31
same case.
2.

Legal Background.-

a. The Meaning of "Conviction."-Whack is not the first time
the Court of Appeals had to resolve a statutory ambiguity concerning
the word "conviction." In Myers v. State,3 the court determined that
"the meaning of 'convicted' and 'conviction' turns upon the context
and purpose with which those terms are used."33 Faced with the question of whether a person found guilty of perjury who had been given a
sentence of probation before judgment was competent to testify in the
face of a statute providing that "'[a] person convicted of perjury may
not testify,'"' the Myers court identified two possible meanings of conviction. First, conviction may refer to "the establishment of guilt prior
to, and independent of, the judgment of the court."35 Second, conviction may refer to "the final judgment and sentence rendered by a
court pursuant to a verdict or plea of guilty."3 6 The court stated that
26. Whack v. State, 330 Md. 155, 622 A.2d 1196 (1993).
27. Whack, 338 Md. at 669-70, 659 A.2d at 1348-49.
28. Id. at 670, 659 A.2d at 1349.
29. Whack v. State, No. 631, slip op. at 13 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Apr. 8, 1994) (per
curiam).
30. Id. at 11.
31. Whack, 338 Md. at 668, 659 A.2d at 1349.
32. 303 Md. 639, 496 A.2d 312 (1985).
33. Id. at 639, 642, 496 A.2d at 313.
34. Id. at 640, 496 A.2d at 312 (quoting MD. CODE ANN., Crs. & JUD. PROC. § 9-104
(1984)) (emphasis in Myers). The court stated that because the General Assembly had not
defined the meaning of "conviction," it was the court's duty "to ascertain its meaning in the
context of [the statute]." Id. at 642, 496 A.2d at 313.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 642-43, 496 A.2d at 313-14. This was the common-law meaning of the term
"convicted." Id. at 642, 496 A.2d at 313 (citing 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIAL AT COMMON LAW § 521, at 731 (J.Chadbourn ed., 1979)); see also Francis v. Weaver, 76 Md. 457,
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"unless the context in which the word is used indicates otherwise, a
'conviction' is the final judgment and sentence rendered by a court
pursuant to a verdict or plea of guilty.""7 Pointing to the wording of
the probation before judgment statute, 8 the court concluded that a
sentence of probation imposed prior to judgment was not a conviction in the legal sense of the word, 9 and thus did not bar the witness
in Myers from testifying.'
The court found a different meaning for conviction in State v.
Broadwater.4" In Broadwater, the court considered a statute denying
voter registration to an individual "convicted of theft or other infamous crime, unless he has been pardoned, or, in connection with his
first such conviction only, he has completed any sentence imposed pursuant to that conviction."4 2 At issue was the question whether multiple counts arising in the same criminal proceeding were to be treated
as a single conviction or as multiple convictions in construing the
words "first such conviction."s Repeating its position that the meaning of the words "convicted" and "conviction" depends upon the con-

467, 25 A. 413, 415 (1892) (explaining that in legal sense, conviction is used to denote the
judgment of the court); Hunter v. State, 193 Md. 596, 606-07, 69 A.2d 505, 509-10 (1949)
(citing numerous cases that support the majority view that a conviction includes not only
the verdict of a jury but the imposition of a sentence or judgment).
37. Myers, 303 Md. at 645, 496 A.2d at 315.
38. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 641 (1982 & Supp. 1984). Section 641(c) provides in
relevant part that at the satisfactory conclusion of the probationary period, "a person
under this section shall be withoutjudgment of conviction" and that the completed probationary sentence "is not a conviction for purposes of any disqualification or disability imposed by law because of conviction of a crime." Id. § 641 (c). Also, § 641 (a) provides that if
there was a determination of guilt or acceptance of a nolo contendere plea, a trial judge
could "stay the entering ofjudgment, defer further proceedings, and place the person on
probation." Id. § 641(a).
39. Myers, 303 Md. at 647, 496 A.2d at 316. "[A] person who receives probation before
judgment is not convicted of the crime for which he has been found guilty, unless the
person violates the probation order and a court enters ajudgment on the finding of guilt."
Id.
40. Id. at 648, 496 A.2d at 316. "The General Assembly, as evidenced by its careful use
of the dispositive terms associated with this case, obviously was aware that a situation such
as this might arise. Had the General Assembly intended to disqualify those found guilty,
but not convicted, of perjury, it surely had the ability and knowledge to do so." Id. at 64849, 496 A.2d at 317.
41. 317 Md. 342, 563 A.2d 420 (1989).
42. Id. at 343-44, 563 A.2d at 421 (quoting MD. ANN. CODE art. 33, §§ 3-4(c) (1986))
(emphasis added).
43. Id. at 344, 563 A.2d at 421. The State, which sought to deny Tommy Broadwater,
Jr., a former state senator, the right to re-register to vote, argued that each count for which
a separate sentence could be imposed should be considered a conviction. Id. Broadwater
contended that "first conviction" should apply to the criminal proceeding as a whole and
not to each individual count. Id.
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text and purpose for which the words are used,' the court agreed
with Broadwater that, because the purpose of the statute was to allow
individuals convicted of a crime an opportunity to be rehabilitated
and restored to their right to vote as a citize'n,4 5 it would be contrary
to the intent of the legislature to interpret conviction to apply to each
individual count in a single criminal proceeding.4 6 Hence, the court
concluded that "first such conviction" should be interpreted "in the
broader, layperson's sense of the occasion of conviction of a person
who is a first time offender, as opposed to a repeat offender."4 7
The court's interpretation of legislative purpose also played a key
role in its definition of the meaning of conviction in Shilling v. State.4"
At issue was whether the State was required to give a person notice
under Rule 4-245(c) 49 that it intended to use a prior conviction for
drunk driving, where the judge had imposed probation prior to judgment, in order to seek additional punishment under a subsequent offender provision. ° The State argued, consistent with Myers, that the
prior violation, while sufficient to meet the repeat violation requirements of the drunk driving statute, 1 was not a "prior conviction"
within the meaning of Rule 4-245(c).52 Finding that the purpose of
Rule 4-245(c) was to provide notice so that a defendant would have
the opportunity to "intelligently conduct his defense," the court held
that the State was required to provide the defendant with notice of its
intent to use his prior conviction. 5
The two-pronged effort to ascertain the meaning of the word
"conviction" in a statute through both precedent and the inference of
legislative intent led to differing conclusions in Jones v. Baltimore City
44. Id. at 347, 563 A.2d at 423.
45. Id. at 348, 563 A.2d at 423.
46. Id. at 351-52, 563 A.2d at 425.
47. Id. at 351, 563 A.2d at 425.
48. 320 Md. 288, 577 A.2d 83 (1990).
49. MD. R. 4-245(c). This rule provides that "[w]hen the law prescribes a mandatory
sentence because of a specified previous conviction, the State's Attorney shall serve a notice of the alleged prior conviction on the defendant or counsel at least 15 days before
sentencing in circuit court." Id.
50. Shilling, 320 Md. at 291-92, 577 A.2d at 84-85. Prior to amendment in 1991, Maryland law provided that "a court may not stay the entering ofjudgment and place a person
on probation for a second or subsequent violation" of the state's driving while intoxicated
statutes. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 641(a) (2) (1987).
51. The statute provides that ifa person has received probation under the section, he is
deemed to have been in violation of the statute. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 641 (a) (2).
52. Shilling 320 Md. at 296, 577 A.2d at 87.
53. Id. at 297, 577 A.2d at 87-88.
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Police Department.54 At issue was a provision of the Law Enforcement
Officer's Bill of Rights (LEOBR) that provides that a police officer
must be given an administrative hearing prior to termination unless
he has been "convicted" of a felony. 5 A Baltimore City police officer
was found guilty of two felony counts of distribution and possession of
child pornography and was terminated without a hearing. 56 The trial
judge sentenced him to probation before entering judgment.5 7 The
officer challenged the termination, arguing that he should have been
given a hearing because he had not been legally "convicted" of a felony.5" Relying on the Myers precedent that a conviction means judgment and imposition of sentence unless the context indicates
otherwise, a majority of the court held that the officer should have
been granted a hearing prior to his firing.59 The majority found nothing in the legislative history or the purpose of the statute to "suggest a
6
contrary result." 1
In a forceful dissent, however, Judge Chasanow challenged the
majority's analysis of legislative intent" and its reliance on Myers.62
He argued that the purpose of an administrative hearing is to determine whether an officer was guilty of the offense or violation
charged.6 3 However, the officer's guilt was not in question because he
had been tried and found guilty.6 Moreover, Judge Chasanow argued that there was clear legislative history indicating that the admin54. 326 Md. 480, 606 A.2d 214 (1992); see also id. at 490, 606 A.2d at 219 (Chasanow, J.,

dissenting).
55. Id. at 481, 606 A.2d at 214. LEOBR provides that "[a] law enforcement officer is
not entitled to a hearing under this section if the law enforcement officer has been
charged and convicted of a felony." Id. (quoting MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 730(c) (1992)).
56. Id. at 481-82, 606 A.2d at 214-15.
57. Id. at 482, 606 A.2d at 215.
58. Id. at 483, 606 A.2d at 215.
59. Id. at 489, 606 A.2d at 218.

60. Id. "Whether we agree that such a rule would be beneficial is immaterial-we are
not a legislative body and we are not permitted to engraft a strained or artificial interpretation upon a statute to achieve a result that comports with our idea of societal needs." Id.
61. Id. at 490, 606 A.2d at 219 (Chasanow, J., dissenting). "The General Assembly
could not have intended such a result." Id.
62. Id. at 494-95, 606 A.2d at 221. Judge Chasanow argued that Myers does not dictate

the result because the court had interpreted the words in different ways in the past. Id.
63. Id. at 493, 606 A.2d at 220. Judge Chasanow explained that a hearing under LE-

OBR is a two-stage process, the objective in the first stage being to determine guilt. In the
second stage, the hearing board makes a recommendation to the chief of police regarding
the appropriate sanction. In this case, the city was willing to give Jones a stage-two hearing
and allow him to make his case for reinstatement. However, the city objected to having to
call witnesses, present evidence, and hold a full evidentiary hearing as required in a stageone proceeding. Jones's position, on the other hand, was that he was entitled to reinstatement, back pay, and a new hearing to determine guilt. Id. at 493-94, 606 A.2d at 220-21.
64. Id. at 490, 606 A.2d at 219.
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istrative hearing exception was passed to relieve local governments of
the trouble and expense involved with conducting an additional hearing.65 In that context, he concluded, "conviction" should be "given its
everyday meaning" as a determination of guilt "regardless of the sentence imposed."66
Prior to Whack, the Court of Appeals had an opportunity to interpret the legislative intent of section 286(c). In Garglianov. State,67 the
court held that the mandatory minimum sentence prescribed by section 286(c) could be imposed only where the conviction for a prior
offense preceded the commission of the principal offense.68 Because
the statute was silent as to the sequence of the commission of the
crime and the timing of convictions," the court said ithad to "look
beyond the words of the statute and to other evidence of legislative
intent to determine which interpretation of the two [possible meanings of prior conviction] . . . best furthers the legislative object or
goals."7 0 The legislative history of section 286(c) was of no help.7 1
Drawing on prior decisions7 2 and the general structure of the stat-

65. Id. at 496, 606 A.2d at 222.
66. Id. at 499, 606 A.2d at 223.
67. 334 Md. 428, 639 A.2d 675 (1994).
68. Id. at 431, 639 A.2d at 676. Gargliano sold drugs to a Maryland State police officer
on three occasions in 1989 and 1990. He was tried and convicted on the first two sales in
April 1991. Shortly after that trial, the State notified him that it intended to seek enhanced
punishment in his trial on the third sale on the basis of his conviction. Id. at 431-32, 639
A.2d at 676. While there was no evidence that the State deliberately delayed charging
Gargliano on the third sale in order to be able to get an enhanced sentence, the timing of
the two trials and the possibility that trial dates could be manipulated was mentioned by
the court as a factor in its decision that enhanced sentences could come into play only if
the crime on trial had occurred after the prior conviction. See id. at 448, 639 A.2d at 68485.
69. Id. at 438, 639 A.2d at 679.
70. Id. at 439, 639 A.2d at 680. The question for the court was whether the statute was
"intended to apply only to defendants who fail to reform their behavior after a prior conviction," as Gargliano contended, or "to all defendants who amass multiple convictions," as
the State contended. Id. at 438, 639 A.2d at 680. At no point in Gargianodid the court
define the meaning of conviction. The implicit assumption appears to be that it referred
to the judgment of the court and the imposition of sentence.
71. Id. at 441-42, 639 A.2d at 681.
72. Id. at 442-45, 639 A.2d at 682-83; see, e.g., Jones v. State, 324 Md. 32, 38, 595 A.2d
463, 466 (1991) (holding that the legislature intended to give convicted individuals a
chance to rehabilitate themselves in adopting language of § 286(d) (1)); Montone v. State,
308 Md. 599, 606, 521 A.2d 720, 723 (1987) (finding that the sentence-enhancing statute
was intended to identify individuals incapable of rehabilitation and this required that there
be some opportunity for them to rehabilitate themselves); Garrett v. State, 59 Md. App. 97,
118, 474 A.2d 931, 941 (finding that deterrence rather than retribution was the intent of
the legislature in enacting the statute), cert. denied, 300 Md. 483, 479 A.2d 372 (1984).
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ute,7 the court concluded that the intent of the legislature in enacting section 286(c) was to "protect the public ... and to deter repeat
offenders from perpetrating other criminal acts ... under the threat
of an extended period of confinement."7 4
b. The Finality of Convictions.-In Butler v. State75 the Court of
Special Appeals addressed essentially the same question raised in
Whack 76 whether a predicate conviction had to be final before a sentence-enhancing statute could be applied. In Butler, an enhanced sentence was imposed in a robbery case pursuant to a sentencing statute
when one of the predicate convictions was still on appeal.7 7 Butler
argued that his earlier conviction could not be used to enhance his
sentence because it was not final. The Court of Special Appeals
agreed. The court did not elaborate on the reasons for its holding,
noting only that, "[w]e believe that before the drastic effect of a [section] 643B(c) sentencing can be allowed to stand, the supporting conviction must be a final conviction."7 8 There was no appeal.
The federal code includes analogous statutory provisions similar
to those at issue in Whack.7 9 Title 21, section 841 of the United States
Code includes several sections that provide that a person who commits defined drug violations after one or more prior convictions have
"become final' shall be given an enhanced sentence. 80 Prior to 1970,
the federal statute used the language "previously been convicted" instead of "have become final" to indicate the triggering event for imposition of an enhanced sentence. 8 ' Federal courts of appeals
considering this language prior to its amendment interpreted it to re73. Gargiano,334 Md. at 440-41, 639 A.2d at 680-81. The court noted the various sections of the statute "form a comprehensive scheme of graduated mandatory penalties for
repeat offenders." Id. at 440, 639 A.2d at 680.
74. Id. at 444-45, 639 A.2d at 683 (quoting Hawkins v. State, 302 Md. 143, 148, 486 A.2d
179, 182 (1985)). Given this purpose, there had to be some "provision of fair warning to
previous offenders that if they continue to commit criminal acts after having had the opportunity to reform... they will be imprisoned for a considerably longer period of time
than they were subject to as first offenders." Id. at 444, 639 A.2d at 682-63.
75. 46 Md. App. 317, 416 A.2d 773 (1980).
76. See supra text accompanying note 31.
77. Butler, 46 Md. App. at 321, 416 A.2d at 775. Article 27, § 643B(c) provides for a 25-

year minimum sentence for individuals convicted for the third time of a crime of violence.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 643B(c) (1992 & Supp. 1994).
78. Butler, 46 Md. App. at 322, 416 A.2d at 776.
79. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)-(D) (1994).
80. Id. (emphasis added); see also Whack, 338 Md. at 676 & n.5, 659 A.2d at 1352 & n.5
(discussing these provisions).
81. Whack, 338 Md. at 675, 659 A.2d at 1352.
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fer to the judgment of a trial court after a determination of guilt. s2
After the 1970 amendments, however, federal courts generally have
interpreted this and similar provisions as requiring the exhaustion of
all appeals."3
Courts in other jurisdictions are split on the issue of whether a
predicate conviction must be final.8 4 In the past, allowing convictions
that were not final to be used to enhance sentences was the minority
rule. 5 This may be changing, however, as more jurisdictions appear
86
to be adopting this position.
3. The Court's Reasoning.-Writing for the majority in Whack,
Judge Raker began by noting that the statute does not define "convic82. See, e.g., Rogers v. United States, 325 F.2d 485, 487 (10th Cir. 1963) (holding that

appeal neither voids nor suspends a trial conviction for purpose of sentencing a second
offender), vacated on other grounds and remanded for resentencing, 378 U.S. 549 (1964); Gonzalez v. United States, 224 F.2d 431, 436 (1st Cir. 1955) (arguing that conviction means that
one has been legally charged with commission of a crime and either plead guilty or was
tried and found guilty, and judgment was entered); see also Whack, 338 Md. at 675, 659 A.2d
at 1352 (discussing this interpretation).
83. See, e.g., United States v. Morales, 854 F.2d 65, 69 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that the
statute requires that a prior conviction no longer be subject to appellate review); United
States v. Lippner, 676 F.2d 456, 467 (11 th Cir. 1982) (holding that a conviction is not final
until all avenues of direct attack are exhausted); United States v. Allen, 566 F.2d 1193, 1195
(3d Cir. 1977) (discussing changes in the statute and reasons for the finality rule), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 926 (1978); see also Whack, 338 Md. at 676-77, 659 A.2d at 1352 (discussing
the amendments).
84. See Annotation, Wat Constitutes Former "Conviction" Within Statute EnhancingPenalty
for Second or Subsequent Offense, 5 A.L.R.2d 1080, 1092 (1949 and Later Case Service, 1985)
(citing cases); 39 AM. JUR. 2d Habitual Criminalsand Subsequent Offenders § 8 (1968 & Supp.
1995) (citing cases).
85. Annotation, 5 A.L.R.2d 1080, 1092 (1949 and Later Case Service).
86. See, e.g., Prock v. State, 471 So. 2d 519, 521 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985) (holding enhanced sentence was appropriate despite fact that three of four predicate convictions were
on appeal); Wright v. State, 656 P.2d 1226, 1229 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983) (holding that
sufficient safeguards exist to allow sentence on appeal to be used); State v. Swartz, 683 P.2d
315, 318 (Ariz. Ct.App. 1984) (holding that convictions are a verity until set aside and can
be used to enhance a sentence); Glick v. State, 689 S.W.2d 559, 562 (Ark. 1985) (holding
that a conviction not yet final could be used to enhance a sentence and explaining that
"not using a felony conviction for enhancement purposes until every possible remedy was
exhausted would result in the rare application of the habitual offender statutes"); People v.
Sarnblad, 103 Cal. Rptr. 211, 213-14 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972) (holding that the fact that a prior
conviction was on appeal is not significant); People v. District Ct., 559 P.2d 235, 236 (Colo.
1977) (holding prior conviction on appeal is a "previous conviction" under habitual criminal act); Mainsonet v. State, 448 N.E.2d 1052, 1055 (Ind. 1983) (holding that only time a
prior conviction may not be used if it has been set aside); State v. Heald, 382 A.2d 290, 299
(Me. 1978) (disagreeing with the rule that a predicate conviction must be final) ;Jackson v.
State, 418 So. 2d 827, 831-32 (Miss. 1982) (following Mississippi jurisprudence holding that
until ajudgment of a trial court is reversed, a defendant found guilty and sentenced stands
convicted).
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tion," "prior conviction," and "previously has been convicted.""7 According to the court, the word "conviction" can be interpreted in
three different ways:
in its general and popular sense, to mean establishment of
guilt pursuant to a verdict or plea of guilty; in its legal and
technical sense, to mean following judgment or sentence; or
in its "final" sense, to mean establishment of guilt, judgment,
or sentence, and absence or resolution of any appeal.8 8
In resolving which of these interpretations to employ, the court
looked first to precedent and authority. Applying Myers v. State s9 the
court held that "prior convictions pending on appeal may be used to
impose enhanced sentences under § 286(c) and § 293. "' 0 The court
also considered legislative intent and concluded that a finality requirement would be counter to the intent and purpose of the two
1
statutes.

9

The court rejected Whack's reliance on recent federal cases and
his argument thatjudicial economy, as well as the need to avoid resentencing in cases where the appeal of a prior conviction was successful,
required a decision for finality. Judicial economy, the court admitted,
"prompted Congress to require that a prior conviction be final before
it can be used as a predicate for an enhanced penalty."9 2 The General
93
Assembly has not imposed a similar requirement, however.
87. Whack, 338 Md. at 672, 659 A.2d at 1350. "[W]hether the statutes require the absence of a pending appeal on the prior conviction is unclear on the face of the statutes."
Id.
88. Id. at 675, 659 A.2d at 1351.
89. 303 Md. 639, 645, 496 A.2d 312, 315 (1985); see supra notes 32-40 and accompanying text. "[U]nless the context in which the word is used indicates otherwise, a 'conviction' is the final judgment and sentence rendered by a court pursuant to a verdict or plea
of guilty." Myers, 303 Md. at 645, 496 A.2d at 315.
90. Whack 338 Md. at 674, 659 A.2d at 1351.
91. Id. at 678, 680, 659 A.2d at 1353, 1354. The court defined the intent of the legislature in several ways: "first, deter the future commission of criminal offenses by persons
who have previously been convicted and subject to the threat of punishment," id. (quoting
Gargliano v. State, 334 Md. 428, 442-43, 639 A.2d 675, 682 (1994)); second, to identify
defendants "who have not reformed their behavior after prior convictions and incarcerating such defendants for a longer period than would otherwise be applicable in order to
protect the community and deter others from similar behavior," id. (quoting Gargliano,338
Md. at 444, 639 A.2d at 682); third, "to protect society against repeat drug offenders and to
deter recidivism," id., 659 A.2d at 1354; and fourth, "to punish repeat drug offenders more
severely," id. at 683, 659 A.2d at 1355.
92. Id. at 676, 659 A.2d at 1352.
93. Id. at 677, 659 A.2d at 1352. The court agreed with the Court of Special Appeals
that the appropriate analogy was to federal law before it was amended in 1970, noting that
the earlier version "was interpreted by several courts to mean convicted in the trial court."
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The Whack court also rejected a contrary decision by the Court of
Special Appeals in Butler v. State, 4 stating:
The appellant thus appeals, let it be noted, not to the binding authority of Butler but to the force of its logic. We must
confess, however, that the force of its logic eludes us. Butler
established its finality requirement without defining finality,
in a single unilluminating paragraph. It announced its holding as an ipse dixit but engaged in no analysis whatsoever of
the issue before it. Neither did it cite authority where such
analysis might be found. 5
The court also rejected the argument that because Butlerwas decided
two years before section 286 was enacted, the court should assume the
legislature agreed with the decision and, through its silence, ratified
Butler's interpretation of the law.9 6 The court explained that because
Butler was not a decision by the Court of Appeals, the legislature was
not bound by its outcome. 9 Moreover, there was no evidence that
the General Assembly's attention was ever called to Butler.a" The court
also rejected the argument that because convictions on appeal cannot
be used for purposes of impeachment,9 9 they should not be allowed
for sentence-enhancement purposes.' 0 0
As to whether the two sections could be applied simultaneously to
different counts in the same criminal proceeding, the court noted
that the two provisions enhance the sentence in different ways. The

Id., 659 A.2d at 1353. The court stated that a finality requirement would give the criminal
defendant an "undeserved windfall." Id.
94. 46 Md. App. 317, 322, 416 A.2d 773, 776 (1980) (holding that a prior conviction
must be final in order to be used to enhance a sentence under MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§ 643B (1992 & Supp. 1994)); see supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
95. Whack, 338 Md. at 680-81, 659 A.2d at 1354 (quoting Whack v. State, No. 631, slip
op. at 8-9 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Apr. 8, 1994) (per curiam) (citation omitted)).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 681, 659 A.2d at 1354. "J]udicial construction of a statute has little or no
application when the construction is not by the highest court of the jurisdiction involved."
Id.; see also United States v. Streidel, 329 Md. 533, 551 & n.12, 620 A.2d 905, 914 & n.12
(1993) (stating the General Assembly may well wait for authoritative interpretation from
the Court of Appeals before reacting to interpretation of the Court of Special Appeals).
98. Whack, 338 Md. at 681, 659 A.2d at 1354.
99. Id.; see MD. CODE ANN., Cs. &JUD. PROC. § 10-905(a) (1995) (barring convictions
subject to or pending appeal for purposes of impeachment).
100. Whack, 338 Md. at 681, 659 A.2d at 1354. The difference, the court said, is that the
damage cannot be undone if a successful appeal is taken when used to impeach, whereas a
sentence improperly imposed can be reversed under the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act, MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 645A (1992). Whack, 338 Md. at 681, 659 A.2d at 1354.
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court agreed with the Court of Special Appeals that there was no ambiguity or inconsistency in their meaning and application.'
Writing in dissent, Judge Bell, joined by Judge Eldridge, argued
that "[w]here a statute is silent as to a prerequisite to its application
and the legislative intent is unclear on the matter, the rule of lenity
13
applies." 1°2 Given that the key statutory terms were not defined'
and the legislative history provided no guidance, 10 4 Judge Bell concluded that the statute was ambiguous.' 0 5 Consequently, Judge Bell
argued that the rule of lenity was applicable because "ambiguous penal statute [s] must be 'strictly construed so that only punishment con°
templated by the language of the statute is meted out.' 106
While agreeing that the meaning of conviction must "be defined
in light of the statutes' purpose,"'° 7 Judge Bell concluded that the rule
of lenity should apply and the court should rule in the way most
favorable to the defendant. 0 8
101. Whack, 338 Md. at 682-83, 659 A.2d at 1355. Section 286(c) enhances the minimum sentence by mandating 10 years without parole, while § 293 allows for the doubling
of the maximum sentence. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 286(c), 293 (1992 & Supp. 1994).
The court limited its holding to the question of whether the two provisions could be applied to different counts in the same proceeding. Whack, 338 Md. at 682, 659 A.2d at 1355.
The court did not determine whether both statutes may used to enhance a sentence on the
same count. Id.
102. Whack 338 Md. at 683, 659 A.2d at 1355 (Bell,J, dissenting); see supra notes 7-8 and
accompanying text (discussing the rule of lenity).
103. Whack, 338 Md. at 685, 659 A.2d at 1356 (Bell, J., dissenting). "No where... are
the terms 'conviction,' 'prior conviction,' or 'previously has been convicted' defined." Id.
"The statutes, therefore, do not expressly provide guidance as to the Legislature's intent."
Id.
104. Id. "The legislative intent is not apparent from the legislative history of the statutes
either." Id. Judge Bell quoted the finding in Gargliano that nowhere in the legislative
history of § 286 were the words "previously has been convicted" defined. Id. (citing Gargliano v. State, 334 Md. 428, 441-42, 639 A-2d 675, 681 (1994)).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 685-86, 659 A.2d at 1356-57 (quoting CargIiano,334 Md. at 437, 639 A.2d at
679). "The rule [of lenity] expressly prohibits a court from interpreting a criminal statute
so as to increase the penalty it places on a defendant 'when such an interpretation can be
based on no more than a guess as to what [the legislature] intended.'" Id. at 686, 659 A.2d
at 1357 (quoting Monoker v. State, 321 Md. 214, 222, 582 A.2d 525, 529 (1990)).
107. Id. at 687, 659 A.2d at 1357. Judge Bell agreed with the majority's determination
that the purpose of the two statutes is to identify "defendants who have not reformed their
behavior after prior convictions." Id. at 687-88, 659 A.2d at 1357-58 (quoting Gaigiano,334
Md. at 444, 639 A.2d at 682-83).
108. Id. at 689, 659 A.2d at 1359. The dissent also argued by analogy between §§ 286(c)
and 293 and § 643B, which it argued imposes a requirement of finality "by its express
terms." Id. Presumably this is a reference to § 643B(b), which imposes a mandatory life
sentence on "any person who has served three separate terms of confinement in a correctional institution as a result of three separate convictions of any crime of violence," and
§ 643B(d), which provides for an enhanced sentence for a second conviction of a crime of
violence after serving a term of confinement. MD. CODE ANN. art. 27, § 643B (b), (d) (1992
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4. Analysis.--Confronted with two ambiguous statutes, the
Court of Appeals had three choices: (1) it could admit that it was
impossible to unambiguously interpret the statutes, in which case application of the rule of lenity would be appropriate;" 9 (2) it could
interpret the statutes in light of the way the same or similar statutes
had been interpreted in the past;' 10 or (3) it could look for meaning
in the context and purpose of the statutes.'
The dissent argued for the first option."12 However, adopting the
rule of lenity would, in effect, impose a finality requirement in Maryland. This was clearly something the court was reluctant to do on its
own. 1 13 Nor were there compelling circumstances in the facts or context in which the question arose that gave the court reason to apply
the rule of lenity in this case." 4 Significantly, no legal harm would
come to a defendant by refusing to invoke the rule. If a predicate
conviction that is used to enhance a sentence is later overturned, the
defendant is entitled to have his enhanced sentence reduced under
the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act."' In contrast, if the
& Supp. 1994). Arguably, if a person has served out his term of confinement, his sentence
might be considered final. But nowhere does § 643B explicitly specify that convictions be
final. Indeed, subsection (c), providing for sentence on a third conviction provides that
there be two prior convictions but only one term of confinement. Id. § 643B(c). Without
an explicit requirement for finality, the second conviction in that case presumably could
be on appeal without violating the explicit terms of 643B(c). See id.
109. See Gargliano, 334 Md. at 437, 639 A.2d at 679 (noting highly penal statutes like
§ 286(c) must be strictly construed and that rule of lenity requires court to construe any
ambiguity in favor of lenity so as to not increase penalty based on no more than a guess as
to legislative intent).
110. See id. at 436, 639 A.2d at 679. In Gargliano,the court noted that:
Section 286(c) must be construed in light of the construction we have previously
given to similarly worded enhanced penalty statutes, as "statutes that deal with the
same subject matter, share a common purpose, and form part of the same system
are in pari materiaand must be construed harmoniously in order to give full effect
to each enactment."
Id. (quoting State v. Loscomb, 291 Md. 424, 432, 435 A.2d 764, 768 (1981)).
111. See id. at 442-45, 639 A.2d at 681-83 (citing cases where court had to interpret legislative intent).
112. Wack, 338 Md. at 683, 659 A.2d at 1355 (Bell, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 680, 659 A.2d at 1354. "Absent a clear statement of legislative intent to the
contrary, we shall not read a finality requirement into the use of prior convictions under
§ 286(c) and § 293." Id.
114. See, e.g., Gargliano,334 Md. at 448, 639 A.2d at 684-85. Gargliano's second conviction was on a drug sale that occurred before he was charged in the first case, giving rise to
the suspicion-or at least the possibility in future cases-that prosecutors deliberately
could delay a prosecution in order to get an enhanced sentence. Id. The rule of lenity was
a convenient tool to support the court's decision to ensure that this could not happen.
115. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 645A (1992). The Uniform Post Conviction Procedure
Act gives a criminal defendant sentenced to more than the allowable sentence a way to
have his sentence reduced. Subsection (a) provides that:
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court imposed a finality requirement and the appeal of the prior conviction was denied, the State probably could not seek to have the sentence on the second conviction enhanced after the fact.1 16 As the
majority noted, this would amount to an "undeserved windfall" for the
criminal defendant who would avoid punishment he otherwise would
be liable for simply because his earlier 1 conviction
was on appeal, re17
gardless of the outcome of that appeal.
Having rejected the rule of lenity,1"' the court determined that
the meaning of the words "convicted" and "conviction" must be ascertained either from precedent or from an analysis of the context and
purpose of the words within the statute.' 9 Unlike Jones v. Baltimore
City Police Department,2 ' where these two analytical approaches led to
different interpretations, 1 in Whack, they supported the same conclusion-that conviction refers to the final judgment and sentence of
the court subsequent to a determination of guilt regardless of whether
122
the issue is pending appeal.
any person convicted of a crime and either incarcerated under sentence of death
or imprisonment or on parole or probation... who claims that the sentence or
judgment was imposed in violation of the Constitution of the United States or the
Constitution or laws of this State, or that the court was without jurisdiction to
impose the sentence, or that the sentence exceeds the maximum authorized by
law... may institute a proceeding under this subtitle in the circuit court for the
county to set aside or correct the sentence....
Id. Although mentioned only obliquely in the opinion, Whack, 338 Md. at 681, 659 A.2d at
1354, it is reasonable to assume that the presence of a well-established mechanism to correct sentences imposed in violation of sentencing guidelines made it much easier for the
-court to agree to allow convictions on appeal to be used to enhance sentences.
116. MD. R. 4-345. Rule 4-345(b)(2) specifies that "[t]he court may not increase a sentence after the sentence has been imposed." MD. R. 4-345(b) (2). Rule 4-345(a) does provide, however, that "[t]he court may correct an illegal sentence at any time." MD. R. 4345(a). This raises the possibility that the State could petition for review of a sentence
under § 286(c), which mandates a 10-year minimum sentence. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§ 286(c) (1992 & Supp. 1994). This would not be true of a sentence enhanced by § 293,
which only gives ajudge the option of imposing an increased sentence, however. Id. § 293.
117. Whack, 338 Md. at 677, 659 A.2d at 1353. There may be an argument based in
judicial economy for a rule that would avoid the need for resentencing hearings, but this is
an issue for the court to decide and it obviously was not one with which they were
concerned.
118. Id. at 673-74, 659 A.2d at 1351-52; see supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
119.
hack 338 Md. at 672, 659 A.2d at 1350.
120. 326 Md. 480, 606 A.2d 214 (1992); see supra notes 54-66 and accompanying text.
121. Jones, 326 Md. at 489, 606 A.2d at 218. In holding that probation before judgment
was not a conviction sufficient to excuse the police department from holding a hearing
prior to termination under LEOBR, the Jones majority relied primarily on precedent. Id.
The dissent, however, emphasized the purpose and intent behind LEOBR in arguing that
the legislature would never have intended such a result. Id. at 490-91, 606 A.2d at 219-22
(Chasanow, J., dissenting); see supra notes 61-66 and accompanying text.
122. Whack, 338 Md. at 675, 659 A.2d at 1351.
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In terms of precedent, Myers v. State"'5 defined a rule that the
court easily could cite as controlling. 124 The Myers rule also reflected
the common law,12 5 and there were supporting cases in other
jurisdictions. 126
With respect to the court's analysis of context and purpose, Gargliano v. State1 7 already had defined the purpose of section 286(c) and
similar sentence-enhancing statutes as being "to deter the future commission of criminal offenses by persons who have previously been convicted."'12 There was no problem of notice in this case because an
individual who was tried and sentenced in court once would be on
notice that a subsequent conviction on a later crime would make him
subject to enhanced penalties even if his first conviction was on appeal. 129 While appearing to challenge the majority on its analysis of
legislative purpose, in the end, the dissent relied on the argument
that it is impossible to know what the legislature intended. The dissent made no substantive argument for adoption of a finality
requirement.
The question of whether the two sentence-enhancing provisions
could be applied simultaneously was essentially a non-issue given that
the two provisions were applied to different counts.1 3 0 There was
nothing contradictory or ambiguous about their application outside
of the question of the finality of the conviction.
5. Conclusion.-In Whack v. State, the Court of Appeals decided
that mandatory or enhanced sentencing provisions are triggered by a
123. 303 Md. 639, 496 A.2d 312 (1985); see supra notes 32-40 and accompanying text.
124. Whack, 338 Md. at 674, 659 A-2d at 1351; see supra notes 32-40 and accompanying
text (discussing the court's decision that conviction refers to the final judgment and sentence rendered by a court after a verdict or plea of guilty).
125. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
126. See Whack, 338 Md. at 679, 659 A.2d at 1353. Although the court appears to have
paid only minimal analytical attention to the treatment afforded the question in other
jurisdictions, it cited an extensive list of cases from other jurisdictions on both sides of the
question. Id.
127. 334 Md. 428, 639 A.2d 675 (1994); see supra notes 67-74 and accompanying text.
128. Whack, 338 Md. at 678, 659 A.2d at 1353 (quoting Gargliano,334 Md. at 442-43, 444,
639 A.2d at 682); see supra notes 67-74 and accompanying text.
129. The court did not address the question of notice or fair warning directly, although
it did discuss the deterrent effect of the statutes at several points. See Whack, 338 Md. at
678, 680, 659 A.2d at 1353, 1354. The argument in Garg/iano was that fair warning was
essential if defendants were to be permitted to reform themselves. Gargiano,334 Md. at
445, 639 A.2d at 683. The absence of any discussion of fair warning would appear to indicate the court did not see this as a problem in Whack.
130. Whack, 338 Md. at 682, 659 A.2d at 1355. Any argument that Whack had on this
point disappeared when the sentence review panel reduced his sentence so each count was
only enhanced by one statutory provision. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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judgment and sentence on a prior crime and are not stayed by the fact
that the judgment is on appeal. The decision is an extension of prior
holdings that forced the court to distinguish between conviction as a
determination of guilt and conviction as the entry ofjudgment after a
finding of guilt. The court applied the reasoning of these cases to the
new issue of whether there is a requirement for "finality" before a conviction can be used to enhance a sentence. The court's decision reflects its willingness to interpret ambiguous statutes in light of a
judicial analysis of their purpose, and a rejection of rules of statutory
construction that would limit arbitrarily the ability of the court to consider statutory purpose when there is only limited legislative history.
The decision was made easier by the fact that provisions exist to correct inappropriate sentences should the appeal of a prior conviction
be upheld.
DOYLE L. NIEMANN

F.

RestrictingExpert Testimony on Post Traumatic Stress Disorder

In Hutton v. State,' the Court of Appeals held that expert testimony that an alleged victim of child sexual abuse suffered from Post
Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) was inadmissible for the purpose of
proving that the abuse occurred.' In reaching this conclusion, the
court determined that expert testimony regarding PTSD implicates
the credibility of the alleged victim and, hence, invades the province
of the jury.' Relying on Bohnert v. State,4 the court found that PTSD
testimony exceeds the scope of proper expert opinion, and therefore,
is inadmissible as a matter of law.5
In so holding, Hutton limits the court's seemingly broad authorization, announced in State v. Allewalt,6 to use expert psychological testimony in cases involving sexual abuse.7 The court achieved this result
by shifting its analytical framework from the balancing approach 8 employed in AllewalP to the exclusionary approach' 0 employed in
1. 339 Md. 480, 663 A.2d 1289 (1995).
2. Id. at 504, 663 A.2d at 1301.
3. Id. at 504-05, 663 A.2d at 1301.
4. 312 Md. 266, 539 A.2d 657 (1988).
5. Hutton, 339 Md. at 504-05, 663 A.2d at 1301.
6. 308 Md. 89, 517 A.2d 741 (1986).
7. Id. at 109-10, 517 A.2d at 751-52.
8. See infra note 108 and accompanying text.
9. Alewat, 308 Md. at 110, 517 A.2d at 752.
10. See infra note 106 and accompanying text.
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Bohnert."1 As a result of the court's liberal application of the Bohnert
approach, Hutton appears to erect a significant obstacle to the admission of expert psychological testimony in child sexual abuse cases.
1. The Case.--Steven Clarence Hutton was charged with sexually
abusing his stepdaughter.' 2 According to the victim, Hutton forced
her to perform sexual intercourse and fellatio on him."5 The abuse
allegedly began when she was seven years old. 1 4 Although the victim
reported the abuse to her mother on several occasions, and once reported it to a classmate, Hutton continued the abuse until the time of
his arrest, when the victim had reached the seventh grade."5
At trial, the State presented the testimony of two child behavior
experts. 6 GailJackson, a clinical social worker who examined the victim on approximately thirty occasions, related the behavioral characteristics that she observed in the victim and testified that they were
consistent with the behavioral characteristics of children who are confirmed victims of sexual abuse. 7 When asked on redirect examination how she assessed the credibility of a patient claiming sexual
abuse, Jackson responded that the "consistency" of the victim's story is
indicative of whether the individual is "telling me the truth."' 8
Dr. Nancy Davis, a psychologist with a specialty in child sexual
abuse, opined that the victim suffered from PTSD triggered by child
sexual abuse. 9 She based this opinion on her review of a medical
report issued from the Prince George's County Sexual Assault Center,
a review of Ms. Jackson's interview notes, discussion of the case with
Ms. Jackson, and her conversations with the alleged victim. 20 When
asked during the State's case in chief how she determined the credithat the victim's symptoms
bility of the victim's story, Dr. Davis stated
21
of PTSD were "not in any way faked."
11. 312 Md. 266, 278, 539 A.2d 657, 663 (1988).
12. Hutton, 339 Md. at 484, 663 A.2d at 1290.
13. Id. at 484-85, 663 A.2d at 1291.
14. Id. at 484, 663 A.2d at 1291.
15. Id. at 484-85, 663 A.2d at 1291.
16. Id. at 485, 663 A.2d at 1291. Additionally, the State presented the testimony of the
victim's pediatrician, the victim's mother, and a social worker from Virginia, where the
family had previously lived, in order to corroborate certain aspects of the victim's story. Id.
at 485 n.4, 663 A.2d at 1291 n.4.
17. Id. at 486-87, 663 A.2d at 1291-92.
18. Id. at 487-88, 663 A.2d at 1292.
19. Id. at 488, 663 A.2d at 1292-93.
20. Id., 663 A.2d at 1292.
21. Id. at 489-90, 663 A.2d at 1293.
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Hutton was found guilty of two counts of second degree rape, two
counts of second degree sexual offense, and two counts of child
abuse. 2 The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the conviction in an
unreported opinion.2 ' The Court of Appeals granted a writ of certiorari to consider two issues: first, whether an expert witness may testify
that an alleged victim of child sexual abuse is suffering from PTSD
triggered by child sexual abuse in order to prove that the defendant
committed the abuse; and second, whether an expert's testimony that
the victim's PTSD is "not in any way faked" was an impermissible com24
ment on the credibility of the victim.
2. Legal Background.--Child sexual abuse became a national
concern during the mid-1980s as a result of widespread media coverage of the problem. 25 The increased public attention created a flood
of allegations of sexual abuse and an intense desire to punish offenders of this heinous crime. 26 However, the dynamics of child sexual
abuse create significant evidentiary obstacles to the effective prosecution of persons accused of the crime.
Many cases of alleged child sexual abuse are completely void of
any objective evidence of the offense.2 7 The abuse is often committed
by a family member in a private atmosphere. 2 ' Because of numerous
factors, including fear of reprisal and fear of being blamed for the
incident, a child often delays in reporting an incident of sexual
abuse.2 9 Hence, physical evidence of the abuse is often not detectable. Therefore, the child's uncorroborated testimony is often the only
evidence available to a prosecutor in a child sexual abuse case. Consequently, the jury's evaluation of the credibility of the alleged victim is
often the determinative issue in many child sexual abuse cases.
In order to support the victim's allegations of abuse, prosecutors
often attempt to introduce expert psychological testimony." The purpose of the expert's testimony is to create an inference that a child has
been abused based upon the presence of certain behavioral character22. Id. at 484, 663 A.2d at 1290.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 483-84, 663 A.2d at 1290.

25. Lisa R. Askowitz & Michael H. Graham, The Reliability ofExpert PsychologicalTestimony

in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 15 CARDozo L. REv. 2027, 2029-30 (1994).
26. Id. at 2029 (citing DAVID HECHLER, THE BATr
AND THE BACKLASH:
SExuAL ABUSE WAR 3 (1988)).
27. Id. at 2033-34.
28. Id. at 2033.
29. Id. at 2033-34.
30. Id. at 2034.
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istics or syndromes in the child. 3s However, expert psychological testimony has met with varying degrees of acceptance depending on the
purpose for which the testimony is offered. 2
Many courts reject the use of expert psychological testimony
when it is presented as substantive evidence of child sexual abuse.3 3
However, many courts do permit the use of expert psychological testimony when it is employed on rebuttal to bolster the victim's testimony
after the defense has impugned the child's credibility.3 4 Courts that
do admit expert psychological testimony on rebuttal are careful to ensure that such testimony does not extend beyond the scope of rehabilitation and invade the province of the jury. 5
The Court of Appeals has confronted the issue of the admissibility of expert testimony regarding PTSD on several occasions.3 6 In the
leading case of State v. Allewalt,"7 the prosecution, seeking to rebut the
defendant's claim of consensual sex, elicited the opinion of a psychiatrist that the alleged victim of a rape suffered from PTSD.3 s The psychiatrist described PTSD as a "condition recognized in psychiatry as
the emotional reaction to a traumatic event."3 1 Moreover, the psychi31. Id. at 2028 (noting that expert psychological testimony is often the determinative
factor in measuring the credibility of the alleged victim and the defendant).
32. See infra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
33. See, e.g., People v. Bledsoe, 681 P.2d 291, 301 (Cal. 1984) (indicating that rape
trauma syndrome is not relied upon in the scientific community to prove that a rape occurred); Hutton, 339 Md. at 494-95, 663 A.2d at 1296; State v. Cressey, 628 A.2d 696, 699702 (N.H. 1993) (indicating that an expert's testimony regarding the effect of sexual abuse
on children is not sufficiently reliable to be admitted in order to prove that the abuse
occurred); State v. Hall, 412 S.E.2d 883, 890 (N.C. 1992) (noting that PTSD "does not
alone prove that sexual abuse has in fact occurred"). But see Townsend v. State, 734 P.2d
705, 708 (Nev. 1987) (admitting expert testimony regarding PTSD in order to prove that
the abuse actually occurred).
34. See, e.g., State v. Spigarolo, 556 A.2d 112, 123 (Conn.) (admitting expert testimony
describing the general behavior characteristics of child sexual abuse victims in order to
explain the inconsistent and incomplete disclosures of the alleged victim), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 933 (1989), and habeas corpus denied, 934 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1991); Hutton, 339 Md. at
496, 663 A.2d at 1296-97 (citations omitted); People v. Beckley, 456 N.W.2d 391, 404
(Mich. 1990) (admitting expert psychological testimony only when the alleged victim's
behavior becomes an issue in the case).
35. See, e.g., State v. Moran, 728 P.2d 248, 255 (Ariz. 1986) (permitting an expert to
explain the behavior patterns of child sexual abuse victims to a jury, but refusing to allow
the expert to go further and offer an opinion regarding the behavior of the alleged victim); Hutton, 339 Md. at 496-97, 663 A.2d at 1297.
36. See infra notes 37-67 and accompanying text.
37. 308 Md. 89, 517 A.2d 741 (1986).
38. Id. at 95, 517 A.2d at 744.
39. Id. at 94, 517 A.2d at 743. The basic diagnostic criteria of PTSD are as follows: (1)
the person has experienced an event that is outside the range of usual human experience
and that would be markedly distressing to almost anyone; (2) the traumatic event is persistently re-experienced; (3) persistent avoidance of stimuli associated with the trauma or
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atrist stated that, based upon the information provided to him by the
alleged victim, the traumatic event that caused the PTSD was rape.4"
Relying on Beahm v. Shortall, 4 1 the court held that the expert's
opinion regarding causation, based upon history provided by the alleged victim, was admissible as substantive evidence.42 In reaching
this conclusion, the court found that expert testimony regarding
PTSD was relevant to the issue of consent. 4 Furthermore, the court
determined that the probative value of expert testimony regarding
PTSD outweighed any potential prejudice. 44
The Allewalt court articulated several reasons why the expert testimony regarding PTSD was not unduly prejudicial. First, the expert
clearly informed the jury that his opinion was based upon history provided by the alleged victim. 45 Second, the expert stressed that rape

was only one of many types of severe traumas that could trigger
PTSD. 46 Third, the expert's testimony was given on rebuttal in regard
to the issue of consent.4 7 The court concluded that "[b]y requiring a
numbing of general responsiveness (not present before the trauma); (4) persistent symptoms of increased arousal, not present before the trauma; (5) duration of the disturbance
for at least one month. Se generallyAMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (DSM-III-R) 250-51 (4th ed. rev. 1994).
40. AllewaIt 308 Md. at 95, 517 A.2d at 744.
41. 279 Md. 321, 368 A.2d 1005 (1977). "[A] physician ... may present his medical
conclusions and the information, including the history and subjective symptoms, received
from the patient which provide the basis for the conclusions." Id. at 327, 368 A.2d at 1009.
42. Al/aiat, 308 Md. at 98-99, 517 A.2d at 745-46. In drawing an analogy to Beahm, the
court stated that
[the psychiatrist's] opinion that the PTSD which he diagnosed... was caused by
the rape which [the alleged victim] described is as evidentiarily reliable as an
opinion by an orthopedist who has been engaged only to testify ascribing a plaintiffs subjective complaints of low back pain to soft tissue injury resulting from an
automobile accident described in the history given by the plaintiff.
Id., 517 A.2d at 746.
43. Id. at 99-100, 517 A.2d at 746. The court stated that, because PTSD is a diagnostic
category in DSM III, "[ti here is no issue in this case over the fact that the psychiatrists and
psychologists recognized PTSD as an anxiety disorder." Id. at 99, 517 A.2d at 746.
44. Id. at 102-03, 517 A.2d at 747-48.
45. Id. at 108-09, 517 A.2d at 751. "[The psychiatrist] was asked by the State '[B]ased
on what she told you, what would be the trauma that forms the basis for your opinion?' He
replied that '[tihe only trauma that she claims that she went through at that time was
being raped.'" Id. at 95, 517 A.2d at 744.
46. Id. at 108, 517 A.2d at 751.
47. Id. at 109, 517 A.2d at 751. The court stated that,
U1 ust as the jury can understand that evidence of the complainant's hysteria
shortly following an alleged sexual assault tends to negate consent, so ajury, with
the assistance of a competent expert, can understand that a diagnosis of PTSD
tends to negate consent where the history as reviewed by the expert, reflects no
other trauma which in the expert's opinion could produce that medically recognized disorder.
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full explanation on direct, by allowing liberal cross-examination, and
by proper jury instructions,... the trial court can prevent any impression that the psychiatric opinion is like a chemical reaction."48
Writing in dissent, Judge Eldridge rejected the notion that PTSD
testimony was relevant to the issue of consent.4 9 Judge Eldridge concluded that scientific literature indicated that PTSD was developed as
a therapeutic tool to treat emotional injuries that resulted from traumatic events; 50 it was not designed to prove that a particular triggering
event actually occurred.5 1 Furthermore, like the Court of Special Appeals, Judge Eldridge determined that, even if PTSD was relevant to
the issue of consent, the limited probative value of such testimony was
clearly outweighed by its danger of prejudice.5" Significantly, Judge
Eldridge found that expert testimony regarding PTSD has a high degree of prejudicial effect because an expert "implicitly express [es] an
opinion about the credibility of the witness's testimony." 5
Allewalt was subsequently applied in the context of a child sexual
abuse case in Acuna v. State.54 In Acuna, a psychologist testified in the
State's case in chief that the alleged victim of child sexual abuse exhibited symptoms consistent with PTSD. 55 However, the expert did not
testify that the child had been sexually abused.5 6 Furthermore, the
expert was not permitted to testify that the child displayed behavior
consistent with other victims of child sexual abuse. 57 On cross examination, the psychologist linked the commencement of the victim's
PTSD symptoms to the time frame when the sexual abuse allegedly
occurred. 58 Relying on Allewalt, the court held that the testimony was
not "evidentiarily meaningless" because the expert was able to link the
traumatic event at issue to the victim's PTSD based on a review of the
victim's history.5 9
In both Allewalt and Acuna, the expert witnesses based their testimony on both objective and subjective evidence of sexual abuse that
Id.
48. Id.

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 116-17, 517 A.2d at 755 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
Id. (quoting State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227, 230 (Minn. 1982)).
Id. (quoting People v. Bledsoe, 681 P.2d 291, 301 (Cal. 1984)).
Id. at 119, 517 A.2d at 756.
Id. at 120, 517 A.2d at 757.

54. 332 Md. 65, 629 A.2d 1233 (1993).
55. Id. at 69, 629 A.2d at 1235.
56. Id.

57. Id.
58. Id. at 70-71, 629 A.2d at 1235-36.
59. Id. at 71, 629 A.2d at 1236.
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was discerned from a review of the alleged victim's history.6" However
in Bohnert v. State,61 the court was presented with a child sexual abuse
case that rested completely on the subjective allegations of the alleged
victim. 62 In order to support the child's testimony, the State introduced the testimony of a social worker who had interviewed the alleged victim.6" Relying exclusively on the child's story, the expert
concluded that the alleged victim had been sexually abused.' 4
The court held that the expert's opinion testimony was inadmissible because it improperly interfered with the jury's responsibility to
weigh the credibility of witnesses.6 5 Specifically, the court found that
"[t] estimony from a witness relating to the credibility of another witness is to be rejected as a matter of law."' As a result, the court rejected the social worker's testimony because it was "tantamount to a
declaration by her that the child was telling the truth and that
Bohnert was lying."6 7
3.

The Court's Reasoning.-In Hutton, the Court of Appeals held

that expert testimony regarding PTSD was inadmissible when offered
to prove that sexual abuse had occurred.6' In so holding, the court
applied the reasoning of Bohnert and determined that PTSD testimony

goes beyond the scope of proper expert opinion testimony because it
60. At issue in A/lewalt was whether the alleged victim had consented to the sexual
intercourse. State v. Allewalt, 308 Md. 89, 90, 517 A.2d 741, 741 (1986). Consequently, the
expert witness did not speculate about whether a possible triggering event of PTSD had in
fact occurred. Id. at 95-96, 517 A.2d at 744-45. In Acuna, the victim's mother witnessed the
incident that led to the defendant's arrest for child sexual abuse, and undoubtedly related
this knowledge to the expert when detailing the child's "developmental history." Acuna,
332 Md. at 67, 629 A.2d at 1234.
61. 312 Md. 266, 539 A.2d 657 (1988).
62. Id. at 268, 539 A.2d at 658.
63. Id. at 270-73, 539 A.2d at 559-60.
64. Id. at 276, 539 A.2d at 662. The social worker's
source of all the evidence concerning the incidents was the child-what she told
[her], what the mother said the child told her, what the mother's friend said the
child told her. [The social worker] proffered no evidence as to objective tests or
medically recognized syndromes with respect to the child.... The opinion was
reached on the child's unsubstantiated averments and "a certain sense about children" which [the social worker] believed she possessed.
Id.
65. Id. at 279, 539 A.2d at 663.
66. Id. at 278, 539 A.2d at 663. Additionally, the court stated that "[i]n ruling on a
question of law a judge is either right or wrong, and discretion plays no part." Id. at 279,
539 A.2d at 663.
67. Id. at 278-79, 539 A.2d at 663.
68. Hutton, 339 Md. at 504, 663 A.2d at 1301.
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amounts to a comment on the alleged victim's credibility.6 9 The court
based its decision on several grounds.
First, the unique diagnostic criteria of PTSD require an expert to
rely upon the alleged victim's story in order to make a diagnosis of
PTSD.7 Second, expert testimony regarding PTSD may usurp the
jury's function of determining the credibility of witnesses.7 1 The court
found that this danger exists with PTSD testimony because ajury likely
will give excessive weight to the expert's opinion without realizing that
its validity depends upon the veracity of the alleged victim. 72 Third,
the responsibility of assessing the credibility of witnesses is traditionally entrusted to the jury and is a matter outside the realm of the expert's unique knowledge.7 3
Based on this reasoning, the Hutton majority concluded that the
trial court erred in admitting Dr. Davis's testimony regarding the
existence of PTSD in the alleged victim as proof that the sexual abuse
had occurred."4 The court found that "[i ] n expressing an opinion as
to PTSD, Dr. Davis ...necessarily stated her opinion on the victim's
credibility."7 5 As a result, the Hutton majority applied Bohnert and excluded Dr. Davis's testimony as a matter of law.7 6
Nonetheless, the court authorized the use of expert testimony regarding PTSD when offered for a purpose other than to prove that
the abuse occurred.7 7 The court stated that PTSD testimony might be
admissible to refute a defense claim of consent to sexual intercourse
or to explain inconsistent behavior on the part of the alleged victim.7 8
After concluding its analysis of PTSD testimony, the court examined Dr. Davis's statement that the victim's symptoms were "not in
69. Id. at 505, 663 A.2d at 1301.
70. Id. at 503, 663 A.2d at 1300. The diagnostic criteria require the victim to re-experience the traumatic event. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. Because a mental
health care professional objectively cannot determine this element of PTSD, an expert "is
required to believe that the PTSD sufferer has experienced the traumatic experience related." Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 504, 663 A.2d at 1301.
75. Id. at 505, 663 A.2d at 1301.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 504, 663 A.2d at 1301.
78. Id. (citing People v. Taylor, 552 N.E.2d 131, 136-38 (N.Y. 1990)). The Taylor court
stated that "we believe that patterns of response among rape victims are not within the
ordinary understanding of the layjuror. For that reason, we conclude that introduction of
expert testimony describingrape trauma syndrome may under certain circumstances assist a
lay jury in deciding issues in a rape trial." Taylor, 552 N.E.2d at 136 (emphasis added).
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any way faked."7 9 The Hutton majority, supported by the concurring
opinion by Judge Rodowsky, found that Dr. Davis's statement
amounted to a comment on the credibility of the alleged victim. 0 As
a result, the court held that the statement was a clear violation of
Bohnert, and therefore was inadmissible as a matter of law.81
At this point, the court had disposed of all the issues presented
on appeal. However, in articulating its holding regarding the testimony of Dr. Davis, the court focused attention on the admissibility of
the opinion of Ms. Jackson. Specifically, the Hutton majority questioned whether the trial court had erred in permitting Ms. Jackson to
comment on the "consistency" of the alleged victim's story.82 Also, the
Hutton majority expressed concern about whether Ms. Jackson's testimony, which compared the behavioral characteristics that she observed in the alleged victim with the behavioral characteristics
commonly found in the class of victims of child sexual abuse (hereinafter "comparative behavioral testimony"), also implicated the credi83
bility of the alleged victim.
Again relying on Bohnert, the court, in dicta, found that "both
" 84
experts commented, impermissibly... on the victim's credibility.
The court was somewhat ambiguous, however, as to what aspect of Ms.
Jackson's testimony constituted improper expert opinion. In a relatively clear announcement, the court indicated that Ms. Jackson's
comment regarding the "consistency" of the alleged victim's story
amounted to an indirect statement of her belief in the "truthfulness"
of the victim's story. 85 Yet, in rather opaque language, the court appeared to imply that Mrs. Jackson's comparative behavioral testimony
also implicated the credibility of the alleged victim and, therefore, was
inadmissible under Bohnert. In an apparent reference to Ms. Jackson's
comparative behavioral testimony, the court stated that "[i] n expressing an opinion as to PTSD, Dr. Davis, to an even greater extent than
Ms. Jackson, necessarily stated her opinion on the victim's
credibility."86
79. Hutton, 339 Md. at 489-90, 663 A.2d at 1293.

80. Id. at 505, 663 A.2d at 1301.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 504-05, 663 A.2d at 1301.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 505, 663 A.2d at 1301.
86. Id.; see infra note 92 and accompanying text (discussing how the ambiguity in Hutton regarding comparative behavioral testimony subsequently was handled in Hall v. State,
107 Md. App. 684, 670 A.2d 962 (1996)).
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Having completed its analysis of the instant case, the Hutton majority revisited Allewalt in order to clarify its holding. s7 The court
stated that Allewalt was consistent with the line of cases that admit
PTSD testimony in rape cases when the defense asserts the claim of
consensual intercourse. 8 In reaching this conclusion, the Hutton majority noted that the Allewalt court found that the expert testimony
regarding PTSD did not implicate the credibility of the alleged victim
because the defendant previously had acknowledged the intercourse
but asserted that it was consensual. s9
Furthermore, the court stated that Allewalt also was aligned with
those cases that admit expert psychological testimony on rebuttal in
order to refute evidence challenging the consistency of the child's behavior.9" In this context, the court found that expert testimony regarding PTSD would assist the jury in understanding the "unique
trauma experienced by minor victims of sexual abuse."9 However the
Hutton majority was unclear as to whether an expert may employ comparative behavioral testimony or is limited to offering a clinical description of PTSD for this purpose.9" At one point, the court stated
that "[t]he cases make clear . . . that the agent's role is that of an
educator, 'supplying the jury with necessary information about child
sexual abuse in general, without offering an opinion as to whether a
certain child has been abused. ' "9 Nonetheless, immediately thereafter, the court stated that "testimony admissible for that purpose is
'limited to whether the behavior of this particular victim is common
to the class of reported child abuse victims. '
87. Hutton, 339 Md. at 505-07, 663 A.2d at 1301-02.
88. Id. at 505, 663 A.2d at 1301.
89. Id. at 506, 663 A.2d at 1301.
90. Id. at 506-07, 663 A.2d at 1302. The court cited People v. Bledsoe, 681 P.2d 291,
298 (Cal. 1984); State v. Spigarolo, 556 A.2d 112, 123 (Conn. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
933, and habeas corpus denied, 934 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1991); People v. Beckley, 456 N.W.2d
391, 405 (Mich. 1990); State v. Cressey, 628 A.2d 696, 702 (N.H. 1993); and State v.J.Q.,
617 A.2d 1196, 1201 (N.J. 1993), as falling within this line of cases. Hutton, 339 Md. at 50607, 663 A.2d at 1302; see also supra text accompanying note 29 (stating that victims of child
sexual abuse commonly delay reporting their abuser for various reasons).
91. Hutton, 339 Md. at 507, 663 A.2d at 1302 (quoting Spigarolo,556 A.2d at 123).
92. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text (indicating that the language employed by the Hutton majority regarding the admissibility of Ms. Jackson's comparative behavioral testimony is unclear).
In Hall v. State, 107 Md. App. 684, 670 A.2d 962 (1996), a child sexual abuse case
remanded by the Court of Appeals with the direction to reconsider its decision in the
context of Hutton, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals found that "[n]othing in Hutton
... prohibits an expert from opining that the child's behavior problems are consistent with
abuse." Id. at 691-92, 670 A.2d at 965-66.
93. Hutton, 339 Md. at 507, 663 A.2d at 1302 (quoting Cressey, 628 A.2d at 702).
94. Id. (quoting Beckley, 456 N.W.2d at 406-07).
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Judge Rodowsky, joined by Chief Judge Murphy, wrote a concurring opinion agreeing with the majority's judgment that Dr. Davis's
testimony that the alleged victim's symptoms were "not in any way
faked" violated Bohnert.9 5 However, Judge Rodowsky rejected the majority's conclusion that an expert's diagnosis of PTSD was inadmissible
to prove that child sexual abuse had occurred.9 6 In making this assertion, Judge Rodowsky argued that a diagnosis of PTSD precipitated by
child sexual abuse, which was based on history provided by an alleged
victim, does not implicate the credibility of the complainant. 97 Judge
Rodowsky based this argument on several grounds.
First, the foundation of an expert's opinion has bearing on the
weight that a jury assigns to the testimony and not on the question of
its admissibility.9 " Second, the court permits physicians to testify as to
causation based on unconfirmable history provided by a patient,99
and hence, mental health providers should not be treated differently. 00 Third, it would be irrational to admit a patient's statements
made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment °1 as substantive
95. Id. at 507-08, 663 A.2d at 1302 (Rodowsky, J., concurring).
96. Id. at 508, 663 A.2d at 1302.
97. Id. at 508-14, 663 A.2d at 1302-05. In additionJudge Rodowsky rejected the majority's contention that a diagnosis of PTSD caused by child sexual abuse runs a danger of
usurping the jury's function by virtue of the notion that a jury would assign excessive
weight to the testimony of the expert. Id. at 512-13, 663 A.2d at 1304-05; see supra notes 7172 and accompanying text. Judge Rodowsky noted that a jury would be fully aware of the
fact that the expert's opinion depended upon the veracity of the alleged victim because at
some point the expert would be required to state the basis of his opinion. Hutton, 339 Md.
at 513, 663 A.2d at 1305. Consequently, the jury would be capable of performing its function of weighing the evidence.
Finally, Judge Rodowsky rejected the majority's view that credibility assessment is
outside the realm of an expert's area of expertise. Id. at 513-14, 663 A.2d at 1305. Judge
Rodowsky asserted that clinical guidelines require mental health professionals to assess the
child's credibility. Id.
98. Id. at 509, 663 A.2d at 1303.
99. See Baltimore Transit Co. v. Truitt, 223 Md. 440, 445, 164 A.2d 882, 885 (1960)
(admitting the opinion of an attending physician, based upon information furnished by
the patient, that a herniated disk was caused by an automobile accident); Yellow Cab Co. v.
Henderson, 183 Md. 546, 552-53, 39 A.2d 546, 550 (1944) (admitting a treating physician's
opinion, based on history provided by the victim's mother, that a child's drooping eyelid
was caused by a motor vehicle collision).
100. Hutton, 339 Md. at 511, 663 A.2d at 1304 (Rodowsky, J., concurring).
101. Maryland Rule of Evidence 5-803(b) (4) provides that:
Statements made for purposes of medical treatment or medical diagnosis in contemplation of treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensation, or the inception or general character of the cause or
external sources thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to treatment or diagnosis
... [are] not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is unavailable as a witness.
MD. R. 5-803(b) (4).
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evidence but to exclude a mental health care provider's diagnosis that
10 2
was made in reliance on this information.
Later in his concurrence, Judge Rodowsky articulated his belief
that a diagnosis of PTSD precipitated by child sexual abuse is relevant
to the determination of whether the abuse actually occurred.10 3 Furthermore, Judge Rodowsky asserted that the probative value of a diagnosis of PTSD outweighed any danger of prejudice that may be
10 4
associated with the testimony.
Judge Eldridge, in a separate concurrence, rejected the analysis
of Hutton based on the reasoning contained in his dissenting opinion
in Allewalt. He therefore concurred in the result only.' 0 5
4. Analysis.-Hutton elevates the standard for admitting expert
psychological testimony in child sexual abuse cases in Maryland. In a
significant shift in the court's jurisprudence, the Court of Appeals decided the question of the admissibility of expert testimony regarding
PTSD by adopting the exclusionary approach 0 6 applied in Bohnert ° 7
102. Hutton, 339 Md. at 510-11, 663 A.2d at 1304 (Rodowsky, J., concurring).
103. Id. at 514, 663 A.2d at 1305.
104. Id. at 516, 663 A.2d at 1306. Judge Rodowsky noted that a significant number of
courts have admitted expert testimony that related to similarities in the behavioral characteristics of children who have been sexually abused with the behavioral characteristics of
the alleged victim. See id. at 517, 663 A.2d at 1307 (citations omitted). However, a number
of courts have refused to admit such testimony on the grounds that no "universal
symptomology of sexual abuse" is generally accepted by the psychiatric community because
"[t]he American Psychiatric Association does not include the sexually abused child syndrome in its diagnostic manual." See id. at 518, 663 A.2d at 1307-08 (quoting Mary Ann
Mason, A JudicialDilemma: Expert Witness Testimony in Child Sex Abuse Cases,J. PSYCHIATRY &
LAw, Fall-Winter 1991, at 185, 203).

However, Judge Rodowsky noted that PTSD is a generally accepted psychological disorder, as evidenced by its recognition by the American Psychiatric Association. See id. at
518, 663 A.2d at 1308 (citing AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS IV (DSM-IV) 424 (4th ed. 1994)). Moreover, DSM-IV recognizes child sexual abuse as being a traumatic event that could precipitate PTSD. Id. at
518-19, 663 A.2d at 1308.
Consequently, Judge Rodowsky concluded that "when so many courts are prepared to
accept 'characteristics or behavior' evidence in [child sexual abuse] cases, I submit that
this [c]ourt should accept a diagnosis of PTSD ... because the latter is much more reliable
that the former." Id. at 518, 663 A.2d at 1307.
105. Id. at 520, 663 A.2d at 1309 (Eldridge, J., concurring); see supra notes 49-53 and
accompanying text.
106. Under the exclusionary approach, expert testimony is inadmissible if it invades the
province of the jury by impermissibly implicating the alleged victim's credibility. Maryland
Rule of Evidence 5-702 states:
Expert testimony may be admitted, in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if the
court determines that the testimony will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue. In making that determination, the court
shall determine (1) whether the witness is qualified as an expert by knowledge,
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instead of the balancing approach °8 applied in Allewalt.' °9 Consequently, the court excluded Dr. Davis's testimony regarding PTSD as a
matter of law on the ground that such testimony implicated the credibility of the alleged victim. 110 Curiously, the court could have reached
the same conclusion, without rejecting the balancing approach of Allwalt, by simply correcting Allewalts erroneous determination that the
probative value of PTSD testimony was not substantially outweighed
by its prejudicial effect.
The immediate effect of Hutton is the exclusion of expert psychological testimony regarding PTSD to prove that child sexual abuse occurred."' More important, however, the court's decision to exclude
Dr. Davis's testimony as violative of Bohnert indicates that expert testimony that marginally implicates credibility is inadmissible as a matter
of law.'
As a result, Hutton may have profound ramifications upon
the admissibility of expert psychological testimony in child sexual
abuse cases in Maryland.
a. Allewalt's Influence on Hutton.-The court's reasoning in
Allewalt played a significant role in the Hutton majority's decision to
examine the admissibility of PTSD testimony through the Bohnert
framework of analysis. In Allewalt, the court determined that testimony regarding PTSD was not unduly prejudicial as long as the expert
did not present his opinion with an air of "mystical infallibility."'
In
reaching this conclusion, the court stated that "[w ] e emphasize that
admissibility is a matter of trial court discretion based on the facts."" 4
Consequently, Allewalt left open the possibility that the State could use
skill, experience, training, or education, (2) the appropriateness of the expert
testimony on the particular subject, and (3) whether a sufficient factual basis exists to support the expert testimony.
MD. R. 5-702.

Because juries are responsible for determining issues of credibility, an expert's testimony that implicates a witness's credibility will not "assist the trier of fact" and thus, exceeds the scope of proper expert testimony. Therefore expert testimony that implicates
credibility is inadmissible as a matter of law.
107. See supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
108. The balancing approach refers to Maryland Rule of Evidence 5-403, which states
that "[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." MD. R. 5-403.
109. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
111. Huttom 339 Md. at 504, 663 A.2d at 1301.
112. See infra notes 127-140 and accompanying text.
113. State v. Allewalt, 308 Md. 89, 102-03, 517 A.2d 741, 748 (1986).
114. Id. at 109, 517 A.2d at 751.
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PTSD testimony in order to prove that child sexual abuse occurred.1 15
Moreover, the court's decision in Acuna appeared to give this possibility further support. In Acuna, the court held that there was no error
under Allewalt in permitting an expert to testify regarding PTSD in the
16
State's case in chief.'
1 17
However, as stated by Judge Eldridge in his Allewalt dissent, scientific literature indicates that PTSD was not designed to prove that
child sexual abuse actually occurred." 8 Rather, PTSD was developed
as a therapeutic tool to help treat emotional injuries that result from
traumatic events. 119 Therefore, the probative value associated with
PTSD in the context of child sexual abuse cases is extremely low. 2 °
When this fact is considered in relation to the danger of prejudice
associated with expert testimony regarding PTSD, it is clear that the
Allewalt court erred in determining that the probative value of PTSD
testimony outweighed its prejudicial effect.
The Hutton majority, apparently recognizing the flawed reasoning
of Allewalt, responded by applying Bohnert in order to exclude Dr. Davis's PTSD testimony. Drawing fromJudge Eldridge's dissenting opinion in Allewalt,12 the court determined that a diagnosis of PTSD
impermissibly implicates the credibility of an alleged victim. Therefore, expert testimony regarding PTSD, when offered to prove that
the abuse occurred, is inadmissible as a matter of law under Bohnert.12 2
However the court's decision to apply Bohnert, instead of correcting the erroneous balancing test performed in Allewalt, produces
115. "We hold only that in this case the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony of [the expert]." Id. (emphasis added).
116. See supranotes 54-59 and accompanying text.
117. Allewalt, 308 Md. at 116-17, 517 A.2d at 754-55 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 116, 517 A.2d at 754 (citing Kilpatrick, Rape Victims: Detection, Assessment and
Treatment, CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST, Summer 1983, at 92, 94).
119. Id.; see also People v. Bledsoe, 681 P.2d 291, 301 (Cal. 1984) (observing that the
relevant scientific "literature does not even purport to claim" that the disorder is a "scientifically reliable means of proving that a rape occurred"); State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227,
230 (Minn. 1982) (stating "Rape Trauma Syndrome is not a fact finding tool, but a therapeutic tool useful in counseling").
120. In perhaps the most probative clinical study regarding the relationship of PTSD
and victims of child sexual abuse, 31 children, all of whom were confirmed victims of
sexual abuse, were interviewed to determine the frequency of PTSD and related symptoms.
Susan V. McLeer et al., Post Traumatic Stress Disorder in Sexually Abused Children, 27 J. Am.
AcAD. CHILD ADOLESCENT PSYCHIAmTRY 650 (1988). Only 48.4% of the sample groups satisfied the diagnostic criteria of PTSD. Id. at 652. Moreover, the study did not employ a
control group that would indicate the frequency of PTSD in the population of children
who were not victims of sexual abuse. See id. at 651.
121. See supra text accompanying note 53.
122. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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illogical results."' 3 As previously discussed, Hutton authorizes the use
of expert testimony regarding PTSD in order to counter a defense
claim of consent or to explain inconsistent behavior on the part of the
alleged victim.' 2 4 Consequently, Hutton creates the highly anomalous
situation whereby expert testimony regarding PTSD is inadmissible as
a matter of law when offered to prove that the abuse occurred, but is
admissible when offered to explain the alleged victim's inconsistent
behavior.
Moreover, Hutton appears to contradict the court's intent in reversing the Court of Special Appeals's decision in Allewalt. In Allewalt,
the court stated that the Court of Special Appeals "erects an unreasonably high standard" for the admission of expert psychological testimony by excluding it on the grounds of undue prejudice.' 2 5
Furthermore, the Allewalt court believed that such "[a] slavish application of so rigid a requirement would eliminate most of the evidence at
trials of all kinds."' 2 6 In reality, however, Hutton's exclusion of expert
testimony as a matter of law under Bohnert actually creates a much
higher obstacle to the admission of expert psychological testimony
than that which the court rejected in Allewalt.
b. The Extension of Bohnert.-Bohnertstands for the proposition that "testimony from a witness relatingto the credibility of another
witness is to be rejected as a matter of law."' 2 7 In reaching this conclusion, however, Bohnert did not specify what degree of credibility implication was sufficient to constitute testimony "relating to" the
credibility of another witness. This determination is critical because
"expert testimony, by its very nature, often tends to confirm or refute
28
the truthfulness of another witness."'
Hutton substantially clarifies the ambiguity of Bohnert. In rejecting
Dr. Davis's expert testimony regarding PTSD, the court indicated that
expert testimony that has only a slight tendency to implicate credibility is inadmissible under Bohnert. In so holding, the Hutton majority
extended the scope of Bohnert and severely restricted the application
of PTSD testimony in child sexual abuse cases in Maryland.
123. In Part I of his concurring opinion, Judge Rodowsky, joined by Chief Judge Murphy, persuasively rejected the majority's contention that expert testimony regarding PTSD
implicates credibility and therefore, is inadmissible as a matter of law. See supra notes 97102 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
125. State v. Allewalt, 308 Md. 89, 97-98, 517 A.2d 741, 745 (1986).
126. Id. at 101, 517 A.2d at 747.
127. Bohnert v. State, 312 Md. 266, 278, 539 A.2d 657, 663 (1988) (emphasis added).
128. Townsend v. State, 734 P.2d 705, 709 (Nev. 1987).
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The Hutton majority believed that PTSD testimony implicated
credibility because it "requires the expert to believe that the PTSD
sufferer has experienced the traumatic experience related." 129 However the degree to which PTSD testimony implicates the credibility of
an alleged victim is relatively insignificant when compared to the
highly prejudicial nature of other examples of expert testimony that
the court deemed to be violative of Bohnert. For example, the Hutton
majority, supported by the concurring opinion of Judge Rodowsky,
found Dr. Davis's comment that the victim's symptoms were "not in
any way faked" amounted to a direct statement to the jury regarding
the expert's assessment of the credibility of the alleged victim. 1 30 Sim-

ilarly, the testimony of the expert witness in Bohnert unanimously was
declared to exceed the scope of proper expert opinion because it was
based solely on the expert's personal intuition about the alleged vic31
tim's unsubstantiated story.'
In contrast to these violations of Bohnert, Dr. Davis's testimony
regarding PTSD had a much lower tendency to implicate the credibility of the alleged victim. Unlike the statement that the victim's symptoms were "not in any way faked," Dr. Davis's PTSD testimony did not
amount to a direct comment on the victim's credibility because it did
not attempt to tell a jury that the victim was being truthful. Rather,
her testimony simply indicated that the diagnostic criteria of PTSD
has been satisfied. 3 2 Furthermore, unlike the PTSD testimony of the
expert witness in Bohnert, Dr. Davis's PTSD testimony was based upon
a thorough investigation of the clinical data surrounding the victim's
story. l3 3 Therefore her opinion regarding PTSD was narrowly confined to her trained evaluation of the alleged victim and the application of her unique skills as a psychological expert in child sexual
abuse.
Undeniably, expert testimony regarding PTSD carries with it
some danger of unfair prejudice. Expert testimony has an inherent
tendency to support the allegations of either the alleged victim or the
defendant.1 3 4 But as Judge Rodowsky persuasively argued in his con129. Hutton 339 Md. 503, 663 A.2d at 1300.
130. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
132. See Hutton, 339 Md. at 509, 663 A.2d at 1303 (Rodowsky, J., concurring). Judge
Rodowsky stated that "if the expert believes that the diagnostic criteria are met, including
the stressor, the diagnosis would be PTSD. If the criteria actually exist, the diagnosis would
be objectively correct." Id
133. See supra text accompanying note 20.
134. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
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cuIming opinion, 135 expert testimony that implicates credibility is not
automatically inadmissible unless the opinion is de facto prejudicial.136 PTSD, because of its relatively marginal tendency to implicate
credibility, does not appear to rise to a level that would require automatic exclusion under Bohnert. By utilizing the balancing approach of
Maryland Rule 5-403,1s7 as advocated in the concurring opinions of
Judge Rodowsky l s 8 andJudge Eldridge"5

9

and employed by the Court

Appeals,14 °

of Special
trial judges would have discretion to determine
the prejudicial effect of PTSD testimony based on the unique circumstances surrounding each case.
c. Ramifications of Hutton.-Hutton has important ramifications regarding the admissibility of expert psychological testimony in
Maryland. By employing Bohnert instead of the balancing test of Rule
5-403, Hutton adopts an inflexible standard for determining the admissibility of expert psychological testimony in child sexual abuse cases.
Under Hutton, Maryland courts must automatically exclude expert
opinion testimony if such testimony implicates the credibility of the
alleged victim."' Furthermore, the court apparently will invoke
Bohnert in regard to testimony that has only a slight tendency to implicate credibility.' 4 2 In so doing, Hutton appears to blur the line separating expert testimony that is de facto prejudicial and subject to
exclusion under Maryland Rule 5-702 from testimony that is only marginally prejudicial and is subject to the balancing test of Maryland
Rule 5-403.
In the aftermath of Hutton, prosecutors are faced with the difficult challenge of offering expert testimony that is probative of child
sexual abuse without implicating the credibility of the alleged victim.
135. See supra notes 97-102 and accompanying text.
136. Hutton, 339 Md. at 511, 663 A.2d at 1304.
It is true that this Court does not permit experts directly to tell a jury that they
believe histories given by their patients. But the majority opinion in the instant
matter goes far beyond Bohnert. Attending physicians who testify that they prescribed medication.... exclusively based on the patient's description of physical
pain, impliedly give credence to those subjective complaints. Nevertheless, their
medical opinions as to the cause of the objectively unconfirmable complaints
have been admissible. The opinions of mental health care providers, based on
the diagnosis of a mental disorder, should not be treated differently.
Id. (citations omitted).
137. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
138. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
139. See supra text accompanying note 52.
140. See supra text accompanying note 125.
141. See supra text accompanying notes 75-76.
142. See supra text accompanying notes 8-11.

694

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 55:529

Because Hutton only authorizes the use of expert testimony regarding
PTSD in order to rebut a defense claim of consent or to explain the
inconsistent behavior of the alleged victim, 1 43 prosecutors will have
little to gain by using PTSD testimony in a child sexual abuse case.
14
For example, consent is never an issue in child sexual abuse cases.1
Furthermore, the diagnostic criteria of PTSD does not explain to a
jury why a victim of child sexual abuse might recant her story or delay
in reporting the abuse.145
In light of the limited application of PTSD testimony, prosecutors, undoubtedly, will attempt to employ other forms of expert psychological testimony. Recent psychological research indicates that
Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS) 14 and the
observation of age-inappropriate sexual behavior 47 have a high degree of probative value in the context of child sexual abuse cases."'
Keeping in mind the Hutton majority's concerns with credibility implication, it is likely that a description of CSAAS would be admissible to
explain the inconsistent behavior of the alleged victim, but would be
inadmissible to prove that the abuse occurred. However the observation of age-inappropriate sexual behavior, considered highly probative of child sexual abuse, would not be admissible for any purpose
because of its tendency to implicate the credibility of the alleged
victim.

143. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
144. SeeJohn E.B. Myers, The Child Witness: Techniquesfor Direct Examination, Cross-Examination, and Impeachment, 18 PAc. L.J. 801, 903 & n.303 (1987) (stating that "[c]onsent is not
a defense to a charge of child sexual abuse"); cf. Garnett v. State, 332 Md. 571, 584-85, 632
A.2d 797, 803-04 (1993) (finding that Maryland's second degree rape statute contained in
MD. CODE ANN. art. 27, §463(a)(3) (1992), which prohibits a person from engaging in
vaginal intercourse with a person under the age of 14 when the person performing the act
is 4 years older than the victim, is a strict liability offense).
145. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (describing the diagnostic criteria of
PTSD).
146. See Myers, supra note 144, at 37 (noting that CSAAS describes five characteristics
commonly observed in sexually abused children: (1) secrecy; (2) helplessness; (3) entrapment and accommodation; (4) delayed, conflicted, and unconvincing disclosure; (5)
retraction).
147. Id. at 42 (indicating that age-inappropriate sexual behavior displayed by a child
includes sexualized play, preoccupation with genitals, excessive masturbation, and age-inappropriate sexual knowledge).
148. See id. at 68 (noting that "[CSSAS] has a place in the courtroom. The syndrome
helps explain why many sexually abused children delay reporting their abuse, and why
many children recant allegations of abuse and deny that anything occurred."); see also id. at
62 (indicating that age-inappropriate knowledge of sexual acts or anatomy, sexualized play,
the appearance of genitalia in a child's drawings, and sexualized play with anatomical dolls
is considered by psychologists as probative of sexual abuse).
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5. Conclusion.--"Society must tread a measured path that avoids
ignoring the reality of child sexual abuse and avoids as well the possibility of unjust conviction of this most shameful of crimes."14 9 In attempting to achieve this delicate balance, the Court of Appeals
appears to have adopted a restrictive framework for analyzing the admissibility of expert psychological testimony in child sexual abuse
cases. By employing Bohnert to exclude expert testimony regarding
PTSD, the Hutton majority rejected its previous jurisprudence that emphasized that the admissibility of expert psychological testimony was a
matter of trial court discretion. Moreover, in doing so, the court indicated that expert testimony that has a relatively minor tendency to
implicate the credibility of an alleged victim was sufficient to invoke
the strict rule of Bohnert. As a result, Hutton will significantly impair
the ability of prosecutors to effectively employ expert psychological
testimony in child sexual abuse cases.
ALFRED

F.

PETERSON

G. Defining the Standardfor Abrogating the
Psychotherapist-PatientPrivilege
In Goldsmith v. State,' the Court of Appeals held that a criminal
defendant has no pretrial right to discovery of privileged
psychotherpy records.2 To gain access at trial, a defendant must establish a reasonable likelihood that the records contain exculpatory' information necessary for a proper defense. This standard is
significantly more rigid for defendants than the balancing test used
for educational records4 and therefore imports a higher degree of
privilege to the psychtherapist-patient relationship.'
The court's decision is largely consistent with decisions from
other jurisdictions.6 However, the court's reasoning creates potential
149. State v. J.Q., 617 A.2d 1196, 1200 (N.J. 1993).
1. 337 Md. 112, 651 A.2d 866 (1995).

2. In Maryland, a privilege exists in "[clommunications between patient and psychiatrist or psychologist." MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &Juo. PROC. § 9-109 (1995); see infra note 25
and accompanying text.
3. Exculpatory evidence has been defined as "[elvidence which extrinsically tends to
establish defendant's innocence of crimes charged as differentiated from that which
although favorable, is merely collateral or impeaching." BLACC'S LAW DICTIONARY 566 (6th
ed. 1990).
4. See Zaal v. State, 326 Md. 54, 81-82, 602 A.2d 1247, 1261 (1992) (stating that defendant must demonstrate a likelihood that relevant information will be obtained in order
to gain access to educational records); see also infra text accompanying note 60.
5. Goldsmith, 337 Md. at 132-34, 651 A.2d at 876-77.
6. See infra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
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problems in practice. Specifically, the majority made a disturbing distinction between private psychotherapists and psychotherapists paid
by the government,7 implying that records in the hands of private psychotherapists warrant greater protection. In addition, the vagueness
of the new standard makes it subject to widely differing interpretations and leaves this area of law in a state of uncertainty.
1. The Case.-Eugene Franklin Goldsmith was charged with
committing various sexual offenses on his adopted stepdaughter.'
The criminal charges were not brought until more than ten years after
the time that the acts were alleged to have occurred.' Knowing that
his stepdaughter regularly visited a psychologist, Goldsmith attempted
to gain access to her psychotherapy records by filing a motion requesting a subpoena "for production of tangible evidence prior to trial"
pursuant to Rule 4-264."o Goldsmith also requested, and was granted,
a subpoena calling for the stepdaughter's psychologist to appear and
produce his records at trial pursuant to Rule 4-265.11 At a hearing on
the motion, 12 Goldsmith's defense counsel identified credibility as the
crucial issue necessitating production."3 He argued that the records
should be opened because the alleged incidents occurred over ten
years earlier, therefore raising questions about his stepdaughter's

7. Go/dsmith, 337 Md. at 125-26, 651 A.2d at 872-73.
8. Id. at 115, 651 A.2d at 868. Goldsmith was charged with committing sexual child
abuse, second degree rape, second and third degree sexual offense, and unnatural and
perverted sexual practices. Id.
9. Id. at 115-16, 651 A.2d at 868.
10. 1d at 116, 651 A.2d at 868. Rule 4-264 authorizes the trial court to issue subpoenas
.commanding a person to produce for inspection and copying at a specified time and
place before trialdesignated documents, recordings, photographs, or other tangible things,
not privileged, which may constitute or contain evidence relevant to the action." MD. R. 4264 (emphasis added).
11. Goldsmith, 337 Md. at 119, 651 A.2d at 869. Rule 4-265 details the procedures for
the court clerk and the parties for issuing a subpoena for trial of tangible evidence that is
not privileged. See MD. R. 4-265.
12. The trial court's record was not clear as to what motion was being considered at the
hearing. The majority of the Court of Appeals thought that the hearing addressed Rule 4264 and evidence before tria but conceded that a trialsubpoena under Rule 4-265 could be
reviewed pretrial, as here, on a motion to quash or a motion for a protective order. Goldsmith, 337 Md. at 117-18, 132, 651 A.2d at 869, 876. In his dissent, Judge Bell argued that
the trial court was in fact ruling on a motion by the prosecution to keep the wimess's
privileged psychotherapy records from being discovered by the defense at trial despite the
existence of a Rule 4-265 subpoena. Id. at 140 n.4, 651 A.2d at 880 n.4 (BelI,J, dissenting).
13. Id. at 117-18, 651 A.2d at 869.
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emotional state in bringing the charges at this time.14 The trial judge
denied the motion and the records were not produced.15
The defense never called the psychologist to testify, and at trial
Goldsmith denied sexually abusing his stepdaughter.1 6 Goldsmith was
found guilty of several sexual offenses, and sentenced to prison.1 7 On
appeal, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed all but one part of the
judgment in an unreported opinion."8 The Court of Appeals granted
certiorari,' 9 framing the issue as "whether Maryland Rule 4-264 or the
federal and/or state constitution entitles a defendant charged with
child abuse and related sexual offenses to obtain pre-trial discovery
review of the victim's psychotherapy records maintained by the victim's private psychotherapist. "20
2. Legal Background.-In Goldsmith, the court balanced a witness's privileged communication with her psychotherapist against a
defendant's constitutional Confrontation Clause and due process
rights. 21 To make this determination, the court had to consider the
14. Id. at 118, 651 A.2d at 869. The Court of Appeals observed that the defendant's
proffer was not sufficient to show "any likelihood that relevant information would be obtained by reviewing the records." Id. at 117, 651 A.2d at 869. The defense did not persuade the court that there was any reason to expect the psychologist's records to contain
relevant information. Id at 128, 651 A.2d at 874.
15. I at 118, 651 A.2d at 869.
16. I. at 119, 120-21, 651 A.2d at 870.
17. I. at 121, 651 A.2d at 870. Goldsmith was acquitted of second degree rape and
found guilty of sexual child abuse, second and third degree sexual offense, and unnatural
and perverted sexual practices. I Goldsmith's prison sentence was for 12 years, with 6
years being suspended. Id. Upon his release, Goldsmith would be placed on probation for
5 years, "conditioned upon payment of restitution, performing community service, and
undergoing psychiatric counseling." Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id at 115, 651 A.2d at 868. In his dissent, Judge Bell noted that the issue as
presented in the petition for certiorari was different I. at 135-39, 651 A.2d at 877-79
(Bell,J., dissenting). The court granted certiorari to consider the question: "Did the trial
court err in refusing either to permit defense counsel to inspect the records of the complainant's treating psychologist or to conduct an in camera review of the record itself?." Id.
at 139 n.2, 651 A.2d at 879 n.2 (quoting the petition for certiorari).
21. Criminal defendants have asserted a right to confidential information for use in
their defense on the basis of constitutional protections guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
§ 24.3 (2d ed. 1992).
Specifically, defendants have tried to invoke the Sixth Amendment's protection of the
right of confrontation and the right of compulsory process. Id. The Sixth Amendment
states in pertinent part that "[iln all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right... to be confronted with the witnesses against him; [and] to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
Criminal defendants have contended that the restriction of access to potentially relevant information is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, which
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nature of the psychotherapist-patient privilege, the defendant's right
to pretrial discovery in light of the victim's right to privacy, and the
defendant's right to fairly present a defense.
a. The Psychotherapist-PatientPrivilege.--Given broad discretion to determine the extent of the psychotherapist-patient privilege, 22 federal courts have split over its existence.2" At the state level,
psychotherapist-patient communication is governed by different statutes, allowing various degrees of privacy protection.2 4 Maryland's law
is set out in the Courts andJudicial Proceedings Article, section 9-109:
"Unless otherwise provided, in all judicial, legislative, or administrative proceedings, a patient or his authorized representative has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent a witness from disclosing,
communications relating to diagnosis or treatment of the patient's
2
mental or emotional disorder."
Prior to Goldsmith, the Court of Appeals had not addressed
whether the psychotherapist-patient relationship is protected so as to
forbids any state from depriving "any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONsT. amend. X1V, § 1; see also LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra, at 1016-19.
Defendants have also argued that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment protects
their right to discovery of information for use in preparing a defense. See, e.g., Goldsmith,

337 Md. at 124-25, 651 A.2d at 872; Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 42-43 (1987).
22. FED. R. EVID. 501. The rule provides in pertinent part: "Except as otherwise required ... the privilege of a...
person ... shall be governed by the principles of the
common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of
reason and experience." Id.
23. See Anne D. Lamkin, Should Psychotherapist-patientPrivilege Be Recognized?, 18 Am. J.
TRIAL Anvoc. 721, 721-23 (1995). Lamkin discusses the status afforded the privilege in
each of the 11 regional federal circuits. Id, at 721-23. Currently, three circuits-the Second, Sixth, and Seventh-have recognized the psychotherapist-patient privilege on public
policy grounds. See id. at 721-22. Five circuits-the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh-have declined to adopt the privilege, finding no federal common-law basis for it Id.
at 722. Finally, three circuits-the First, Third, and Tenth-have not ruled definitively as
to the existence of the privilege. See id. at 722-23. Recently, the Supreme Court agreed to
hear a case out of the Seventh Circuit that could potentially resolve the conflicts among
the circuits. Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. CL 334 (1995) (granting writ of certiorari); see
Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court to Rule on EstablishingTherapist-ClientPrivilege,N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 17, 1995, at A23. This case involved a police officer who sought counseling from a
licensed clinical social worker after mortally shooting a man while acting in the line of
duty. Jaffee v. Redmond, 51 F.3d 1346, 1348-50 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 334
(1995). The Seventh Circuit became the third federal circuit to recognize the psychotherapist-patient privilege. Id. at 1355, 1357. The Supreme Court is likely to confine its ruling
to apply only to the federal courts. See id. at 1354.
24. See Lamkin supra note 23, at 723-25. Texas is the only state that does not have at
least a limited privilege for the psychiatrist-patient relationship. Id.
25. MD. CODE ANN., Crs. &JuD. PROC. § 9-109 (1995). The statute also provides for six
exceptions to when a patient may claim the privilege, none of which are applicable in this
case. Id.
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bar completely discovery of records within its boundaries. 6 In contrast, the Court of Special Appeals has considered the extent of this
privilege on several occasions.
In Avery v. State, 7 the Court of Special Appeals characterized the
privilege as virtually absolute when claimed by a patient, finding no
constitutional basis for disclosure." With time, the court's view moderated,' and in Reynolds v. State ° the court established a procedure
for balancing the competing interests at stake.3 The Reynolds court
allowed limited access to records for defendants who could prove that
there was a "substantial possibility" that the records contained information that would affect the verdict.3 2
b. PretrialDiscovery Under Rule 4-264.-In Maryland, subpoenas ordering the production of documents and other information are
issued in accordance with Rule 4-264 at the discretion of the trial
court.3 3 The rule grants to the circuit court the power to command a
person by subpoena to produce information that is "not privileged." 4
c. ConstitutionalRight to PretrialDiscovery.--In Brady v. Marythe Supreme Court held that in a criminal trial the prosecution
is required to disclose to the defense evidence that is exculpatory in
nature. 6 Lower courts have expressed broad agreement that the
prosecution is said to be in control of evidence that is in the possesland,35

26. Goldsmith, 337 Md. at 145, 651 A.2d at 883 (Bell, J., dissenting).
27. 15 Md. App. 520, 292 A.2d 728 (1972), appeal dismissed, 410 U.S. 977 (1973).
28. Id. at 536-38, 292 A.2d at 741. The court refuted the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendment theories offered by the appellant, although it considered no other constitutional arguments. Id.
29. See Oliver v. State, 53 Md. App. 490, 499, 454 A.2d 856, 861 (1983) (declaring that
when patient refused to waive psychotherapist-patient privilege, appellant had no constitutional right to cross-examine him on protected records), cert. denied, 296 Md. 61 (1983);
Reese v. State, 54 Md. App. 281, 289, 458 A.2d 492, 497 (1983) (holding that on crossexamination, exploratory questions about protected subject matter should liberally, albeit
carefully, be permitted).
30. 98 Md. App. 348, 633 A.2d 455 (1993).

31. Id. This procedure has been nullified, at least in part, by the Goldsmith court. Id. at
369, 633 A.2d at 464-65; Goldsmith, 337 Md. at 133-34, 651 A.2d at 877.
32. Reynolds, 98 Md. App. at 368, 633 A.2d at 464.
33. MD.R. 4-264; see supra note 10.
34. MD.R. 4-264.

35. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
36. Id. at 87. In Brady, the defense counsel had asked to examine the extrajudicial
statements of the codefendant. Id at 84. The prosecution turned over some of the statements, but withheld a statement in which the codefendant admitted to the actual homicide. Id The defendant, having confessed to his participation in the robbery and been
sentenced to death, was awarded a new trial limited to the question of punishment. Id. at
84, 90-91.
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sion of any agency that has contributed to the investigation.3 7 Maryland has codified this understanding of discovery.38 However, the
prosecution is not deemed to have "control" over all government documents.3 9 The Court of Special Appeals has noted that because
"[h]ealth and social service agencies do not ordinarily report their
findings or suspicions to the State's Attorney... material in the files
of those agencies, especially material protected by privilege, would not
[normally] be subject to disclosure."4 ° Furthermore, the Reynolds
court declared that allowing the prosecution pretrial access to protected communications constitutes only a limited waiver of the patient's privilege, and thus does not guarantee access to defendants.4
The Brady doctrine can become a factor in cases involving records
kept by a government-employed psychotherapist.
The majority in Goldsmith distinguished between the limited pretrial rights of the accused, and the more expansive constitutional protections available at trial.4 2 In Weatherford v. Bursey, 43 the Supreme
Court announced that "[t]here is no general constitutional right to
discovery in a criminal case, and Brady did not create one."' Maryland courts have consistently followed this principle.4 5
37. See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 21, § 20.7, at 893-94.
38. MD. R. 4-263(g). The rule provides that:
The obligations of the State's Attorney under this Rule extend to material and
information in the possession or control of the State's Attorney and staff members and any others who have participated in the investigation or evaluation of
the action and who either regularly report, or with reference to the particular
action have reported, to the office of the State's Attorney.
Id.
39. See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 21, § 20.7, at 893-94.
40. Craig v. State, 76 Md. App. 250, 261, 544 A.2d 784, 789 (1988), rev'd on other
grounds, 316 Md. 551, 560 A.2d 1120 (1989), modified, 322 Md. 418, 588 A.2d 328 (1991).
The court stated that disclosure was not available on the basis of due process, or under
Rule 4-263(a) (1). Id. Section (g) of the rule refers to its entirety, including section (a) (1).
MD. R. 4-26 3 (g); see also supra note 38.
41. Reynolds v. State, 98 Md. App. 348, 363, 633 A.2d 455, 462 (1993). In this case,
material that was examined by the prosecution, and not "shielded from all eyes" was still
considered privileged by the court. Id
42. Goldsmith, 337 Md. at 121, 651 A.2d at 870-71.
43. 429 U.S. 545 (1977).
44. Id. at 559. Lower courts agree that Brady and its progeny do not require pretrial
disclosure of evidence. Rather, due process demands only that evidence be disclosed in
time for the defense to use it properly. See LAFAvE & IsRAEi, supra note 21, § 20.7, at 89495.
45. See Evans v. State, 304 Md. 487, 509, 499 A.2d 1261, 1272 (1985) (stating that the
defendant had no right to demand a pretrial deposition or pretrial interrogation of the
wimess); Kardy v. Shook, 237 Md. 524, 542, 207 A.2d 83, 93 (1965) (holding that persons
under indictment have no constitutional right to take pretrial depositions of a state witness); State v. Haas, 188 Md. 63, 69, 51 A.2d 647, 650 (1947) (noting that no right to
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The Supreme Court has concluded that in some instances a defendant's constitutional right of confrontation outweighs a state's interest in safeguarding confidential communications.' Cases involving
privileged psychotherapy records are often analyzed as part of a larger
group of decisions encompassing many different privacy interests.
The Goldsmith court considered two such decisions, one by the
Supreme Court, and the other from the Court of Appeals itself.
In Pennsylvania v. Ritchie,4 7 the Supreme Court examined a Pennsylvania statute that provided confidentiality for the records of a state
child protective service agency.48 The statute contained an exception
stating that reports could be disclosed pursuant to a court order.4 9 In
holding that the defendant was entitled to an in camera review of the
information by the trial court,5° the Court first cited the qualified nature of the privilege.5" The Court also indicated that although the
prosecution had not viewed the evidence, the records were in the
hands of a state investigative agency, and therefore the government
was obligated to produce them if the records satisfied the Brady criteria.5" The Court tempered its holding by requiring that the defendant establish a basis for the claim of materiality before the trial court
would be compelled to review the file.5" Finally, the Court held that
direct access to the records by defense counsel was an unnecessary
infringement on state policy, and opted instead for in camera review
by the trial court alone.5 4
In Zaal v. State,5" the Court of Appeals addressed the degree of
protection afforded by a Maryland regulation to confidential children's records held by a county board of education.5 6 As in Ritchie,
the records could be disclosed pursuant to a court order.5 7 The court
first noted that these files were not discoverable under Rule 4-2635"
pretrial discovery existed at common law), ovemded on other grounds by In re Petition for Writ
of Prohibition, 312 Md. 280, 305, 539 A.2d 664, 676 (1988).
46. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 319 (1974) (holding that state secrecy policy denying effective cross-examination to the defendant was a constitutional violation).
47. 480 U.S. 39 (1987).
48. Id. at 43.
49. Id. at 43-44.
50. Id. at 61.

51. Id. at 57-58. The privilege was qualified because it allowed for disclosure at the
discretion of the court. Id.
52. Id. at 57.
53. Id. at 58 n.15.

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 59-61.
326 Md. 54, 602 A.2d 1247 (1992).
Id. at 61-62, 602 A.2d at 1250-51.
Id. at 61 n.1, 602 A.2d at 1250 n.1.
See supra note 38.
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because they were not in the possession or under the control of the
prosecution. 59 The Zaal court announced that "[t]o overcome a privacy interest in ... records, some relationship must be shown between
the charges, the information sought, and the likelihood that relevant
information will be obtained as a result of reviewing the records."6 °
The court allowed discovery on the basis that the defendant met this
standard. The court distinguished Zaal from Ritchie, declaring that
educational records were entitled to a lesser degree of protection than
child abuse information.6 1 This distinction paved the way for the Zaal
court to rule that the defendant was entitled to an expanded in camera review, with controlled access available to defense counsel.62
d. Disclosure of Privileged Records at Trial.-While some state
courts have ruled that the statutory psychotherapist-patient privilege
is absolutely immune from being abrogated by the rights of the accused, 65 the majority of courts have held that the privilege is not absolute.'
The Goldsmith court cited Commonwealth v. Bishop,65 a case
holding that psychotherapy records are not protected by an absolute
privilege.6 6 The test announced in Bishop attempts to strike a balance
between the rights of the accused and society's interest in protecting
59. Zaa 326 Md. at 62 n.2, 602 A.2d at 1251 n.2. Records held by the county board of
education were not considered to be in the possession or under the control of the prosecution. Id.
60. Id. at 81-82, 602 A.2d at 1261.
61. Id. at 76, 602 A.2d at 1258.
62. Id. at 86-88, 602 A.2d at 1263-64.
63. See Goldsmith, 337 Md. at 147-51, 651 A.2d at 884-85 (Bell, J., dissenting). Judge Bell
cited several cases adhering to the view that the privilege is absolute, including Commonwealth v. Kyle, 533 A.2d 120, 131 (Pa. Super. Ct.) (finding that the compelling public
interest in confidential relationships justifies total nondisclosure of information), appeal
denied, 541 A.2d 744 (Pa. 1987). Goldsmith, 337 Md. at 148-51, 651 A.2d at 884-85 (Bell,J.,
dissenting).
64. See Goldsmith, 337 Md. at 151-54, 651 A.2d at 885-87 (Bell, J., dissenting).
65. 617 N.E.2d 990 (Mass. 1993). The Bishop court stated that "in certain circumstances
a defendant must have access to privileged records so as not to undermine confidence in
the outcome of trial." Id. at 994-95. The court set forth a five-stage test for determining
access to privileged materials: (1) ajudge makes written determination of whether records
are privileged; (2) the judge rules on defense counsel's proffer of relevance, and reviews
records in camera if the defense has met its burden of persuasion; (3) after individual
review, the judge allows confidential access to records by both the defense and the prosecution for the purpose of determining which information must be disclosed to ensure a
fair trial for the defendant; (4) the burden is on the defense to demonstrate that disclosure
to the trier of fact is necessary, with any doubts the judge may have being resolved in favor
of the defendant; (5) at trial the judge determines the admissibility of records that counsel
may wish to introduce in a voir dire examination, keeping in mind that the duty to disclose
is ongoing. Id. at 997-98.
66. Goldsmith, 337 Md. at 134-35 n.9, 651 A.2d at 877 n.9 (citing Bishop, 617 N.E.2d at
998-99).
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privacy by requiring the defendant to show that the request for disclosure is based on more than the desire to embark on a "fishing expedithat might assist an attack on
tion" in search of unknown information
67
the credibility of the patient-witness.
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Goldsmith v. State, the court served
notice that the psychotherapist-patient privilege is to be afforded
strong protection in judicial proceedings.6 8 The Court of Appeals developed this protection by holding that criminal defendants have no
pretrial right to discover privileged communications, and by designing
a stringent trial standard that is difficult to overcome.6 9
Relying on the events that transpired at the trial level, Judge
Chasanow, writing for the majority, framed the primary issue as a
question of pretrial discovery rights for the accused. 7' The majority
ruled out the possibility of a common-law right to pretrial discovery in
this case, observing that "the right to pre-trial discovery is strictly limited to that which is permitted by statute or court rule or mandated by
constitutional guarantees." 7 1 The majority next ruled out a statutory
right to pretrial discovery, stating that Rule 4-264 applies only to nonprivileged information.7 2
Performing a constitutional analysis of a defendant's pretrial
right to discovery, the majority distinguished Pennsylvania v. Ritchie7'
from the instant case. 7 4 While Ritchie dealt with a statute setting out
only a qualified protection for records held by a state agency, 75 the
Goldsmith law contained no qualifying provision allowing for judicial
review, and pertained to the records of a private psychologist in this
case. 76 Based on these distinctions, the majority concluded that
Ritchie did not constitutionally mandate a right to pretrial discovery7 7
because the majority viewed both of the Goldsmith variations as worthy
of greater protection from abrogation.7 8
67. Bishop, 617 N.E.2d at 997-98.

68. Goldsmith, 337 Md. at 133-35, 651 A.2d at 877.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 115, 651 A.2d at 868.
71. Id. at 121-22, 651 A.2d at 871.
72. Id. at 122-23, 651 A.2d at 871. Under Rule 4-264 discovery is only provided for
things "not privileged." MD. R. 4-264; see supra notes 10, 34 and accompanying text.

73. 480 U.S. 39 (1987); see supra notes 47-54 and accompanying text.
74. Goldsmith, 337 Md. at 124-26, 651 A.2d at 872-73.
75. Id. at 124-25, 651 A.2d at 872.

76. Id.
77. Id. at 126, 651 A.2d at 873.
78. Id. at 124-26, 651 A.2d at 872-73.
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In distinguishing Zaal v. State,79 the majority again emphasized
that the records at issue were controlled by a nongovernmental entity."° Thus, the court's first holding found "no common law, court
rule, statutory or constitutional requirement that a defendant be permitted pre-trial discovery of privileged records held by a third party.""1
The majority opinion then considered whether the defendant
could even satisfy the standard necessary for pretrial discovery of nonprivileged records.8 " Applying the test announced in Zaa/, 3 the court
determined that the showing made by the defendant could not even
satisfy the standard required for disclosure of nonprivileged records
because Goldsmith had failed to establish that the records were likely
to contain relevant information. 4
Although not compelled to do so, the majority chose to address
the rights of the accused at trial.8 5 The majority explicitly acknowledged that "the defendant's constitutional fights at trial may outweigh
the victim's right to assert a privilege." 6 The court also made an appeal to the practical advantages of an in camera review of psychotherapy records at trial pursuant to Rule 4-265 as opposed to a pretrial
procedure.8 7 The majority opined that ajudge is in a better position
to evaluate the relevancy and importance of privileged documents at
trial, rather than at the premature pretrial stage. 8
Even if the trial subpoena was reviewed pretrial on a motion to
quash or a protective order, the Goldsmith court reasoned that the burden of proof for a defendant attempting to abrogate the psychotherapist-patient privilege should be higher than under the Zaal standard
because the records in Zaalwere entitled to a lesser degree of protection.8 9 The majority believed that to allow access to protected materials upon a simple assertion that the files may contain information
relevant to credibility would effectively serve to eliminate the privilege
because of the ease with which this standard could be met.9 ° The ma79. 326 Md. 54, 602 A.2d 1247 (1991).
80. Goldsmith, 337 Md. at 125-26, 651 A.2d at 872-73. The majority cited Aveyy, declaring that because the privileged files were not in the control of a state agency, "no disclosure is required under Brady." Id.
81. Id. at 127, 651 A.2d at 873.
82. Id. at 127-29, 651 A.2d at 873-74.
83. See supra text accompanying note 60.
84. Goldsmith, 337 Md. at 127-29, 651 A.2d at 873-74.
85. Id. at 129, 651 A.2d at 874.

86. Id.
87.
88.
89.
90.

I& at 130-82, 651 A.2d at 875-76.
Id.
Id. at 132, 651 A.2d at 876; see also supra note 80 and accompanying text.
Goldsmith, 337 Md. at 133, 651 A.2d at 876.
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jority determined that the social importance of maintaining privileged
relationships warranted stronger protection of privacy. 9 ' Therefore,
the court held that "in order to abrogate a privilege such as to require
disclosure at trial of privileged records, a defendant must establish a
reasonable likelihood that the privileged records contain exculpatory
information necessary for a proper defense." 92 The majority found
that Goldsmith did not meet this burden."
In his dissent, Judge Bell disputed the propriety of the majority's
framing of the issue, observing that no distinction had been drawn
between a Rule 4-264 subpoena and a Rule 4-265 subpoena by either
the courts below or the grant of certiorari. 94 Judge Bell asserted that
state agency control of the records in Zaal had not been a factor in the
decision. 9 5 In advancing a different organizational approach to the
case, he reviewed state court decisions that confront the question of
whether the psychotherapist-patient privilege is absolute.9 6 Concluding that the majority's requirement for allowing a defendant access to
privileged records is virtually impossible to satisfy, Judge Bell supported application of the standard and procedure announced in Zaal
to cases involving a privilege.9 7
4. Analysis.-In Goldsmith v. State, the Court of Appeals demonstrated a great reluctance to infringe upon the psychotherapist-patient privilege as codified at the Courts and Judicial
Proceedings Article, section 9-109. 9 ' By completely closing off pretrial
access to protected communications, and instituting a rigorous trial
standard, the court runs the risk of subordinating the constitutionally
guaranteed rights of the accused. In addition, the distinction drawn
by the court between private and governmental control of privileged
records is troublesome as a matter of policy.
a. EliminatingPretrialDiscovery for CriminalDefendants Seeking
PrivilegedMaterialfrom a Third Party.-The court's holding on pretrial
discovery was well-grounded in legal precedent, 99 and advanced a pol91. Ii., 651 A.2d at 876-77.
92. adL
at 13--34, 651 A.2d at 877.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 135-39, 651 A.2d at 877-79 (Bell, J., dissenting). Judge Bell's dissent mistakenly refers to Rules 2-264 and 2-265, rather than Rules 4-264 and 4-265. Id. at 136, 651
A.2d at 878.
95. Id at 142-43, 651 A.2d at 881-82.
96. Id. at 147-54, 651 A.2d at 884-87.
97. Id. at 154, 651 A.2d at 887.
98. Id. at 133-34, 651 A.2d at 876-77.

99. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
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icy of strong protection for the psychotherapist-patient privilege without necessarily denying essential rights to those under indictment.
Criminal defendants still have a right to be heard at trial and still
maintain their trial discovery rights. As evidenced by the court's own
uncertainty as to whether the trial court was ruling on a motion under
Rule 4-264 or Rule 4-265,1°° distinguishing between pretrial and trial
proceedings can be complicated. With the distinction announced in
Goldsmith, practicing attorneys must pay special attention to procedural matters when a privilege is at issue.
b. Questioning the Subtle DistinctionBetween Government Psychotherapists and Private Psychotherapists.-The Goldsmith court noted that
"the psychotherapist-patient privileged records at issue in the instant
case were not kept by a state agency or required to be kept by a state
agency."1" 1 This rationale implies that privileged information held by
a state-employed psychotherapist is entitled to a lesser degree of protection than records in a private psychotherapist's office. Such a distinction would be patently unfair. In Avery, the Court of Special
Appeals, making no distinction among psychotherapists, ruled that
when a witness claimed a privilege, the witness would be in control of
the records for purposes of Brady.' °2 Therefore, under Avery, no Brady
inquiry is necessary when a witness claims a privilege. Indeed, according to the Avery court's reasoning, no "public-private" analysis is necessary because the privilege evoked belongs solely to the witness and not
to the psychiatrist. Thus, the court misread Avery in stating that "It] he
"l
[Avery] court held the psychiatrist was not a State agent. 10
Judge Bell, disputing the majority's interpretation of Zaal, revisited an important footnote 10 4 that made clear that, although a state
agency, a county school board was not part of the "prosecution team"
for Brady purposes.' 5 Judge Bell properly expressed alarm at the potential for inequity brought about by the court's discrimination between state-employed and private psychotherapists. 0 6 The court
100. Goldsmith, 337 Md. at 132, 651 A.2d at 876; see also supra note 12 (noting the uncertainty on this in the trial record). The court entertained both possibilities and ruled on
both. Goldsmith, 337 Md. at 132, 651 A.2d at 876.
101. Id. at 125, 651 A.2d at 873; see supra notes 76, 80 and accompanying text.
102. Avery v. State, 15 Md. App. 520, 537, 292 A.2d 728, 741 (1972), appeal dismissed, 410
U.S. 977 (1973). For discussion of Brady, see supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text.
103. Goldsmith, 337 Md. at 125, 651 A.2d at 873.
104. Zaal v. State, 326 Md. 54, 62 n.2, 602 A.2d 1247, 1251 n.2 (1992).
105. Goldsmith, 337 Md. at 142, 651 A.2d at 881 (Bell, J., dissenting). Judge Bell noted
that, in Zaal, the State was not obligated to produce records because of its role as prosecutor. Id.
106. Id. at 142-43, 651 A.2d at 881-82.
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should have set down a uniform standard for all psychotherapists,
trusting that any Brady complications could be dealt with as they arose.
c. Assessing the Goldsmith Standard.-In Goldsmith v. State,
the Court of Appeals placed a heavy burden on a defendant to establish a reasonable likelihood that privileged material contains exculpatory information necessary for a proper defense.'" 7 In his dissent,
Judge Bell decried this standard as making the psychothera10 8
pist-patient privilege "effectively absolute."
The Goldsmith court was justified in granting strong protection to
privileged psychotherapist-patient records. As noted above, some
states have declared the privilege to be absolute, with no opportunity
at all for discovery by a criminal defendant.'0 9 This fact, combined
with the court's recognition of a defendant's right to abrogate the
witness's privilege," 0 supports a characterization of the Goldsmith standard as being less than extreme. An examination of the Courts and
Judicial Proceedings Article, section 9-109"' also lends credibility to
the court's holding. In contrast to the controlling laws in both
Ritchie' 2 and Zaal,11 3 the statute in Goldsmith makes no allowance for
the disclosure of privileged communications pursuant to a court order.11 4 This distinction imports a higher degree of protection to the
privilege at issue in Goldsmith." 5
d. The Scope and Long-Term Effects of the Court's Ruling.There is little doubt that the Goldsmith court enunciated a rigorous
standard difficult for defendants to meet." 6 The Court of Appeals
made clear that a defendant's constitutional rights do not extend so
far as to abrogate a privacy interest "by the mere assertion of the possi17
bility of impeachment evidence."'
Although vague and strict, the standard the court articulated in
Goldsmith is unlikely to render the psychotherapist-patient privilege,
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 133-34, 651 A.2d at 877.
Id. at 162, 651 A-2d at 891 (Beli, J., dissenting).
See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
Goldsmith, 337 Md. at 129, 651 A.2d at 874-75; see supra text accompanying note 86.
111. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 9-109 (1995); see supra note 25.
112. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987); see supra notes 47-54 and accompanying
text.

113. Zaal v. State, 326 Md. 54, 602 A.2d 1247 (1992); see supra notes 55-62 and accompanying text.
114. MD. CODE ANN., CTs. &JUD. PROC. § 9-109(d) (1995).
115. Goldsmith, 337 Md. at 124-25, 651 A.2d at 872.
116. Id. at 133-34, 651 A.2d at 876-77.
117. Id. at 133, 651 A.2d at 876-77.
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as Judge Bell warned, "effectively absolute."' 18 The Goldsmith standard
depends on a large dose of subjectivity for its administration. In particular, the phrase "reasonable likelihood" is open to widely differing
interpretation. 1 9 Judges and advocates will still encounter a measure
of flexibility in the announced rule.
Entering the largely uncharted territory of the psychotherapist-patient privilege, the court left some questions unanswered. Little mention was made of how a defendant should go about fashioning
a proffer in order to effectively challenge credibility by meeting the
standard put forth. The majority was also silent as to the requisite
procedure for review. Judge Chasanow mentioned in camera review
more than once, but declined to elaborate."
In his dissent, Judge
Bell argued that the varied procedures the court announced in Zaal
remain intact. 2 ' The Zaal court justified the expansion of review options on the ground that the privacy interest in Zaalwas owed a lesser
degree of protection than the records at issue in Ritchie.' Extending
this reasoning to Goldsmithwould produce in camera review as the sole
option because the psychotherapist-patient privilege commands even
greater protection than the child abuse reports in Ritchie. What
should remain untouched from Zaal is the liberal standard of review
for a trial court in conducting an in camera proceeding. 125
By placing a relatively strong burden on the defendant, but also
contemplating the defendant's eventual use of the private information,124 the recently adopted Bishop test 1 25 is fair to all parties. Judge
Chasanow's reference to the Massachusetts case is important because
the Goldsmith court offered few details as to the administration of its
new standard. The Court of Appeals would have done well simply to
adopt the Bishop test in its entirety, but looking to Bishop for guidance
was also a wise idea. In light of the still amorphous state of the Goldsmith test, this reference to Bishop may well serve as a tempering influence on the development of the new standard.
5. Conclusion.-The Goldsmith court attempted to strike a balance between a criminal defendant's trial rights and society's desire to
118. Id. at 162, 651 A.2d at 891 (Bell,J., dissenting).
119. See supra text accompanying note 92.
120. Goldsmith, 337 Md. at 131-32, 651 A.2d at 875-76.
121. Id. at 159-62, 651 A.2d at 890-91 (Bell, J., dissenting).
122. Zaal v. State, 326 Md. 54, 76-77, 602 A.2d 1247, 1258 (1992).
123. Id. at 87-88, 602 A.2d at 1264. This standard should remain in effect because it was
not at all addressed by the Goldsmith court.
124. Commonwealth v. Bishop, 167 N.E.2d 990, 998 (Mass. 1993).
125. See supra note 65.
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maintain the confidentiality of psychotherapy records. While facially
the end result is supportable, the court's reasoning, especially important in interpretive matters such as these, was problematic. As a result
of this missed opportunity to present a unified analysis, it will be up to
the lower courts to refine the Goldsmith standard.
ANTHONY M. PETTOLINA

H.

Affirming the State's Right to Try a CriminalDefendant In Absentia

In Walker v. State,1 the Court of Appeals held that a trial may proceed in a criminal defendant's absence if the court determines that
the defendant is cognizant of when the trial will begin but intentionally fails to appear on that date.' In so holding, the court deviated
from the United States Supreme Court's decision that a federal court
may not conduct a trial in absentia of a defendant who absconds
before the start of trial.' The court analyzed the pertinent provisions
of Maryland Rule 4-2314 and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43,5
and determined that the language of the federal rule is sufficiently
distinct from Maryland's rule that a Maryland court is not bound by
the Supreme Court's ruling.6
The court's decision in Walker is consistent with prior case law in
Maryland concerning the waiver of one's right to be present at trial. 7
The decision expands the circumstances under which a criminal defendant can effectively waive his right to be present.'
This Note argues that the holding in Walker is a logical and sensible interpretation of Rule 4-231. The Walker court did not suggest
that all defendants who are absent at the beginning of trial necessarily
have relinquished their right to be present. Rather, Walker reaffirms
1. 338 Md. 253, 658 A.2d 239, cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 254 (1995).
2. Id. at 255, 658 A.2d at 240.

3. Id. at 261, 658 A.2d at 242 (distinguishing Crosby v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 748
(1993)).
4. See infra note 55.
5. See infra notes 45, 93.
6. Walker, 338 Md. at 261, 658 A.2d at 242.

7. See, e.g., Noble v. State, 46 Md. App. 154, 159, 416 A.2d 757, 760 (1980) (holding
that the two provisions enumerated in former Maryland Rule 724 are not the only circumstances in which a defendant's right to be present can be waived); see also Sorrell v. State,
315 Md. 224, 230-31, 554 A.2d 352, 355 (1989) (holding that the court may instruct the
jury that it could infer guilt from a defendant's absence); Barnett v. State, 307 Md. 194,
201-03, 512 A.2d 1071, 1075-76 (1986) (stating that the Maryland rules permit a court to
try a defendant in absentia who absconds before his trial begins).
8. The Court of Special Appeals's holding in Noble, 46 Md. App. at 154, 416 A.2d at
757, marked the beginning of Maryland courts' willingness to expand the situations in
which they will permit trials in absentia.
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the court's earlier holding in Barnett v. State9 that if a trial court determines that a criminal defendant made a knowing and voluntary relinquishment of his right to be present, then the Maryland rules permit
that court to try the defendant in absentia.' °
1. The Case.-Lebon Walker, Patricia Lee, and Anna Hall were
indicted by a grand jury in Montgomery County, Maryland, for allegedly stealing more than $2 million from lenders and investors in a real
estate and mortgage scam. 1 ' The circuit court judge granted the
State's motion for a consolidated trial.12 Following a pretrial detention hearing, Walker, Lee, and Hall were released on bond, and their
trial was scheduled for January 18, 1993.'" However, on January 10,
1993, Walker and Lee disappeared from their apartment, and a bench
warrant was issued for their arrest.' 4 When the case was called for trial
on the scheduled date, both Walker and Lee failed to appear. 5 Upon
the court's inquiry, the defense attorney stated that his clients were
aware of their trial date and location.' 6 It was further revealed that
most of Walker and Lee's possessions had been removed from their
apartment.'

7

The State argued that due to the complexity of the case and the
large number of witnesses who would be testifying, the trial should
commence without Walker and Lee.' 8 The circuit court agreed. 9
Despite the defense attorney's objection, Walker and Lee were tried in
absentia.2 0 The defense attorney asked the court to allow him to withdraw from the case, arguing that his clients could not get a fair trial in
absentia.2 ' The court rejected his dismissal request. 22 Although phys9. 307 Md. 194, 512 A.2d 1071 (1986). The Barnett court made clear that if defense
counsel could justify the defendant's absence, or if it was later discovered that the defendant had a good faith excuse for failing to appear, the court could grant either a mistrial or
a new trial. Id.at 214, 512 A.2d at 1081.
10. Waker, 338 Md. at 258, 658 A.2d at 241.
11. Id. at 255, 658 A.2d at 240.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 255-56, 658 A.2d at 240.
15. Id. at 255, 658 A.2d at 240.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 256, 658 A.2d at 240.
20. Id. The circuit court based its decision to begin the trial in the defendants' absence
on two reasons: (1) the unlikeliness that Walker and Lee would be apprehended quickly,
and (2) the burden on the State if the trial were delayed. Id.
21. Id. The defense attorney also argued that his clients would not want him to validate
the proceedings with his participation. Id.
22. Id. at 257, 658 A.2d at 241.
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ically present in the courtroom, the defense attorney refused to participate in any stage of the trial.2" A jury was selected, sworn, and
Walker and Lee were convicted.2 4 Nine months after their conviction,
Walker and Lee were apprehended in Zambia and returned to the
United States. 5
Walker and Lee appealed their convictions to the Court of Special Appeals. 26 They argued that conducting the trial in their absence
violated their common-law right to be present at trial and their constitutional right of confrontation.2 7 Before the Court of Special Appeals
could consider the case, a writ of certiorari was issued by the Court of
Appeals to determine whether a defendant can be tried in absentia if
he is aware of the date and location of his trial but absconds prior to
28
the trial's commencement.
2. Legal Background.a. Constitutional Interpretation of a Defendant's Rights at
Trial.-An accused's right to be present at every stage of his trial is
regarded as one of the most fundamental rights incorporated in the
Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution. 29 The Confrontation Clause ensures a criminal defendant that "[i] n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to... be confronted
23. Id. Before proceeding with the trial, the circuit court made sure that the defense
attorney thought that he was acting in the best interests of his clients:
THE COURT: May I ask you this, Mr. Greenberg, do you believe, as a strategy of
defense of your clients and in their best interests, that it would be appropriate for
you not to actively participate in the examination of any witnesses? Is that
correct?
MR. GREENBERG: I do believe that.
Id., 658 A.2d at 240-41.
24. Id., 658 A-2d at 241. Defendant Hall, who was present for the duration of the trial,
also was convicted. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 258, 658 A.2d at 241.
27. Id. In addition to their contention that they were wrongly tried in absentia, Walker
and Lee also argued that: (1) they were denied effective assistance of counsel due to their
attorney's nonparticipation in the trial and by his joint representation of both appellants;
(2) they were deprived of the right to counsel during pretrial hearings and; (3) the prosecution knowingly elicited perjury from defendant Hall during grand jury testimony. Id
Because Walker and Lee did not present these three issues to the trial court, the Court of
Appeals left those issues for consideration at postconviction proceedings. Id. at 262-63, 658
A.2d at 243.
28. Id. at 258, 658 A.2d at 241.
29. See Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 373 (1892) ("It is the right of any one,
when prosecuted on a capital or criminal charge, to be confronted with the accusers and
witnesses and it is within the scope of this right that he be present.., at any ... stage when
anything may be done in the prosecution by which he is to be affected.") (internal quotations omitted).
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with the witnesses against him.""° The Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution "makes the guarantees of [the Confrontation Clause] ob31
ligatory upon the states."
Although the right of confrontation is fundamental, a defendant
can elect to waive this right. In Diaz v. United States,32 the Supreme
Court began to recognize situations in which an accused can waive
both his constitutional and common-law rights to be present during
his trial.A Under Diaz, if a case is not for a capital offense and the
accused is not in custody, the accused can waive his right to be present
at trial if he voluntarily absents himself after the trial has begun.'
The Diaz Court reasoned that the law should not permit an accused
35
person to profit from his own wrongful act.

Because the Constitution guarantees the fundamental rights of
life and liberty, the Supreme Court believed it essential that before a
constitutional right can be relinquished, one must make an "intelligent waiver" of that right.3 " In Johnson v. Zerbst,"7 the Court defined
30. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights confers
the identical right of confrontation to those accused of a crime and tried in the Maryland
courts. Article 21 guarantees that "in all criminal prosecutions, every man hath a right...
to be confronted with the witnesses against him .... " MD. CONST. DECL. oF RTs. art. 21.
31. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965) (holding that "the Sixth Amendment's
right of an accused to confront the witnesses against him is ... a fundamental right and is
made obligatory on the states by the Fourteenth Amendment").
32. 223 U.S. 442 (1912).
33. Id. at 455.
34. Id. In Diaz, the Court stated:
[W] here the offense is not capital and the accused is not in custody, the prevailing rule has been, that if, after the trial has begun in his presence, he voluntarily
absents himself, this does not nullify what has been done or prevent the completion of the trial, but, on the contrary, operates as a waiver of his right to be present and leaves the court free to proceed with the trial in like manner and with
like effect as if he were present.
Id.
35. Id. at 452; see also Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158 (1878) (observing that
"[tihe Constitution does not guarantee an accused person against the legitimate consequences of his own wrongful acts"). In fashioning its ruling, the Dia Court addressed
concerns that the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia voiced in
Falk v. United States, 15 App. D.C. 446 (1899). In FAk, the court expressed concern that a
criminal defendant would be able to control the course of his trial by absenting himself
whenever he pleased. Id. at 454. The Falk court stated:
It does not seem to us to be consonant with the dictates of common sense that an
accused person, being at large upon bail, should be at liberty, whenever he
pleased, to withdraw himself from the courts of his country and to break up a trial
already commenced. The practical result of such a proposition, if allowed to be
law, would be to prevent any trial whatever until the accused person himself
should be pleased to permit it.
Id.
36. SeeJohnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
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an "intelligent waiver" as one that is "an intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right or privilege.""8 Whether one made a
knowing and voluntary waiver of a constitutional right must be ascertained by the specific facts and circumstances of each case.3 9 Thus,
for a criminal defendant to effectively waive his right to be present at
trial, he must have been aware that he had this right, and he must
have voluntarily elected not to appear.4°
Although the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Johnson was
clear, the Court did not specify what constitutes an effective waiver of
one's right to be present at trial. In Taylor v. United States,4 the
Supreme Court addressed whether mere voluntary absence from trial
is enough to establish an effective waiver of an accused's right to be
present.42 In answering in the affirmative, the Court proclaimed that
the real consideration at issue is whether the accused knew he had a
right to be present, not whether he was aware that the trial would
proceed in his absence if he chose not to attend.4
b. Federal Rule of CriminalProcedure 43(b): Allowing Only Narrow Exceptions to When a Defendant Must Be Presentfor Tial.-In 1945
Congress enacted Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43(b), which
codified the Diaz holding." Under Rule 43(b) (1), a court may try a
criminal defendant in absentia under two circumstances: (1)if the
defendant absents himself after his trial has begun; and (2) if the ac-

37. Id.
38. Id. at 464. Although the Johnson Court primarily was concerned with a defendant's
ability to waive his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the Court's assertion as to what
constitutes an effective waiver applies to all constitutional rights. Id.
39. Id. "The determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of right to
counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused." Id.
40. See, e.g., United States v. Tortora, 464 F.2d 1202, 1208 (2d Cir.) (holding that a trial
can proceed against a defendant who was voluntarily absent at the impaneling of the jury),
cert.
denied sub nom. Santoro v. United States, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972).
41. 414 U.S. 17 (1973).
42. In Taylor, the petitioner argued that his voluntary absence from trial was not sufficient evidence to establish an effective waiver under the dictates of Johnson. Id. at 19. The
petitioner contended that because he was not aware that the trial would continue in his
absence, he could not have intentionally relinquished or abandoned a known right or
privilege. Id.
43. Id. at 20. "The right at issue is the right to be present, and the question becomes
whether that right was effectively waived by [the accused's] voluntary absence." Id. The
Taylor Court found it incredible that a defendant who fails to return to the afternoon
session of his trial would not know that the trial would continue in his absence. Id.
44. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
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cused is removed from the courtroom because of his disruptive
behavior.4 5
In 1993, in Crosby v. United States,' the Supreme Court interpreted the federal rule to hold that a federal court cannot try a defendant in absentia if he absents himself prior to his trial's
commencement.4 7 In Crosby, the defendant attended pretrial conferences and hearings and was told of the date of his trial.4" On the
scheduled date, the defendant did not appear and was not apprehended until six months later.4 9 The Court, relying on a strict interpretation of Rule 43, concluded that a defendant is not considered to
have effectively waived his right to be present if he absconds before his
trial has commenced.5" The Court found the rule's two waiver provisions exhaustive of the situations in which a defendant can waive the
right to be present.5 1 Because the Supreme Court found the federal
rule dispositive, it did not consider whether it is constitutionally permissible to try a defendant in absentia who disappears before the start
of his trial.52
c. Maryland Rule 4-231: A Broader Range of Exceptions. -A
criminal defendant, tried in a Maryland court, also possesses certain
rights at trial. Maryland has consistently recognized that a criminal
defendant has a common-law right to be present at every stage of his
45. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43(b) (1) pertains to the waiver of a defendant's right to be present:
(b) Continued Presence Not Required. The further progress of the trial to and
including the return of the verdict shall not be prevented and the defendant shall
be considered to have waived the right to be present whenever a defendant, ini-

tially present,
(1) is voluntarily absent after the trial has commenced whether or not the
defendant has been informed by the court of the obligation to remain during the
trial; or
(2) after being warned by the court that disruptive conduct will cause the
removal of the defendant from the courtroom, persists in conduct which is such
as to justify exclusion from the courtroom.
FED. R. CGRIM. P. 43(b)(1)-(2).
46. 113 S. Ct. 748 (1993).
47. Id. at 753.
48. Id. at 750.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 751.
51. Id. at 753. The Court focused on the restrictive phrase in Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 43(a) "except as otherwise provided for by this rule" and determined that the
drafters of the rule intended the enumerated provisions of Rule 43 to be a comprehensive
list of all possible waiver situations. Id. at 750-52.
52. 1&. at 753.
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trial."3 "At common law the personal presence of the [accused was]
essential to a valid trial and conviction on a charge of felony" and was
considered unwaivable for most felony cases.5 4
Against the backdrop of the aforementioned Supreme Court
cases, Maryland has devised its own case law and statutory requirements concerning the waiver of one's right to be present at trial. The
applicable rule is 4-231, formerly codified until 1983 as Maryland Rule
724. 55 The most noteworthy revision in the new rule is the addition of
subparagraph (3) to section (c), which allows a defendant to waive his
right to be present if he "personally or through counsel, agrees to or
acquiesces in being absent."56 It is also important to note that Rule 4231 (a) no longer contains a proviso present in former Rule 724(a)
that a defendant shall be present "except as provided by these
57
Rules."
In contrast to the Supreme Court's strict interpretation of the
federal rule, Maryland courts have subscribed to the belief that the
waiver provisions codified in the Maryland rules do not exhaust the
possibilities under which a criminal defendant's right to be present
can be waived.58 In Noble v. State,5 9 the Court of Special Appeals declared that the two waiver provisions enumerated in Rule 724 are not
53. See Barnett v. State, 307 Md. 194, 202, 512 A.2d 1071, 1075 (1986) ("As we have
often pointed out, a criminal defendant's right to be present at every stage of his trial is a
common law right." (citing Williams v. State, 292 Md. 201, 211-12, 438 A.2d 1301, 1306
(1981))).
54. WILLIAM E. MIKELL, CLARK'S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 492 (2d ed. 1918).
55. Maryland Rule 4-231 states in pertinent part:
(a) When Presence Required.-A defendant shall be present at all times when
required by the court.
(c) Waiver of Right to be Present.-The right to be present... is waived by a
defendant:
(1) who is voluntarily absent after the proceeding has commenced,
whether or not informed by the court of the right to remain; or
(2) who engages in conduct that justifies exclusion from the courtroom, or
(3) who, personally or through counsel, agrees to or acquiesces in being absent.
MD. R. 4-231.
56. MD. R. 4-231(c)(3); see supra note 55.
57. MD. R. 4-231 (a); see supra note 55.
58. See, e.g., Noble v. State, 46 Md. App. 154, 161, 416 A.2d 757, 761 (1980) (holding
that an accused's right to be present at a bench conference can be waived by inaction and
does not require an affirmative act based on an intelligent and knowing understanding of
his rights); Barnett v. State, 307 Md. 194, 202, 512 A.2d 1071, 1075 (1986) (stating that a
defendant who knowingly and voluntarily absents himself before the start of trial falls
within the third waiver provision of Rule 4-231(c)).
59. 46 Md. App. at 154, 416 A.2d at 757.
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"the only circumstances where the [accused's] right to be present can
6°
be waived."
Perhaps the most significant case to be handed down pertaining
to the waiver of the right to be present is Barnett v. State.6 1 In Barnett,
the Court of Appeals held that an accused can waive both his common-law right to be present at trial and his constitutional right of confrontation if he disappears prior to the commencement of his trial.6"
The Barnett court agreed with the Noble court that the specific circumstances outlined in the rules are not intended to restrict the possible
63
situations in which a defendant can waive his right to be present.
The Barnett court also reasoned that subparagraph (3) was added to
Rule 4-231 (c) to serve as a general provision indicating that the rule
does not intend to restrict all possible waiver situations.'
Thus,
although Rule 4-231 does not specifically address a defendant who absconds prior to the beginning of his trial, it does not preclude such a
defendant from waiving his right to be present.6 5
In addition to the interpretation of Rule 4-231, Barnett held that
trying a defendant in absentia who absconds prior to the commencement of his trial is permissible under both the Maryland and United
States Constitutions.6 6 The Barnett court determined that as long as
the accused has made a "voluntary relinquishment of a known right to
be present," it does not matter whether or not the trial has begun for
the accused to effectively waive that right.6 7
d. Other Jurisdictions' Reliance on the Federal Interpretation.Since Crosby was decided in 1993, four states have followed the
Supreme Court's holding.6" Yet the states that have found Crosby com60. Id. at 159, 416 A.2d at 760.
61. 307 Md. at 194, 512 A.2d at 1071.
62. Id. at 212, 512 A.2d at 1080.
63. Id. at 202, 512 A.2d at 1075.
64. Id. The court cited the Rules Committee advisory note attached to revised Maryland Rule 4-231, which states: "Except when specifically covered by this Rule, the matter of
presence of the defendant during any stage of the proceedings is left to case law and the
Rule is not intended to exhaust all situations." MD. R. 4-231 committee note.
65. Barnett, 307 Md. at 202-03, 512 A.2d at 1075-76.
66. Id. at 204-14, 512 A.2d at 1076-81.
67. Id. at 210, 512 A.2d at 1079.
68. Since Crosby was handed down, in addition to Maryland, four states have considered
the issue of whether a defendant, not present at the beginning of trial, can effectively waive
the right to be present. These courts have reviewed their respective state statutes and,
based upon the rationale in Crosby, have concluded that a defendant cannot be considered
to have waived his right to be present at trial if he absconds before the trial begins. See
Meadows v. State, 644 So. 2d 1342, 1346 (Ala. Grim. App. 1994) (holding that a defendant
who is not present at the start of trial cannot be tried in absentia); Jarrett v. State, 654 So.
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pelling have done so either because of analogous provisions in their
waiver rule and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43 or because
they favor a "bright-line" rule.6 9 For example, in State v. Hammond,7 °
the State of Washington followed Crosby's lead and held that Washington's law pertaining to waiver of the right to be present at trial only
permitted trials in absentia of defendants who abscond after their trial
has begun. 71 The Washington rule, however, contains the express language that "[t]he defendant shall be present ... at every stage of the
trial... except as otherwise provided by these rules."72 It is unsurprising that Hammond agreed with the reasoning of Crosby-the Washington rule contains the same limiting phrase found in Federal Rule 43.
Similarly, in Sandoval v. State,73 the Supreme Court of Mississippi
held that Mississippi's state courts could not try a defendant in absentia who was not present at the beginning of the trial. 74 Like the Washington court, Mississippi came to this conclusion because of an
express provision in the state code that the waiver rule in felony cases
only allowed a defendant to waive the right to be present if "he be in
custody and consenting thereto."7 5 This condition is more specific
than any provision contained in Maryland's rule and thus, more
restrictive.
The other two states that have adopted Crosby's rationale are Florida and Alabama. Interestingly, Florida and Alabama courts have
based their decisions on specific requirements within their respective
2d 973, 975 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that voluntary absence by a defendant can

only be presumed when such absence occurs after the trial has begun); Sandoval v. State,
631 So. 2d 159, 164 (Miss. 1994) (stating that the Mississippi state code prohibits trying a
defendant in absentia who is not present at the beginning of trial); State v. Hammond, 854
P.2d 637, 641 (Wash. 1993) (holding that the state rule does not permit a trial to begin in
the defendant's absence).
69. See Meadows, 644 So. 2d at 1346. "[Bly requiring the defendant's presence at the
beginning of the trial, the court has a bright-line rule that ensures that any later absence
on the part of the defendant is a voluntary waiver of the defendant's right to be present."
Id.; see also Jarrett, 654 So. 2d at 973 (stating that unless the record establishes that the
defendant waived the right to be present, voluntary absence before trial begins does not
create the presumption that the defendant knew he had the right and voluntarily relinquished that right).
70. 854 P.2d at 637.
71. Id. at 639.
72. Id at 640 (citing Superior Court Criminal Rules 3.4(a)).
73. 631 So. 2d 159 (Miss. 1994).
74. Id. at 164.
75. Id. (citing Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-17-9 (1972)). Section 99-17-9 states, in pertinent
part: "In criminal cases the presence of the prisoner may be waived, and the trial progress,
at the discretion of the court, in his absence, if he be in custody and consenting thereto." Miss.
CODE ANN. § 99-17-9 (1972) (emphasis added).
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state waiver rules that are much less limiting than Federal Rule 43.76
Both of these statutes provide that a court can conduct a trial in a
criminal defendant's absence as long as that absence is voluntary.7 7
Alabama has the additional requirement that the absence must indicate that the defendant knows of his right to be present.7 While influenced by Crosby, Florida and Alabama were most persuaded by the
Supreme Court's dicta. In Crosby, the Court posited that the federal
rule "treats midtrial flight as a knowing and voluntary waiver of the
right to be present"79 and "the defendant's initial presence serves to
assure that any waiver is indeed knowing." ° However, the Court restricted its argument to an interpretation of the federal rule and expressly cautioned that it offered no opinion on whether the right to
be present can be waived constitutionally in other circumstances.8 "
In Meadows v. State,"2 Alabama held that in the absence of any
"affirmative evidence" that the defendant voluntarily waived his right
to be present, the court will adopt the "bright-line rule" that "ensures
that any later absence on the part of the defendant is a voluntary
waiver of the defendant's right to be present."" Similarly, inJarrettv.
State, 4 Florida held that "[v]oluntary absence before trial does not
create the presumption [that the defendant knew of his right to be
present] that arises when such absence occurs only after trial has begun."8" Both of these states favor drawing a clear line between preand midtrial flight.
3.

The Court's Reasoning.-Walker holds that trial courts are not
precluded from trying an absent defendant who is aware of the date of
the trial but voluntarily flees before the trial's commencement.8 6 In
so ruling, the court relied on its interpretation of Rule 4-231 (c) (3),
76. Among the waiver provisions in Florida's statute, a court can proceed with a criminal trial if the defendant "voluntarily absent[s] himself or herself from the presence of the
court without leave of court." FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.180(b). Likewise, the Alabama Rules of
Criminal Procedure state in pertinent part that the defendant's presence may be waived
"[b]y the defendant's absence from any proceeding, upon the court's finding that such
absence was voluntary and constitutes an understanding and voluntary waiver of the right
to be present." ALA. R. CriM. P. 9.1(b) (1) (ii).
77. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
78. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
79. Crosby v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 748, 752 (1993) (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 43).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. 644 So. 2d 1342 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994).
83. Id. at 1346.
84. 654 So. 2d 973 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
85. I&t at 975.
86. Waker, 338 Md. at 258-61, 658 A.2d at 241-43.
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which permits a defendant to waive his right to be present at trial if he
"personally or through counsel, agrees to or acquiesces in being absent.""7 The court reaffirmed its prior decision in Barnet s and held
that Rule 4-231 (c) (3) permits a trial in absentia of a defendant who
knowingly and voluntarily absents himself prior to the trial's commencement.8 9 In so holding, the court rejected Walker and Lee's assertion that its ruling in Barnett was a misinterpretation of Rule 4231 (c) (3).90

Writing for a unanimous court, Judge Raker explained that because the Maryland rule differs from its federal counterpart, Maryland
courts are not bound by the United States Supreme Court's decision
in Crosby, which held that pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43, a defendant cannot be tried in absentia if he disappears
before his trial begins. 91 According to Judge Raker, Rule 4-231 (c) (3)
"has no analog in the federal rule," 92 nor does any section of Rule 4231 contain the restrictive provision found in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43.93 Thus, the Court of Appeals reasoned that its
holding in Barnett was not affected by the Supreme Court's later
decision. 9 4
In Crosby, the Supreme Court found its analysis of Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 43 to be dispositive and did not address whether,
as a matter of constitutional law, the right to be present can be waived
prior to trial.9" Thus, the Court of Appeals found no reason to alter
Barnett's conclusion that it is constitutionally permissible to try a de87. MD. R. 4-231 (c) (3); see supra note 55.
88. See supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
89. Walker, 338 Md. at 259-60, 658 A.2d at 242. Specifically, Barnett reasoned that
under Rule 4-231 (c) (3), a defendant who knowingly and voluntarily absents himself before
the start of the jury selection process "acquiesces" in being absent pursuant to the third
waiver provision in Rule 4-231(c). Barnett v. State, 307 Md. 194, 202-03, 512 A.2d 1071, 7576 (1986); see supra note 55.
90. Walker, 338 Md. at 259-60, 658 A.2d at 242.
91. Id. at 260, 658 A.2d at 242 (citing Crosby v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 748 (1993)); see
supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
92. Walker, 338 Md. at 261, 658 A.2d at 242.
93. Id. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43(a) pertains to when the accused's presence is required: "(a) Presence Required. The defendant shall be present at the arraignment, at the time of the plea, at every stage of the trial including the impaneling of the jury
and the return of the verdict, and at the imposition of sentence, except as otherwise provided by this rule." FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(a).
There is no provision in Federal Rule 43 analogous to Maryland Rule 4-231(c)(3).
Additionally, unlike the Maryland rule, the federal rule contains the stipulation that "[tI he
defendant shall be present... at every stage of the trial... except as otherwise provided by this
rule." FED. R. CiuM. P. 43(a) (emphasis added).
94. Walker, 338 Md. at 261, 658 A.2d at 242.
95. Crosby v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 748, 753 (1993).
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fendant in absentia if he absconds before the trial has begun.9 6 As
long as the trial court, in its discretion, determines that a defendant is
cognizant of his right to be present at trial and voluntarily fails to appear, the defendant effectively will have waived that right.9 7 It is of
little significance whether the trial commenced prior to the defendant's disappearance.9 8
4. Analysis.a. Differences Between the Federal and Maryland Rules.-In
Walker, the Court of Appeals reaffirmed its position, first articulated in
Barnett, that under the Maryland rules a court may conduct a trial
without the presence of a criminal defendant who is aware of when his
trial will begin but voluntarily fails to appear on the scheduled date.9 9
Because the provisions in Maryland Rule 4-231 and Federal Rule 43
are not analogous, the Supreme Court's ruling that Federal Rule 43
permits trials in absentia only where the defendant was present initially had little persuasive impact on the Court of Appeals's interpretation of Rule 4-231.1°° The court's decision in Walker ensures that
Maryland courts will not permit a criminal defendant to dictate when
and if he is to be tried.
The Walker court stated that the Supreme Court's reasoning in
Crosby is "inapposite to our interpretation of Maryland Rule 4231 (c)." 1 1 This assertion by the court is justified given the language
of the Maryland rule.1"' Rule 4-231, like Federal Rule 43, does not
contain an express provision providing for the trial in absentia of a
defendant who absconds before the start of the trial. However, unlike
Rule 4-231, there is a limiting phrase contained in Federal Rule 43
that stipulates that "[t] he defendant shall be present.., at every stage
of the trial... except as otherwise provided by this rule."'0 3 It was the
inclusion of this "express mandate" 0 4 that the Supreme Court found
most persuasive in concluding that the waiver provisions enumerated
in the federal rule were meant to serve as a comprehensive listing of
the circumstances under which the right to be present can be
96. WaLker, 338 Md. at 261, 658 A.2d at 242. "We see nothing in Crosby that invites a
reexamination of [Barnett's] conclusion." Id.
97. Id. at 258-59, 658 A.2d at 241.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 253-60, 658 A.2d at 239-42.
100. Id. at 261, 658 A-2d at 242.
101. Id.
102. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
103. FED. K CuM. P. 43(a); see supra note 93.
104. WaLker, 338 Md. at 260, 658 A.2d at 242.
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waived.10 5 This reasoning is inapplicable to an analysis of the Maryland rule, as there is no analogous limiting phrase in Rule 4-231. Additionally, Rule 724, the predecessor to Rule 4-231, did contain a
restrictive clause identical to that found in Federal Rule 43.106 This
clause was eliminated when the rule was revised and recodified as
Rule 4-231.107 The deletion of the limiting phrase suggests that the
waiver provisions in the current rule are not intended to exhaust the
possible situations in which a defendant can waive the right to be
present.
The Walker court adopted Barnett's conclusion that subparagraph
(3) in Rule 4-231 (c) was incorporated into the rule to serve as a general provision leaving open the possibility that there may be situations
other than those specifically designated in the rule that would enable8
10
a defendant to waive his common-law right to be present at trial.
This is a prudent and logical interpretation of the rule. The committee notes following the text of Rule 4-231 expressly state that "[e]xcept
when specifically covered by this Rule, the matter of presence of the
defendant during any stage of the proceedings is left to case law and
the Rule is not intended to exhaust all situations." 109 The committee's belief is clear: The rule does not provide a comprehensive list of
possible waiver situations.
Moreover, as the Barnett court recounted, during a meeting of the
Court of Appeals's Rules Committee concerning the revision of Rule
4-231, Judge McAuliffe made a recommendation to include a third
subparagraph in Rule 4-231 (c) that would indicate that Maryland recognizes "other situations when the defendant [or] his counsel can
waive the defendant's right to be present."1 10 Subsequently, the committee voted unanimously to adopt the third provision. 1 ' This is one
more indication that the underlying premise of the rule is that there
105. Crosby v. United States, 113 S.Ct. 748, 751 (1993). The Supreme Court reasoned
that "[tihe list of situations in which the trial may proceed without the defendant is
marked as exclusive not by the 'expression of one' circumstance, but rather by the express
use of a limiting phrase. In that respect the language and structure of the Rule could not

be more clear." Id.
106. Maryland Rule 724 provided: "The defendant shall be present at every stage of the
trial... except as provided by these rules." MD. R. 724 (emphasis added).
107. See supra note 55.
108. Walker, 338 Md. at 260, 658 A.2d at 242. The Wa/ker court did not discuss in detail

its conclusion that Rule 4-231(c) (3) permitted Walker and Lee to be tried in absentia.
Instead, the court referred to Barnett's analysis of subparagraph (3). Id. at 259-60, 658 A.2d
at 242.

109. MD. R. 4-231 committee notes.
110. Barnett v. State, 307 Md. 194, 203, 512 A.2d 1071., 1075 (1986) (alteration in
original).
111. Id.
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may be circumstances, not expressly provided for in the provisions of
Rule 4-231, in which a defendant effectively can waive his common law
right to be present.
Walker makes clear that Rule 4-231 does not exhaust the possible
situations in which a defendant can waive the right of presence at
trial. By eschewing the bright-line distinctions favored by other
states, 112 the Court of Appeals recognized that there are other circumstances in which a defendant's knowledge of the right to be present
can be shown. In so doing, the court opens the door for future cases
to expand the circumstances under which a defendant will be considered to have effectively waived his constitutional right of confrontation, as well as his common-law right of presence at trial.
5. Conclusion.-Walker reaffirms the principle espoused in Barnett that Maryland courts are not precluded from trying in absentia a
criminal defendant who absconds before his trial begins. In so holding, the court relied on its prior analysis in Barnettand concluded that
because Maryland Rule 4-231 is sufficiently distinct from Federal Rule
43, the Supreme Court's decision in Crosby has little persuasive effect.
The court recognized that there are more practical circumstances in
which a defendant can effectively waive the right to be present at trial
than those specifically enumerated in Rule 4-231. Walker paves the
way for future cases to expand the circumstances in which a criminal
defendant can be tried in absentia. The Walker decision sends a
strong message that if a defendant is set to stand trial for a crime in a
Maryland court, that trial will proceed in his absence if the trial court
determines that his absence is a knowing and voluntary waiver of the
right to be present at trial. Maryland courts will not allow a criminal
defendant to dictate the course of his trial.
LYNN

.

E.

RiCCARDELLA

Emphasizing Victims' Rights at the Sentencing Phase of
CriminalProceedings

In Cianos v. State,1 the Court of Appeals addressed the right of a
victim to speak to the judge or jury prior to the sentencing of a criminal defendant. 2 The court held that victims and their families may
not appeal a defendant's sentence when oral impact statements are
112. See supra notes 68-85 and accompanying text.
1. 338 Md. 406, 659 A.2d 291 (1995).

2. Id. at 407, 659 A.2d at 292.
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not heard or considered in sentencing a defendant.' Despite this ruling, however, the court, in strongly worded dicta, instructed trial
judges to give appropriate consideration to the impact that a crime
has upon a victim in determining the appropriate sentence given to a
criminal defendant.4 The court explained: "An important step towards accomplishing [the task of considering the crime's impact] is to
accept victim impact testimony wherever possible."5 In reaching this
conclusion, the court traced Maryland's past legislation and constitutional amendments regarding victim rights.6 These measures were enacted in response to the concerns of victims who often feel neglected
by the criminal justice system.'
The Cianos dicta follows the recent legal trend throughout the
United States toward emphasizing victims' rights. The court, however,
correctly refused to allow the recognition of victims' rights to take precedence over the public interest in the administration ofjustice. This
Note will review the legal background of written and oral victim impact statements, and outline some of the practical difficulties that allowing oral testimony will present for trial courts, attorneys, victims,
and victims' families.
1. The Case.-On January 6, 1994, Sean Patrick Hall entered a
guilty plea to two counts of manslaughter by automobile and one
count of driving while intoxicated (DWI) after being charged with the
deaths of Jerome Robert Barrett and James Nicholas Cianos III.8 The
court scheduled Hall's sentencing and ordered a presentence investigation.9 At sentencing, the State requested that the court hear an oral
address by Evelyn Barrett,"° the widow of Jerome Barrett, and by
Robin Cianos, the mother of James Cianos III. " The two had previously submitted written, victim impact statements for the court's consideration." The trial court ruled that there was nothing Ms. Barrett
and Ms. Cianos could say that had not already been expressed in their
written statements and, therefore, that it would not be beneficial to
3. Id. at 412, 659 A.2d at 294.
4. Id. at 413, 659 A-2d at 295.
5. Id.
6. See infta note 80 and accompanying text.
7. Cianos, 338 Md. at 412-13, 659 A.2d at 294-95.
8. Id. at 407-08, 659 A.2d at 292.
9. Id. at 408, 659 A.2d at 292.
10. Ms. Barrett also sustained serious bodily injuries in the accident. Id. at 408 n.1,659
A.2d at 292 n.l.
11. Id. at 408, 659 A.2d at 292.
12. Id.
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take the additional court time to hear oral testimony.1 3 The trial
court permitted the State and Hall's attorney to argue as to sentencing, and allowed Hall's girlfriend to speak on his behalf 14 Afterwards,
the court imposed Hall's sentence. 5
Ms. Cianos and Ms. Barrett filed an application for leave to appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.16 They argued that the trial
court abused its discretion by not allowing them to testify at the sentencing proceeding. 7 Ms. Cianos and Ms. Barrett argued that the
Court of Special Appeals was compelled to vacate Hall's sentence and
to remand the case to the trial court for resentencing " However, the
Court of Special Appeals denied their application because it determined that the issues raised by the application were moot. 9 The
Court of Appeals granted certiorari0 to address the rights of a victim
to speak to the judge or jury prior to the sentencing of a criminal
defendant, as provided in Article 27, section 643D.2

13. Id.
14. Id. Hall's girlfriend had also previously submitted a written statement for the
court's review. Id. at 408 n.2, 659 A.2d at 292 n.2.
15. Id. at 408-09, 659 A.2d at 292. Hall received concurrent 5-year sentences, with all
but 14 months suspended, on each of the manslaughter counts. Id. In addition, Hall
received 4 years probation, 160 hours of community service, and assessment of costs. Id. at
409 n.3, 659 A.2d at 292 n.3. On the DWI count, Hall received one year to be served
concurrent with the manslaughter sentences and a $1000 fine. I&Lat 409, 659 A.2d at 292.
Hall was also ordered to attend Alcoholics Anonymous meetings and to participate in 10
victim impact panel sessions. Id. at 409 n.4, 659 A.2d at 292 n.4.
16. Id. at 409, 659 A.2d at 292-93. The only avenue of appeal from a guilty plea before
a circuit court is by application for leave to appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. Id. at
407, 659 A.2d at 292; see also MD. CODE A'N., CTS. &JUD. PROC. §§ 12-202, -302 (1995); see
infra note 20.
17. Cianos, 338 Md. at 409, 659 A.2d at 293.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 407, 659 A.2d at 292. Under sections 12-202 and 12-302 of the Courts and
Judicial Proceedings Article, an order by the Court of Special Appeals granting or denying
an application for leave to appeal is not reviewable by the Court of Appeals by way of
certiorari. The Court of Appeals, however, may grant certiorari when the intermediate
appellate court makes a decision on an application for leave to appeal based on an alleged
denial of victims' rights. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. §§ 12-202, -302 (1995).
21. Article 27, § 643D (a), addressing oral impact testimony, provides in pertinent part:
In every case resulting in serious physical injury or death, the victim or a member
of the victim's immediate family, or if the victim is deceased, under a mental,
physical, or legal disability, or otherwise unable to provide the required information, the personal representative, guardian, or committee, or other family member may, at the request of the State's Attorney and in the discretion of the
sentencing judge, address the sentencing judge or jury under oath or affirmation
before the imposition of sentence.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 643D(a) (1992).
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2. Legal Background.a. The Rise of Victim Impact Statements.-In recent years, there
has been a growing concern that the criminal justice system devotes
an inordinate amount of its time and resources to protecting the
rights of criminal defendants while the victims' rights are ignored.2"
In response to this concern, Congress and many state legislatures began enacting measures to strengthen the role of the victim as a party
to be officially recognized in criminal proceedings." One method of
victim involvement has been the courts' use of victim impact statements in sentencing criminal defendants. 4 Generally, a victim impact
statement, written or oral, describes the physical, emotional, and psychological effect the crime had on the victim and the victim's family.2 5
22. Charlton T. Howard III, Note, Booth v. Maryland-Death Knellfor the Victim Impact
Statement?, 47 MD. L. REv. 701, 705 (1987). In 1982, President Ronald Reagan endorsed
the Final Report of the President's Task Force on Victims of Crime. This report called for
over 100 victim-oriented reforms aimed at state and federal legislatures and the judiciary.
In particular, the report stressed that every victim should be allowed to give some form of
input during the sentencing of a criminal defendant. See PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON VITIMS OF CIuME, FINAL REPORT 77 (1982) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE]. The Task
Force also recommended a federal constitutional amendment that would be appended to
the Sixth Amendment to recognize victims' rights. Id. at 114-15. Currently, the Sixth
Amendment guarantees that "[iun all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed." U.S. CONS-r. amend. VI. The proposed modification
reads, "Likewise, the victim, in every criminal prosecution shall have the right to be present
and to be heard at all critical stages of judicial proceedings." PRESIDENT's TASK FORCE,
supra, at 114-15.
23. As noted by the Court in Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987), ovemded in partby
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991), at least 36 states now permit the use of some form
of victim impact evidence in sentencing proceedings. Id. at 509 n.12.
24. In addition, the pressure for reform has centered on several other general areas,
including protection for victims and wimesses of crime, victim compensation, and restitution programs, victim assistance programs, and increasing victim input in the decisionmaking processes of the criminal justice system. Patrick M. Fahey, Note, Payne v. Tennessee: An Eye for an Eye and Then Some, 25 CoN. L. REv. 205, 207 (1992).
25. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 4-609(c) (1993). A victim impact statement shall:
(i) Identify the victim of the offense;
(ii) Itemize any economic loss suffered by the victim as a result of the offense;
(iii) Identify any physical injury suffered by the victim as a result of the offense
along with its seriousness and permanence;
(iv) Describe any change in the victim's personal welfare or familial relationships
as a result of the offense;
(v) Identify any request for psychological services initiated by the victim or the
victim's family as a result of the offense; and
(vi) Contain any other information related to the impact of the offense upon the
victim or the victim's family that the court requires.
Id.
Generally, four basic types of information have been provided to the sentencing authority by a victim impact statement: (1) the circumstances surrounding the crime and the
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Such a statement is used solely during the sentencing phase of a criminal proceeding. 6 On the federal level, Congress passed the Victim
and Witness Protection Act of 1982, which amended the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure to require the inclusion of a victim impact
statement as a part of a presentence report submitted to the sentencing authority.2 7 Although many states have enacted similar statutes,
the admissibility of victim impact statements remains a controversial
issue.
b. The Supreme Court's Treatment of Victim Impact Statements.The Supreme Court first addressed the admissibility of victim impact
statements in Booth v. Maryland.2 8 The Booth Court, in a five-to-four
decision, held unconstitutional the use of victim impact statements in
capital sentencing proceedings. 9 In so holding, the Supreme Court
concluded that the Maryland statute, Article 41, section 4-609(c), was
invalid to the extent that it required consideration of victim impact
statements."0 The Court determined that introducing victim impact
statements could render the sentencing jury's death penalty decision
impermissibly arbitrary and capricious by shifting the focus away from
the defendant and onto the victim and the victim's family.3 1 The
manner in which the crime was perpetrated; (2) the identity and characteristics of the
victim; (3) the effects of the crime on the victim and the victim's family; and (4) the victim
or victim's family's opinion of the defendant and of an appropriate sentence. Phillip A.
Talbert, Comment, The Relevance of Victim Impact Statements to the CriminalSentencing Decision,
36 UCLA L. REv. 199, 203 (1988).
26. Common policy justifications for victim impact statements include giving victims
more control of their recently shattered lives, satisfying victims' demands for retribution,
and making criminal proceedings more fair by addressing victims' needs and not just treating them as witnesses. Micheal A. Johnson, Note, The Application of Victim Impact Statements
in Capital Cases in the Aftermath of Booth v. Maryland: An Impact No More?, 13 T. MARSHALL
L. REv. 109, 113-15 (1988).
27. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(b)(4)(D) (previously codified as FED. R. CuM. P.

32(c) (2) (C)), which states in pertinent part: "[The presentence report must contain] verified information, stated in a nonargumentative style, containing an assessment of the financial, social, psychological, and medical impact on any individual against whom the
offense has been committed." Id.
28. 482 U.S. 496 (1987), overruled in part by Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
29. Id. at 502-03. In the dissent's view, the full extent of the harm caused by a defendant is germane to deciding an appropriate punishment. Id. at 515-21 (White, Rehnquist,
O'Connor, Scalia, fJ.,dissenting).
30. Id. at 502-03.
31. The underlying constitutional claim raised in these capital sentencing cases is the
Eighth Amendment proscription of cruel and unusual punishment. The Eighth Amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishment inflicted." U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII; see Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962) (applying the prohibitions of the Eighth Amendment to the
states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). Commencing with
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), the Court has required state death penalty
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Court emphasized that the jury must focus on the defendant and his
personal characteristics as a unique human being prior to imposing a
sentence of death. Two years later, the Supreme Court extended
Booth in South Carolina v. Gathers,12 to hold that a prosecutor cannot
include a victim impact statement in his closing argument to ajury in
a death penalty case."3 Neither Booth nor Gathers expressed an opin34
ion as to the use of victim impact statements in noncapital cases.
In Payne v. Tennessee, 5 the Supreme Court overruled both Booth
and Gathers.3 6 The Court held that the Eighth Amendment "erects no
per se bar"3 7 prohibiting a capital sentencing jury from considering victim impact evidence relating to the victim's personal characteristics
and to the emotional impact of the murder on the victim's family.3 "
In addition, the Payne Court determined that a prosecutor is not pre-

schemes to conform to the dictates of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment. Thus, a state may no longer inflict the death penalty in an arbitrary manner. Sentencing must "be, and appear to be, based on reason rather than caprice
or emotion." Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977).
32. 490 U.S. 805 (1989), ovemded in part by Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
33. Id. at 810. In Gathers, the Court determined that the prosecutor's reading into the
sentencing record a religious tract that the murder victim was carrying, and comments
about the victim's personal qualities inferred from the victim's possession of a religious
tract and voter registration card were grounds for reversal of a sentence of death. Id. at
810-12.
34. Booth, 482 U.S. at 509 n.12. The Booth Court recognized that sentencing considerations may be different in a noncapital context and therefore was careful to note that its
holding was "guided by the fact that death is a 'punishment different from all other sanctions.'" Id. (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303-05 (1976) (plurality
opinion of Stewart, J.)).
35. 501 U.S. 808 (1990). For a general discussion of Payne v. Tennessee, see Christine D.
Marton, Comment, The Admissibility of Victim Impact Evidence at the Sentencing Phase of a Capital Tria, 31 DUQ. L. REv. 801, 816 (1993) (expressing opinion that the Court's decision in
Payne represents a beneficial change in the Court's death penalty jurisprudence). But see
Michael I. Oberlander, Note, The Payne of AUowing Victim Impact Statements at Capital Sentencing Hearings,45 VAND. L. REv. 1621, 1649-57 (1992) (discussing why victim impact evidence at capital sentencing plays no role in any of the legitimate theories for punishment).
36. Payne, 501 U.S. at 830.
37. Id. at 827.
38. Id. at 831. "We do not hold today that victim impact evidence must be admitted, or
even that it should be admitted. We hold merely that if a State decides to permit consideration of this evidence, 'the Eighth Amendment erects no per se bar.'" Id. (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
The Court in Payne considered only the first type of victim impact evidence presented
in Booth-the personal characteristics of the victims and the emotional impact of the murder on the survivors. Id. The Court did not consider the second type of victim impact
evidence, which relates to a victim's or family member's characterizations of a defendant
or opinion about an appropriate sentence. Thus, it is unclear if it remains unconstitutional to present this second type of impact evidence in a capital case.
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cluded from arguing such evidence at a capital sentencing hearing. 9
After Payne, individual states are left to decide whether to include victim impact evidence in assessing the defendant's culpability in a capital sentencing case.40
c.

Victim Impact Statements: The Development of Maryland

Law.-

(i) Statutory Develpments.-Maryland has followed the national trend by enacting laws designed to increase meaningful victim
involvement in criminal proceedings. 4 ' The Maryland General Assembly designed a sentencing scheme that required presentence investigation reports to include written victim impact statements in two
situations: (1) felonies where the defendant caused physical, psychological, or economic injury to the victim, and (2) misdemeanors
where the defendant caused serious physical injury or death. 42 A year
later, Maryland required that a victim impact statement be prepared
in capital cases.4" As a result of these laws, Maryland courts have considered written victim impact statements in determining the appropriate sentence for defendants. 44 Maryland has also expanded the rights
of victims beyond written victim impact statements to include oral victim testimony.4 5 In 1986, the General Assembly passed Article 27, sec39. Id. at 827. The Payne Court explained that victim impact statements reflect "each
victim's 'uniqueness as an individual human being,' whatever the jury might think the loss
to the community resulting from his death might be." Id. at 823.
40. Id. at 824-25. If, in a particular case, a wimess's testimony or a prosecutor's remark
so infects the sentencing proceeding as to render it fundamentally unfair, the defendant
may still seek appropriate relief under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 825.
41. In fact, Maryland was the first state to use a victim impact statement. See S. REP. No.
532, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, 11 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.CAN. 2515, 2517-18 (noting that "[t] he victim impact statement was first used in Federal Courts for the District of
Maryland in May, 1979, as a way of providing the sentencingjudge with information on the
victim that might not otherwise be brought to his attention").
42. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 4-609(c) (2) (1993).
43. Id. § 4-609(d).
44. See Tibbs v. State, 72 Md. App. 239, 259, 528 A.2d 510, 519 (holding that a sentencing judge in a noncapital case could consider the impact that a crime had upon the victims), cert. denied, 311 Md. 286, 533 A.2d 1308 (1987); Hurley v. State, 60 Md. App. 539,
564-65, 483 A.2d 1298, 1311 (1984) (finding that a trial court may properly consider the
impact a crime had upon its victims before passing on the defendant's sentence), cert.
denied, 302 Md. 409, 488 A.2d 500 (1985).
45. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 643D (1992) (for pertinent text, see infra note 46 and
accompanying text); see also Lodowski v. State, 302 Md. 691, 743-44, 490 A.2d 1228, 1254-55
(1985) (declaring, in dicta, that a victim may make oral as well as written statements, even
though oral statements are not specifically permitted in the statute), vacated on other
grounds, 475 U.S. 1078 (1986). Similarly, other states have extended victims' rights to include oral victim impact testimony. See e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-91a(c) (West
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tion 643D, which allows a victim or representative of a victim to
address the sentencing judge or jury at the request of the state's attorney and in the discretion of the sentencing judge.4 6 Similarly, Article
27, section 761 provided guidelines for treatment of and assistance to
crime victims and witnesses.4 7
The Maryland legislature has continued to enact other victims'
rights measures. One provision allows the victim of violent crime to
file an application for leave to appeal to the Court of Special Appeals
from an interlocutory or final order that denies or fails to consider a
right secured to that victim by Article 27, section 620(b) or section
643D, or Article 41, section 4-609 of the Maryland Code.48 In addition, by enacting Article 47 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights,
Maryland has recently joined the handful of states that have already
adopted constitutional amendments on victims' rights. This provision
includes "the right, in a case arising in the circuit court, the right,

1990); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4B-36m-n (West 1995); R.I. GEN. LAwS § 12-28-4 (1994); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 7006 (1995). By legislative amendment, New York has recently joined
those states permitting the victim to testify in person at the sentencing hearing. N.Y. CuM.
PROC. LAw § 380.50 (McKinney 1994).
For case law prior to the New York amendments, see People v. McCarthy, 519 N.Y.S.2d
118, 119 (N.Y. County Ct. 1987) (limiting crime victim to written statement submitted to
sentencing judge, as oral presentation could "becloud the judicial atmosphere"). In McCarthy, the court recognized that the New York legislature contemplated the victim impact
statement only as a written document to the mandated presentence report- "The charged
atmosphere at sentencing is fraught with the opportunity for someone bent on mischief or
with interest in other civil or criminal matters to attempt to intimidate the Court, provoke
the defendant or generally disrupt the sentencing proceeding." Id.
46. Article 27, § 643D provides in pertinent part:
In every case resulting in serious physical injury or death, the victim or a member
of the victim's immediate family, or if the victim is deceased, under a mental,
physical, or legal disability, or otherwise unable to provide the required information, the personal representative, guardian, or committee, or other family member may, at the request of the State's Attorney and in the discretion of the
sentencing judge, address the sentencing judge or jury under oath or affirmation
before the imposition of sentence.
MD. ANN. CODE art 27, § 643D (1992).
47. Article 27, § 761 provides in pertinent part:
(12) A crime victim or witness should: ...
On request of the State's Attorney to and in the discretion of the judge, be permitted to address the judge or jury or have a victim impact statement read by the
judge or jury at sentencing before the imposition of the sentence or at any hearing to consider altering the sentence.
Id. § 761(12).
48. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 12-303.1 (1995); see also infra notes 70-83
and accompanying text.
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upon request and if practicable, to be notified of, to attend, and to be
heard at a criminal justice proceeding."4 9
(ii) Judicial Developments.-Priorto the Supreme Court's decision in Booth declaring victim impact statements in capital cases unconstitutional,5" theCourt of Appeals allowed victim impact evidence
even in death penalty cases.5 1 In complying with the holdings of Booth
and Gathers,12 the Court of Appeals did not allow victim impact statements to be introduced at capital sentencing until after Payne.5" After
the Payne decision, however, the Court of Appeals, in Evans v. State,'
reaffirmed its pre-Booth position that victim impact evidence may be
considered even in capital proceedings.5 5 As a result, the court has
continued to view victim impact evidence as "relevant and
probative."5 6
Although the Supreme Court has remained silent on the issue,
Maryland has addressed the use of victim impact statements in noncapital cases. The Court of Appeals has accorded the noncapital sentencing judge "virtually boundless discretion" in conducting the
sentencing proceeding.5
49. See MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTs. art. 47. For similar constitutional amendments enacted by other states that have granted crime victims the right to be present and to be
heard in criminal proceedings, see FA. CONST. art. 1, § 16(b); TEx. CONST. art. 1, § 30;
WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 35. Other constitutional provisions have granted crime victims a
right to restitution. See CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 28(b); MicH. CONST. art. 1, § 24; R-I. CONST.
art. 1, § 23.
50. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
51. See, e.g., Booth v. State, 306 Md. 172, 507 A.2d 1098, cert. ranted in par, 479 U.S.
882 (1986), vacated in part, 482 U.S. 496 (1987); Lodowski v. State, 302 Md. 691, 749, 490
A-2d 1228, 1257-58 (1985) (concluding that the victim impact statement imparts to the
sentencer important information concerning the full measure of harm caused by the defendant), vacated on other grounds, 475 U.S. 1078 (1986).
52. See supra notes 28-34 and accompanying text.
53. See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Harris v. State, 312 Md.
225, 235-36, 539 A.2d 637, 642 (1988) (vacating a death sentence because victim impact
statements presenting the victim's family members' opinions and characterizations of the
crime injected an impermissible arbitrary component into the sentencing proceeding);
Hunt v. State, 312 Md. 494, 540 A.2d 1125 (1988). In light of Booth, the Hunt court vacated
a death sentence and a new sentencing hearing was held on capital conviction because a
victim impact statement was improperly admitted in evidence at the sentencing hearing.
Id. at 497, 540 A.2d at 1126.
54. 333 Md. 660, 637 A.2d 117, cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 109 (1994).
55. Id. at 687-88, 637 A.2d at 130-31.
56. Id.
57. Logan v. State, 289 Md. 460, 480, 425 A.2d 632, 642 (1981); see also Smith v. State,
308 Md. 162, 166, 517 A.2d 1081, 1083 (1986) (accordingjudges broad discretion in conducting sentencing proceedings); Johnson v. State, 274 Md. 536, 542, 336 A.2d 113, 116
(1975) ("[I]t is our belief that the sentencing judge will have difficulty determining the
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The court has determined that the Maryland legislature set forth
only the minimum standard for factors that a sentencing judge must
59
consider when using victim impact evidence."8 Thus, in Reid v. State,
the Court of Appeals held that the trial judge did not err in considering a written victim impact statement prepared by the victim and forwarded directly to the court, even though a victim impact statement
had already been submitted by the Division of Parole and Probation as
part of its presentence investigation.6 0 Similarly, the Court of Special
Appeals, in Ingoglia v. State,6 noted that the legislature in enacting
Article 41, section 4-609 did not purport "to limit the victim's role to
the single Victim Impact Statement of the presentence investigation."6 2 There, the court determined that the sentencing court did
not abuse its discretion in receiving into evidence the sentencing recommendation of the assault victim's mother.6" It reasoned that the
trial court indicated that it would exercise its discretion in imposing
the sentence "independently regardless of what anybody thinks including [the victim's mother], the State, [defense counsel] or the defendant."6' As in Reid, the court in Ingoglia did not mention the
recommendation of the victim's family when it imposed sentence.6 5
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Cianos, the Court of Appeals held
that crime victims and their representatives were precluded from chalproper sentence... if he is forced to bridle himself with mental blinders and thus enter
the process of imposing sentence with impaired vision.").
58. Reid v. State, 302 Md. 811, 820-23, 490 A.2d 1289, 1294-95 (1985). In Reid, the
court explored the legislative history of Article 41, § 124(c) (now codified at MD. ANN.
CODE art. 41, § 4-609). Senator Garrity, the sponsor of the measure, stressed the purpose
behind the proposed legislation. In a hearing before the State SenateJudicial Proceedings
Committee on January 19, 1982, he stated: "[This bill] provides the mechanism to place at
the judge's disposal all the facts regarding impact of the crime on the victim." Reid, 302
Md. at 816, 490 A.2d at 1292.
59. Reid, 302 Md. at 816, 490 A-2d at 1292.
60. I& at 812-13, 490 A.2d at 1290.
61. 102 Md. App. 659, 651 A.2d 409 (1995).
62. Id. at 670, 651 A.2d at 414 (quoting Reid, 302 Md. at 819, 490 A.2d at 1293).
63. Id. The Maryland court found the words of the Court of Appeals of Wisconsin
instructive in determining whether a victim's sentencing recommendation can be received
into evidence. In State v. Johnson, 463 N.W.2d 352 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990), the Wisconsin
Court of Appeals stated:
courts are not rubber stamps. They do not blindly accept or adopt sen[T] rial
tencing recommendations from any particular source.... We believe that consideration of the comments-even the "wishes"-of a victim is within the sentencing
court's prerogatives. Courts are entitled-even encouraged-to consider the
rights and interests of the public in imposing a sentence in a particular case.
Id. at 355-56.
64. Ingoglia, 102 Md. App. at 670, 651 A-2d at 414.
65. Id.
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lenging a final criminal judgment.6 6 The court first addressed Cianos
and Barrett's contention that the trial court abused its discretion by
not allowing them to testify at the sentencing proceeding.6 7 The
court found that even if it accepted that Cianos and Barrett were denied their right to address the sentencing court as to the impact of the
defendant's crimes upon them, the appeal would still be moot.6" To
support this finding, the court pointed to sections 12-301 and 12-302
of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, which allow only a
party to appeal from a final judgment. 9 Section 12-303.1 of the
Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article expressly acknowledges that a
victim is not a party in a criminal proceeding.7 " Furthermore, even if
Cianos and Barrett had applied for leave to appeal prior to the final
judgment, such action would not have stayed the criminal proceedings against the defendant.7 " An appeal by a victim or the victim's
representatives is collateral and may not interrupt a criminal case, and
such an appeal cannot result in reversal of judgment and reopening
of the case.7 2 Thus, the court concluded the petitioners were not entifled to appeal the final judgment of Hall's conviction and sentence. 3
The court next addressed Cianos and Barrett's assertion that the
absence of a provision expressly precluding a victim from challenging
a final criminal judgment implies the right to do so.7 4 The court
again pointed to the plain language of the relevant statutes, sections
12-301, 12-302, and 12-303.1, to refute their argument.7 5 Moreover,
the court reasoned that the legislative history demonstrated the legislature's unwillingness to institute a provision that would invalidate a
defendant's sentence simply because victim testimony was not taken
into account at the sentencing proceeding.7 6 The major practical
66. Cianos, 338 Md. at 412, 659 A.2d at 294.
67. Id. at 409, 659 A.2d at 293.
68. Id. at 410, 659 A.2d at 293.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 410-11, 659 A.2d at 293.
71. Id. at 411, 659 A.2d at 293. An application for leave to appeal filed by a victim may
not result in a stay of other proceedings in the criminal case unless all the parties to the
case consent. See MD. CODE ANN., Cis. &JUD. PROC. § 12-303.1 (1995).
72. Cianos, 338 Md. at 411, 659 A.2d at 293-94.
73. Id.
74. Id., 659 A.2d at 294.
75. Id. Ordinarily, where there is no ambiguity in the language of a statute, there is no
need to look elsewhere to ascertain the intent of the legislature. Id. Nevertheless, the
court in Cianos examined the legislative history of the relevant statutes. Id.
76. Id. at 411-12, 659 A.2d at 294. Senate Bill 132 (1983) provided for victim testimony
in addition to the written victim impact statement and stated that a defendant's sentence
would be invalidated absent this testimony. The Senate amended S.B. 132 to permit,
rather than to mandate, this testimony and to strike the provisions invalidating the defend-
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problem of such a provision would be "the possibility of placing the
defendant in jeopardy a second time during the sentencing hearing."7 7 Staff of the House Judiciary Committee concluded that the bill
"would be acceptable, however, if [the] lines [invalidating the sentence] were deleted. The statute would have no teeth after such a
deletion but it would provide the personal input toward which the
statute is aimed."78 Thus, the Cianoscourt determined that section 12303.1 does not allow a victim, as a nonparty, to appeal from a final
judgment.7 9
After concluding that Cianos and Barrett's application for leave
to appeal was properly denied, the court addressed the rights of a
victim to speak to the judge or jury prior to the sentencing of a criminal defendant. In dicta, the court detailed the seven Maryland legislative acts concerning victims' rights"0 to demonstrate that the
"mandate of the people is clear" in increasingly recognizing victims'
rights.8 1 The court stated definitively that "trial judges must give appropriate consideration to the impact of crime upon the victims. An
important step towards accomplishing that task is to accept victim impact testimony wherever possible." 2 In an attempt to provide future
guidance, the court explained that sentencing judges should not request that victims waive their rights to address the court as to the im83
pact of the crimes upon them.
4. Analysis.a. Balancing the Administration ofJustice and Victims' Rights.In Cianos, the Court of Appeals held that victims and their family
members were precluded from challenging the final judgment of conviction and sentence of a defendant.8 4 With respect to its holding,
ant's sentence. This amended bill was passed and codified as Article 41, § 124(d) (now
codified as Mn. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 4-609).
77. Cianos, 338 Md. at 411-12, 659 A.2d at 294 (citing Lodowski v. State, 302 Md. 691,
747, 490 A.2d 1228, 1256-57 (1985)).
78. Id. (alterations in original).
79. Id. at 410-11, 659 A.2d at 293.
80. The seven legislative acts are as follows: (1) § 12-303.1 of the Courts and Judicial
Proceedings Article; (2) Article 27, § 640(b) (7); (3) Article 27, § 620; (4) Article 27,
§ 643D; (5) Article 27, § 761; (6) Article 41, § 4-609(c); (7) Article 47 of Maryland's Declaration of Rights. For a detailed discussion of each act, see supra notes 21, 25, 42-49, 70-71,
75-79 and accompanying text.
81. Cianos, 338 Md. at 413, 659 A.2d at 295.
82. Id.
83. Id. The court concluded that because the petitioners were arguably denied their
rights guaranteed by Article 27, § 643D(a), they did not have to pay court costs. Cianas,
338 Md. at 413, 659 A.2d at 295.
84. Cianos, 338 Md. at 412, 659 A.2d at 294.
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Cianos presented a relatively straightforward case and was thus decided according to the plain meaning of the relevant statutory text.8 5
The limitation against challenging the final judgment by nonparties is
appropriate for reasons of judicial administration. It would be a miscarriage of justice if a defendant's sentence were invalidated simply
because the victim was not permitted to give oral testimony.
Aside from the specific outcome and holding in Cianos, the court
seized the opportunity to clarify victims' rights. The court responded
to Cianos and Barrett's request that the court give guidance for future
cases in the event it found their appeal moot.8 6 One of the reasons
for the lack of appellate case law on victims' rights provisions is that
the State, having obtained the defendant's conviction, has not appealed victims' rights issues in criminal cases.8 7 As discussed below,
the Court of Appeals's laudable attempt to emphasize a victim's right
to address a sentencing court raises as many questions as it purports to
answer.
b. The Future Impact of the Court's Dicta.-It is unclear how
great an impact the dicta expressed in Cianos will have on Maryland
courts in the future. As defined by the Court of Special Appeals, dictum is "any statement made by a court for use in argument, illustration, analogy or suggestion. It is a remark, an aside, concerning some
rule of law or legal proposition that is not necessarily essential to the
decision and lacks the authority of adjudication."88 Of course, lower
courts may simply ignore the court's words of guidance in Cianos,89 or
they may choose to interpret them broadly or narrowly.
85. See supra notes 66-79 and accompanying text.
86. Petitioners' Brief at 15-16, Cianos v. State, 338 Md. 406, 659 A.2d 291 (1995) (No.
107).
87. See id.
88. Stover v. Stover, 60 Md. App. 470, 476, 483 A.2d 783, 786 (1984) (citing BLACK'S
LAW DicTIoNAaY, 409 (5th ed. 1979)); see also Welker v. Strosnider, 22 Md. App. 401, 409,
323 A.2d 626, 631 (1974) (stating that "[p]erhipheral [sic] recitals [in appellate court
opinions] are not precedent at the common law"). For a discussion of the role of dictum
in legal analysis, see generally Charles W. Collier, Precedent and Legal Authority: A Critical
History, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 771; Kent Greenawalt, Reflections on Holding and Dictum 39 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 431 (1989); Note, Dictum Revisited, 4 STAN. L. REv. 509 (1951-52).
89. But see Evans v. State, 333 Md. 660, 687, 637 A.2d 117, 131 (noting that there have
been many times that the court has adopted and relied on the dicta articulated in Lodowski v. State, 302 Md. 691, 490 A.2d 1228 (1985)), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 109 (1994); Murray
v. Comptroller of Treasury, 241 Md. 383, 395, 216 A.2d 897, 904 ("Occasionally a dictum,
when it strikes a note resonant with accepted legal principle, becomes as important as the
actual decision."), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 816 (1966). Furthermore, in Greenawalt, supra
note 88, at 434, the author states:
The precise weight of earlier authority may rest to some extent on whether the
point covered was argued by counsel and carefully considered by the court. Dis-
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A narrow reading of the opinion suggests a case-by-case approach, in which future sentencing courts will use their statutorily
broad discretion9" to determine when victims' oral testimony should
be permitted, and if permitted, what type of victim impact testimony
to allow, by whom, and how much.9 1 Such a discretionary approach
would enable the sentencing court to balance fairness to a defendant
with the rights of a victim.
A broader reading of Cianos suggests that oral victim impact testimony will be heard, in addition to the requisite written victim statements, in all criminal cases where victims wish to testify. There are
potential difficulties with such a broad interpretation. Victims may,
for example, speak at length, recounting in an emotional manner exactly what they stated in their written victim impact statements. If significant resources have already been devoted to the presentence
investigation compiling victim impact statements that are complete or
nearly complete, it is difficult to justify testimony at the sentencing
hearing. Judicial economy may be hampered further by the probable
increase in the time needed for sentencing proceedings. The amount
of time and resources wasted in litigating this "mini-trial" could be
extraordinary. Not only would additional time be needed for testimony, but the defense would need to be given the right to cross-examine, as provided in section 643D.9 2 It would be "difficult if not
impossible" to provide the defense a fair opportunity to contradict the
cussion that is evidently dictum because of the way a case is finally resolved can
have somewhat more power if it reflects extensive argument by counsel and careful judicial consideration.
Id.
90. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 643D (1992).
91. See supra note 25 and accompanying text (discussing the various types of information that could be provided to the sentencing authority by a victim impact statement).
92. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 643D(b) (1) (providing that if the victim or the victim's representative is permitted to address the judge or jury, the defendant may crossexamine the victim or the victim's representative); see also Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349,
362 (1977) (concluding that due process requires a defendant be given an opportunity to
rebut a presentence report); cf.Miller v. State, 67 Md. App. 666, 509 A.2d 135, cert. denied,
307 Md. 260 (1986). In Miller, the victim of second degree rape, second degree sexual
offense, perverted practice, assault with intent to rape, and battery, provided oral impact
testimony to the judge in his chambers, even though she had already provided a written
victim impact statement as part of the presentence investigation. Id. at 670-71, 509 A.2d at
137. On appeal, the defendant argued that he was improperly sentenced after the judge
privately questioned the victim about the impact of the offenses and of her thoughts as to
sentencing. Id. at 672, 509 A.2d at 138. The Court of Special Appeals remanded the case
for resentencing because it held that the sentencing court should not have taken further
statement from the victim in chambers, without giving the defendant the opportunity to
hear and refute that statement. Id. "Statements by a victim to ajudge should ordinarily be
made in the presence of the defendant." Id. at 675, 509 A.2d at 139.
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information being offered by the State.9" The result illustrated by the
above examples suggests that the court failed to consider the practical
problems of allowing victim impact testimony.
Although it stressed that trial judges should not deny victims their
right to provide victim impact testimony, the Court of Appeals did not
discuss what types of victim impact testimony it was interested in promoting and what types, if any, it wished to discourage. Because Cianos
was not a capital case, it was not the best possible case to use as a
vehicle for discussing oral victim impact testimony. Cianos offers no
specific guidance for cases where victims offer opinions about appropriate sentences for criminal defendants. Because Maryland permits
the death penalty, a sentence suggested by a victim's family member
presents a continuing problem. An emotional appeal for a harsh sentence could improperly influence the decision to impose a death
sentence.
The court's dicta also may be read as a judicial message to the
General Assembly. The Court of Appeals has informed the legislature
that it interprets Article 27, section 643D expansively, limiting the
broad discretion trial courts historically have been afforded.9 4 If the
General Assembly disagrees with the court's reading of section 643D,
the General Assembly is invited to amend the statute or to clarify its
legislative intent. If the legislature feels strongly that oral testimony is
unfairly prejudicial or a waste of judicial resources, it may choose to
follow the path taken by those states that have, in the past, limited
95
victims to providing written statements.
While victims' rights groups may celebrate the Cianos dicta, the
court's strong words of guidance unfortunately may prove to be difficult to administer and to enforce. The court's recognition of the
right of victims to testify may become an empty promise. Indeed,
there remains no appropriate remedy for denial of victims' rights.
Currently, there is no possibility for resentencing the defendant and
little chance of staying a sentencing proceeding. In Cianos, for example, the case was not remanded for resentencing even when the court
recognized that the victims' rights were denied outright. This case

93. See Howard, supra note 22, at 720 ("Tactically, it is hard to imagine when crossexamining the victim's family would not be counterproductive, evoking antipathy towards
the defendant or counsel. Indeed, such measures may be futile. Rarely can it be shown
that grieving family members have exaggerated emotional trauma, depression, fear or
anxiety.").
94. See supra notes 57, 82-83 and accompanying text.
95. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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illustrates that there is no real remedy for noncompliance by judges.9 6
The only victory the victims' families received was a token one: not
having to pay the court costs.9 7
5. Conclusion.-Although Cianos was not a difficult decision with
respect to its holding-proving consistent with Maryland's statutory
language and legislative history-its discussion framed in dicta is significant. The court laudably emphasized the rights of victims and
their representatives to give oral victim impact testimony at the sentencing phase of criminal proceedings. The court, however, failed to
deal with possible problems, both substantive and procedural, that are
likely to arise in future sentencing proceedings. Practitioners and sentencingjudges will continue to have the formidable task of determining the limits of oral victim impact statements. This task will be
particularly difficult in death penalty cases and cases in which victims
wish to testify not only as to the effects of the crimes upon them, but
also as to their opinion of the defendant and of the appropriate
sentence.
ILANA SUBAR

96. The Senate Bill 264 review letter of May 17, 1993, addressed to the governor by the
attorney general, concluded that while practical problems would render appellate review
rare, "the bill serves a legitimate purpose and has legal effect" because "the existence of the
remedy may, in itself, act as a check on judges who might otherwise give short shrift to
victims rights." Respondent's Brief at 12, Cianos v. State, 338 Md. 406, 659 A.2d 291 (1995)
(No. 107) (quoting Senate Bill 264 review letter).
97. See supra note 83.
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EVIDENCE

A New Interpretationof Rule 5-608

In Sahin v. State,1 the Court of Appeals held that a defendant
charged with a veracity-impeaching crime who chooses to testify may
offer witness testimony to rehabilitate his reputation for truthfulness
and veracity. 2 The court maintained that the State's evidence against
defendants for veracity-impeaching crimes is sufficient to constitute
an attack on their truthfulness, thereby allowing rehabilitative testimony.' In so ruling, the court misinterpreted the intent behind Maryland Rule 5-608 and extended the meaning of "attack," as denoted in
the rule,4 beyond acceptable limits.
The court also held that the crime of drug trafficking is not sufficiently relevant to credibility so as to allow evidence of reputation for
truthfulness and veracity as circumstantial evidence of innocence.'
The court neglected to recognize that historically, evidence to bolster
credibility has been allowed only after the prosecution affirmatively
has attacked the defendant's credibility. Furthermore, because the
category of veracity-impeaching crimes is not fully developed, the
court's ruling burdens trial courts with the task of determining
whether an alleged crime is a veracity-impeaching crime.
1. The Case.-In 1992 Isa Sahin was charged with four counts of
distribution of cocaine and lesser included offenses.6 Sahin pleaded
innocent to these charges.7 During Sahin's jury trial, a vice detective
in the Anne Arundel County Police Department testified that he and
an informant were the only persons present during the transactions
with the defendant. 8 Testifying in his own defense, Sahin denied the
allegations and insisted that he did not know the vice detective or the
informant.'
Sahin then attempted to introduce evidence of his reputation for
truthfulness through the testimony of two character witnesses." The
trial judge refused to allow the testimony on two grounds.' First, the
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

337 Md. 304, 653 A.2d 452 (1995).
Id. at 322, 653 A.2d at 461.
Id.
See infra note 22 and accompanying text.
Sahin, 337 Md. at 311-12, 653 A.2d at 455-56.
Id. at 307, 653 A.2d at 454.
id.
Id. at 308, 653 A.2d at 454.
Id. at 309, 653 A.2d at 454.
Id.
Id.
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court stated that Sahin's reputation for truthfulness and veracity was
not so relevant to the crime of distribution of narcotics that possession
12
of those traits would serve as circumstantial evidence of innocence.
Second, the trial judge recited the familiar rule"3 that a defendant
may not introduce evidence to rehabilitate his character until his
character has been attacked.1 4 The court reasoned that charges
against Sahin for distribution of cocaine did not constitute an attack
on his veracity.1 5 In their closing arguments, both the defense and
the prosecution instructed the jury that the case hinged on whether
they believed the testimony of Sahin or the vice detective.' After the
jury returned a verdict against Sahin, 17 the court sentenced him to
four concurrent three-year terms."8
On appeal, Sahin argued that the circuit court denied him a fair
trial because it prohibited him from introducing evidence of his reputation for truthfulness. 9 In an unreported decision, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed Sahin's conviction.2 0 The Court of Appeals
granted certiorari to consider whether the State's evidence against a
defendant constitutes an attack sufficient to allow the defendant to
present evidence of his character for truthfulness, when the crime
charged is an impeachable offense and the defendant chooses to
21
testify.
2.

Legal Background.-

a. Maryland Rule 5-608.-UnderRule 5-608(a) (2), witnesses
may not introduce evidence to bolster their credibility until their credibility is attacked. 22 This rule, in direct contradiction of the early law
12. Id.

13. At the time of Sahin's trial, Maryland common law prohibited evidence of a witness's truthfulness until the witnesses's credibility had been attacked. Boone v. State, 33
Md. App. 1, 6, 363 A.2d 550, 554 (1976) ("[R]ehabilitation is only permissible... where [a

witness's] character or reputation for truth and veracity has been directly attacked."). The
rule has since been codified at MD. R. 5-608(a) (2). See infra note 22.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Sahin, 337 Md. at 309,
Id.
Id., 653 A-2d at 455.
Id. at 310, 653 A.2d at
Id. at 307, 653 A.2d at
Id. at 310, 653 A.2d at

653 A.2d at 454-55.

455.
454.
455.

20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Rule 5-608(a)(2), adopted in 1994, states, "Rehabilitation by a Character Witness.-Afer the characterfor truthfulness of a witness has been attacked, a character witness may

testify (A) that the witness has a good reputation for truthfulness or (B) that, in the character witness's opinion, the witness is a truthful person." (emphasis added). MD. R. 5608(a) (2).
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disallowing convicts from testifying, creates a rebuttable presumption
of a witness's credibility. 2 Traditionally, courts deemed defendants
incompetent as witnesses, and consequently did not permit the accused to testify. 24 It was believed that defendants would perjure themselves to increase their chances of a favorable outcome.2 5 As a result,
courts admitted credibility evidence only in proceedings in which the
defendant was on trial for a crimen falsi offense. 26
In 1876, the Maryland legislature enacted a statute that eliminated the "automatic" disqualification of defendants as witnesses. 27
This Act provided:
In the trial of all indictments, complaints and other proceedings against persons charged with the commission of crimes
and offenses, and in all proceedings in the nature of criminal proceedings in any court of this State, and before a justice of the peace or other officer acting judicially, the person
so charged shall at his own request, but not otherwise, be
deemed a competent witness; but the neglect or refusal of
any such person to testify shall not create any presumption
against him.2 "
The current law, Rule 5-60129 differs little from the 1876 Act and
has several justifications. First, the rule serves as a corollary to the
evidentiary rule that credibility evidence is inadmissible absent a direct
attack.3 0 Second, prior to an attack on credibility, it creates the presumption that all witnesses tell the truth." Additionally, the rule's
limitation on the admission of character evidence is supported by ar23. See Boone v. State, 33 Md. App. 1, 7, 363 A.2d 550, 554 (1976) (quoting 81 AM.JuR.
2D, Witnesses, § 636).
24. See, e.g., Kinnard v. State, 183 Md. 377, 379, 39 A.2d 92, 93 (1944).
25. Peter Moser, Compellability of One Spouse to Testify Against the Other in Criminal Cases,
15 MD. L. REV. 16, 18 (1955). "It was believed that if... an accused in a criminal case were
permitted to testify, he would tend to commit perjury in order to win his case. Therefore,
he was not a competent witness." Id.
26. Id. A lie by the defendant is an element of the crimen falsi offense. The offense
involves elements of "deceitfulness, untruthfulness, or falsification bearing on the witness's
propensity to testify truthfully." State v. Giddens, 335 Md. 205, 213 n.5, 642 A.2d 870, 874
n.5 (1994).
27. MD. ANN. CODE art. 35, § 4 (1939).
28. Id.
29. MD. R. 5-601. The rule states, "Except as otherwise provided by law, every person is
competent to be a witness." Id. Convicted perjurers are still classified as incompetent, and
are barred from testifying. See LYNN MCLAIN, MARYLAND RULES oF EVIDENCE 130-31 (1994).
30. Sahin, 337 Md. at 318, 653 A.2d at 459.
31. Id.
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guments that positive character is irrelevant."2 Finally, restricting a
defendant's ability to introduce evidence of his good character limits
the length of trials."3
Although the Maryland rules prohibit the admission of character
evidence prior to an attack on credibility, because the rules do not
explain or define what constitutes an attack, it is ajudge's responsibility to determine when a witness's credibility has been attacked. 4 Rule
5-608 (a) (1) states that an attack may arise as evidence "(A) that the
witness has a reputation for untruthfulness, or (B) that, in the character witness's opinion, the witness is an untruthful person."3 5 Rule 5608(a) defines when specific instances of the witness's veracity may be
brought into evidence.3 6 Additionally, a witness may be impeached by
evidence of a prior conviction.3 7
Maryland courts have held that neither persistent cross-examination nor recognition of contradictions between witnesses' testimony38
constitute an attack sufficient to trigger the rule permitting rehabilitation by a character witness.3 9 For example, in Boone v. State, the Court
of Special Appeals wrote, "[t] hat which [the defendant] argues was an
impeachment of him in this case was simply State's evidence which
controverted his position. This was not such an attack upon credibility so as to permit the type of rehabilitation here urged."'
b. Veracity-Impeaching Offenses.-The common law prohibited testimony by a person previously convicted of treason, any felony,
a misdemeanor involving dishonesty, or crimes relating to the obstruction of justice. 4 Chapter 109 of the Acts of 1864 abolished this rule
32. Id. at 319-20, 653 A.2d at 459-60. As the court observed, witnesses often contradict
each other because of honest mistakes, not because of intentional lies. Id.
33. Id. at 321, 653 A.2d at 460.
34. Mn. R. 5-608(a) (2); see alsoVernon v. Tucker, 30 Md. 456, 462 (1869) (finding trial
court "properly refused" to hear testimony about witness's character); Boone v. State, 33
Md. App. 1, 6, 363 A.2d 550, 554 (1976) (finding trial judge did not abuse "his discretion"
in permitting admission of character evidence).
35. MD. R. 5-608(a)(1).
36. "The court may permit a character witness to be cross-examined about specific instances in which a witness has been truthful or untruthful...." MD. R. 5-608(a)(4). Evidence of specific instances of veracity may not be brought out during direct examination.
MD.R. 5-608(a) (3) (B).
37. MD. R. 5-609; see infra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
38. See, e.g., Boone, 33 Md. App. at 6-8, 363 A.2d at 554; see infra text accompanying note
40.
39. See Vernon v. Tucker, 30 Md. 456, 462 (1869); Boone, 33 Md. App. at 6-8, 363 A.2d
at 554-55.
40. Boone, 33 Md. App. at 6, 363 A.2d at 554.
41. See, e.g., Prout v. State, 311 Md. 348, 359, 535 A.2d 445, 450 (1988) (holding that
the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by refusing to allow credibility impeachment
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and permitted a previously convicted person to testify.4 2 Maryland
continues to follow this rule.4" Under current law, a convict is permitted to testify, although an opposing party is permitted to impeach the
convict's credibility with evidence of conviction for a "veracity-impeaching offense".
A veracity-impeaching offense is an offense for which a conviction
would be allowed as evidence in another proceeding to impeach one's
testimony.' Rule 5-609 states that impeachable45crimes include any
infamous crime or crime relevant to dishonesty.
Courts, however, continue to interpret and expand the meaning
of "impeachable crimes."' In Ricketts v. State,4 7 for example, the court
expanded the eligible universe of impeachable crimes to include
crimes of "moral turpitude."' a However, in Prout v. State,49 dissatisfied
with the phrase "moral turpitude," the Court of Appeals urged the
standard of "reasoned judgment
as to whether the offense affects the
5
defendant's credibility. "

0

51

In Carter v. State, the Court of Special Appeals held that a prior
conviction for drug manufacturing could be used for impeachment
purposes. 52 The court explained that "[drug manufacturing] necessarily requires several steps involving premeditation and conscious viowith prior convictions for prostitution and solicitation). Potential wimesses convicted of
infamous crimes were deemed incompetent to testify. McCoRImCK
(John W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992) [hereinafter McCo~mtcK].

ON EVIDENCE

§ 42

42. Prout 311 Md. at 358-59, 535 A.2d at 450. The witness was still subject to possible
impeachment by introduction of the prior conviction. Id.
43. "Evidence is admissible to prove the interest of a witness in any proceeding, or the
fact of his conviction of an infamous crime." MD. CODE ANN., CTs. &JUD. PROC. § 10-905
(1995). The Court of Appeals has held that when § 10-905 is inconsistent with Maryland
Rule 5-609, the latter will prevail. The court insists that not every infamous crime is sufficiently relevant to veracity that it may be used to impeach witness testimony. See, e.g.,
Beales v. State, 329 Md. 263, 273, 619 A.2d 105, 110 (1993) (holding that prior theft conviction was not per se admissible); State v.Giddens, 335 Md. 205, 207 n.2, 214-16, 642 A.2d
870, 871 n.2, 874-75 (1994) (holding that prior conviction for narcotics distribution was an
impeachable offense).
44. See, e.g., Giddens, 335 Md. at 215, 642 A.2d at 875; see also infra note 115 and accompanying text (noting the vague, self-defining definition of the term).
45. MD. R. 5-609(a)(1).
46. As recently as 1994, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that the list of impeachable crimes continues to develop. See Giddens, 335 Md. at 216, 642 A-2d at 875; see alsoJames
A. Protin, Note, What Is a "Crime Relevant to Credibility"?, 54 MD. L. REV. 1125 (1995) (criticizing the development of the includable impeachable crimes).
47. 291 Md. 701, 436 A.2d 906 (1981).
48. Id. at 711-14, 436 A.2d at 912-13.
49. 311 Md. 348, 535 A.2d at 448 (1988).
50. Id. at 362-63, 535 A.2d at 452 (quoting Ricketts, 291 Md. at 714, 436 A.2d at 913).
51. 80 Md. App. 686, 566 A.2d 131 (1989).
52. Id. at 694, 566 A.2d at 135.
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lation of the law.... Furthermore, all of these acts must be carried
out surreptitiously to avoid detection and arrest."5 3 In Morales v.
State,5 4 the Court of Appeals limited the holding of Carterwhen it determined that simple possession of controlled substances was not a
crime relevant to credibility, and therefore, it could not be used for
impeachment purposes.5 5
In Giddens v. State,5 6 the Court of Special Appeals ruled that distribution of cocaine was not an impeachable offense.5 7 According to the
court, the behavior associated with narcotics distribution need not involve "surreptitious conduct or moral depravity sufficient to suggest a
lack of credibility."5 8 The Court of Appeals reversed, believing that a
person previously convicted of drug trafficking would be willing to lie
under oath. 9 The court explained: "[A] narcotics trafficker lives a
life of secrecy and dissembling in the course of that activity, being
prepared to say whatever is required by the demands of the moment,
whether the truth or a lie."6 °
3. The Court's Reasoning.-The Court of Appeals granted certiorari in Sahin v. Stat 1 to consider whether the trial court improperly
excluded testimony regarding the defendant's reputation for truthfulness and veracity. In a unanimous opinion, the Court of Appeals held
that a defendant charged with a "veracity-impeaching offense"6" who
elects to take the stand, may introduce testimony regarding his reputation for truthfulness.65 The court also ruled that evidence of a defendant's veracity may not be admitted as circumstantial evidence of
innocence of the charge of narcotics distribution.'
53. Id. at 693, 566 A.2d at 134-35.
54. 325 Md. 330, 600 A.2d 851 (1992).
55. Id. at 339, 600 A.2d at 855.
56. 97 Md. App. 582, 631 A.2d 499 (1993).
57. Id. at 592, 631 A.2d at 504.
58. Id. at 591, 631 A.2d at 503. The court said, "There is simply no warrant to declare
these offenses eligible for impeachment on the theory that they entail secretive behavior."
Id. at 592, 631 A.2d at 504.
59. State v. Giddens, 335 Md. 205, 222, 642 A.2d 870, 878 (1994).
60. Id. at 217, 642 A.2d at 876 (citing United States v. Ortiz, 553 F.2d 782 (2d Cir.)
(holding that the district court judge did not abuse his discretion by concluding that a
prior conviction for heroin distribution is probative of a lack of veracity and therefore
admissible for impeachment purposes), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 897 (1977)).
61. 337 Md. at 304, 653 A.2d at 452.
62. See Giddens, 335 Md. at 219-20, 642 A.2d at 877; see a/so supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
63. Sahin, 337 Md. at 322, 653 A.2d at 461.
64. Id. at 311-12, 653 A.2d at 455-56.
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Initially, the court considered whether credibility, viewed as a
character trait, pertains to the crime of drug trafficking.6" The court
rejected this notion, and in so doing, clarified its holding in State v.
Giddens.66 In Giddens, the court stated that for purposes of impeachment, a prior conviction of distribution of drugs is relevant to credibility.6 7 In Sahin, however, the court explained that there are traits more
relevant to the distribution of narcotics than character for truthfulness.6" Accordingly, the court held that evidence of Sahin's veracity
could not be used as circumstantial evidence of his innocence.6 9
The court's review, however, did not end with its decision relating
to circumstantial evidence. Because Sahin testified as a witness, the
court next considered whether Sahin's testimony made evidence as to
his character for truthfulness admissible. 70 The court first determined
that the Maryland Rules, including the newly adopted Rule 5-608,"
permit all witnesses to rehabilitate their character for truthfulness after the trait has been attacked.7 2 Based upon this finding, the court
held that when a defendant charged with an impeachable offense decides to testify in his own defense, the State's evidence against the
defendant constitutes an attack sufficient to permit the defendant to
present evidence of his good character for truthfulness.7"
In reaching this holding the court acknowledged that few courts
have held that the prosecution's evidence is equivalent to an attack on
credibility."4 To further bolster its holding, however, the court
quoted from the 1971 Proposed Revision of the Federal Rules of Evi65. Id. at 310, 653 A.2d at 455. Sahin argued that to show circumstantial evidence of
innocence, a defendant may always put forth evidence of a character trait relevant to the
crime of which he is accused. Id. Sahin asserted that the language from Giddens and Ortiz
should be interpreted to find that "credibility is a pertinent character trait of the crime of
distribution of narcotics." Id.
66. 335 Md. at 205, 642 A.2d at 870.
67. Id. at 217, 642 A.2d at 875-76.
68. Sahin, 337 Md. at 312-13, 653 A.2d at 456.
69. Id. at 313, 653 A.2d at 456.
70. Id.
71. See supra note 22.
72. Sahin, 337 Md. at 313, 653 A.2d at 456-57.
73. Id. at 314, 653 A.2d at 457. Prior to Sahin v. State, the Court of Special Appeals
found that State evidence contradicting the defendant's testimony did not directly attack a
defendant's veracity. Boone v. State, 33 Md. App. 1, 6, 363 A.2d 550, 554 (1976). The
Boone court based its holding on previous decisions by the Court of Appeals and other
authorities. Id. at 6-7, 363 A.2d at 554. In Sahin, the court acknowledged that its decision
effectively overruled the decision. Sahin, 337 Md. at 316, 653 A.2d at 458.
74. Sahin, 337 Md. at 317, 653 A.2d at 458. The court did discuss People v. Taylor, 225
Cal. Rptr. 733 (Ct. App. 1986), a case that paralleled the court's reasoning in Sahin. In
Taylor, the California court found that if the question of the defendant's credibility is not
collateral, (i.e., the primary task of the jury is to assess credibility), then "[e]vidence of
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dence. 5 This proposal, which the Committee on Rules of Practice
and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States ultimately rejected, would have permitted witnesses to testify about any
defendant's credibility.7 6 Finally, the court concluded its opinion by
rejecting the reasons most often given for excluding evidence of a witness's good character until that witness's character has been
attacked.7 7
4. Analysis.-In Sahin v. State, the Court of Appeals held that the
prosecution's evidence that the defendant committed a veracity-impeaching offense 7' amounted to an attack on the defendant's veracity
sufficient to permit him to rehabilitate his reputation for truthfulness
and veracity with witness testimony. 79 The Sahin decision is problematic for several reasons. First, the court's holding in Sahin is inconsistent with the common interpretations of rules similar to Maryland
Rule 5-608(a) (2). Second, by citing a draft version of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, the court interpreted the federal rule in a substantially different manner than did the Evidence Subcommittee of the
Maryland Rules Committee. Finally, the task of determining what
crimes bear on veracity unduly burdens trial courts.
a. The Majority View of When a Witness's Credibility May Be Rehabilitated.-MarylandRule 5-608, adopted in 1994, addresses how witnesses may be impeached and when witnesses may rehabilitate their
credibility with evidence of truthfulness and veracity." The subsection of the rule interpreted by the court in Sahin v. State, 5-608(a) (2),
defendant's reputation [for truthfulness] could only assist the jury in this determination."
Id. at 739.
75. Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the
United States, Revised Draft of the Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and
Magistrates, 51 F.R.D. 315, 388-90 (1971).
76. Id. "The exception with respect to the accused who testifies is based upon the
assumption that the mere circumstance of being the accused is an attack on character." Id.
This proposal ultimately was eliminated. Sahin, 337 Md. at 315-16, 653 A.2d at 457-58.
77. Sahin, 337 Md. at 318-22, 653 A.2d at 459-61. The reasons are as follows: (1) evidence of good character for truthfulness should be excluded absent a direct attack on
truthfulness because character evidence as a general rule is inadmissible; (2) character
evidence for truthfulness is irrelevant because it is presumed, absent an attack on truthfulness, that all witnesses tell the truth; (3) evidence of good character is irrelevant because
witnesses frequently make honest mistakes, not because of deliberate untruthfulness; (4)
permitting evidence of good character, absent a character attack, would unduly prolong
trials. Id.
78. See supra notes 4142 and accompanying text.
79. Sahin, 337 Md. at 314, 653 A.2d at 457.
80. See supra note 22 for the text of the rule.
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is substantively identical to its federal counterpart, Federal Rule of Evidence 608."1
Prior to the adoption of Rule 5-608, Maryland courts followed the
common-law rule, which, although similar to Rule 5-608(a) (2), did
not permit witnesses to offer evidence of their reputations for truthfulness before an attack on the their credibility.8 2 Because Rule 5-608(a)
is consistent with the common law, Maryland courts interpret the rule
in the same manner as they interpreted the common law.8" Accordingly, in Sahin v. State, the Court of Appeals did not abrogate the prohibition against admissibility of credibility evidence prior to an attack
on veracity; rather the court expanded the meaning of an attack.
Over a century ago, the court stressed the importance of disallowing the testimony of credibility witnesses if credibility had not been
attacked. 4 The court explained:
[S]uch conflict [as contradiction] does not authorize the admission of evidence as to the general character of the witness
for truth. "If this were the practice, great delay and confusion would arise; and as almost all cases are tried upon controverted testimony, each witness must bring his
compurgators to support him when he is contradicted, and it
would indeed be a trial of witnesses, and not of the action."85
Federal courts, applying the analogous federal rule, 6 also require
the attack on character to be direct and pronounced. In United States
v. Jackson, 7 the Drug Enforcement Administration arrested the de81. Federal Rule of Evidence 608(a) (2) states that "evidence of truthful character is
admissible only after the character of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked by
opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise." FED. R. EvID. 608(a) (2). In addition, many
other states have incorporated Federal Rule 608 into their evidence codes. See infra note
96.
82. Because the Maryland Rules of Evidence were not adopted until 1994, all previous
decisions interpret the common-law rule. See Vernon v. Tucker, 30 Md. 456 (1869) (holding witnesses may not rehabilitate their reputations for veracity absent an attack on their
truthfulness and mere contradiction does not amount to such an attack); Boone v. State,
33 Md. App. 1, 363 A.2d 550 (1976) (holding, inter alia, that evidence contradicting defendant's claim of accident did not permit him to rehabilitate his reputation for veracity);
see also supra text accompanying notes 30-31.
83. See, e.g., Sahin, 337 Md. at 313, 653 A.2d at 456; Wilson v. State, 103 Md. App. 722,
725-26, 654 A.2d 936, 938 (1995) (holding that because defendant was on trial for murder,
an "impeachable offense," as defined by the Court of Appeals, the trial court erred in
excluding evidence of the defendant's reputation for truthfulness and veracity); see also
supra note 13 (discussing the common law at the time of Sahin's trial).
84. Vernon, 30 Md. at 462-63.
85. Id. at 462 (quoting Russell v. Coffin, 8 Pick. 154).
86. Federal Rule 608 does not permit evidence of reputation for truthfulness until the
credibility of the witness has been attacked. See supra note 81.
87. 588 F.2d 1046 (5th Cir. 1979).
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fendants for possession with intent to distribute heroin."8 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that when defendants elect to testify, they do not automatically acquire the right to call
witnesses to bolster their credibility.8 9 The court wrote, "[w]here an
accused takes the stand as a witness he places his credibility in issue as
does any other witness. If the prosecution chooses to attack his credibility, he may then introduce evidence of his good character for truthfulness and veracity."9"
In United States v. Danehy,9 1 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit held that "[g]ovemment counsel pointing out
inconsistencies in testimony and arguing that the accused's testimony
is not credible does not constitute an attack on the accused's reputation for truthfulness within the meaning of Rule 608. "92 The court
concluded that the prosecution's remarks that the witness's testimony
was not credible were insufficient to permit the witness to respond
with rehabilitative testimony.9 Finally, in United States v. Dring,94 the
Ninth Circuit held that neither defense-initiated attacks on the defendant's veracity, nor evidence of the defendant's interest in the outcome of the trial were sufficient to trigger rehabilitative testimony. 9
Similarly, in states with an evidentiary rule comparable to Federal
Rule 608,96 courts have construed the analogous state rule in accordance with the federal courts' interpretations.9 7 Seemingly, no state
has interpreted the word "attack" to include charges for veracity-impeaching crimes.9 8 For example, in State v. Carr,99 the Supreme Court
of Oregon interpreted the term "or otherwise" in the Oregon Evi88. Id. at 1048-50.
89. Id. at 1055.
90. Id.
91. 680 F.2d 1311 (11th Cir. 1982).
92. Id. at 1314; see also Jackson, 588 F.2d at 1055.
93. Danehy, 680 F.2d at 1314.
94. 930 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1991).
95. Id. at 690-91.
96. Counterparts of Federal Rule 608(a) (2) exist in the majority of states, including,
Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana,
Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, and
Wyoming. See 3 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAiRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE
§ 260 (1994).
97. Id. at 140.
98. In Sahin v. State, the Maryland court acknowledged that it has embraced the minority viewpoint. 337 Md. at 317, 653 A.2d at 458. But see Wis. STAT. ANN. § 906.08 (West
1994). Wisconsin has adopted a rule allowing criminal defendants to bolster their credibility when they testify, even absent an attack on veracity. Id.
99. 725 P.2d 1287 (Or. 1986).
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dence Code 608(1) (b)' ° as referring to testimony of prior instances
of conduct by the impeached witness. 10 1
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals ruled in State v. Zaccagnini0 2 that a defendant's denial that he committed a crime does
not give him the right to have character witnesses testify as to his truth
and veracity.'
In People v. Collasure,0 the Illinois Appellate Court
held that evidence of reputation for truthfulness is not admissible
merely because the defendant chose to testify.10 5
In Sahin v. State,10 6 however, the Court of Appeals ignored an
overwhelming volume of adverse persuasive authority. Given the precedent set by federal and other state courts, it seems likely that the
Maryland Rules Committee intended the courts to construe Rule 5608 in accordance with Maryland's common law and the Federal Rule
of Evidence 608. The Rules Committee clearly modeled Rule 5608(a) (2) after Federal Rule 608(a)(2).107 Although the Committee

100. "Evidence of truthful character is admissible only after the character of the wimess
for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise." OR. REv.
STAT. § 40.350, Rule 608 (1988) (emphasis added).
101. Canr, 725 P.2d at 1291. By defining "otherwise," the court leaves no room for a
broader interpretation. Id.; see supra note 100.
102. 308 S.E.2d 131 (W. Va. 1983). Zaccagnini was charged with possession with intent
to deliver LSD and cocaine. Id.
103. Id. at 138. The court went on to say that there would be a different result if, during
cross-examination, the State persistently attempts to force the defendant to acknowledge
the conflicts between his testimony and that of the State's witnesses. Only in that situation
would the prosecution be "attacking" the defendant's credibility. Id.
104. 558 N.E.2d 705 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990). The defendant was on trial for first degree
murder. Id.
105. Id. at 710.
106. 337 Md. at 304, 653 A.2d at 452.
107. See, e.g., 20 Md. Reg. pt. II, at 1, 13-14 (issue no. 15) (July 23, 1993) (noting that
style changes had been made to bring the text "in closer conformity with how the [federal]
courts have construed [the rules]").
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made both substantive and cosmetic changes to Rule 5-608,1°8 the essential meaning remained intact.' °9
b. Reliance on the 1971 ProposedRevision of the FederalRules.The Court of Appeals's discarding of persuasive judicial and legislative
authority was unfortunately not the only troublesome point in
Sahin. 0 Equally problematic was the court's reliance on a draft version of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence."' The 1971 revision
of the initial draft of the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence would
have allowed any defendant who took the stand to present witness testimony of his reputation for truthfulness and veracity.11 The drafters
ultimately rejected the proposed rule because of protest from the Department of Justice"' and Senator McClellan."' The Maryland
108. See Alan D. Hornstein, The New Maryland Rules of Evidence: Survey, Analysis, and Critique, 54 MD. L REv. 1032, 1057-58 (1995); see alsoMCLAiN, supra note 29, at 148-49. Professor McLain, reporter for the Rules Committee, wrote:
Because the Committee found FED. R. EvID. 608 to be confusingly drafted, Rule 5608 is substantially new in style and organization.
The part of section (b) of the federal rule that concerns cross-examination of
character witnesses is added to section (a) of the Maryland Rule, so that section
(a) is devoted to impeachment and rehabilitation of a witness by a character witness, and to impeachment of the character witness by questions about prior acts
of the other witness.
Subsection (a) (3) is more detailed than the federal rule. Subsection
(a) (3) (A) is contrary to the decision in United States v. Davis, 639 F.2d 239, 245
(5th Cir. 1981). Subsection (a) (3) (B) is consistent with the reading that the federal courts have given to the federal rule.
•.. [s]ubsection (a) (4) and section (b) echo some of the federal case law.
Because of a conflict with Rule 5-607, the federal rule's restriction in section
(b) to "cross-examination" is omitted.
The last paragraph of section (b) of the federal rule is recast as section (c).
Id. at 148.
109. MCIMN, supra note 29, at 146-49; see also 20 Md. Reg. pt. II, at 14 (issue no. 15)
(July 23, 1993). The Committee Reporter wrote, "Subsection (a) (2) [is] consistent with
F.REv. 608(a) and
Maryland law. .. ." Id.
110. 337 Md. at 317, 653 A.2d at 458.
111. Id. at 314, 653 A.2d at 457.
112. Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the
United States, Revised Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and Magistrates, 51 F.R.D. 315, 388-90 (Mar. 1971).
113. See, e.g., 3 MUELLER & KiRXPATmCK, supra note 97, § 260, at 136 (quoting First Kleindienst Letter, 117 Cong. Rec. 33,648, 33,655 (Sept. 28, 1971)). The Department ofJustice
argued that a rule that would allow a defendant to admit testimony of good credibility
whenever the defendant testified, "raises the specter of a long line of 'oath helpers.'" Id.
114. See, e.g., id. at 136-37 (quoting Sen. McClellan's Letter, 117 Cong. Rec. 33,642,
33,645 (Sept. 28, 1971)). Senator McClellan criticized the "departure from the traditional
practice" that would arise if the courts were to allow "an accused to buttress his character
for veracity before it is attacked." Id.
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court's reliance on this discarded proposal is perplexing. If the Maryland Rules Committee intended for defendants to be treated differently under Rule 5-608, the Committee could have recommended
language similar to the 1971 draft.
c. Defining a Veracity-Impeaching Crime.-Another problem
presented by the court's ruling in Sahin v. State is the vague, self-defining description of a veracity-impeaching offense. 15 The trial courts
are now presented with the task of deciding whether a crime is sufficiently relevant to credibility to constitute an attack.
Rule 5-609 provides no definition or list of veracity-impeaching
crimes. 116 Where the Court of Appeals has classified a crime as a veracity-impeaching offense, as it did in State v. Giddens,'1 7 trial courts
will have guidance. 1 8 Trial courts will have to decide, however, in
cases where the crime charged has not been deemed a veracity-impeaching offense. They have been given very little guidance on how
to do so.
5. Conclusion.-Relying on discarded reasoning and misplaced
arguments, the Court of Appeals in Sahin v. State, extended the meaning of "attack," as denoted in Maryland Rule 5-608, beyond its intended scope. Rule 5-608 was intended to permit credibility testimony
only after the prosecution has attempted to impeach or otherwise discredit the defendant's reputation for truthfulness. Furthermore, because no predetermined list of veracity-impeaching crimes exists,
courts are now burdened with determining what crimes constitute veracity-impeaching offenses. By permitting a defendant to offer evidence of truthfulness and veracity regardless of whether the
prosecution affirmatively attacks the defendant's credibility, the Court

115. The court defined veracity-impeaching offense as "infamous crimes or other crimes
relevant to credibility as used in Maryland Rule 5-609. That is, those crimes that are so
relevant to credibility that convictions of the crime may be used to attack the credibility of
a witness." Sahin, 337 Md. at 307 n.1, 653 A.2d at 453 n.1.
116. Rule 5-609 defines the impeachable offense as, "an infamous crime or other crime
relevant to... credibility." MD. R. 5-609(a) (1).
117. 335 Md. 205, 642 A.2d 870 (1994).
118. See Protin, supra note 46, at 1137. Protin wrote, "Unfortunately, the Giddens decision did no more than add one specific crime to a piecemeal list of crimes relevant to
credibility. The court issued no rules to guide trial judges in this matter of law, nor did it
clarify what information could be used to make the determination." Id. (footnote
omitted).
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VI. PROCEDURE

A.

Denying Trial Courts the Power to Grant Sua Sponte Transfers

In Urquhart v. Simmons,' the Court of Appeals held that trial
courts could not sua sponte transfer an action for the convenience of
the parties under Maryland Rule 2-327(c).2 This holding is in stark
contrast to the practice of federal courts, which do allow sua sponte
transfers under Title 28, section 1404(a) of the United States Code,'
from which Rule 2-327 is derived. This narrowly reasoned decision
turned on a fine point of statutory construction and did not illuminate the historical or policy underpinnings of the holding.
This Note will describe the concept and history of convenienceof-forum proceedings, both in Maryland and in the federal system.
The Note questions the court's restricted approach to the issue of
transfers for convenience in Urquhart, and suggests that the court
missed an opportunity to modernize the use of transfers for
convenience.
1. The Case.-In March 1987 Anthony Simmons died from complications of a medical diagnostic procedure performed a few days
earlier.4 Simmons was survived by his wife, Angela Simmons, and
their three children, who together brought a wrongful death and survival action against William Tullner, Joann Urquhart, and Maryland
Cardiology Associates (MCA), the firm that employed the two doctors.5 Dr. Tullner performed the procedure on Simmons, and Dr. Urquhart assumed responsibility for Simmons's case when Dr. Tullner
left town. 6 Dr. Urquhart conversed with Simmons over the phone
during the two days prior to his death, although the exact number of
1. 339 Md. 1, 660 A.2d 412 (1995).
2. Id. at 15, 660 A.2d at 419. See infra note 25 for text of MD. R. 2-327(c).
3. See infra note 31 for text of 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
4. Mr. Simmons underwent a cardiac catheterization. This is a procedure in which a
catheter, or thin tube, is inserted into a large blood vessel in the groin area and is extended and manipulated through the body until it reaches the heart. A dye that is opaque
to x-rays is injected into the catheter and then x-rays are taken. The dye outlines the interior walls of the blood vessels so that any blockages can be detected. One of the more
serious complications of this procedure is a potentially fatal condition called a pulmonary
embolism. This occurs when a blood clot forms in the leg at the entry site of the catheter,
dislodges, and travels to the lungs, creating a blockage. An autopsy confirmed that this was
the cause of Mr. Simmons's death. Simmons v. Urquhart, 101 Md. App. 85, 91, 643 A.2d
487, 490 (1994), rev'd, 339 Md. 1, 660 A.2d 412 (1995).
5. Id.

6. Dr. Tullner was dismissed from the case prior to trial. Urquhafl 339 Md. at 3 n.1,
660 A.2d at 413 n.1.

1996]

MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS

753

times they spoke was disputed by the parties, as was the advice that Dr.
Urquhart gave to Simmons.7
After her husband died, Angela Simmons filed a medical malpractice claim with the Health Claims Arbitration Office, in accordance with statute.' Following discovery, the parties waived arbitration
and filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County,
Maryland. 9
Soon after the lawsuit was filed, the health care provider defendants filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, a motion to transfer to the Circuit Court for Montgomery County.' ° The defendants
argued that venue was improper in Prince George's County.1 They
referred to the "contacts" in the alternate forum' 2 and contended that
(1) all of MCA's physicians resided in Montgomery County, (2) the
business address of each was in Montgomery County, (3) the procedure was performed in Montgomery County, and (4) that Dr. Urquhart had conducted her conversations with the deceased from her
office in Montgomery County.' 3 Simmons countered that MCA had
an office in Prince George's County, and that her husband had died
14
in Prince George's County.
At the hearing on the motion, the trial judge asked if the defendants had really intended to raise a forum non conveniens issue, rather
than an improper venue argument.' 5 The defendants agreed that the
court could "probably draw that analogy" and appealed to the court's
7. Id. at 4-7, 660 A.2d at 414-15.

8. MD. CODE ANN., CTs. &JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-04 (1995).
9. Urquhart, 339 Md. at 4,. 660 A.2d at 413.
10. Id. at 4-5, 660 A.2d at 413.
11. Simmons v. Urquhart, 101 Md. App. 85, 91, 643 A.2d at 490 (1994), rev'd, 339 Md.
1, 660 A.2d 412 (1995). Defendants cited MD. CODE ANN., CTs. &JuD. PROC. §§ 6-201 and 202 (1995) in support of their motion. Urquhart,339 Md. at 5. 660 A.2d at 413; see infra
notes 40-41 (discussing § 6-201). In addition, section 6-202(8) states that venue for tort

actions based on negligence may be "[w]here the cause of action arose." MD. CoDE ANN.,
CTS. &JuD. Paoc. § 6-202(8).
12. Urquhart 339 Md. at 5, 660 A.2d at 414. The Court of Special Appeals made note
of the fact that the issue of "contacts" typically is associated with disputes over jurisdiction,
not venue. Urquhar, 101 Md. App. at 107, 643 A.2d at 498. See International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945) (holding that assertion of personal jurisdiction
meets due process requirements when the defendant has minimum contacts with the
forum).
13. Urquhart, 339 Md. at 5, 660 A.2d at 414.
14. Id. The Court of Appeals also noted that Mr. Simmons was a resident of Howard
County at the time of his death. I. at 19 n.8, 660 A.2d at 420 n.8.
15. Id. at 6, 660 A.2d at 414. Venue rules specify which courts that have jurisdiction
(both personal and subject matter) over the action are ones in which the action may be
brought. Forum non conveniens, as discussed infra.notes 60-80 and accompanying text,
permits transfers of cases to another venue, even though the original venue is proper.
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discretion in the matter.16 The trial judge agreed that the case should
be transferred to Montgomery County, and signed the appropriate
order. 17
After a trial in which the number and nature of the telephone
calls between the parties were sharply disputed, the jury found that
while Dr. Urquhart was negligent in her response to Simmons's calls,
Simmons was contributorily negligent, presumably because he had
not gone to the hospital when advised by his wife and another physician to do so." Judgment was entered for the defendants. 9
Angela Simmons appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, claiming, among other things,"° that the trial court abused its discretion by
ruling that venue was improper and transferring the action to Montgomery County.2 ' Simmons also maintained that because the defendants had mistakenly argued improper venue, they should be
precluded from arguing in the alternative that the transfer was justified under the separate doctrine of forum non conveniens.22
The Court of Special Appeals agreed with Simmons that the con23
cepts of venue and forum non conveniens are procedurally distinct.
However, the court did not agree that the defendants' failure to bring
a proper motion would preclude a transfer on the basis of forum non
conveniens, holding instead that a trial court may transfer a case on its
own initiative if it determines that another forum is more
appropriate. 4
In reaching this holding, the Court of Special Appeals began its
analysis by examining the wording of Rule 2-327(c), 25 which it de16. Urquhart,339 Md. at 6, 660 A.2d at 414.
17. Id.

18. Simmons v. Urquhart, 101 Md. App. 85, 97, 643 A.2d 487, 492-93 (1994), rev'd, 339
Md. 1, 660 A.2d 412 (1995). Simmons, who had diabetes, had also phoned Dr. Cheetham,
his diabetes physician, for advice. Dr. Cheethamn had told him that it would be appropriate
to go to the emergency room if he could not contact Dr. Urquhart. Id, at 94, 643 A.2d at
491.
19. Id. at 97, 643 A.2d at 493.
20. Simmons also appealed the trial court's refusal to give a "last clear chance" instruction to the jury. Id. at 89, 643 A.2d at 489. Both appellate courts addressed but did not
decide this issue.
21. Urquhart,339 Md. at 9, 660 A.2d at 414.
22. Urquhart,101 Md. App. at 97, 643 A.2d at 493.
23. Id. at 99, 643 A.2d at 493 ("Generally the right to change venue of an action is
purely statutory .... In comparison, forum non conveniens refers to the discretionary power
of a court to transfer an action whenever it appears that a cause may be tried more appropriately in another valid venue.").
24. Id. at 105, 643 A.2d at 496.
25. Rule 2-327(c) states: "On motion of any party, the court may transfer any action to
any other circuit court where the action might have been brought if the transfer is for the
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scribed as the codification of the forum non conveniens doctrine in
Maryland. 6 The intermediate court focused on the phrase "on the
motion of a party," declaring that this wording neither prohibited nor
licensed a court to transfer a case on its own initiative. 2 7 It then cited
Coins v. State28 as precedent for the proposition that a court has "inherent authority to control its docket except as expressly limited by
statute"29 and that this authority could be manifested in a sua sponte
motion to transfer.3 0
To further support its reasoning, the Court of Special Appeals
turned to federal case law addressing Title 28, section 1404(a) of the
United States Code, the statute that controls transfers based on convenience in federal court.3 ' Maryland Rule 2-327 "is derived from 28
U.S.C. § 1404(a) and is intended to incorporate the body of law construing that statute.", 2 The court cited a number of state and federal
cases that interpreted 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) in a manner that accorded
wide discretion to a trial court to transfer cases on its own initiative,
and concluded that Maryland courts possess similar authority under
Rule 2-327(c). 3
The Court of Special Appeals then applied the balancing test
from Odenton Development Co. v. Lamy 4 to determine if the trial judge
had abused his discretion in transferring the case.3 5 The intermediate
convenience of the parties and witnesses and serves the interests of justice." MD.R. 2327(c).

26. Urquhart, 101 Md. App. at 99, 643 A.2d at 494.
27. Id. at 100, 643 A.2d at 494.
28. 293 Md. 97, 111, 442 A.2d 550, 557 (1982).
29. Urquhart 101 Md. App. at 101, 643 A.2d at 495.
30. Id. at 102, 643 A.2d at 495.
31. It provides: "For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest ofjustice,
a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might
have been brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1994).
32. PAUL V. NIEME ER & LINDA M. RcHARa s, MARYLAND RULES COMMENTARY, Rule 2327, at 215 (1984).
33. Urquhart, 101 Md. App. at 103, 643 A.2d at 496.
34. 320 Md. 33, 575 A.2d 1235 (1990).
35. Urquhalrt, 101 Md. App. at 105-06, 643 A.2d at 497. In Odenton, the Circuit Court for
Baltimore City, pursuant to Rule 2-32 7 (c), transferred a negligence action to the Circuit
Court for Anne Arundel County. Odenton, 320 Md. at 38, 575 A.2d at 1237. In affirming
the transfer, the Court of Appeals held that "a motion to transfer should be granted only
when the balance weighs strongly in favor of the moving party." Id. at 40, 575 A.2d at 1238.
This test weighs the convenience of the parties and witnesses, as well as "those public interest factors of systemic integrity and fairness that, in addition to private concerns, come
under the heading of 'the interest of justice.'" Id. (quoting Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh
Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29 (1988)). The public interest factors that the Court of Special Appeals used in Urquhartare detailed in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1947)
(e.g., administrative problems for courts when litigation piles up, the local interest in having local disputes settled at home, and the potential burden on jurors of deciding a dispute
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appellate court concluded that there had been an abuse of discretion
because the defendants had failed to demonstrate that they would be
inconvenienced by a trial in Prince George's County. 6 The court reversed the judgment of the trial court and ordered that the case be
remanded and transferred to the Circuit Court for Prince George's
County for a new trial." The defendants appealed, and the Court of
Appeals subsequently issued a writ of certiorari.3 "
2. Legal Background.-Venue is a statutory requirement that varies by jurisdiction. 9 In Maryland,' venue is proper in the county in
which the defendant resides, carries on a regular business, is employed, or habitually engages in a vocation.41 In the case of multiple
defendants, the action may be brought in a county where any one of
them resides, or where the cause of action arose. 42 A corporate defendant may be sued where it maintains its principal offices in the
state.43 Other considerations are called into play, depending on the
circumstances. 44 For example, the venue for a negligence claim may
that has no relation to their community). See Urquhart,101 Md. App. at 105 n.9, 643 A.2d
at 497 n.9; infra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
36. Urquhart, 101 Md. App. at 106-07, 643 A.2d at 497-98. This result is not surprising,
as it had been well-established by that time that the defendants' argument had been directed at the issue of whether venue was proper, and not whether it was convenient.
37. Id. at 113, 643 A.2d at 500.
38. Urquhar 339 Md. at 9, 660 A.2d at 416.
39. JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIt PROCEDURE 79 (1993). Venue is a matter of geography, not to be confused with subject matter or personal jurisdiction. The concepts of
subject matterjurisdiction and personal jurisdiction are both firmly rooted in the Constitution and the grant of authority by Congress. Neirbo v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308
U.S. 165, 167-68 (1939). Venue, by contrast, is a creature of statute that merely deals with
the best location to hear a case within a judicial system. As the Ninth Circuit explained,
"jurisdiction is the pouer to adjudicate, while venue, which relates to the place where judicial authority may be exercised, is intended for the conveniente of the litigants." Washington Pub. Util. Group v. United States Dist. Court, 843 F.2d 319, 328 (9th Cir. 1987)
(citation omitted); see also 15 CHA.LEs A. WUGlrH ET AL., FEDERAL PRAMcICE AND PROCE.
DURE: JURIsDncriON 2D § 3801 (1986). There may be more than one proper venue for a
given case. The appropriateness of a particular venue is a function of both convenience to
the parties and judicial efficiency, which, depending on the jurisdiction, are determined by
factors such as the plaintiff's privilege of choice, the residences of the parties, location of
counsel, availability of exhibits and wimesses, proximity to the property in an in rem proceeding, the length of the court docket, and the familiarity of the jury or court with a
particular issue. Id. §§ 3847-3854. These are the factors that parties must address in motions for change of venue under Rule 2-327(c).
40. In Maryland, venue is addressed in the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article,
sections 6-201 through 6-203. MD. CODE ANN., CrS. &JUD. PROC. §§ 6-201 to -203 (1995).
41. Id. § 6-201 (a).
42. Id. § 6-201 (b).
43. Id.
44. Id. §§ 6-202, -203.
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be where the cause of action arose, regardless of the number of defendants.' When there are multiple venues to choose from, the
plaintiff has the right to select the one in which to proceed.' Generally, this choice "should not be disturbed except for weighty
47
reasons."
Venue for federal cases is determined by statute.4 8 The factors in
determining venue are substantially the same as those in Maryland.
One difference is that federal venue also lies wherever "the defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced,"4 9 which means wherever they can be served with process.5"
In addition, certain federal actions have special venue statutes associated with them.5"
If an action is filed in a venue that does not meet any of the statutory requirements and the defendant makes a timely objection,5 2 the
action may be dismissed.55 However, in the federal system,' 4 and in
many state jurisdictions including Maryland,5 5 the action may also be
transferred to a court of proper venue.
Improper venue is not the only justification for dismissal or transfer of an action. In both the Maryland and the federal system,
changes of venue are allowed for reasons of convenience.56 These

45. Id. § 6-202(8).
46. Simmons v. Urquhart, 101 Md. App. 85, 98, 643 A.2d 487, 493 (1994), rev'd 339
Md. 1, 660 A.2d 412 (1995).
47. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 84 cmt c (1971); see also Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947) (stating that court weighs relative advantages
and obstacles to fair trail and preserves plaintiff's choice of forum unless balance is
strongly in favor of defendant's motion to transfer).
48. 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1994).
49. Id. § 1391(a)(3).
50. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 39, at 80.
51. 1d&at 79 n.3; see, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1396 (1994) (governing tax collection actions); id.
§ 1400 (governing patent infringement actions); id. § 1401 (governing stockholders' derivative actions).
52. See infra note 92 and accompanying text.
53. ROBERT C. CASAD, JURISDICTION & FORUM SELECTION §§ 4:24, :25 (1988).
54. Section 1406(a) states: "The district court of a district in which is filed a case laying
venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice,
transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought." 28
U.S.C. § 1406(a) (1994).
55. Rule 2-327(b) states: "If a court sustains a defense of improper venue but determines that in the interest ofjustice the action should not be dismissed, it may transfer the
action to any county in which it could have been brought." MD. R. 2-327(b).
56. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1994); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 2-327(c); see supra
notes 25, 31.
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"convenience-of-forum" decisions may also result in either dismissal or
transfer of the action. 5 7
a. Convenience of Forum in the FederalSystem.--Convenienceof-forum decisions in the federal system are governed by both the
common-law doctrine of forum non conveniens and by the provisions
of Title 28, section 1404(a) of the United States Code. 8 There is a
distinct difference between the two. Section 1404(a) is reserved for
transfers of actions, whereas forum non conveniens authorizes
dismissals.59
The term "forum non conveniens" first entered the American
legal lexicon in a law review article published in 1929.60 Before that
time, references to it had been rare, although the issue of when a
court could reject a case had been discussed since the early days of the
republic.6 1 The issue generally arose regarding controversies that had
been imported from outside the jurisdiction by two nonresidents.6 2
The doctrine appeared in a few opinions throughout the 1930s
and 40s. 6" In 1947, Justice Jackson wrote a "primer" on forum non
conveniens in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert.'4 This case, like many that
would follow, involved forum-shopping for a suit against a corporate
57. Christina M. Morin, Note, Review and Appeal of Forum Non Conveniens and Venue
Transfer Orders, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 715, 715 (1991).
58. See supra note 31.
59. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 253 (1981) (noting that "transfers
[under § 1404(a)] are different than dismissals on the ground of forum non conveniens...
Although the statute was drafted in accordance with the doctrine of forum non conveniens,
... it was intended to be a revision rather than a codification of the common law.").
It is sometimes said that the venue transfer statute is a codification of the doctrine
of forum non conveniens, but this is not accurate. Forum non conveniens authorizes dismissal of an action where the forum chosen is seriously inconvenient.
Transfer can be ordered even if the forum chosen is not seriously inconvenient, if
another would be more convenient.
CAsAD, supra note 53, § 4:26.
60. Paxton Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-American Law, 29 COLUM.
L. REV. 1 (1929).
61. Id. at 3-19.
62. Id.
63. See, e.g., Urquhart v. American-La France Foamite Corp., 144 F.2d 542, 544-45 (D.C.
Cir. 1944) (refusing case where parties were nonresidents and there was another suitable
forum); Kelley v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 139 F.2d 76, 79 (1st Cir. 1943) (applying the
doctrine to avoid interfering in internal affairs of corporation); Wittig v. Canada S.S. Lines,
59 F.2d 428, 430 (2d Cir. 1932) (holding that an admiralty court could reject a case where
both the cause of action and the witnesses were located in a foreign jurisdiction, and the
parties were foreign).
64. 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
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defendant that operated in many states.65 In a decision that would be
cited frequently thereafter, JusticeJackson described the history of the
doctrine, the principles on which it is based, and the factors to consider in its application. 6
As the Court recognized in Gilbert, the doctrine of forum non
conveniens presupposes that there is at least one other jurisdiction in
which the defendant is amenable to process. However, if these two
forums are not in the same jurisdiction, the court has no authority to
effect a transfer and must dismiss the case outright." This situation
arises on the federal level when the other possible forum is in another
country. 69 In such cases, the court will occasionally decline jurisdiction.7 ' This is permitted even if the substantive law of the alternate
forum is different and may significantly affect the relative rights of the
litigants, as long as the remedy available to the plaintiff is not "clearly
inadequate."7 1 Where a remedy is unavailable because the statute of
limitations has tolled in the alternative jurisdiction, the original court
65. Gilbert, a resident of Virginia, brought suit in the Southern District of New York
against Gulf Oil, a Pennsylvania corporation that was licensed to do business in both Virginia and New York. Id. at 502-03. Gilbert alleged that Gulf Oil had carelessly handled a
delivery of gasoline, resulting in an explosion and the fiery destruction of his warehouse
and its contents. I. Gulf Oil invoked the doctrine of forum non conveniens to have the
case transferred to Virginia where the cause of action arose. Id. at 503. The district court,
using New York state law regarding forum non conveniens, granted the motion and dismissed the case. Id. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals took a dim view of the entire
doctrine, and reversed. Id. The Supreme Court, in a five-to-four decision, gave credence
to the doctrine of forum non conveniens by reversing the Court of Appeals. IAt at 512.
66. Id. at 504-09. The factors enumerated included those relevant to the litigants such
as:

(1) the relative ease of access to sources of proof;
(2) the availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling witnesses;
(3) the cost of obtaining the attendance of witnesses;
(4) the possibility of a view of the premises;
(5) the enforceability of a judgment if one is obtained;
(6) all other practical problems that make a trial easy, expeditious, and inexpensive.
Id. at 508.
Factors relevant to the public interest included:
(1) the administrative difficulties of congested dockets;
(2) the burdens ofjury duty imposed on the local citizenry;
(3) the interest of deciding controversies in the community most affected;
(4) the familiarity of the court with the applicable law.
Id. at 508-09.
67. Id. at 506-07.
68. See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 243 (1981) (upholding district
court's dismissal of case after finding proper venue was in Scotland).
69. Id.
70. Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 504.
71. Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 254.
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may either retain jurisdiction or exact an agreement by the defendant
72
to waive that affirmative defense.
Title 28, section 1404(a) of the United States Code was enacted
soon after the Gilbert decision. 73 Section 1404(a) authorizes transfer
even when the forum is not seriously inconvenient so long as another
would be more convenient, 74 and has replaced forum non conveniens
as the authority for transfers within the federal system.7 5 Where the
more convenient forum is outside the United States, however, forum
non conveniens still applies.7 6 Both federal and state courts are accorded broad discretion in considering these factors,7 7 and section
1404(a) transfers are granted more latitude than are dismissals under
the doctrine of forum non conveniens.78
b. Convenience of Forum in the States.-At the state level, interjurisdictional venues typically involve different states. The courts of
one state have no authority to transfer a case to another state, and so
must dismiss the case. 79 If the alternative venue is within the same
jurisdiction, intra-jurisdictional transfer rules come into play."°
Unlike its federal counterpart, Maryland law81 does not seem to
recognize a doctrinal distinction between dismissal and transfer. In
72. RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 84 cmt. c (1971); see, e.g., Piper
Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 242 (stating that defendants agreed to waive any statute of limitations defense).
73. Gilbert was decided in 1947 and 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) was enacted in 1948.
74. See supra note 31.
75. CAsAD, supra note 53, § 4:26, at 78.
76. Id.
77. See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29 (1987) ("Section 1404(a) is
intended to place discretion in the district court to adjudicate motions for transfer according to an 'individualized, case-by-case consideration of convenience and fairness.'");
Odenton Dev. Co. v. Lamy, 320 Md. 33, 40, 575 A.2d 1235, 1238 (1990) ("When determining whether a transfer of the action... is in the interest ofjustice, a court is vested with
wide discretion.").
78. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 253 (1981) (stating that when Congress
enacted § 1404(a), district courts were given more discretion to transfer under § 1404(a)
than they had to dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens).
79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFUCT OF LAws § 84 cmt. e (1971).
80. In Maryland, such transfers among circuit courts are governed by Rule 2-327(b),
(c), and (d); among district courts by Rule 3-326; and between circuit and district courts by
Rules 2-327(a), 3-503(a) (2), and 3-325(c). For federal courts, the general transfer statute
is 28 U.S.C. § 1404; 28 U.S.C § 1406 permits transfers to cure improper venue; 28 U.S.C.
§ 1407 permits transfers for the purpose of consolidating actions; and 28 U.S.C. § 1631
permits transfers for want of jurisdiction.
81. The doctrine of forum non conveniens was codified in Maryland at least as early as
1951. MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 88(b) (1951) (repealed by Acts of 1967, ch. 532, § 1, 1967
Md. Laws 1146). It first appeared in appellate case law in 1954, Thomas v. Hudson Sales
Corp., 204 Md. 450, 465, 105 A.2d 225, 232 (1954), and in four other cases up to 1980,
Springle v. Cottrell Eng'g Corp., 40 Md. App. 267, 391 A.2d 456 (1978); Lewis v. German-
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Springle v. Cottrell Engineering Corp.,8 2 the Court of Special Appeals
stated that Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, section 6-1048_
which controls dismissals of actions that could be heard in another
forum-"codifies the doctrine of forum non conveniens."8 4 Then, in
Simmons v. Urquhart,8 5 the same court stated that "the doctrine of forum non conveniens is embodied in Rule 2-327(c),"86 which governs
transfers between forums.17 As a general matter, the Maryland doctrine of forum non conveniens is not restricted to dismissals but also
"refers to the discretionary power of a court to transfer an action
whenever it appears that the cause may be tried more appropriately in
another valid venue."8 8
c. ProceduralRules.--It is generally presumed that a plaintiff
has chosen the most convenient forum in which to bring the action, 9
and this presumption must be strongly rebutted if the defendant
wishes to effect a change.9" The plaintiff's choice may be overturned
when the chosen forum imposes considerable inconvenience on the
defendant and the plaintiff cannot justify the reason for the choice.9 1
Unlike motions based on improper venue, which must be made
very early in an action,9 2 motions to transfer or dismiss based on fotown Ins. Co., 251 Md. 535, 248 A.2d 468 (1968); Texaco, Inc. v. Vanden Bosche, 242 Md.
334, 219 A.2d 80 (1966); Compania De Astral, SA. v. Boston Metals Co., 205 Md. 237, 107
A.2d 357 (1954). These cases were similar to Gilbertin that all of them involved out-of-state

corporations.
82. 40 Md. App. 267, 391 A.2d 456 (1978).
83. Section 6-104(a) states that "[i]f a court finds that in the interest of substantial
justice an action should be heard in another forum, the court may stay or dismiss the
action in whole or in part on any conditions it considersjust." MD.CODE ANN., Crs. &JuD.
PROC. § 6-104(a) (1995).
84. 40 Md. App. at 270, 391 A.2d at 459.
85. 101 Md. App. 85, 643 A.2d 487 (1994), rev'd, 339 Md. 1, 660 A.2d 412 (1995).
86. I& at 99, 643 A.2d at 494.
87. See supra notes 25-26, 80 and accompanying text.
88. Urquhar, 101 Md. App. at 99, 643 A.2d at 493.
89. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947).
90. Odenton Dev. Co. v. Lamy, 320 Md. 33, 40, 575 A.2d 1235, 1238 (1990). This may
not be the case, however, if a contractual forum selection clause has governed the selection. Such clauses are given significant weight in federal actions. Stewart Org., Inc. v.
Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29 (1988).
91. See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 (1981) ("[W]hen trial in the
chosen forum would 'establish ...oppressiveness and vexation to a defendant... out of all
proportion to plaintiffs convenience...' the court may, in the exercise of its sound discretion, dismiss the case.") (quoting Koster v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 524
(1947)).
92. Improper venue is a defense under both federal and Maryland law. In the federal
system, this defense is included in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) (3) and, according
to Federal Rule 12(h)(1), it is waived unless pleaded as part of or prior to the party's
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rum non conveniens may be made at any time.9" Nonetheless, it
seems unlikely that such motions would be entertained once a trial
has begun. In federal district court, motions to transfer, if not made
during a hearing or trial, "shall be made in writing, shall state with
particularity the grounds therefor, and shall set forth the relief or order sought."9 4 The same requirements, worded somewhat differently,
are contained in Maryland's general rule concerning the filing of motions." Maryland has an additional requirement, not found in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7, that any facts recited in a motion that
are not contained in the record must be set forth in an affidavit.9 6
Hearings on these motions to transfer are not required, although the
Court of Appeals considers it good practice to do so.97 The significant
difference between transfers in the two systems is found in the Urquhart holding-while federal courts may order a transfer for convenience of the parties sua sponte, 98 Urquhart now makes clear that
Maryland courts may transfer a case only on motion of one of the
parties. 99
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Urquhart, the Court of Appeals reversed not only the Court of Special Appeals's decision, but the preliminary conclusions that supported the intermediate court's decision.
The Court of Appeals held that a trial court could not transfer a case
under Rule 2-327(c) sua sponte, but could do so only on a motion
from one of the parties.1 00 However, with regard to the facts
presented, it decided that the defendants' original motion to transfer
was a sufficient procedural impetus to permit the trial court to exercise its discretion to transfer on the grounds of forum non conveniens, even though that doctrine had not been the basis of the
motion. 1° 1
answer. In Maryland, a defense of improper venue must be made as a motion to dismiss
before the answer is filed, and not as part of the answer. MD.R. 2-311.
93. Motions to transfer under Rule 2-327(c) or (d)may be filed at any time. NIEMEYER
& RicHARDs, supra note 32, at 217.
94. FED. R_ CIv. P. 7(b)(1).
95. MD.R. 2-311.
96. MD.R. 2-311(d).
97. Odenton Dev. Co. v. Lamy, 320 Md. 33, 41, 575 A.2d 1235, 1239 (1989).
98. See, e.g., Kirby v. Mercury Say. & Loan Ass'n, 755 F. Supp. 445, 448 (D.D.C. 1990);
Clisham Management, Inc. v. American Steel Bldg. Co., 792 F. Supp. 150, 157 (D. Conn.
1992).
99. Urquhart,339 Md. at 21, 660 A.2d at 422.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 19, 660 A.2d at 421.
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The Court of Appeals construed Rule 2-327 much differently
than did the Court of Special Appeals. The Court of Appeals agreed
that Rule 2-327(c) was derived from 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).1°2 However,
the court also noted that there was a conspicuous difference in the
wording of the two statutes.1 03 Rule 2-327(c) contains the phrase
"[o]n motion of any party," while 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) does not."
Because section 1404(a) contains less restrictive language than Rule 2327(c), the court found the related federal case law that permitted sua
sponte transfers unpersuasive. "5 Writing for the court, Judge Chasanow reasoned that
[i]f Maryland wished to permit a trial court to act sua sponte
in transferring an action, Md. Rule 2-327(c) could have
adopted the language of 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) verbatim ....
Given that this Court adopted the recommendation of the
Rules Committee to add the "[o]n the motion of any party"
language to the Maryland rule, however, that addition indicates that a motion by a party requesting a transfer is required prior to a trial court transferring an action under Md.
Rule 2-327(c). 1 °6
By the same reasoning, the court rejected the Court of Special
Appeals's view that a court could make a Rule 2-327(c) transfer sua
sponte because the other paragraphs of Rule 2-327 permit the court
to act on its own initiative. 1 7 Again, the court maintained that by
inserting the additional wording only to Rule 2-327(c), it was the intent of the Rules Committee that a party must make a motion to transfer before a trial court could transfer a case.10 8

102. Id. at 11, 660 A.2d at 417.
103. Id.
104. See supra notes 25 and 31.
105. Urquhart, 339 Md. at 12, 660 A.2d at 417.
106. Id.
107. Simmons v. Urquhart, 101 Md. App. 85, 103 n.7, 643 A.2d 487, 496 n.7 (1994),
rev'd, 339 Md. 1, 660 A.2d 412 (1995). There are three other sections to Rule 2-327, none
of which shares the restrictive language of Rule 2-327(c). Rule 2-327(a) allows a circuit
court to transfer an action to a district court when the transferring court determines that
the district court has exclusive jurisdiction. No motions are required. Rule 2-327(b) allows

a court the option of transferring, rather than dismissing, an action when venue has been
found improper. Again, no motion is required. Rule 2-327(d) allows related actions to be
transferred and consolidated in one court. Paragraph (2) of this section states that "[a]

transfer under this section may be made on motion of a party or on the transferor court's
own initiative." MD. R. 2-327(d) (2).
108. Urquhart, 339 Md. at 12, 660 A.2d at 417.
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The Court of Appeals distinguished Goins v. State,10 9 a case involving criminal procedure, from the instant case."1 0 In Goins, the trial
court sua sponte postponed a criminal trial beyond the 180-day limit
imposed by Rule 746."' Rule 746(b) stated that a change of date
would be considered "upon motion of a party."" 2 In Goins, the court
reasoned that "[ t] he mere use of the word 'party' in ... Rule 746 does
not preclude a motion by the court sua sponte.""' The court held
that "[a] rule authorizing a litigant to file a procedural motion for this
purpose... should not be construed to prohibit the court from accomplishing the same object sua sponte unless such a construction is
compelled by clear language." 4
The Court of Appeals in Urquhartbelieved that while the phrase
"on motion of a party" was not a "clear language" prohibition of sua
sponte motions under former Rule 746, it was such a prohibition
under Rule 2-327(c). Without exploring this contradiction in depth,
the court reasoned that the Rule 2-327(c) language was clearer than
the Rule 746 language because the Rules Committee specifically recommended its inclusion, and had done so with full knowledge that it
made the resulting rule more restrictive than 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), its
progenitor." 5
109. 293 Md. 97, 442 A.2d 550 (1982).
110. In this criminal case, Goins pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity and submitted
himself for evaluation by the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DHMH). Id. at
101, 442 A.2d at 552. Because of its heavy caseload, DHMH requested, and the trial court
granted, an extension of time to evaluate Goins. Id. at 102, 442 A.2d at 553. This extension had the collateral effect of delaying the trial beyond the statutory limit of 180 days. Id.
at 103, 442 A.2d at 553. Coins then entered a motion to dismiss the charges against him.
Id. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of this motion, reasoning that
the dilatory action of the defendant constituted good cause for the delay, and thus the trial
court could postpone the trial on its own initiative. Id. at 111-12, 442 A.2d at 557-58.
111. Rule 746 provided as follows:
a. General Provision
Within 30 days after the earlier of the appearance of counsel or the first appearance of the defendant before the court pursuant to Rule 723, a trial date shall be
set which shall be not later than 180 days after the appearance or waiver of counsel or after the appearance of defendant before the court pursuant to Rule 723.
b. Change of Trial Date
Upon motion of a party made in writing or in open court and for good cause
shown, the county administrative judge or ajudge designated by him may grant a
change of trial date.
MD. R. 746 (recodified as MD. R. 4-271).
112. MD. R 746(b) (recodified as MD. R. 4-271); see supra note 111.

113. Goins, 293 Md. at 111, 442 A.2d at 557.
114. Id.

115. Urquhrt 339 Md. at 13, 660 A.2d at 418.

1996]

MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS

The court also referred to its conclusion in Hartford Insurance Co.
v. ManorInn.1 6 In that case, decided the previous term, the Court of
Appeals held that the court could not sua sponte grant summaryjudgment to a party that had not so moved under Rule 2-501(e).III Rule
2-501 (e) contains a provision similar to "on the motion of a party,"
and the court reasoned that this clearly indicated that the court could
not act entirely on its own motion."I Finally, the Urquhartcourt buttressed its conclusion by citing holdings from other states that also
prohibit sua sponte transfers.1 19
Having established that a motion of one of the parties was the
only way to transfer a case on the grounds of forum non conveniens,
the court turned to the question of whether the defendants actually
had made such a motion.12 0 The court found that they had. 2 1 Despite the fact that the original motion to transfer had been based on a
theory of improper venue, the defendants' arguments in support of
the motion were interpreted to rely on "any appropriate basis in determining that the case should be transferred to Montgomery
116. 335 Md. 135, 642 A.2d 219 (1994).
117. Id. at 146-47, 642 A.2d at 225. In Hartford, plaintiff insurance company brought a
subrogation claim against the State and the Manor Inn of Bethesda for injuries sustained
when its insured collided with an escaped mental patient who had stolen an inadequately
secured van from the hotel. Id. at 138-39, 642 A.2d at 221. The State moved for summary
judgment against Hartford Insurance Company, but Manor Inn did not. Id. at 140, 642
A.2d at 221-22. The trial court granted the State's motion, and also sua sponte entered
judgment in favor of Manor Inn, notwithstanding the fact that the hotel had not filed a
motion. Id. The Court of Appeals found the trial court in error. Id. at 147, 642 A.2d at
225.
118. Hartford 335 Md. at 146, 642 A.2d at 224. Rule 2-501 states in pertinent part:
(a) Motion.-Any party may file at any time a motion for summaryjudgment
on all or part of an action on the ground that there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact and that the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law....
(e) Entry of Judgment.-The court shall enter judgment in favor of or
against the moving party if the motion and response show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the party in whose favor judgment is
entered is entitled to judgment as a matter of law ....
MD.R 2-501 (a), (e).
119. Urquhart 339 Md. at 14-15, 660 A.2d 412 at 418-19. The court cited Stevens v.
Blevins, 890 P.2d 936, 940 (Okla. 1995) (holding that a trial court does not have the authority to transfer an action absent a motion by a party requesting a transfer); VSL Corp. v.
Dunes Hotels & Casinos, Inc., 519 N.E.2d 617, 617 (N.Y. 1988) (holding that a court may
not invoke the doctrine of forum non conveniens on its own motion); Penox Technologies, Inc. v. Foster Medical Corp., 546 A.2d 114, 116 (Pa. Super. Ct 1988) (holding that a
court may not transfer a case from a proper venue without a motion by a party); Robertson
v. Gregory, 663 S.W.2d 4, 5 (Tex. Ct.App. 1983) (holding that courts have no statutory
authority to change venue in civil suits on their own motion).
120. Urquhar, 339 Md. at 15, 660 A.2d at 419.
121. Id.
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County," 12 2 including forum non conveniens. This was enough for
the court, which found "that the trial court did not transfer this action
sua sponte, but transferred the action only after defendants made a
motion to transfer, albeit a motion lacking in proper citation of
123
authority."
Finally, the court addressed the issue of whether the trial court
had properly decided the motion to transfer. The court reiterated its
previous holding that "abuse of discretion" is the standard of review
for transfers for the convenience of parties and witnesses, 12 4 and referred to the balancing test announced in Odenton Development Co. v.
Lamy. 125 The court also reiterated that it "'is the moving party who
has the burden of proving that the interest of justice would be best
served by transferring the action. '"126 Applying this test, the Court of
Appeals found that there was "ample evidence"12 7 to support the trial
court's decision.12 8 Holding that the trial court had not abused its
discretion, the majority reversed the decision of the Court of Special
Appeals. 2 9
Judge Raker, joined by Judge Bell, concurred in the holding that
a trial court may not transfer an action sua sponte, but dissented in
the judgment."
Judge Raker would have been more stringent in interpreting the defendants' motion as one based on improper venue
rather than forum non conveniens, especially in light of the defense
counsel's equivocal answer when the trial court pressed for clarification.'
Judge Raker noted that a motion based on forum non conveniens is procedurally distinct from one based on improper venue,
122. Id. at 17, 660 A.2d at 419-20.
123. Id. at 17, 660 A.2d at 420.
124. Id. (citing Odenton Dev. Co. v. Lamy, 320 Md. 33, 40, 575 A.2d 1235, 1238 (1990)).
125. 320 Md. at 40, 575 A.2d at 1238; see supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
126. Urquhart, 339 Md. at 17-18, 660 A.2d at 420 (quoting Odenton, 320 Md. at 40, 575
A.2d at 1238).
127. Id. at 18, 660 A.2d at 420.
128. Id. Each of the individual defendants resided in Montgomery County; all of Mr.
Simmons's care was delivered in Montgomery County; both of Mr. Simmons's physicians
spoke on the phone with him from their offices in Montgomery County, only one of the
eleven witnesses called resided in Prince George's County. Id. at 18-19, 660 A.2d at 420-21.
Mr. Simmons himself resided in Howard County, not Prince George's County. Id at 18
n.8, 660 A.2d at 420.
129. Id. at 20, 660 A.2d at 421.
130. Id. at 21, 660 A.2d at 422 (Raker, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 22, 660 A.2d at 422.
[Wlhen the trial court expressly asked the defense counsel whether he intended to make a forum non conveniens argument, counsel did not say yes, but
rather that one 'could probably draw that analogy.' It appears to me that counsel's answer represented a disavowal of any reliance on forum non convenins.
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and objected to the fact that even had the defendants' motion been
sufficient to invoke the doctrine of forum non conveniens, Simmons
had not been given the opportunity to brief and properly argue the
issue. '

32

Judge Raker also argued that the record did not support the trial
court's decision, as it contained no findings of fact that would indicate
that the Odenton balancing analysis' had been performed.' 3 4 Considering that the original venue had been proper, and that the plaintiffs choice of venue should not be disturbed lightly, Judge Raker
believed that the trial court had not established sufficient justification
13 5

to order the transfer.

4. Analysis.-Urquhart v. Simmons is notable less for what it decided than for the issues that it did not reach. The Court of Appeals
effected a fine-tuning of Rule 2-327(a),1 3 ' but did so without overturning an incongruous holding in Coins v. State.13 7 In the process, the
court avoided an opportunity to reexamine the policy underpinnings
of discretion that
of convenience-of-forum transfers and the ldegree
3
trial courts may exercise in ordering them. 1
The court held that a trial judge may not order a Rule 2-327(c)
transfer without a motion by one of the litigants.' 9 However, the
court effectively ruled that there need not be much substance to this
motion so long as it serves notice that a transfer is requested.""4 The
court left unchanged the wide discretion that a trial court has in deciding such motions.
Urquhartis the second of two recent decisions that have used similar reasoning to limit the initiative that trial courts have in controlling
their dockets. In Hartford Insurance Co. v. Manor Inn,"' the Court of
Appeals held that a trial court could not sua sponte enter summary
132. Id.
133. See supra note 35.
134. Urquhart,339 Md. at 23, 660 A.2d at 423 (Raker, J., dissenting).
135. Id.
136. See supra note 107.
137. 297 Md. 97, 442 A.2d 550 (1982); see supra notes 109-115 and accompanying text.
138. Neither appellate court opinion addressed the effect of its holding on Rule 3326(b), the convenience transfer rule for district courts. Except for the words "any other
county" in place of "any other circuit court," Rule 3-326(b) is identical to Rule 2-327(c). It
is likely that the Urquhart prohibition against sua sponte transfers applies to district courts
as well.
139. Urquhart,339 Md. at 15, 660 A.2d at 419.
140. Id.
141. 335 Md. 135, 642 A.2d 219 (1994).

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

55:529

judgment in favor of a nonmoving party. 14 2 In reaching this holding,
143
the court was interpreting Rule 2-501, the summary judgment rule.
It is significant to note that the reasoning in Hartford Insurance is almost identical to that in Urquhart. Judge Bell, writing for the court in
HartfordInsurance,also focused on the requirement of a "motion" and
a "moving party," and he also supported his interpretation with the
Rules Committee Report. 144
Both these holdings are inconsistent with Goins v. State,145 in
which the court held that
[e]xcept as limited by statute or rule, a trial court has inherent authority to control its own docket. A rule authorizing a
litigant to file a procedural motion .

.

. should not be con-

strued to prohibit the court from accomplishing the same
unless such construction is compelled by
object sua sponte
46
clear language.1

The rule at issue in Goins was Rule 746(b) (now recodified as Rule 4271(b)), which, like Rule 2-327(c), was instigated by "motion of a
party." 14 7 Although the language in the two rules seems to be virtually
identical, the Urquhartcourt held that legislative history indicated that
Rule 2-327(c) is a clear language prohibition of sua sponte motions. 4 8 In other words, the language of the rule is made clear by
language that is not contained in the rule.
One would be hard pressed to find a more attenuated analysis.
The court may want to retreat from its holding in Goins without actually overruling that decision or restricting it to its facts. Of the nine
judges who decided Goins, only two sat on the Urquhartcourt; perhaps
the attitudes of the judges have correspondingly changed in the intervening years. It is also possible that, by preserving the Goins holding,
it is the court's intention to restrict generally the trial judge's ability to
reject cases entirely, while still allowing a certain flexibility in scheduling them.
142. Id. at 147, 642 A.2d at 225.
143. Id. at 146, 642 A.2d at 224; see supra note 118.
144. Hartford Ins. Co., 335 Md. at 146, 642 A.2d at 224. The court explained that
Rule 2-501 .... by requiring the entry of judgment in favor or against the
moving party ....
did not contemplate.., a court's acting entirely on its own
motion, that is to say, where none of the parties has moved for summary judgment. That interpretation is consistent with what was intended when the Rules
Committee proposed, and this Court adopted, Rule 2-501.
Id.
145.
146.
147.
148.

293 Md. 97, 442 A.2d 550 (1982).
Id. at 111, 442 A.2d at 557 (emphasis added).
See supra note 111 for text of former Rule 746(b).
See supra text accompanying note 115.
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Still, there is a question of the importance of this case. The
court's true focus may be far broader than simple statutory clarification. The court could have been reacting to real or perceived abuses
of procedural devices on the part of trial judges who wish to tailor
their dockets. Some commentators, as well as anecdotal evidence,
suggest that judges use sua sponte motions to clear a congested
docket, to avoid issues of law with which they are unfamiliar, or to
relieve themselves of particularly unsavory cases.14 9
The Court of Appeals also sidestepped an issue that deserved
more attention. The court questioned the dubious decision to transfer the case from one adjacent county to another, but did not reverse
the trial court.1 ° However, Judge Raker, in her dissent, objected to
the fact that the trial judge had made no findings of fact to justify a
decision that so minimized the right of the plaintiffs to choose where
to file suit.' 5 1
Had the trial court generated such findings, it could easily have
1 52
determined that Prince George's County was more convenient.
The change in venue improved the access of the moving parties, but
to the detriment of the plaintiffs and those witnesses who were located
at the hospitals and MCA's Laurel office. At first blush, it does not
look as if this is a proper "balance of the convenience of the parties
and witnesses." 5 ' Even if other relevant factors are considered,"M the
decision is unsupported. For example, three of the Gilbert factors' 5 5access to sources of proof, view of the premises, and cost of obtaining
the attendance of witnesses-would have been neutrally affected by
the change, at most. Three other factors-availability of compulsory
process, enforceability of ajudgment, and familiarity of the court with
the applicable law 15 -were irrelevant because the actions were in the
149. See David E. Steinberg, The Motion to Transfer and the Interest ofJutice, 66

NOTRE

DAME L. REv. 443, 500-04 (1990).

150. Urquhart,339 Md. at 19, 466 A.2d at 421 ("We... may not have chosen to transfer
this case to Montgomery County ....
Nevertheless, we find that the trial judge did not
abuse his discretion in determining that the present action should be transferred to Montgomery County."). In fact, there is some question as to which venue was closer to where
the original procedure was performed-the Montgomery County courthouse in Rockville
or the Prince George's County courthouse in Upper Marlboro. Id. at 16, 660 A.2d at 419.
151. Id. at 23, 660 A.2d at 423 (Raker, J., dissenting).
152. The trial court could have looked at street maps to determine the relative distances
between sites relevant to the action, and considered typical traffic patterns. Doing so
would seem to indicate that Prince George's County was more convenient to the key sites
involved in the litigation. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
153. Urquhart 339 Md. at 18, 660 A.2d at 420.
154. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.

155. 330 U.S. 501 (1947); see supra note 66 and accompanying text.
156. Id.
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same legal system. With regard to the factors of local interest, it is
difficult to imagine how two adjacent counties would have exclusive
parochial concerns about the outcome of a malpractice suit, especially
when the practice area of the defendant encompassed both.
Some commentators have argued that it is time to revisit many of
the assumptions that underlie transfer rules such as 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a)15 7 and its derivatives. 5 ' The Court of Appeals needs to
consider to what degree the typical forum non conveniens situation
"scales down" to the county level. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert 59 is still
cited as the seminal case regarding forum non conveniens, but it was
decided in 1947, before metropolitan counties were linked by eightlane beltways. Air travel was still a luxury, and tools that the legal community takes for granted today, such as fax machines, video tape,
notebook computers, electronic documents, and pocket phones, were
nonexistent. This is not to say that the doctrine does not retain some
justification; compelling a Garrett County defendant to appear in
Wicomico County Circuit Court would be "vexatious" indeed. However, as Judge Raker asserted, some finding of fact more substantial
than that in Urquhart should be required before a transfer is
ordered.160
5. Conclusion.-In Urquhart v. Simmons, the Court of Appeals
held that a Maryland trial court cannot transfer an action sua sponte
under Rule 2-327(c). Transfers under this rule may be effected only
after a motion by one of the parties, although this motion need express little more than a desire for a venue change. This holding creates a disparity with federal practice, where a court may transfer a case
on its own initiative.
Urquhart is a decision carefully crafted to reach this single issue
and no other, even though it touches on other important matters
such as judicial initiative and the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
The facts of the case presented both justification and opportunity to
take a broad look at the policies underlying certain rules of civil procedure. The court passed on this opportunity.
Concerning forum non conveniens in particular, the facts of Urquhart offer a contemporary setting for an aged doctrine that may not
157. See supra text accompanying notes 73-75.
158. See Margaret G. Stewart, Forum Non Conveniens: A Doctrine in Search of a Roe, 74
CALm. L. REv. 1259 (1986); Stowell R.R1Kelner, "Adrifl On An UnchartedSea". A Survey of
Section 1404(A) Transfer in the Federal System, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 612 (1992).
159. 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
160. See supra text accompanying note 151.
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have adapted well to modern society. Distance does not pose the
same inconvenience that it once did, and the doctrine of forum non
conveniens should evolve to reflect this. If it does not adapt, it may
become just another avenue for producing unintended and inefficient results.
HARRY N. MALONE

B.

Rejecting Appellate Court Conversion of Motions for Summary
Judgment into Motions to Dismiss

In Davis v. DiPinoa a case of first impression, the Court of Appeals considered whether a motion for summary judgment at trial can
be converted into a motion to dismiss on appeal. The court held that
when a motion to dismiss was not argued or decided at the trial level,
an appellate court may not determine that the lower court improperly
granted summary judgment but still affirm the lower court's dismissal
of the case on the basis that the complaint failed to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted.2 In so holding, the court maintained
the scope of appellate review contemplated by Maryland Rule 8131 (a)3 in order to prevent procedural prejudice against plaintiffs.
1. 337 Md. 642, 655 A.2d 401 (1995).
2. Id. at 648, 655 A.2d at 404.
3. Rule 8-131 states in pertinent part:

Scope of Review:
(a) Generally.-The issue ofjurisdiction of the trial court over the subject matter
and, unless waived under Rule 2-322, over a person may be raised in and decided
by the appellate court whether or not raised in and decided by the trial court.
Ordinarily, the appellate court will not decide any other issue unless it plainly
appears by the record to have been raised in or decided by the trial court, but the
Court may decide such an issue if necessary or desirable to guide the trial court or
to avoid the expense and delay of another appeal.
(b) In Court of Appeals-Additional Limitations.(1) PriorAppellateDecision.-Unlessotherwise provided by the order granting
the writ of certiorari, in reviewing a decision rendered by the Court of Special
Appeals or by a circuit court acting in an appellate capacity, the Court of Appeals
ordinarily will consider only an issue that has been raised in the petition for certiorari or any cross-petition and that has been preserved for review by the Court of
Appeals. Whenever an issue raised in a petition for certiorari or a cross-petition
involves, either expressly or implicitly, the assertion that the trial court committed
error, the Court of Appeals may consider whether the error was harmless or nonprejudicial even though the matter of harm or prejudice was not raised in the
petition or in a cross-petition.
(2) No Prior Appellate Decision.-Except as otherwise provided in Rule 8304(c), when the Court of Appeals issues a writ of certiorari to review a case pending in the Court of Special Appeals before a decision has been rendered by that
Court, the Court of Appeals will consider those issues that would have been cognizable by the Court of Special Appeals.
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This Note gives a brief synopsis and the history behind the scope
of appellate review pursuant to Rule 8-131, including an analysis of
the distinctions between a motion to dismiss and a motion for summary judgment. The Note will also survey how other jurisdictions
have dealt with the question of whether an appellate court can dismiss
a case on pure pleading grounds, when the grounds were not asserted
or debated at the trial court. Finally, it will argue that the court ruled
correctly and that Davis, while unlikely to have a major impact on
practitioners, will encourage proper pleading practices by attorneys.
1. The Case.-On May 12, 1991, Wayne Nelson Davis and a
friend were standing on Wicomico Street, near the boardwalk, in
Ocean City, Maryland, when Davis observed Bernadette DiPino and
Alice Brumbley getting into their vehicle across the street.4 DiPino
and Brumbley were both Ocean City police officers working undercover.5 The following colloquy then occurred between Davis and his
friend:
Davis: "Those are the two girls who tried to sell me some pot
and were gonna bust me."
Friend: "What are they, narcs?"
Davis: "I don't know what they are."6
The conversation was loud enough for both police officers to
hear it, and as a consequence, Officer DiPino later sought a statement
of charges in order for the issuance of a summons or warrant for Davis's arrest.7 The application alleged that Davis knowingly and willfully advised his friend that Officers DiPino and Brumbley were

MD.

R. 8-131.

4. Davis, 337 Md. at 644-45, 655 A.2d at 402.
5. Davis v. DiPino, 99 Md. App. 282, 284, 637 A.2d 475, 477 (1994), revd, 337 Md. 642,
655 A.2d 401 (1995).
6. Davis, 337 Md. at 642, 645, 655 A.2d at 402. Because the court was called upon to
consider whether Davis had a legal cause of action against the defendants, the court considered the disputed facts contained in the pleadings, proffers, and affidavits in the light
most favorable to Davis's potential causes of action. Id. at 644, 655 A.2d at 402; see also
Southland Corp. v. Griffith, 332 Md. 704, 712, 633 A.2d 84, 87 (1993) (stating that in

reviewing a disposition by summary judgment, an appellate court resolves all inferences
against the party making the motion) (citing Rosenberg v. Helsinki, 328 Md. 664, 674, 616
A.2d 866, 871 (1992)); Hrehorovich v. Harbor Hosp. Ctr., Inc., 93 Md. App. 772, 790, 614
A.2d 1021, 1030 (1992) (noting that in determining whether a factual dispute exists, all
inferences should be drawn in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party).
7. Davis, 337 Md. at 645, 655 A.2d at 402. Officer DiPino applied for the statement of
charges nearly two months after the conversation between Davis and his friend had occurred. Id.
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narcotics officers,8 thus compromising the detectives' cover and placing them in extreme danger.9
Davis was subsequently arrested at his place of employment and
was brought before District Court Commissioner Donald E. Turner,
who refused to release Davis on personal recognizance and set bond
at $50,000.10 When the case came up for trial on October 2, 1991, the
state entered a nolle prosequi as to each charge."
Davis filed a nine-count complaint in the Circuit Court for
Worchester County against Officer DiPino, the mayor and City Council of Ocean City, and District Court Commissioner Turner.' 2 The
complaint alleged violations of Davis's rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
and under the Maryland Constitution, and sought injunctive and declaratory relief as well as attorney's fees.' 3 Each answered Davis's
complaint and filed a motion for summary judgment with supporting
affidavits. 4 DiPino's affidavit claimed that Davis's comment was an
intentional effort to blow her cover, and that she had no malicious
8. Id. The application alleged that:
[Davis] did knowingly and willfully advise an unknown white male as to the identity and occupation of [DiPino] and ... Alice N. Brumbley. [DiPino] and Brumbley were working in an undercover capacity on Wicomico St. Ocean City
Worchester County Md. While entering a vehicle [DiPino] and Brumbley observed [Davis] state to an unknown white male 'Look those two girls are narcs.'
Narcs being a derogatory street term for a narcotics officer. This statement was
said in a loud enough voice as so the [detectives] approx[imately] 3 yds away
could hear and any passerby could also hear placing the [detectives] in extreme
danger and compromising their cover.
Id.
9. Id. DiPino presented the application for statement of charges to District Court
Commissioner Donald E. Turner, who issued an arrest warrant rather than a summons.
Id., 655 A.2d at 402-03. Turner also issued a statement of charges charging Davis with two
counts of "obstructing and hindering." Id.
10. Id. at 645-46, 655 A.2d at 403.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 645, 655 A.2d at 402. Count I alleged that DiPino violated Davis's First,
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendment rights as protected by 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id.
Count II alleged that DiPino and Ocean City violated Davis's rights under Articles 21, 24,
25, 26, and 40 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Id. Counts III through VI were
against DiPino and Ocean City for false arrest and imprisonment, malicious prosecution,
abuse of process, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. Count VII alleged
that Ocean City violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for failing to supervise and discipline DiPino. Id.
Counts VIII and IX alleged that Turner and other similarly situated court commissioners
violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Articles 24 and 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights by
routinely issuing warrants without a finding of probable cause and routinely ignoring Maryland Rule 4-212(d) (1) by issuing arrest warrants instead of criminal summons. Id.
13. Id. Davis sought money damages from DiPino and Ocean City and requested injunctive and declaratory relief against Turner for issuing the arrest warrant for Davis. Id.
14. Id. at 646, 655 A.2d at 403.
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intent or ill will towards Davis. i" In Turner's affidavit, he stated that
he had probable cause to believe that "there was a substantial likelihood that [Davis] may have disregarded a mere summons because the
charges sought involved the compromising of a police cover." 6 Davis
filed separate responses in opposition to the motions for summary
judgment, along with a supporting affidavit.1 7 The circuit court heard
arguments on the defendants' motions for summary judgment and
Davis's opposition, and thereafter granted summary judgment in favor
of all defendants.1 8
Davis appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, which determined that the defendants "were not entitled to summary judgment
on the basis of the affidavits filed by DiPino and Turner."19 Nevertheless, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the circuit court's decision
to terminate the proceedings because "each count of [the] complaint
failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted."2 ° The Court
of Appeals granted certiorari to consider whether the Court of Special
Appeals properly dismissed Davis's complaint for failure to adequately
plead any claim upon which relief can be granted, when the only motion filed and the only motion on appeal was the trial court's grant of
21
summary judgment.
2. Legal Background.-The scope of review in appellate proceedings is governed by Rule 8-131.2 Section (a) of the rule provides that
an appellate court cannot decide an issue that does not appear in the
record and was not raised in or decided by the trial court.23 The purpose of this section is to prevent the procedural unfairness that would
15. Id. Specifically, DiPino stated in her affidavit that Davis's statements were made
louder than normal conversation and were "loud enough to be heard by the bouncer...
and all others in the vicinity." Id. DiPino stated the bouncer was the subject of an undercover narcotics investigation and that Davis's comment hindered her "ability to operate in
an undercover capacity." Id.
16. Id. Turner's affidavit was a response to Davis's assertion that Turner lacked any
basis to issue an arrest warrant, rather than a criminal summons, under Rule 2212(a)(1)(B). See supra note 12 (discussing Counts VIII and IX of Davis's complaint).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Davis v. DiPino, 99 Md. App. 282, 289, 637 A.2d 475, 478 (1994), rev'd, 337 Md. 642,
655 A.2d 401 (1995).
20. Id.
21. Davis, 337 Md. at 647, 655 A.2d at 403.
22. See supra note 3 for the text of the rule. Rule 8-131 is derived from former Rules
1085 and 885.
23. MD. R.8-131(a).
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result if ajudgment were reversed on appeal on issues that were never
raised nor decided below.24
It is a long-standing rule that the Court of Appeals shall in no
case decide any point or question that does not plainly appear by the
record to have been tried and decided by the court below.2" Before
the enactment of section (a) of Rule 8-131, the practice of not permitting an appellate court to decide an issue not raised in the trial court
was firmly entrenched in case law.2 6 In 1909, the Court of Appeals in
Ward v. Schlosse 27 traced the purpose of the rule back to the Act of
1825.28 The court stated that the purpose of passing the Act was
to remedy an evil which had been severely felt and loudly
complained of, that in this court the judgment of the county
court was reversed upon points never raised or decided below, and which, had they been there raised, would at once by
amendment or otherwise have been obviated and never been
presented for consideration by the appellate court.29
24. Ward v. State, 111 Md. 528, 534, 75 A. 116, 119 (1909).
25. See, e.g., Basoffv. State, 208 Md. 643, 650, 119 A.2d 917, 921 (1956) (holding that
when a party has the option whether to object or not to object, failure to exercise this
option while it is still within the power of the trial court to correct the error is regarded as a
waiver of it, estopping him from obtaining a review of the point or question on appeal);
Banks v. State, 203 Md. 488, 495, 102 A.2d 267, 271 (1954) (noting that the rule was
adopted to ensure fairness for all parties in a case and to promote the orderly administration of the law in both civil and criminal cases); Davis v. State, 189 Md. 269, 273, 55 A.2d
702, 704 (1947) (ruling that it is still necessary for the purpose of appeal that some objection be made and that the court below rule on the question in order for the Court of
Appeals to review); Courmey v. State, 187 Md. 1, 5, 48 A.2d 430, 431 (1946) (stating that in
the absence of a ruling by the court below, there is nothing for the Court of Appeals to
review) (citing O'Connor v. Estevez, 182 Md. 541, 546, 35 A_2d 148, 151 (1943)).
26. Friedman v. Clark, 252 Md. 26, 31, 248 A.2d 867, 870 (1969) (stating section (a) of
Rule 8-131 reflects long-established practice); see also Gordon v. State Nat'l Bank, 249 Md.
378, 383, 239 A.2d 915, 918 (1968) (stating that the rule follows the practice that has
existed since 1825 (citing Mundell v. Perry, 2 G. &J. 193 (1830)).
27. 111 Md. 528, 75 A. 116 (1909).
28. Id. at 534, 75 A. at 119. The Act of 1825, chapter 117 (codified at MD. ANN. CODE
art. 5, § 12 (1994)) states in pertinent part:
That in no case wherein a judgment may hereafter be rendered in any county
court, and which may be removed to the court of appeals, by appeal or writ of
error, shall the appellant or plaintiff in error, or the appellee or defendant in
error, be permitted to urge or insist upon any point or question which shall not
appear by the record to have been raised or made in the county court, and upon
which that court may have rendered judgment; and the court of appeals shall not
reverse or affirm any such judgment on any point or question which shall not
appear to have been presented to the county court, and upon which that court
may have rendered judgment.
Id.
29. Ward, 111 Md. at 534, 75 A. at 119.
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In the 1954 case of Banks v. State,3 0 the Court of Appeals held that
Rule 8-131 (a) applied to both civil and criminal cases."1 The court
reiterated that the primary purpose of the rule was "to ensure fairness
for all parties in a case and to promote the orderly administration of
the law." 2
Rule 8-131 (a) was further explained by the court in Clayman v.
Prince George's County.3 3 The Clayman court refused to consider the
issue of standing on appeal because there was nothing in the record
that showed that the question of standing was argued before the lower
court, and there was no mention of the issue in the briefs of the appellants or the appellee.'M The court reiterated its concern for the interest of fairness to all parties in a case and stated that providing fairness
to the parties may be accomplished by
requir[ing] counsel to bring the position of their client to
the attention of the lower court at the trial so that the trial
court can pass upon, and possibly correct any errors in the
proceedings,33 and .. .prevent[ing] the trial of cases in a
piecemeal fashion,3 6 thus accelerating the termination of
litigation. 7
Robeson v. State 8 broadened the scope of appellate review by establishing exceptions to this narrow rule. The Court of Appeals stated
that it will ordinarily affirm a judgment on any ground adequately
30. 203 Md. 488, 102 A-2d 267 (1954).
31. Id. at 495, 102 A.2d at 271; see also Basoffv. State, 208 Md. 643, 650, 119 A.2d 917,
921 (1956) (holding that in a criminal case, the rule that the Court of Appeals shall not
decide any point that does not plainly appear by the record to have been tried and decided
by the court below applies).
32. Banks, 203 Md. at 495, 102 A.2d at 271; see also Brice v. State, 254 Md. 655, 661, 255
A.2d 28, 31 (1969) (reversing the criminal conviction of a defendant who, to the best of his
ability, attempted to record his objections to the court's failure to dispose of the motion to
dismiss that he had filed on his own behalf and remanding for new trial); Basoff, 208 Md. at
650, 119 A.2d at 921.
33. 266 Md. 409, 292 A.2d 689 (1972).
34. Id. at 415-16, 292 A.2d at 693.
35. Id. at 416, 292 A.2d at 693 (citing Lane v. State, 226 Md. 81, 89, 172 A.2d 400, 404
(1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 993 (1962)). In Lane, the court stated that one of the principal objectives of Rule 885 (now codified at section (a) of Rule 8-131) is "to require counsel
to call any irregularity in the proceedings to the trial court's attention, so that it may be
corrected, if possible, as the Court of Appeals does not sit to review the wisdom of, or
correct possible errors in, the trial tactics of counsel for the respective parties." Lane, 226
Md. at 89, 172 A.2d at 404.
36. See State v. Zimmerman, 261 Md. 11, 25, 273 A.2d 156, 163 (1971) (stating that
"[the interest ofjustice is best served if there are not piecemeal appeals").
37. Clayman, 266 Md. at 416, 292 A.2d at 693 (citing Hewitt v. State, 242 Md. 111, 11314, 218 A.2d 19, 20-21 (1966)).
38. 285 Md. 498, 403 A.2d 1221 (1979), ert. denied, 444 U.S. 1021 (1981).
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shown by the record, whether or not it was raised by the parties or
relied on by the trial court.3 9 Thus, an appellate court could affirm a
trial court's holding for different grounds than those relied on by the
lower court.' ° The Robeson court allowed the State to raise the issue of
harmless error for the first time in the Court of Appeals, stating that
there are well-recognized exceptions to the narrow scope of appellate
review. 4 ' "One exception is where the record in a case adequately
demonstrates that the decision of the trial court was correct, although
on a ground not relied upon by the trial court and perhaps not even
raised by the parties .... "42 The court justified its resolution of the
case on grounds of judicial economy.43
After Robeson, the scope of appellate review was litigated in a
number of cases. The day after the Court of Appeals decided Robeson,
the court handed down Offutt v. Montgomery County Board of Education," which, like Robeson, noted that an appellate court may affirm on
any ground in the record.4 5
The scope of appellate review was further broadened by the
Court of Appeals in Moats v. City of Hagerstown. 6 In Moats, law enforcement officers charged with intentionally misrepresenting facts on
overtime reports sought to waive the procedure under the Law Enforcement Officers' Bill of Rights (LEOBOR) and pursue a grievance
under a collective bargaining agreement." The Court of Appeals
ruled that the Court of Special Appeals properly raised sua sponte an
important policy issue concerning the exclusivity of the administrative
procedure under LEOBOR.48 The Moats court recognized that be39. Id. at 501-02, 403 A.2d at 1223.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 502, 403 A.2d at 1223.
42. Id.
43. Id. This was explained by the Supreme Court in Securities & Exch. Comm'n v.
Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 88 (1943). "It would be wasteful to send a case back to a lower
court to reinstate a decision which it had already made but which the appellate court
concluded should properly be based on another ground within the power of the appellate
court to formulate." Id.
44. 285 Md. 557, 404 A.2d 281 (1979).
45. Id. at 563 & n.3, 404 A.2d at 285 & n.3; see also Neville v. State, 290 Md. 364, 368-69,
430 A.2d 570, 572 (1981) (holding that under § (b) of Rule 8-131, an appellate court may,
on a direct appeal, affirm a trial court's decision on any ground adequately shown by the
record, even though not relied on by the trial court or the parties (citing Robeson, 285 Md.
at 503-04, 403 A.2d at 1224)); Van Wyk, Inc. v. Fruitrade Int'l, Inc., 98 Md. App. 662, 669,
635 A.2d 14, 18 (1994) (stating that an appellate court will affirm a trial court's judgment
on any ground adequately shown by the records, even a ground not relied upon by the trial
court (citing Robeson, 285 Md. at 502, 403 A.2d at 1223)).
46. 324 Md. 519, 597 A.2d 972 (1991).
47. Id. at 521, 597 A.2d at 973.
48. Id. at 526, 597 A.2d at 975.
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cause of important public policy considerations, there is a limited category of issues, in addition to jurisdiction, that an appellate court
ordinarily will address even though they were not raised by a party.49
Another circumstance in which the Court of Appeals will make
an exception to the general rule of appellate review is standing." The
court has held that in circumstances where absence of standing would
present an alternative ground for upholding a trial court's judgment,
an appellee is entitled to argue that ground in an appellate court."
Moreover, the court has stated that
even if lack of standing were not raised by the appellee, an
appellate court noticing the issue would normally consider it
sua sponte under the principle that a judgment will ordinarily be affirmed on any ground adequately shown by the record, whether
or not relied on by the trial court or raised by a
52
party.

The most significant modern case defining the scope of appellate
review is State v. Bell,53 which held that the Court of Special Appeals
did not abuse its discretion in declining to address a question that was
49. See, e.g., Muhl v. Magan, 313 Md. 462, 480-81, 545 A.2d 1321, 1330-31 (1988) (remanding the case of a physician who was denied a preliminary hearing before the Insurance Commission to challenge his insurer's refusal to cover obstetrical practice, under the
exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine for an agency preliminary hearing on the
complaint); Board of Educ. v. Hubbard, 305 Md. 774, 787, 506 A.2d 625, 631 (1986) (remanding the case of teachers who had filed grievances with the county board of education
until the teachers pursued and exhausted their administrative remedies before the State
Board of Education); Maryland Comm'n on Human Relations v. Mass Transit Admin., 294
Md. 225, 232, 499 A.2d 385, 388 (1982) (remanding the case and reversing the circuit
court's granting of declaratory judgment for an employer who refused to hire the plaintiff

because of obesity pursuant to the circuit court's interpretation that obesity was not a
handicap within the state anti-discrimination in employment statute); Secretary, Dep't of
Human Resources v. Wilson, 286 Md. 639, 644-55, 409 A.2d 713, 717 (1979) (remanding
the case of whether claimants were eligible to receive an increased weekly unemployment
benefit provided by statutory amendment for their previously filed claims until they exhausted their administrative remedy before the Board of Appeals of Employment Security
Administration).
50. Joseph H. Munson Co. v. Secretary of State, 294 Md. 160, 167, 448 A.2d 935, 939
(1982), affd, 467 U.S. 947 (1984).
51. Id. at 167, 448 A.2d at 939 (citing Temoney v. State, 290 Md. 251, 261-62, 429 A.2d
1018, 1023 (1981) (stating that the principle that an appellate court will normally affirm
the trial court on a ground adequately shown by record, even though the ground was not
one relied upon by the trial court, is as fully applicable in the Court of Appeals as in the
Court of Special Appeals)).
52. Id. at 167-68, 448 A.2d at 939 (citing Robeson v. State, 285 Md. 498, 502, 403 A.2d
1221 (1979) (holding that an appellate court will normally affirm a trial court on a ground
adequately shown by the record, even though that ground was not the one relied upon by
the trial court), cert. denied 444 U.S. 1021 (1980)).
53, 334 Md. 178, 638 A.2d 107 (1994).
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raised by the State for the first time on appeal.5 4 The court reasoned
that it would procedurally prejudice the defendant to let the State
change its strategy on appeal concerning what constitutes probable
cause for police officers' warrantless search of an automobile, given
that the State's prior strategy dissuaded Bell from offering evidence
on the matters of probable cause and exigency of the circumstances. 55
The State, relying on Robeson v. State, 6 argued that the Court of Special Appeals should have affirmed the decision because an appellate
court has discretion to affirm a decision of a trial court on grounds
that had not been relied upon by either the trial court or the parties.5 7
The Court of Appeals held that the State misinterpreted the Robeson
ruling and stated that even though an appellate court has the discretion to review arguments not raised at the trial level, doing so is not
mandatory.58
The Bell court clarified Robeson: "Clearly, Robeson stands not for
the proposition that an appellate court must examine new, alternative
grounds for upholding a trial court's decision, but only for the proposition that it may do so if it deems such review appropriate." 59 The
court further explained that although an appellate court clearly has
the discretion to affirm a decision on a ground not raised below, this
discretion should be exercised only when it is clear that it will not
work an unfair prejudice to the parties or to the court. 60 The court
emphasized that "[t]he concept of fairness is necessarily implicit in
any 'entitlement' that may ordinarily exist for the appellee, and again,
the matter ultimately rests in the discretion of the appellate court."61
In recent cases, the court has continued to hold that the primary purpose of Rule 8-131 (a) is "to ensure fairness for all parties in a case and
to promote the orderly administration of law."6 2
In 1994, the court narrowed the discretion of an appellate court
to review an issue of first impression in County Council v. Offen.6 3 In
Offen, the court held that the Court of Special Appeals abused its discretion under Rule 8-131 (a) by raising sua sponte the doctrine of zon54. Id. at 187-91, 638 A.2d at 112-14.
55. Id. at 189-91, 638 A.2d at 113-14.
56. 285 Md. 498, 403 A.2d 1221 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1021 (1981); see supra
notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
57. Be/! 334 Md. at 187, 638 A.2d at 112-13.
58. Id. at 187-88, 638 A.2d at 112-13.
59. Id., 638 A.2d at 112.
60. Id. at 189, 638 A.2d at 113.
61. Id. at 189 n.5, 638 A.2d at 113 n.5; see also MD. R. 8-131(a); supra note 3.
62. Bel. 334 Md. at 189, 638 A.2d at 113 (citing Brice v. State, 254 Md. 655, 661, 255
A.2d 28, 31 (1969)).
63. 334 Md. 499, 639 A.2d 1070 (1994).
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ing estoppel.' Zoning estoppel was an issue of first impression in
Maryland because it had been neither briefed nor argued in either
the trial court or in the intermediate appellate court in any prior
cases; therefore, it was beyond the scope of appellate review of an administrative action.6 5 The court explained that the discretion that an
appellate court possesses to consider matters that were not relied
upon by the trial judge, or perhaps not even raised by the parties, 6 6 is
not unbridled and exceptions to the general rule should not be applied haphazardly.6 7 The Offen court stated that "[i]f an issue does
not fall within a common exception to the general 'raise or waive'
rule, an appellate court should weigh carefully whether its consideration of an issue not raised in the lower court is in fact 'necessary or
desirable to guide the trial court or to avoid the expense and delay of
another appeal' before it exercises its discretion under Rule 8131 (a)." 6 8
3. The Court's Reasoning.-The Davis court held that an appellate court cannot determine that a lower court improperly granted
summary judgment and still affirm the trial court's judgment based on
the plaintiffs failure to plead any claim upon which relief can be
granted, when the motion to dismiss was not argued or decided at the
trial level.6 9 In so ruling, the Court of Appeals maintained the scope
of appellate review contemplated by Rule 8-131 (a).7'
In its opinion, the Court of Appeals first discussed the distinctions between the legal standards of a motion to dismiss and a motion
for summary judgment, according to the Maryland Rules of Civil Procedure.7 1 Pursuant to Rule 2-322(b) (2),72 dismissal is proper only if
the facts alleged in the complaint fail to state a cause of action.73 In
64. Id. at 511, 639 A.2d at 1076.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 508-09, 639 A.2d at 1074-75; see also Bell, 334 Md. at 187, 638 A.2d at 112
(declining to exercise discretion to consider the State's probable cause argument, which
was raised for the first time on appeal); Crown Oil & Wax Co. v. Glen Const. Co., Inc., 320
Md. 546, 561, 578 A.2d 1184, 1191 (1990) (stating that the court had in its discretion the
ability to consider a party's "successorship theory" in order to avoid unnecessary expense
and delay even though it was not previously asserted in the lower court).
67. Offen, 334 Md. at 508-09, 639 A.2d at 1074-75.
68. Id. at 510, 639 A.2d at 1075.
69. Davis, 337 Md. at 648, 655 A.2d at 404.
70. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
71. Davis, 337 Md. at 648-49, 655 A.2d at 404.
72. Rule 2-322(b) (2) states in pertinent part: "The following defenses may be made by
motion to dismiss filed before the answer, if an answer is required: ... (2) failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted . . " MD. R. 2-322(b) (2).
73. Id.
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contrast, the court noted that pursuant to Rule 2-501 (e),74 a motion
for summary judgment may be granted only if "there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and... the party in whose favor judgment is entered is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."75
The court next discussed the procedural prejudice that a plaintiff
would suffer if an appellate court were allowed to sua sponte grant a
motion to dismiss at the appellate level when the motion considered
at the trial level was one for summary judgment.76 The court examined Rule 2-322(c) 77 and reiterated that when a trial court grants a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, the court also has the discretionary authority to grant the
plaintiff leave to amend the complaint to cure any defects.7" The
court reasoned that because there is no such discretionary authority
to permit the amendment of the complaint subsequent to the grant of
74. Rule 2-501 (e) states in pertinent part:
Entry of Judgment
The court shall enter judgment in favor of or against the moving party if the
motion and response show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and that the party in whose favorjudgment is entered is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. By order pursuant to Rule 2-602 (b), the court may direct entry of
judgment (1) for or against one or more but less than all of the parties to the
action, (2) upon one or more but less than all of the claims presented by a party
to the action, or (3) for some but less than all of the amount requested when the
claim for relief is for money only and the court reserves disposition of the balance
of the amount requested. If the judgment is entered against a party in default for
failure to appear in the action, the clerk promptly shall send a copy of the judgment to that party at the party's last known address appearing in the court file.
MD. R. 2-501(e).
75. Davis, 337 Md. at 648, 655 A.2d at 404 (quoting MD. R. 2-501(e)).
76. Id. at 649, 655 A.2d at 404.
77. Rule 2-322(c) states:
A motion under sections (a) and (b) of this Rule shall be determined before trial,
except that a court may defer the determination of the defense of failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted until the trial. In disposing of the motion, the court may dismiss the action or grant such lesser or different relief as
may be appropriate. If the court orders dismissal, an amended complaint may be
filed only if the court expressly grants leave to amend. The amended complaint
shall be filed within 30 days after entry of the order or within such other time as
the court may fix. If leave to amend is granted and the plaintiff fails to file an
amended complaint within the time prescribed, the court, on motion, may enter
an order dismissing the action. If, on a motion to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as
one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 2-501, and all
parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 2-501.
* MD. R. 2-322(c).
78. Davis, 337 Md. at 648, 655 A.2d at 404.
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summary judgment, the plaintiff would be procedurally prejudiced.7 9
Additionally, the court pointed out that because arguments on an appeal of summary judgment focus solely on whether there are any disputes as to material facts, the arguments are not likely to address
whether the complaint failed to plead a claim upon which relief can
be granted.8" The court noted that even if he might not succeed,"
Davis should be given the opportunity to argue that the pleading adequately alleges or could be amended to allege a sufficient
cause of
2
action, and that dismissal is therefore inappropriate .
The Court of Appeals also reviewed its decisions in similar cases
to the one at hand,8" and found that "our cases have consistently held
that in appeals from either a motion for summary judgment or a motion to dismiss, an appellate court must focus on whether the trial
court properly ruled on the motion before it."84 Additionally, the
court examined the holdings of courts in other jurisdictions8" and
found that they also adhered to the rule that if a trial court never
79. Id. at 649, 655 A.2d at 404.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 651-52, 655 A.2d at 406.
82. Id. at 649, 655, 655 A.2d at 404, 406. The Court of Appeals confined its review of
the case solely to the pleading issues, and made no determination as to Davis's claim
against Commissioner Turner. Id. at 653, 655 A.2d at 406. Counts VIII and IX of Davis's
complaint alleged that Turner and other similarly situated district court commissioners
violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Articles 24 and 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights by
routinely issuing warrants without any finding of probable cause and routinely ignoring
the requirements of Rule 4-212(d) (1) by issuing warrants instead of a criminal summons.
Id. at 644, 655 A.2d at 402. The complaint sought injunctive and declaratory relief as well
as attorney's fees. Id. The court noted that in limiting its review solely to Davis's complaint, the Court of Special Appeals did not determine that the facts were insufficient to
establish that Turner acted with malice. Thus, the court reasoned that it is not inconceivable that Davis may be able to amend his complaint in order to sufficiently establish that
Turner acted with malice in violation of Rule 4-212(d) (1), entitling him to declaratory and
injunctive relief. Id. at 654, 655 A.2d at 407.
83. Id. at 650, 655 A.2d at 405; see, e.g., Antigua Condominium Ass'n v. Melba Investors
Ad., Inc., 307 Md. 700, 719-21, 517 A.2d 75, 84-85 (1986) (holding that an appellate court
could not consider a condominium developer's notice argument, allegedly supported by
discovery documents, absent an initial decision by the trial court). Cf Shofer v. Stuart
Hack Co., 324 Md. 92, 97, 595 A.2d 1078, 1080 (1991) (treating a motion to dismiss as a
motion for summary judgment because the circuit court relied on discovery material and
affidavits in ruling on the motion), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1096 (1992).
84. Davis, 337 Md. at 650, 655 A.2d at 405.
85. See, e.g., Perez v. Coast to Coast Reforestation Corp., 785 P.2d 365, 366 (Or. App.
1990) (deciding "to affirm the dismissal of a case on pure pleading grounds, when only
substantive legal reasons for dismissal were presented to the trial judge and when an
amendment might cure the defect" (citing Hendgen v. Forest Grove Community Hosp.,
780 P.2d 779 (Or. App. 1989))); Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 624-25
(Utah 1990) (stating that the court would not consider any evidence presented at a preliminary injunction hearing in determining whether the grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted was proper).
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decided whether the plaintiff failed to plead a claim upon which relief
can be granted, an appellate court should not consider that issue.8 6
The Davis court rejected Davis's reliance on Robeson 7 and Of88
futt. The court explained that "the issues decided by those cases at
the appellate level are clearly distinguishable"8 9 because it merely determined that even though the trial court reached its decision
through "faulty analysis," the issue was decided correctly, albeit for
different reasons.9" The court distinguished Robeson and Offutt by stating that they represent general exceptions to the rule.9 1 The court
pointed out that neither Robeson nor Offutt was "decided on alternative procedural grounds by substituting one motion, which was held to
be improperly granted, for another motion and then affirming the
judgment based on the alternative motion."9" Additionally, the court
emphasized that the general rule is that an appellate court will not
address matters that were not raised or decided in the trial court.9 3
The court concluded that the distinctions in legal standards between a motion to dismiss and a motion for summary judgment make
it unfair and prejudicial to a plaintiff for an appellate court to sua
sponte grant a motion to dismiss when the motion on appeal is one
for summary judgment.9 4 The court stated that "because the Maryland rules do not authorize a motion for summary judgment to be
converted into a motion to dismiss at the trial level, this conversion is
certainly inappropriate at the appellate level."9"
4. Analysis.a. Distinctions Between a Motion to Dismiss and a Motion for
Summary Judgment.-The Court of Special Appeals has observed that
"[a] motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action is a different animal from a motion for summary judgment."96 One way the
motions are distinct is in their standard of review. When reviewing a
grant of either a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judg86. Davis, 337 Md. at 649-51, 655 A.2d at 404-05.
87. 285 Md. 498, 403 A.2d 1221 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1021 (1980).
88. 285 Md. 557, 404 A.2d 281 (1979).
89. Davis, 337 Md. at 655, 655 A.2d at 407.
90. Id., 655 A.2d at 407-08.
91. Id., 655 A.2d at 407 (quoting County Council v. Offen, 334 Md. 499, 509, 639 A.2d
1070, 1075 (1994)).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 656, 655 A.2d at 408.
95. Id.
96. Hrehorovich v. Harbor Hosp. Ctr., Inc., 93 Md. App. 772, 784, 614 A.2d 1021, 1027
(1992).
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ment, the appellate court must determine whether the trial court was
legally correct; that determination depends on the nature of the relief
given. 9 7 A motion to dismiss is proper if a complaint does not disclose, on its face, a legally sufficient cause of action.9" In such a motion, a defendant typically argues that even if the pleaded facts are
true, the plaintiff is not entitled to recover under the law.99 Arguments are based on the complaint and the judge can grant the plaintiff leave to amend the complaint. 10 0
On the other hand, the grant of summary judgment is proper
only if there is no genuine dispute of any material fact and therefore
the movant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. 10 1
The standard for appellate review for a trial court's grant of a motion
0 2
for summary judgment is whether the court was legally correct.1
Rule 2-322 (b) 0 gives the trial court discretion to convert a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment; however, the
rules are silent as to whether a motion for summary judgment can be
converted into a motion to dismiss. Treating a motion to dismiss as a
motion for summary judgment would not lead to a different result or
any procedural prejudice to the plaintiff at the trial level because all
the parties are given a reasonable opportunity to present, in a form
suitable for consideration, any additional material pertinent to the
o4
motion.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 785, 614 A.2d at 1027 (citing Bramble v. Thompson, 264 Md. 518, 520, 287
A.2d 265, 267 (1972)).

99. Id. at 784, 614 A.2d at 1027.
100. Id.
101. MD. R_ 2-322(c); see also MD. R. 2-501 (e); Southland Corp. v. Griffith, 332 Md. 704,
712, 633 A.2d 84, 87 (1993); Brady v. Ralph Parsons Co., 308 Md. 486, 495, 520 A.2d 717,
722 (1987); Hrehorovich, 93 Md. App. at 785, 614 A.2d at 1027.
102. Southland Corp., 332 Md. at 712, 633 A.2d at 87-88 (citing Beatty v. Trailmaster, 330
Md. 726, 737, 625 A.2d 1005, 1011 (1993)); Rosenberg v. Helsinki, 328 Md. 664, 674, 616
A.2d 866, 871 (1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 3041 (1993); Presbyterian Univ. Hosp. v. Wilson, 99 Md. App. 305, 315, 637 A.2d 486, 491 (1993), affd, 337 Md. 541 (1995);
Hrehorovich, 93 Md. App. at 789, 614 A.2d at 1030 (citing Heat & Power Corp. v. Air Prods.
& Chems., Inc., 320 Md. 584, 591, 578 A.2d 1202, 1206 (1990)).
103. The last sentence of Rule 2-322(c) provides:
If, on a motion to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment
and disposed of as provided in Rule 2-501, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule
2-501.
MD. R. 2-322(c).
104. Hrehorovich, 93 Md. App. at 784, 614 A.2d at 1027; see also Antigua Condominium
Ass'n v. Melba Investors Ati., Inc., 307 Md. 700, 719, 517 A.2d 75, 85 (1986) (discussing the
discretion committed to the trial court to give plaintiffs the opportunity to present addi-
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On the contrary, if an appellate court were allowed to convert a
motion for summary judgment into a motion to dismiss and sua
sponte dismiss a complaint, the plaintiff would never have the opportunity to seek leave to amend the complaint to cure any defects.' 0 5
Furthermore, as the Davis court noted, because the arguments on an
appeal of a motion for summary judgment focus solely on whether
there are any disputes as to material facts, those arguments are not
likely to address whether the complaint failed to plead a claim upon
which relief can be granted.'
Thus, if the Davis court had ruled the
other way, a plaintiff would be procedurally prejudiced by not being
given the opportunity to argue that the pleading adequately alleged
or could be amended to allege a legally sufficient cause of action such
0 7
that dismissal would be inappropriate.
b. Procedural Prejudice.-The Davis court correctly maintained that the distinctions between a motion to dismiss and a motion
for summary judgment make it unfair and prejudicial to a plaintiff for
an appellate court to sua sponte determine that the plaintiff failed to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted and to grant a motion
to dismiss when the motion on appeal is one for summary judgment.1 0 8 The court examined the pleadings, proffers, and affidavits
presented in the case in the light most favorable to Davis, and found
that Davis may have been able to sufficiently allege that DiPino and
Turner acted with malice.' 0 9 Thus, the court concluded that Davis
was prejudiced as a result of the Court of Special Appeals's sua sponte
raising of the issue of the adequacy of the pleadings, because he was
precluded from either amending his complaint to plead a legally sufficient cause of action, or from having sufficient opportunity to prepare
an argument that he adequately plead a legally sufficient cause of
action."10
Had the Court of Appeals decided the other way and affirmed
the Court of Special Appeals's decision, it could have resulted in a
drain on judicial resources, as lawyers would be forced to argue
against the mere potential of motions, rather than the actual motion
itself. Plaintiffs' lawyers would have to routinely argue against the motional material when the court decides to treat a motion to dismiss as one for summary
judgment under Rule 2-322(b)).
105. Davis, 337 Md. at 649, 655 A.2d at 404.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id., 655 A.2d at 407.
110. Id.
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tion to dismiss in their pleadings, whether or not the motion was
plead by the defense, in order to adequately protect the viability of
their client's suit. Furthermore, it would have undermined proper
pleading procedures by encouraging crafty tactics on the part of defense lawyers, who could purposely wait until the appellate level to
bring a motion to dismiss, so that the plaintiff would not have the
opportunity to amend his complaint nor argue against the motion.
c. Recognized Exceptions to the Law of Appellate Review.-Under
Rule 8-131 (a), 1 the scope of appellate review is "ordinarily" limited
to questions raised and decided by the trial court. 1 2 Nevertheless, as
the rule employs the term "ordinarily," it permits exceptions and the
Court of Appeals has occasionally decided cases on issues not previ3
ously raised.' 1

One such exception that the Davis court discussed is the "faulty
reasoning" exception enumerated in Robeson and Offutt. In these
cases, the Court of Appeals found that "an appellate court might raise
an issue sua sponte in a situation in which a lower court decided a case
correctly but reached its result through faulty analysis... [and] affirm
the lower court on an alternative ground provided the record is adequate to support that ground." 4 This exception provides an important safeguard for the just resolution of a case.
d. OtherJurisdictions.-In Davis v. DiPino, the Court of Appeals examined how courts in other jurisdictions have dealt with the
issue of whether to dismiss a case on the grounds that the complaint
failed to state a cause of action when the issue was raised for the first
time on appeal.1 15 The court examined Perez v. Coast to Coast Reforestation Corp.,1 16 and found that the Oregon Court of Appeals ruled simi111. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
112. MD. R. 8-131(a); see supra note 3.
113. See, e.g., Squire v. State, 280 Md. 132, 136, 368 A.2d 1019, 1021 (1977) (holding that
unique factors existed where a Supreme Court decision handed down four days before the
defendant's trial made the trial court's burden-of-proof instructions prejudicially erroneous); Martin G. Imbach, Inc. v. Deegan, 208 Md. 115, 131, 117 A.2d 864, 871 (1955)
("Among the types of cases so excluded or excepted are those presented on demurrer ....
[0] ther cases which are also excepted or excluded are those arising on motions in arrest
ofjudgment which are considered to be on the same footing as demurrers as regards this
rule.").
114. Davis, 337 Md. at 655, 655 A.2d at 407 (quoting County Council v. Offen, 334 Md.
499, 509, 639 A.2d 1070, 1075 (1994)).
115. Id. at 649-51, 655 A.2d at 404-06.
116. 785 P.2d 365, 366 (Or. App. 1990) (holding that the trial court's dismissal of the
plaintiff's complaint on the ground that the law relied on by the Oregon employees did
not apply could not be affirmed on appeal as an alternative pleading basis, particularly
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larly to the holding in Davis. The court also noted that the Supreme
Court of Utah held similarly in the case of Colman v. Utah State Land
Board.11 7 In Colman, the court refused to consider any evidence
presented at a preliminary injunction hearing in determining whether
the grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted was proper, because the plaintiff did not have
the opportunity to submit other evidence to rebut the defendant's evidence."' Additionally, the court stated that if the trial court never
decided whether the plaintiff failed to plead a claim upon which relief
can be granted, an appellate court should not consider the issue." 9
Still other jurisdictions have ruled similarly to the Court of Appeals ruling in Davis, although not as strictly. The Iowa Court of Appeals held that a motion to dismiss cannot be sustained on appeal on
grounds not asserted in the trial court.1 "0 The Supreme Court of Hawaii held that affirmance of a trial court on a correct, alternative
ground not considered by the trial court is proper if the parties had a
full and fair opportunity to develop facts relevant to the decision. 2 '
Additionally, the Supreme Court of Oregon decided to allow looser
pleading practices when it held that when a trial court arrives at a
correct result based on different grounds from those which were more
proper as the basis for the result, the decision will be affirmed provided that the pleadings are sufficiently broad and there is sufficient
122
evidence in the record.
5. Conclusion.-Davis v. DiPino marks the first time that the
Court of Appeals confronted the question of the silence of the Maryland rules as to whether a motion for summary judgment can be converted into a motion to dismiss. The decision provides guidance to
Maryland courts and practitioners in the proper pleading of cases because it clarified that a motion for summary judgment cannot be converted into a motion to dismiss on appeal.
when an amendment might cure the defect and only substantive legal reasons for dismissal
were presented to the judge).

117. 795 P.2d 622 (Utah 1990).
118. Id. at 624-25.
119. Id.
120. See, e.g., Renander v. Inc., Ltd., 500 N.W.2d 39, 41 (Iowa 1993) (affirming the district court's granting of a restaurant's motion to dismiss a complaint from a customer who
demonstrated no right to recovery).
121. Geremia v. State, 573 P.2d 107, 113 (Haw. 1977) (affirming the judgment of the
district court after finding the plaintiffs had a full and fair opportunity to fulfill their burden of proof but failed to do so).
122. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Sevier, 537 P.2d 88, 98 (Or. 1975).
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Davis is unlikely to have a major impact on the way attorneys
plead their cases, because the Court of Appeals merely maintained the
scope of appellate review as contemplated in Rule 8-131 (a). However,
the decision is likely to serve as an incentive to practitioners to plead
their cases properly. The court's discussion is instructive for both
practitioners and the judiciary, because it stresses the importance of
proper pleadings, and defines the correct standard of appellate review. The practical effect of this decision is that plaintiffs will not be
prejudiced procedurally by the improper pleading practices of the opposing attorney.
KRiSTIN

L. MORRIS-McCoRMICK
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Toughening the Standardfor Recovering PunitiveDamages

In Ellerin v. FaifaxSavings, F.S.B.,I the Court of Appeals held that
a plaintiff may recover punitive damages in an action for fraud only
where the plaintiff proves that the defendant had actual knowledge of
the falsity at the time of the misrepresentation.2 The court concluded
that punitive damages are not recoverable in an action for fraud
where the plaintiff proves that the defendant acted with reckless indifference to the truth.' In reaching its conclusion, the court extended
the standard for awarding punitive damages in non-intentional tort
cases to an intentional tort case. The court distinguished between the
two knowledge elements of fraud: actual knowledge of the falsity and
reckless indifference as to the truth. It explained that in an action for
fraud only, the higher knowledge element of actual knowledge of the
falsity satisfies the actual malice required to sustain an award of punitive damages.4
This Note traces the history of fraud and punitive damages in
Maryland and argues that the court incorrectly modified the standard
for recovering punitive damages for intentional torts. The court
should have held that the actual malice required for punitive damages
is inherent in the elements of fraud. Such a holding not only would
have furthered the twin purposes of punitive damages-punishment
and deterrence-but also would have ensured that punitive damages
are awarded only in cases where the defendant's conduct is sufficiently heinous in character to warrant punitive damages.
1. The Case.-In 1982 Charles Ellerin and Louis Seidel formed a
limited partnership, Sherwood Square Associates (SSA), to acquire
and restore historic property in Westminster, Maryland.' Ellerin and
Seidel financed the project through three loans from Fairfax Savings
Bank, F.S.A. (Fairfax).6 As security for the loans, Fairfax took mortgages on the property and buildings.7 In addition, SSA required personal guarantees from Ellerin and Seidel.' Ellerin and Seidel's
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

337 Md. 216, 652 A.2d 1117 (1995).
Id. at 235, 652 A.2d at 1126.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 219-20, 652 A.2d at 1118.
The loans to SSA totaled $5,700,000. Id. at 220, 652 A.2d at 1118. The first loan

constituted a direct loan from Fairfax to SSA of $850,000. Id.
7. Id., 652 A.2d at 1119.
8. Id.
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attorney, R. Bruce Alderman, approved a final draft of the loan documents on December 22, 1982. 9
Each of the approved loan documents contained two principal
provisions, a loan agreement and a completion guaranty. The loan
agreements obligated SSA to construct and complete the buildings for
the project, and made Ellerin and Seidel personally liable as the general partners of SSA. 10 In the event of default, the loan agreements
provided, "'it being the intent that the Land, improvements and rents
to issue therefrom shall constitute the sole security and source of
funds for the repayment of the Loan' once the buildings were completed."11 Under the completion guaranties, Ellerin, Seidel, their
wives, and Tri-Ess Corp. 12 (the guarantors) were personally liable in
3
the event of default until SSA completed "acquisition" of the facility.'
On December 29 and 30, 1982, the parties settled on the loans. 4
The plaintiffs later contended that at the time of the settlement they
had not been informed of, nor were aware of, any changes to the loan
documents approved a week earlier. 5 Unbeknownst to them, Fairfax
made several substantive changes to the approved loan documents.
The changes extended the liability of the guarantors and SSA past the
acquisition date. 6 Under the modified loan documents, the liability
of the guarantors extended beyond acquisition of the facility and terminated once SSA had fully satisfied a newly inserted rent-roll requirement. 7 The rent-roll requirement imposed post-completion liability
on the guarantors until they leased seventy percent of the leasable
space in the completed facility. 8 The personal liability of the guarantors under the rent-roll requirement decreased according to a rent9. Id.
10. Id. at 221, 652 A.2d at 1119.
11. Id,

12. Tri-Ess was a corporation owned by Ellerin and Seidel that operated as the general
contractor for the project. Id at 220, 652 A.2d at 1119.

13. IM at 221, 652 A.2d at 1119. Acquisition was defined as "the acquisition, construction, rehabilitation, remodeling, extension, equipping and permanent improvement of the
Facility." Id. at 221 n.3, 652 A.2d at 1119 n.3. As defined in the original completion guaranty, "acquisition" extinguished the personal liability of the guarantors once they completed the buildings. Id. at 221, 652 A.2d at 1119.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 223, 652 A.2d at 1120.
16. Id. at 222, 652 A.2d at 1119-20. The Court of Appeals stated, "It is undisputed that
the preapproved loan documents were different from the documents signed at the settlement on December 29 and 30, 1982." &etat 221, 652 A.2d at 1119.
17. Id. at 222, 652 A.2d at 1119.
18. Id. at 221-22, 652 A.2d at 1119. In addition, the tenants had to be approved by
Fairfax. IM.
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roll formula reflecting the proportion of the leasable space actually
leased in the facility.19
SSA defaulted on the loans in November 1985.20 At the time of
default, SSA had completed the acquisition of the facility, but had not
satisfied the rent-roll requirement.2 1 Accordingly, the guarantors
were personally liable to Fairfax under the modified loan documents,
but would not have been personally liable if the original loan documents had controlled." Fairfax filed suit in the Circuit Court of Baltimore County against the guarantors for breach of the completion
guaranties, and against Ellerin and Seidel for default on the loan
agreements. 23 After the guarantors filed counterclaims, which included an allegation of fraud in the contract negotiations, the court
vacated confessed judgments in favor of Fairfax.24
In the circuit court, a jury found that Fairfax fraudulently inserted the post-completion guaranties into the loan documents without notifying the guarantors or SSA. 2 5 However, the circuit court
entered a verdict in favor of Fairfax on the ground that the guarantors
had ratified the fraud. 26 On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals reversed, holding that the trial court erred by instructing the jury that
the guarantors were barred from recovering damages if they had rati27
fied the fraud by continuing with the project.
After a second jury trial resulted in a hung jury, a third trial began in 1990.28 The trial court instructed the jury to consider whether
Ellerin or Seidel or their attorney knew that additional personal guar19. Under the rent-roll formula, the guarantors' post-completion liability could not

exceed $1,150,000 per IRB loan. Id. at 222, 652 A.2d at 1119-20. For an in-depth explanation of the rent-roll formula see Ellerin v. Fairfax Sav. Ass'n, 78 Md. App. 92, 97 n.4, 552
A.2d 918, 921 n.4, cert. denied, 316 Md. 210, 557 A-2d 1336 (1989).
20. E//erin, 78 Md. App. at 98, 552 A.2d at 921.
21. E//erin, 337 Md. at 222, 652 A.2d at 1120.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 222-23, 652 A.2d at 1120.
24. Id. at 223, 652 A.2d at 1120. The guarantors claimed that Fairfax fraudulently
changed the original loan documents approved by Alderman on December 22, 1982. Id.
The guarantors' additional claims of duress and negligent misrepresentation were defeated on summary judgment granted by the trial court in favor of Fairfax. E6ein, 78 Md.
App. at 100, 552 A.2d at 922. The guarantors claimed $6,000,000 in compensatory damages and $10,000,000 in punitive damages. Ellerin, 337 Md. at 223, 652 A.2d at 1120.
25. E//erin, 337 Md. at 223, 652 A.2d at 1120.
26. Id.
27. E//erin, 78 Md. App. at 109, 552 A.2d at 927. The Court of Special Appeals ruled
that a party has two alternatives when he discovers fraud. A party may repudiate the agreement and seek rescission, or ratify the contract and seek damages. Id.
28. E/lerin, 337 Md. at 225, 652 A.2d at 1121.
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antees had been inserted into the loan documents. 9 The jury found
that they did not know of the additions to the loan documents.3" The
court granted directed verdicts in favor of Fairfax based on the liability of the guarantors under the completion guaranties, and Ellerin
and Seidel under the loan agreements.3 1 The jury awarded the guarantors compensatory damages on the fraud"2 and emotional distress
counts, and $6,000,000 in punitive damages.3 3 Fairfax objected on
the ground that the trial court did not instruct the jury on the malice
required to support an award of punitive damages.'M The trial judge
overruled the objection, finding that the malice required for punitive
damages is inherent in the elements of fraud.3 5
Fairfax appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, 6 arguing that
the trial court erred by failing to give a jury instruction on the elements of fraud and by failing to give an instruction on the malice
required to justify an award of punitive damages.3 7 The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the award of compensatory damages to the guarantors and SSA on the ground that Fairfax did not object at trial to
the court's failure to instruct the jury on the elements of fraud."8
With respect to Fairfax's objection to the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the malice required for punitive damages, the Court
of Special Appeals reversed, vacated the award of punitive damages,
and remanded for a new trial on the issue of punitive damages.3 9
29. Id. At the third trial, Fairfax argued that it intended that the post-completion guaranties be a part of the agreement between the parties, and that their absence from the
documents given to Alderman on December 22, 1982 was inadvertent. Fairfax Say., F.S.B.
v. Ellerin, 94 Md. App. 685, 692, 619 A.2d 141, 144 (1993), affrd in pan and vacated in part,
337 Md. 216, 652 A.2d 1117 (1995). Ellerin and Alderman denied the occurrence of a
conference call in which loan terms, including the completion guaranties, were agreed
upon. Id. Ellerin brought forth evidence to show that he rejected a loan from another
bank because that bank required a post-completion guaranty of $1,300,000. Id.
30. El/erin, 337 Md. at 225, 652 A.2d at 1121.
31. E//erin, 94 Md. App. at 695, 619 A.2d at 145.
32. This amount included the $4,371,401.96 awarded to Fairfax on directed verdict.
Id. After the set-off against Fairfax's judgment, the actual compensatory damages awarded
to the guarantors totaled $2,650,695. ElLerin, 337 Md. at 226, 652 A.2d at 1122.
33. Ellerin, 337 Md. at 226, 652 A.2d at 1122.
34. Id. at 225, 652 A.2d at 1121.
35. Id. at 225-26, 652 A.2d at 1121.
36. F.S.B. v. Ellerin, 94 Md. App. 685, 619 A.2d 141 (1993), affd in part and vacated in
part 337 Md. 216, 652 A.2d 1117 (1995).
37. Id. at 689-90, 619 A.2d at 143.
38. Id. at 695-96, 619 A.2d at 145-46.
39. The Court of Special Appeals reasoned that the actual malice standard established
in Owens-Illinois v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 601 A.2d 633 (1992), governs an award of punitive damages in an action for fraud. Ellerin, 94 Md. App. at 714, 619 A.2d at 155. The court
stated that actual malice in the context of punitive damages is not inherent in fraud. Id. at
695-96, 619 A.2d at 145-46. The court held that in an action for fraud, additional aggravat-
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Both parties petitioned the Court of Appeals for writ of certiorari.
The court denied Fairfax's petition on the issues of liability and compensatory damages, but granted the guarantors' petition challenging
the grant of a new trial on the issue of punitive damages. °
2. Legal Background.a. Fraud.-McAleer v. Horsey4 1 is considered the seminal case
on fraud in Maryland. In McAleer, the court wrote:
If the defendant has made a false representation, knowing it
to be false, with intent to induce, and has thereby induced
the plaintiff to enter into a contract into which, but for that
representation, he would not have entered, and the plaintiff
has been damnified by the falsehood, a case of fraud is made
out and an action for damages is maintainable .... 42
The development of Maryland's fraud law culminated with the court's
enumeration of the five elements of fraud in Gittings v. Von Dorn.4" As
stated in Gittings, the elements of fraud are:
(1) [t]hat the representation made is false; (2) that its falsity
was either known to the speaker, or the misrepresentation
was made with such a reckless indifference to truth as to be
equivalent to actual knowledge; (3) that it was made for the
purpose of defrauding the person claiming to be injured
thereby; (4) that such person not only relied upon the misrepresentation, but had a right to rely upon it in the full belief of its truth, and that he would not have done the thing
from which the injury resulted had not such misrepresentation been made; and (5) that he actually suffered damage
44
directly resulting from such fraudulent misrepresentation.
Maryland law requires that a party prove the five elements of fraud by
clear and convincing evidence.4 5
ing factors or exceptional circumstances must be shown to meet the actual malice requirement for punitive damages. Id. at 714, 619 A.2d at 155; see also Fowler v. Benton, 245 Md.
540, 226 A.2d 556, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 851 (1967); Russell v. Stoops, 106 Md. 138, 66 A.
698 (1907).
40. EIJerin, 337 Md. at 219, 652 A.2d at 1118.
41. 35 Md. 439 (1872).
42. Id. at 454.
43. 136 Md. 10, 109 A. 553 (1920).
44. Id. at 15-16, 109 A. at 554.
45. Everett v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 307 Md. 286, 300, 513 A.2d 882, 889-90
(1986); Peurifoy v. Congressional Motors, Inc., 254 Md. 501, 517, 255 A.2d 332, 340
(1969); Aeropesca Ltd. v. Butler Aviation Int'l, Inc., 44 Md. App. 610, 623, 411 A.2d 1055,
1063 (1980); see also Bachrach v. Washington United Coop., Inc., 181 Md. 315, 321, 29 A.2d
822, 825 (1943).
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As the law of fraud has developed, the court has elaborated on
the knowledge element. In Robertson v. Parks,4 6 the Court of Appeals
stated that in an action for fraud, it is not necessary to show that the
defendant had actual knowledge of the falsity at the time of the representation. In Cahill v. Applegarth,4 7 the court directly addressed the
knowledge element of fraud and ruled that the defendant must act
with actual knowledge of the falsity or reckless indifference to the
truth.4 8 In Gittings, the court stated that a defendant's conduct may
amount to such reckless indifference to the truth as to be the
"equivalent to actual knowledge."49
b. Punitive Damages.-The law on punitive damages in Maryland is not as clear as the law on fraud. For the last century, the Court
of Appeals has wavered on the proper standard for recovering punitive damages. One of the first cases to consider punitive damages in
Maryland was Philadelphia, Wilmington & Baltimore Railroad Co. v. Hoeflich.5" In Hoeflich, the court explained that punitive damages are only
recoverable where there is "an element of fraud, or malice, or evil
intent, or oppression entering into and forming part of the wrongful
act."5 1 The Hoeflich court stated that punitive damages are awarded to
serve two purposes. First, they only should be awarded to punish the
wrongdoer for his evil intent.5 2 Second, they should deter similar con53

duct by others.

In Davis v. Gordon,5 4 the court reaffirmed its holding in Hoeflich
that punitive damages are awarded only to punish the defendant for
55
his evil intent and to deter others from attempting similar conduct.
In addition, the court established that negligence, no matter how
46. 76 Md. 118, 24 A. 411 (1892). "It is sufficient if the statement be made for a fraudulent purpose, and without a bonafide belief in its truth by the defendant ....
" Id. at 131,
24 A- 412 (1892).
47. 98 Md. 493, 56 A. 794 (1904).
48. Id. at 502, 56 A. at 797; see also Donnelly v. Baltimore Trust & Guar. Co., 102 Md. 1,
13, 61 A. 301, 306 (1905).
49. 136 Md. 10, 15, 109A- 553, 554 (1920); see also DonneUy, 102 Md. at 13, 61 A. at 306;
Boulden v. Stilwell, 100 Md. 543, 552, 60 A. 609, 610 (1905).
50. 62 Md. 300 (1884).
51. Id. at 307.
52. Id.
53. Id. The court also stated that "where the act, although wrongful in itself, is committed in the honest assertion of a supposed right-or in the discharge of duty, or without any
evil or bad intention, there is no ground on which such [punitive] damages can be
awarded." Id.
54. 183 Md. 129, 36 A.2d 699 (1944).
55. Id. at 133, 36 A.2d at 701.
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gross, does not support an award of punitive damages.5 6 The court
stated that the defendant must intend to do injury evidenced by fraud,
malice, or evil intent." The court's decision in Davis was significantly
modified by Smith v. Gray Concrete Pipe Co.5" In Smith, the court stated
that a party may recover punitive damages in certain automobile accident cases upon a showing of implied, rather than actual, malice.5 9
The court held that operating a motor vehicle with a wanton or reckless disregard for human life,6" with the known dangers and risks attendant to such conduct, provides the legal equivalent of malice
necessary to support an award of punitive damages.6 1 The court defined wanton, reckless disregard for human life as "such conduct as
would carry an implication of malice or from which one might determine the existence of actual malice."62 Thus, the Smith court extended punitive damages to a negligence action, where the
defendant's conduct falls just short of being willful or intentional.
The court explained that the negligence must be "of such an extraordinary (or outrageous) character as possibly to be the legal
equivalent of such actual intent or actual malice." 6"
In H&R Block, Inc. v. Testerman' the court refused to extend
Smith's implied malice standard to a negligence action arising out of a
contractual relationship.6 5 The Testerman court stated that Smith's test
for "wanton or reckless disregard for human life in the operation of a
motor vehicle" did not apply to torts arising out of a contractual relationship for two reasons.66 First, the tort and contract claims in Testerman did not involve conduct on the part of the defendant that
amounted to a wanton or reckless disregard for human life. 7 Second,
actual malice is required to recover punitive damages in a tort action
arising out of a contractual relationship.' The court defined actual
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. 267 Md. 149, 297 A.2d 721 (1972).
59. Id. at 173, 297 A.2d at 734.
60. See Conklin v. Schillinger, 255 Md. 50, 71, 257 A.2d 187, 198 (1969) (defining wanton, reckless disregard of the rights of others).

61. Smith, 267 Md. at 168, 297 A.2d at 731.
62. Id. at 167, 297 A.2d at 731 (quoting St. Paul at Chase v. Manufacturers Life Ins., 262
Md. 192, 238-39, 278 A.2d 12, 34-35 (1971)).
63. Id. at 166, 297 A.2d at 730 (quoting Conklin, 255 Md. at 71, 257 A.2d at 198).
64. 275 Md. 36, 338 A.2d 48 (1975).
65. In Testerman, the plaintiffs sued H&R Block, Inc. in both tort and contract, claiming
that H&R Block negligently, wantonly, maliciously, and intentionally prepared their tax
returns. I& at 37-38, 338 A.2d at 49.
66. Id. at 46-47, 338 A.2d at 54.
67. Id. at 47, 338 A.2d at 54.
68. Id.
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malice as "the performance of an act without legal justification or excuse, but with an evil or rancorous motive influenced by hate, the purpose being to deliberately and willfully injure the plaintiff."6 9
In Wedeman v. City Chevrolet Co.,7 ° the court refined its decision in

Testerman. The court explained that Testerman held that actual malice
must be shown to recover punitive damages for a tort arising out of a
contractual relationship. 71 However, punitive damages may be recovered based on a finding of implied malice where the tortious conduct
precedes the contractual relationship. 7 The court defined implied
malice as "conduct of an extraordinary nature characterized by a wanton or reckless disregard for the rights of others."7 3
In Schaefer v. Miller,74 the court reaffirmed the Testerman-Wedeman
standard. In a concurring opinion, however, Judge Eldridge sharply
criticized the Testerman-Wedeman standard, arguing that the standard
should be overruled because it is not supported by Maryland precedent nor followed by other jurisdictions.75 Judge Eldridge stated that
"the rule has utterly no relationship to the purposes of punitive damages, 76 leads to irrational results, 77 and has been arbitrarily and inconsistently applied."7" Judge Eldridge concluded that the court should
not award punitive damages in negligence actions absent a showing of
actual malice.

79

69. Id. at 43, 338 A.2d at 52.
70. 278 Md. 524, 366 A.2d 7 (1976). In Wedeman, the plaintiff sued the defendant for
fraudulently misrepresenting the condition of an automobile. Id. at 525, 366 A.2d at 7.
71. Id. at 528, 366 A.2d at 10.
72. Id. at 530-31, 366 A.2d at 11-12.
73. Id. at 532, 366 A.2d at 13. The court reasoned that implied malice is sufficient to
recover punitive damages in an action for fraud because "[they] are more likely to serve
their deterrent purpose in a fraud case than in most other instances of tortious conduct."
Id. at 531-32, 366 A.2d at 12. The court stated that "[t ] hose who are tempted... to engage
deliberately in fraudulent conduct for profit are more likely to pause and consider the
consequences if made aware that they may be compelled to pay more than the actual loss
sustained by the plaintiff." Id at 532, 366 A.2d at 12.
74. 322 Md. 297, 587 A.2d 491 (1991) (plurality opinion). In Schaefer, three judges
joined the opinion of the court and three judges concurred.
75. Id. at 312, 587 A.2d at 499 (Eldridge, J., concurring).
76. See supra text accompanying notes 51-53.
77. Judge Eldridge believed that the Testerman-Wedeman standard was irrational because the requisite malice did not depend on the conduct of the tortious party, but on the
time when the party committed the tortious act. Schaefer, 322 Md. at 321-22, 587 A.2d at
503-04.
78. Id. at 312, 587 A.2d at 499.
79. Id. at 332, 587 A.2d at 508. Judge Eldridge acknowledged that Maryland recognizes
a recovery of punitive damages based on an implied malice standard for certain torts. See
infra note 131 and accompanying text.
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In Owens-Illinois v. Zenobia,8 ° the Court of Appeals, building on
Judge Eldridge's concurring opinion in Schaefer, overruled the Testerman-Wedeman "arising out of contract" standard for punitive damages. The court stated that
[w] hether the tort occurred before or after the formation of
a contractual relationship should not determine whether actual or implied malice is required for allowing an award of
punitive damages. Rather, the availability of a punitive damages award ought to depend upon the heinous nature of the
defendant's tortious conduct.8 1
According to the court, "[a]warding punitive damages based upon the
heinous nature of the defendant's tortious conduct furthers the historical purposes of punitive damages-punishment and deterrence."8" The court held that to recover punitive damages in a nonintentional tort action, the plaintiff must prove that "the defendant's
conduct was characterized by evil motive, intent to injure, ill will, or
fraud, i.e., 'actual malice.'"8 " The court recognized that the actual
malice standard did not translate easily to a defendant's conduct in a
products liability case. The court held that the equivalent of actual
malice in the context of a products liability case is actual knowledge of
the defect and conscious or deliberate disregard of the foreseeable
consequences. 8 The Zenobia court declined to modify the standard
for recovering punitive damages in intentional tort cases. 8 5
In addition to adopting a new standard for recovering punitive
damages in non-intentional tort and products liability cases, the Zenobia court heightened the standard of proof required for recovering
punitive damages. The court held that to recover punitive damages a
plaintiff must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant's conduct was characterized by actual malice.8 6 The court ex-

80. 325 Md. 420, 601 A.2d 633 (1992).
81. Id at 454, 601 A.2d at 649.
82. Id., 601 A_2d at 649-50; cf Schaefer, 322 Md. at 321, 587 A.2d at 503 (Eldridge, J.,
concurring).
83. Zenobia, 325 Md. at 460, 601 A.2d at 652.
84. Id. at 462, 601 A.2d at 653. Subsequent non-intentional tort cases have followed

Zenobia's standard for recovering punitive damages. For example, in Komornik v. Sparks,
331 Md. 720, 629 A.2d 721 (1993), the court denied punitive damages in a negligence
action involving an automobile accident. The Komornik court emphasized that Zenobia
overruled the Smith implied malice standard for recovering punitive damages with regard
to products liability and non-intentional tort cases. Id at 729, 629 A.2d at 725-26.
85. Zenobia, 325 Md. at 460 n.21, 601 A.2d at 653 n.21.
86. Id. at 469, 601 A.2d at 657.
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plained that the heightened standard of proof would ensure that
punitive damages are properly awarded. 87
3. The Court'sReasoning.-In Ellerin, the court reviewed the standard for recovery of punitive damages in an action for fraud. Outlining the general purpose for awarding punitive damages, the court
observed that Maryland recognizes an award of punitive damages
where there is evidence of "'fraud, or malice, or evil intent."'8 8 The
award "'depend[s] upon the heinous nature of the defendant's tortious conduct,"' 8 9 and is given to punish the tortfeasor for his conduct
and to deter similar conduct from others.9" The court concluded
that, in most cases, an award of punitive damages is limited to situations in which the defendant's conduct is characterized by "knowing
and deliberate wrongdoing." 9 '
After tracing the rationale for awarding punitive damages in
Maryland, the court analyzed the two mental elements of fraud-a
deliberate intent to deceive9 2 and a knowledge requirement. The
knowledge requirement is composed of two alternative parts. The defendant must act with either actual knowledge of the falsity or reckless
indifference to the truth.9" The court defined reckless indifference to
the truth as "the defendant's awareness that he does not know
whether the representation is true or false." 94 The court emphasized
that reckless indifference to the truth represents a higher knowledge
87. Id.
88. Ellerin,337 Md. at 227, 652 A.2d at 1122 (quoting Philadelphia, Wilm., & Bait. R.R.
v. Hoeflich, 62 Md. 300, 304 (1884)). The court defined "actual malice" as intent to injure,
ill will, or fraud. Id. at 229, 652 A.2d at 1123.
89. Id. at 227, 652 A.2d at 1122 (quoting Schaefer v. Miller, 322 Md. 297, 321-22, 587
A.2d 491, 503 (1991)).
90. Id. at 228, 652 A.2d at 1123; see also Schaefer, 322 Md. at 321, 587 A.2d at 503.
91. Ellerin, 337 Md. at 228, 652 A.2d at 1123.
92. Id. at 230, 652 A.2d at 1124. The court based this statement on McAleer v. Horsey,
35 Md. 439 (1872), where the court wrote:
An action cannot be supported for telling a bare naked lie, i.e., saying a thing
which is false, knowing or not knowing it to be so, and without any intention that
another should rely upon the false statement and act upon it; but if a falsehood
be knowingly told, with an intention that another should believe it to be true and
act upon it, and that person does act upon it and thereby suffers damage, the
party telling the falsehood is responsible in damages in an action for deceit ....
Id. at 453.
93. E//erin, 337 Md. at 231, 652 A.2d at 1124.
94. Id. The court explained that a defendant acts with reckless indifference to the
truth where he makes a statement purporting to have actual knowledge, but, in fact knowing that he does not know the truth or falsity of the statement. Id.; see also Robertson v.
Parks, 76 Md. 118, 132, 24A. 411, 413 (1892).
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than negligence or gross negligence because the defendant knows
that he does not know the truth or falsity of the statement. 9 5
After examining the knowledge elements of fraud, the court analyzed whether the required malice for an award of punitive damages is
inherent in the elements of fraud.9 6 The court extended the reasoning of Zenobia to the recovery of punitive damages in an intentional
tort action, stating that punitive damages are recoverable in fraud
cases only where the defendant has actual knowledge of the falsity of a
statement and intends to deceive the other party with the statement.9 7
The court ruled that the reckless indifference to the truth element of
fraud is not sufficient to recover punitive damages because it does not
mean actual knowledge of the falsity.9 8
Having concluded that only actual knowledge of the falsity supports an award of punitive damages for fraud, the court explained that
the trial court's holding was too broad.9 9 Because the trial court did
not instruct the jury on fraud, the jury did not expressly find that any
officer or agent of Fairfax had actual knowledge of the fraudulent additions to the loan documents, or that any officer or agent of Fairfax
intended to deceive the guarantors into accepting the post-completion guaranties.'0 0 The court found that the failure to instruct the
jury on the elements of fraud was pertinent to the award of punitive
damages because actual knowledge must be found to support an
award of punitive damages.'' Therefore, the Court of Appeals vacated the award of punitive damages and remanded the case for a new
10 2
trial on the issue of punitive damages.

95. Ellerin, 337 Md. at 232, 652 A.2d at 1124-25; see also Cahill v. Applegarth, 98 Md.
493, 502, 56 A. 794, 796 (1904). The Ellerin court acknowledged that it has never decided a
fraud case where the knowledge of the defendant amounted to reckless indifference to the
truth. Ellerin, 337 Md. at 232, 652 A.2d at 1125.
96. Elerin, 337 Md. at 237, 652 A.2d at 1123.
97. Id. at 234, 652 A.2d at 1126.
98. Id. at 235, 652 A.2d at 1126. The court stated that "'reckless disregard' or 'reckless
indifference' concerning the truth of the representation falls short of the mens rea which
is required to support an award of punitive damages." I&. The court also overruled the
Court of Special Appeals by adding that additional aggravating factors are not required to
recover punitive damages in a fraud action where the defendant had actual knowledge of
the falsity. Id. at 236-37, 652 A.2d at 1127.
99. Id. at 241, 652 A.2d at 1129. The trial court held that the malice required for
punitive damages is inherent in the elements of fraud. Id. at 240, 652 A.2d at 1129.
100. Id. at 241, 652 A.2d at 1129.
101. Id. The Court of Appeals did not address the trial court's failure to instruct the jury
on the elements of fraud with respect to compensatory damages because the Court of
Special Appeals correctly ruled that Fairfax failed to make a timely objection at trial. Id.
102. Id.
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The court also commented on Fairfax's objection to the excessiveness of the punitive damages award. The court noted that upon
request, a jury should be instructed that punitive damages are not to
be disproportionate to the wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct
or his ability to pay."0 ' Furthermore, an award of punitive damages is
reviewable by the trial court for excessiveness.1 0 4 The court suggested
that statutory fines should be considered when a trial court reviews an
award of punitive damages.' 0 5 The court cautioned, however, that
such considerations should not serve as an absolute cap on the
10 6
amount that a jury can award as punitive damages.
Judge Bell wrote a concurring and dissenting opinion. Judge Bell
agreed with the majority that proof of additional aggravating factors is
not required to recover punitive damages in an action for fraud." 7
He also agreed that "actual malice" is the correct standard for recovering punitive damages in a fraud action.108 However, Judge Bell argued that the requisite mental state for punitive damages is inherent
in the elements of fraud. 0 9
Judge Bell argued that making a representation of fact with an
intent to deceive and with actual knowledge that the speaker does not
know the truth or falsity of the statement is equivalent to making the
statement with actual knowledge of its falsity, and is equally reprehensible." 0 In addition,Judge Bell argued that the jury was instructed on
fraud in terms of conduct, rather than the elements of fraud."' Because, in his opinion, a finding of fraud inherently includes a finding
of the mental state required for punitive damages, Judge Bell argued
that Fairfax should be liable for punitive damages based on
the jury's
2
finding of fraud even without an instruction on malice.1
Finally, Judge Bell questioned the majority's guidance regarding
excessive awards of punitive damages."' Judge Bell argued that, to
have meaning, the court's guidance must be construed as suggesting
103. Id. at 242, 652 A.2d at 1129-30.
104. Id., 652 A.2d at 1130.
105. Id. at 242 n.13, 652 A.2d at 1130 n.13.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 243, 652 A.2d at 1130.
108. Id. at 243-44, 652 A.2d at 1130.
109. Id. at 244, 652 A.2d at 1130.
110. Id., 652 A.2d at 1131.
111. Id. at 246, 652 A.2d at 1131. The trial court instructed the jurors that they could
award punitive damages in such an amount "'as in your sound judgment and discretion
you find will serve to punish [the appellee] for the conduct you have found it engaged in
this case.'" Id. (quoting the trial court).
112. Id., 652 A.2d at 1132.
113. Id
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the need for a cap on punitive damages. 114 He warned that instructing the jury to consider the maximum fines imposed by the
state, coupled with an instruction that these fines should not be used
as a cap, not only would confuse the jury, but "would tend to usurp
the jury function. "115
4. Analysis.a. Actual Malice Is Inherent in Fraud.-The actual malice required to support an award of punitive damages is inherent in the
elements of fraud.1 16 The contrary holding in Ellerin is based on too
subtle a distinction between the knowledge elements of fraud. In Ellerin, the court acknowledged that a person acting with reckless indifference to the truth and with an intent to deceive another acts with
greater moral turpitude than one acting with negligence or even gross
negligence.1 17 Prior Maryland decisions have described reckless indifference to the truth as importing knowledge to the actor, or as being
the legal equivalent of actual knowledge. 1 ' AsJudge Bell stated in his
concurring and dissenting opinion in Ellerin:
[M]aking a representation of a fact, with intent to deceive
and actual knowledge that the speaker does not know
whether it is fact or not, is as much a misrepresentation as
one made with actual knowledge of falsity and that actual
knowledge of the former is as reprehensible as actual knowledge of the latter.1 19
By treating equivalent states of mind differently when assessing punitive damages, the court makes a distinction where no supportable distinction exists.
When one considers that the definition of reckless indifference
to the truth requires that the speaker have "actual knowledge" that he
does not know the truth or falsity of the statement, the distinction
makes even less sense. Regardless of which knowledge element of
fraud is present, a defendant who commits fraud has actual knowl114. Id. at 246-47, 652 A.2d at 1132.
115. Id.

116. See id. at 244, 652 A.2d at 1130 (Bell, J., concurring and dissenting).
117. Id. at 231, 652 A-2d at 1124.
118. See Martens Chevrolet, Inc. v. Seney, 292 Md. 328, 334, 439 A.2d 534, 537 (1982)
(stating that reckless indifference is the equivalent of actual knowledge); Gittings v. Von
Dor, 136 Md. 10, 15-16, 109 A. 553, 554 (1920) (same); Donnelly v. Baltimore Trust &
Guar. Co., 102 Md. 1, 13, 61 A. 301, 306 (1905) (same); Boulden v. Stilwell, 100 Md. 543,
552, 60 A. 609, 610 (1905) (same); Cahill v. Applegarth, 98 Md. 493, 502, 56 A. 794, 797
(1904) (stating that reckless indifference imports actual knowledge).
119. E//erin, 337 Md. at 244, 652 A.2d at 1131.
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edge of his wrongdoing. The Ellerin court itself stated that "[w] hen a
tort [is] committed willfully and with knowledge of the wrong, instead
of by ignorance, mistake or negligence ...

it [is] committed with the

requisite 'bad motive' to allow punitive damages."1 2 0 As a result, the
court should have concluded that the speaker making a fraudulent
representation has acted in a sufficiently heinous manner to support
an award of punitive damages, regardless of the applicable knowledge
element.
In addition, the court stated that punitive damages are based on
the defendant's conscious wrongdoing. 12 1 A defendant who commits
fraud must have an intent to deceive and some form of actual knowledge, whether it be actual knowledge of the falsity or actual knowledge that the defendant does not know the truth or falsity of a
statement. Clearly, the defendant's intent to deceive, coupled with his
actual knowledge that he does not know the truth or falsity of the
statement, qualifies his conduct as a "conscious wrongdoing." Logically then, the court should have concluded that the mental element
required for an award of punitive damages is inherent in the elements
of fraud.
Moreover, in a fraud action, reckless indifference to the truth
does not mean constructive knowledge or substantial knowledge1 2 2
because the defendant has "actual knowledge" of the wrongdoing; the
defendant knows that he does not know the truth or falsity of the
statement. Applying similar reasoning leads to the conclusion that
reckless indifference to the truth does not mean "should have
known," as this term is used in negligence and gross negligence
cases.12 3 Ellerin and prior cases have made it clear that reckless indifference to the truth is a higher mens rea than negligence and gross
negligence. 124 In Maryland, reckless indifference to the truth is often
defined as being equivalent to actual knowledge of the falsity. 125 Because reckless indifference to the truth is equivalent to actual knowledge and is a higher mental state than constructive knowledge,
120. Id. at 233, 652 A.2d at 1125.
121. Id.
122. The Zenobia court found these states of mind insufficient to support an award of
punitive damages. Owens-Illinois v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 462, 601 A.2d 633, 653 (1992).
123. See Donnelly v. Baltimore Trust & Guar. Co., 102 Md. 1, 13, 61 A. 301, 306 (1905);
Cahill v. Applegarth, 98 Md. 493, 502, 56 A. 794, 796-97 (1904) (stating that failure to know
what the defendant ought to have known is not a high enough mental state to constitute
fraud).
124. Ellerin, 337 Md. at 231-32, 652 A.2d at 1124-25; see also CahiU 98 Md. at 502, 56 A. at
796-97.
125. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
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substantial knowledge, and negligence, the court erred in holding
that reckless indifference to the truth does not satisfy the actual malice requirement for punitive damages. Rather, the court should have
held that the malice required for an award of punitive damages is inherent in the elements of fraud, regardless of which form of knowledge
is found.
b. Zenobia Does Not Apply to Intentional Torts.-The Ellerin
court should not have relied on dictum in Adams v. Coates'2 6 to extend
Zenobia's actual malice requirement to an intentional tort such as
fraud.1 2 7 Zenobia made it clear that while its holding applied to nonintentional and strict liability tort cases, it did not modify the law on
punitive damages for intentional torts. 12 8 The Zenobia court stated
that Schaefer v. Miller"' reviewed, to some extent, the governing legal
principles concerning punitive damages with regard to intentional
torts."' Schaefer stands for the proposition that Maryland recognizes
an implied malice standard for punitive damages for certain torts.13 1
Therefore, while dictum in Adams suggests that Zenobia's actual malice
standard should apply to all tort actions, Zenobia itself does not seem
to extend its holding in this way. Based on this analysis, the Ellerin
court incorrectly relied on Adams as a basis for extending Zenobia to
intentional torts. It follows, therefore, that the court's restriction of
recovery of punitive damages for intentional torts to cases where the
126. 331 Md. 1, 626 A.2d 36 (1993).
127. Adams stated that the policy enunciated by Zenobia should apply to any award of
punitive damages. Id. at 13, 626 A.2d 42. The Adams court defined Zenobia's policy to
mean that punitive damages should only be awarded to punish the defendant for his
wrongful conduct and to deter similar conduct from others. Id. Also, punitive damages
should "depend upon the heinous nature of the defendant's tortious conduct." Id. (quoting Zenobia, 325 Md. at 454, 601 A.2d at 649). Finally, punitive damages should be awarded
to "punish a defendant whose conduct is characterized by evil motive, intent to injure, or
fraud." Id. (quoting Zenobia, 325 Md. at 454, 601 A.2d at 649).
128. Zenobia, 325 Md. at 460 n.21, 601 A.2d at 653 n.21 ("We shall not at this time...
reconsider or modify the legal principles concerning the type of conduct which will support an award of punitive damages in so-called intentional tort actions. ..
129. 322 Md. 297, 587 A.2d 491 (1991).
130. Zenobia, 325 Md. at 460 n.21, 601 A.2d at 653 n.21.
131. Schaefer, 322 Md. at 319-21, 587 A.2d at 502-03 (Eldridge, J., concurring); see, e.g.,
McClung-Logan v. Thomas, 226 Md. 136, 148, 172 A.2d 494, 500 (1961) (allowing punitive
damages in an action for wrongful conversion of personal property where the conduct of
the defendant is accompanied with recklessness); Dennis v. Baltimore Transit Co., 189 Md.
610, 616-17, 56 A.2d 813, 816-17 (1948) (allowing punitive damages in a false arrest action
where the defendant inflicted the injury maliciously or wantonly with extreme recklessness
or utter disregard for the rights of others); Nichols v. Meyer, 139 Md. 450, 457, 115 A. 786,
788 (1921) (allowing punitive damages in an action of trespass de bonis asportatiswhere the
defendant's conduct was reckless or wanton).
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defendant's conduct amounts to actual malice is erroneous. Neither
Zenobia nor Schaefer fully supports this argument.
c. Deviation from the Traditional Definition of Punitive Damages.-The Ellerin court's holding deviates from the traditional definition of punitive damages. Historically, Maryland has allowed recovery
of punitive damages in cases where there is an element of fraud or
where there is conduct characterized by fraud."l 2 In prior cases, the
court has not distinguished between the two forms of knowledge for
fraud in assessing punitive damages. In fact, the Ellerin court acknowledged that "[f]rom our earliest decisions to the present day, this
Court has consistently listed 'fraud' among the types of dishonest or
immoral conduct for which punitive damages are recoverable." ' Because a finding of fraud has been defined to be a sufficient element to
support a recovery of punitive damages, punitive damages should be
recoverable in a fraud action regardless of the form of knowledge
upon which the finding of fraud is based."3 4
d. The Court's Decision Does Not Furtherthe Purposes of Punitive
Damages.-The court's holding that only actual knowledge of the falsity satisfies the actual malice required for an award of punitive damages in an action for fraud does not further the twin goals of punitive
damages-punishment and deterrence. Requiring actual knowledge
of the falsity to recover punitive damages creates an incentive for a
defendant to avoid gaining actual knowledge as to the veracity of his
statement.1 3 5 The less a defendant knows about the truth or falsity of
a representation, the better off the defendant is in terms of liability."3 6
In Zenobia, Judge Bell observed that "[i] n cases where there is no actual malice, the totality of the circumstances may reveal conduct on
the part of a defendant that is just as heinous as the conduct motivated by that actual malice and, so, for all intents and purposes is the
same."13 7 While Judge Bell's criticism of the actual malice requirement was written in the context of a nonintentional tort and products
132. See, e.g., Zenobia, 325 Md. at 460, 601 A.2d at 652; Davis v. Gordon, 183 Md. 129,
133, 36 A.2d 699, 701 (1944); Philadelphia, Wilm. & Bait. R.R. v. Hoeflich, 62 Md. 300, 307
(1884).
133. Elerin, 337 Md. at 234, 652 A.2d at 1126.
134. The court tried to circumvent this analysis by stating that no cases of fraud based
on reckless indifference to the truth have been decided by the Court of Appeals. I& at 23233, 652 A.2d at 1125. However, the court did not cite any authority supporting its deviation from the traditional definitions of fraud and punitive damages.
135. See Zenobia, 325 Md. at 484-85, 601 A.2d at 665 (Bell,J, concurring and dissenting).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 481, 601 A.2d at 663.
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liability case, his reasoning carries even more weight in the context of
an intentional tort case such as fraud. Reckless indifference to the
truth, although not exactly the same mental state as actual knowledge
of the falsity, constitutes the type of egregious and heinous conduct
that punitive damages were developed to punish and deter.
e. An Actual Malice Standard Is Contrary to Precedent Allowing
Punitive Damages in an Action for Fraud.-Zenobia overruled both the
Testerman-Wedeman "arising out of contract standard" and the Smith
implied malice standard for punitive damage awards. Zenobia, however, did not overrule the principles set forth in Wedeman pertaining
to the recovery of punitive damages in an action for fraud. As the
Wedeman court stated, "[p]unitive damages are more likely to serve
their deterrent purpose in a fraud case than in most other instances of
tortious conduct.""' s The Wedeman court held that actual malice is
not required to recover punitive damages in cases of actionable fraud
preceding a contractual relationship.'3 9 Based on this holding and
Zenobia's self-imposed limitation not to modify the standard for recovering punitive damages for intentional torts, the Ellerin court erred in
holding that actual knowledge is required for recovery of punitive
damages in an action for fraud.
f Ellerin: Judicial Tort Reform?-The court's recent decisions concerning punitive damages will have a severe impact on a
plaintiff's ability to recover punitive damages in Maryland. By requiring a showing of actual malice, defined by Zenobia and Ellerin to include actual knowledge of the wrongdoing, and raising the burden of
proof for punitive damages to clear and convincing evidence, the
court precludes recovery of punitive damages in cases where the defendant's conduct is sufficiently heinous and egregious in character to
deserve a punitive damages award.
The court's decision in Ellerin may evidence an intent by the
court to force the legislature to more actively consider tort reform. As
such, it is not surprising that the Ellerin decision comes at a time when
interest groups are preparing for a major battle over tort reform in
the General Assembly. 140 Perhaps the court's recent decisions modifying the standards of recovery for punitive damages are an attempt to
138. Wedeman v. City Chevrolet Co., 278 Md. 524, 531-32, 366 A.2d 7, 12 (1976).
139. Id. at 532, 366 A.2d at 13.

140. SeeJane Bowling, An Uneasy Peace: Mayland Tort Reform InitiativesPut on Hold, DAMLY
REc., Feb. 9, 1995, at 1. Some of the interest groups involved in the tort reform debate are

the Maryland Chamber of Commerce, the Maryland State Bar Association, the Tort Reform Coalition, and the Maryland Civil Trial Lawyers Association. Id.
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steer the legislature in a clear direction concerning tort reform.
Whatever the court's motives, it should not involve itself in the tort
reform debate or take tort reform out of the hands of the legislature.
The court's recent decisions likely will fuel the tort reform debate
in Annapolis, not only because the court raised the standard for punitive damages, but also because of the Ellerincourt's comment concerning the excessiveness of punitive damage awards. The court's
discussion in Ellerin of the need to consider the maximum statutory
fines in Maryland to determine whether an award of punitive damages
is excessive likely will serve as the starting point for the next groundbreaking decision concerning punitive damages, or will serve as guidance to legislators seeking to place a statutory cap on punitive damages. In his dissenting opinion in Ellerin,Judge Bell stated "[i]f the
majority is not suggesting that the [statutory fines] constitute a cap...
it is difficult to understand the purpose of the footnote."1 4 Therefore, if the court is not laying a directjudicial foundation for placing a
cap on punitive damages, it is at a minimum suggesting a need for the
legislature to do so. In addition, the court is putting lower courts on
notice that punitive damages must be examined with extreme scrutiny
for excessiveness. This may cause lower courts to be overly reluctant
in allowing punitive damage awards, despite the presence of heinous
and egregious conduct.
5. Conclusion.-The court's decision in Ellerin erroneously extends Zenobia's actual knowledge requirement to intentional torts.
The court extended Zenobia to intentional torts by manipulating case
law and ignoring precedent that defined punitive damages as evil intent, ill will, or fraud. Based on precedent and the twin purposes of
punitive damages, the court should have held that punitive damages
are recoverable in an action for fraud, regardless of which form of
knowledge supports the finding of fraud. Such a finding would better
serve the punishment and deterrent purposes of punitive damages.
The court's decision will no doubt serve as the authority for modifying
the standard of recovery for punitive damages in all tort cases. There
is also little doubt that the court's decision will fuel the tort reform
debate in Annapolis, as legislators and lobbyists attempt to codify or
overturn the tort reform enacted by the Court of Appeals.
MARK W. CARMEAN

141. Ellerin, 337 Md. at 246, 652 A.2d at 1132 (Bell, J., dissenting).
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B.

Maryland'sRejection of Attractive Nuisance Doctrine

In Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Lane,' the Court of Appeals considered whether a utility company could be held liable for a child's
injuries caused by an empty cable spool left by a utility company near
a residential area and moved onto a playground by neighborhood
children.2 The court properly affirmed the decision of the Court of
Special Appeals to deny summary judgment in favor of the defendant
Baltimore Gas and Electric Company (BGE); 3 however, the majority
opinion adopted an illogical analysis to reach this result. Although
the court recognized the foreseeability of neighborhood children using the object for recreational purposes, Chief Judge Murphy based
the decision on an unfounded interpretation of the trespasser rule.4
In so holding, the court refused to follow the national trend of accepting the attractive nuisance doctrine.
1. The Case.-In June 1985 employees of BGE were engaged in
construction and maintenance activities near the Meade Village Housing Project.5 Upon completion of their work, the employees left an
"unattended, unmarked and unsecured" cable spool, weighing nearly
half a ton, in front of a day care center and in close proximity to the
community playground. 6 Tyrone Lane, a minor and a resident of
Meade Village, initially noticed the spool when several boys pushed it
into the playground and rode it down a hill.7 Lane attempted to repeat the boys' actions, but became scared and dismounted the spool,
after which it rolled over him and caused severe injuries to his face,
head, and body.8
With his mother as next friend, Lane filed a complaint against
BGE, alleging negligence in that BGE "knew or should have known by
the exercise of reasonable care that the.., spool was reasonably dangerous for . . . children . . .who might come into contact with it."'
BGE denied liability and filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming Lane to be a trespasser to whom no duty was owed other than to
avoid willful and wanton injury.' ° BGE further alleged that Lane's in1. 338 Md. 34, 656 A.2d 307 (1995).
2. Id. at 42, 656 A.2d at 311.
3. Id. at 53, 656 A.2d at 316.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 40, 656 A.2d at 310.

6.Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 41, 656 A-2d at 310.
9. Id. at 40, 656 A.2d at 310.
10. Id. at 41, 656 A.2d at 310.
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juries were not proximately caused by BGE's alleged negligence, and
that Lane's claims were barred by the defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk." Without explaining its decision, the
Circuit Court for Baltimore City granted BGE's motion for summary
judgment.1 2 Recognizing foreseeability as a question of disputable
fact, the Court of Special Appeals reversed, holding that "[r] easonable
persons could ...conclude that it is foreseeable that children would
move the spool to a nearby playground."1 3 The Court of Appeals
granted certiorari to consider: (1) whether, as a matter of law, the
trespasser rule precluded BGE's liability for Lane's injury; and (2)
whether foreseeable intervening acts precluded summary judgment
for BGE."4
2.

Legal Background.-

a. The Origin and Evolution of the Attractive Nuisance Doctrine.-According to traditional tort law, the extent of duty that an
owner or occupier of land owes to an entrant upon that land depends
upon the entrant's status while on the property. 5 Generally, a property owner owes no duty to a trespasser "except to refrain from willfully or wantonly injuring or entrapping the trespasser." 16 An
exception to this severe rule has developed, however, with respect to
child trespassers.
The United States Supreme Court first enunciated this special exception available to trespassing children in its 1873 decision, Sioux City
& Pacific Railroad v. Stout. 7 The Stout Court allowed recovery after a
trespassing child was injured while playing with a railroad turntable.'"
Under this new doctrine, a possessor of land was liable for injuries to
trespassing children caused by conditions or objects on the premises if
the possessor knew or should have known that the condition or object
was located where children were likely to trespass. 9 The doctrine
11.

Id.
12. Id. at 42, 656 A.2d at 310.
13. Id., 656 A.2d at 310-11.
14. Id., 656 A.2d at 311.
15. Wagner v. Doehring, 315 Md. 97, 101, 553 A.2d 684, 686 (1989); Rowley v. Mayor
of Baltimore, 305 Md. 456, 464-65, 505 A.2d 494, 498 (1986); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 58 (5th ed. 1984). Although traditional tort
law only recognizes the classifications of trespasser, licensee, and invitee, Maryland also
recognizes a distinction between licensee by invitation and bare licensee. See infra note 47.
16. Wagner, 315 Md. at 102, 553 A.2d at 687.
17. 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 657 (1873).
18. Id. at 662.
19. Id. at 661-62.
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thus required the occupier of land to exercise reasonable care to protect against possible injury to minors.2 °
Following the Stout decision, the Minnesota Supreme Court introduced the term "attractive nuisance" and articulated a modified approach grounded in allurement or attraction.2 1 The court based its
decision on the judicial fiction that enticement, i.e., the object or condition that attracted the child, substituted for an invitation and rendered the child an invitee.2 2 Accordingly, the enticement made the
defendant responsible for the trespass and estopped the defendant
from using the trespass defensively against the child.2"
In the 1920s courts modified the attractive nuisance doctrine to
better balance the conflicting interests of the child trespasser and the
landowner. 24 This approach discarded the necessity of allurement or
enticement onto the land and viewed the child-trespasser law as essentially an issue of ordinary negligence.2 5 Moreover, the fact that the
child was a trespasser was only one of the facts to be taken into account in determining the defendant's duty of care.2 6 In 1934 the
American Law Institute promulgated the Restatement of Torts, which
adopted this modified approach.2 7 The Restatement rule recognized
20. Id. at 661. The Stout decision was based on the foreseeability of injury to a minor,
rather than the minor's status while on the property. Id. at 660.
21. Keffe v. Milwaukee & SL Paul Ry. Co., 21 Minn. 207, 210-11 (1875).
22. Id. at 211.
23. KEETON ET AL., supra note 15, § 59, at 400.
24. Id. at 401.
25. Id. This negligence standard as applied to the landowner is illustrated in § 283 of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which asserts the standard to be that of a "reasonable man."
RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 283 (1965). Comment b of § 283 reads in pertinent
part "The words 'reasonable man' denote a person exercising those qualities of attention,
knowledge, intelligence, and judgment which society requires of its members for the protection of their own interests and the interests of others." Id. cmt. b. Foreseeability and
reasonable care provide the determining factors of reasonable conduct. Id. §§ 289, 290.
Foreseeability of injury is an essential, initial element governing liability of a possessor of
land for harm to a trespassing child. KEETON ET AL., supra note 15, § 59, at 401.
26. KEETON ET AL., supra note 15, § 59, at 401. The surrounding facts and circumstances must infer to an individual of reasonable intelligence that children are likely to
frequent the location. Id. Under this approach,
[n]egligence is to be determined by weighing the probability and the gravity of
the possible harm against the utility of the defendant's conduct. The public interest in the free use of land is such that, in general, [the landowner] will not be
required to take precautions which are so burdensome or expensive as to be unreasonable in light of the risk, or to make his premises "child-proof."
WILtIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS § 76, at 444 (2d ed. 1955); see also
State v. Baltimore Fidelity Warehouse Co., 176 Md. 341, 346-47, 4 A.2d 739, 741 (1939);
Glastris v. Union Elec. Co., 542 S.W.2d 65, 71 (Mo. 1976); Burk Royalty Co. v. Pace, 620
S.W.2d 882, 885 (Tex. 1981).
27. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 339 (1934), as modified by RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF
TORTS § 339 (1965).
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the child's status as a trespasser while imposing on the landowner a
28
limited duty of reasonable care toward the child.
b. Maryland's Rejection of the Attractive NuisanceDoctrine: A Minority Approach.--Section 339 regarding attractive nuisance has proven
to be "one of [the] most effective single sections [of the Restatement of
Torts] .,29 This section, as modified in the second Restatement, has been
cited frequently and generally has been accepted by state courts.3 0 In
failing to adopt the attractive nuisance doctrine," l Maryland remains
one of only three jurisdictions that has neither created a special duty
towards trespassing children in the form of the attractive nuisance
doctrine nor abrogated the distinctions of duty based on one's status
as invitee, licensee, or trespasser.3 2
28. Id.
29. KEETON

ET AL., supra note 15, § 59, at 402; see also infra note 32; PROSSER, supra note
26, § 76, at 440 (recognizing the widespread acceptance of the doctrine).
30. Twenty-twojurisdictions have adopted some form of the Restatement of Torts § 339 or
the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 339. See Taylor v. Alaska Rivers Navigation Co., 391 P.2d
15, 17 (Alaska 1964); MacNeil v. Perkins, 324 P.2d 211, 215-16 (Ariz. 1958); Wolfe v.
Rehbein, 193 A. 608, 609-10 (Conn. 1937); Beaston v.JamesJulian, Inc., 120 A.2d 317, 320
(Del. 1956); Cockerham v. R.E. Vaughan, Inc., 82 So. 2d 890, 892 (Fla. 1955); Wagner v.
Kepler, 104 N.E.2d 231, 233 (Ill. 1951); Brittain v. Cubbon, 378 P.2d 141, 145 (Kan. 1963);
Kentucky & Indiana Terminal R.R. v. Mann, 312 S.W.2d 451, 452 (Ky. 1958);Jones and
Billings, 289 A.2d 39, 43 (Me. 1972); Slinker v. Wallner, 103 N.W.2d 377, 380 (Minn.
1960); Arbogast v. Terminal R.R., 452 S.W.2d 81, 84-85 (Mo. 1970); Nichols v. Consolidated Dairies, 239 P.2d 740, 742 (Mont. 1952); Saul v. Roman Catholic Church, 402 P.2d
48, 49 (N.M. 1965); Dean v. Wilson Constr. Co., 111 S.E.2d 827, 832 (N.C. 1960); Mikkelson v. Risovi, 141 N.W.2d 150, 153-54 (N.D. 1966); Pocholec v. Giustina, 355 P.2d 1104,
1107 (Or. 1960);Jesko v. Turk, 219 A.2d 591, 592 (Pa. 1966); Morris v. City of Britton, 279
N.W. 531, 532 (S.D. 1938); Massie v. Copeland, 233 S.W.2d 449, 451-52 (Tex. 1950); Davis
v. Provo City Corp., 265 P.2d 415, 418 (Utah 1953), overruled in part, Johnson v. Salt Lake
City Corp., 629 P.2d 432 (Utah 1981); Massino v. Smaglick, 89 N.W.2d 223, 226 (Wis.
1958); Afton Elec. Co. v. Harrison, 54 P.2d 540, 545 (Wyo. 1936).
31. Murphy v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 290 Md. 186, 190-91, 428 A.2d 459, 462-63
(1981).
32. Other than Maryland, only Vermont and Ohio have refused to provide a special
duty of care towards children injured while trespassing. Hannan v. Ehrlich, 131 N.E. 504,
508 (Ohio 1921) (asserting that the attractive nuisance doctrine would impose a "greater
burden and higher duty for the protection of children" on the community than the child's
parents); Hillier v. Noble, 458 A.2d 1101, 1103 (Vt. 1983) ("Our rule is that the owner or
occupant is under no obligation to a trespasser, whether adult or child, to protect him
from injury by reason of the unsafe and dangerous conditions of the premises." (quoting
Trudo v. Lazarus, 73 A.2d 306, 307 (Vt. 1950))). However, it appears that Ohio may be on
the verge of adopting a version of the attractive nuisance doctrine. See Wills v. Frank Hoover Supply, 497 N.E.2d 1118, 1122 (Ohio 1986) (reversing lower court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of lessor where issue still remained as to whether risks and injury were
foreseeable); Elliott v. Nagy, 488 N.E.2d 853, 856 (Ohio 1986) ("We hold that the attractive
nuisance doctrine will not extend tort liability to the owner of a home swimming pool
where the presence of a child who was injured or drowned therein was not foreseeable by
the property owner.").
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Maryland courts consistently have held that the doctrine of attractive nuisance does not apply in the state, and that only accepted tort
principles can determine the liability of the parties.3 " Since 1894, in
Mergenthalerv. Kirby,3 4 Maryland courts have expressly rejected any exception to the rule that trespassers take the premises as they find
them.35 The Court of Appeals identified the Maryland formulation of
the trespasser rule in Macke Laundry Service Co. v. Weber,36 stating that
"a landowner is obliged to accord to a trespasser, even one of tender
years, a duty which does not transcend the obligation to abstain from
3T
willful or wanton misconduct and entrapment."
Maryland courts offered little explanation for their rejection of
the attractive nuisance doctrine. In the majority of decisions regarding child trespassers, the courts merely recited boilerplate statements
dismissing the validity of the doctrine.a In State v. Baltimore Fidelity
Warehouse,3 9 the Court of Appeals acknowledged the societal value of
the attractive nuisance doctrine, yet rejected the rule based on precedent. Judge Parke explained:
Although the doctrine of attractive nuisance is supported by
arguments which are rooted in the policy of the law to establish rules which tend to safeguard life and to keep persons
from bodily harm, nevertheless this Court has not applied
the doctrine of attractive nuisance, but has left the right and
33. State v. Baltimore Fidelity Warehouse Co., 176 Md. 341, 349, 4 A.2d 739, 742
(1939) ("The trespasser must accept the property as he finds it and the general rule is that
the occupier of property owes no duty to trespassers except to refrain from wilfully [sic]
injuring them.").
34. 79 Md. 182, 28 A. 1065 (1894).
35. Herring v. Christensen, 252 Md. 240, 241, 249 A.2d 718, 719 (1969).
36. 267 Md. 426, 298 A.2d 27 (1972).
37. Id. at 428, 298 A.2d at 29; see also Fopma v. Board of County Comm'rs, 254 Md. 232,
234, 254 A.2d 351, 352 (1969); Herring,252 Md. at 241, 249 A.2d at 719; Levine v. Miller,
218 Md. 74, 79, 145 A.2d 418, 421 (1958).
38. See Murphy v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 290 Md. 186, 195, 428 A.2d 459, 465
(1981) ("Moreover, the 'attractive nuisance doctrine' has been expressly rejected in this
State."); Macke Laundry Serv. Co. v. Weber, 267 Md. 426, 428, 298 A.2d 27, 29 (1972)
("Nothing is more certain than that we have consistently declined to adopt the doctrine of
attractive nuisance in cases involving children who are licensees or trespassers."); Hicks v.
Hitaffer, 256 Md. 659, 669, 261 A.2d 769, 773 (1970) ("The attractive nuisance doctrine
has not been adopted in Maryland."); Hensley v. Henkels & McCoy, Inc., 258 Md. 397, 411,
265 A.2d 897, 905 (1970) ("Maryland has specifically rejected the attractive nuisance doctrine."); Ritter v. City of Baltimore, 219 Md. 477, 478, 150 A.2d 260, 261 (1959) ("[The
attractive nuisance doctrine] is not accepted in this State."); Conrad v. City of Takoma
Park, 208 Md. 363, 369, 118 A.2d 497, 499 (1955) ("[The attractive nuisance doctrine] has
not been recognized in Maryland.").
39. 176 Md. 341, 4 A.2d 739 (1939).
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liability of the parties for solution in accordance with the applicable principles of torts.40
Only one Maryland case has explained its rejection of the doctrine.4"
In Mondshour v. Moore,4 2 the Court of Appeals asserted that "a rigid
adherence to fundamental principles at all times and a stem insensibility to the results which an unvarying enforcement of those principles may occasionally entail, are the surest, if not the only, means by
which stability and certainty in the administration of the law may be
43
secured."
3. The Court's Reasoning.-The Lane court held that the circuit
court's decision was not appropriate because unresolved questions of
material fact precluded summary judgment.' Writing for the majority, Chief Judge Murphy based his decision on two theories: the trespasser rule and the theory of proximate cause.4"
The majority grounded its reasoning in the premise that the extent of duty, owed by a possessor of property to those who come in
contact with it, depends on the person's status while on the property.46 In determining the level of care required, the court recognized
four classifications of status: invitee, licensee by invitation, bare licensee, and trespasser.4 7 The majority emphasized that these classifications apply to both personal property and real property. Therefore,
the court explained that "[i] t is possible ... for a person to trespass
40. Id. at 349, 4 A.2d at 742.
41. Mondshour v. Moore, 256 Md. 617, 624, 261 A.2d 482, 485 (1970).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 617, 261 A.2d at 482 (quoting Demuth v. Old Town Bank, 85 Md. 315, 319-20,
37 A- 266, 266 (1897)).
44. 338 Md. at 47, 53, 656 A.2d at 313, 316.
45. Id. at 42, 656 A.2d at 311.
46. Id. at 44, 656 A.2d at 311; see also Wagner v. Doehring, 315 Md. 97, 101, 553 A.2d
684, 686 (1989) ("In Maryland, the liability of an owner of real property is dependent

upon the standard of care owed to an individual ...

[which] depends upon the individ-

ual's status while on the real property.").
47. Lane, 338 Md. at 44, 656 A.2d at 312. The court stated:

To an invitee-one on the property for a purpose related to the possessor's business-the possessor owes a duty of ordinary care to keep the property safe for the
invitee. To a licensee by invitation-essentially a social guest-the possessor owes
a duty to exercise reasonable care to warn the guest of dangerous conditions that
are known to the possessor but not easily discoverable. To a bare licensee-one

on the property with permission but for his or her own purposes-the possessor
owes a duty only to refrain from willfully or wantonly injuring the licensee and
from creating "new and undisclosed sources of danger without warning the licensee." To a trespasser-one on the property without permission-the possessor
owes no duty "except to refrain from willfully or wantonly injuring or entrapping
the trespasser."

Id. (citations omitted).
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upon personal property without trespassing on the real property upon
48
which the personal property sits."
Chief Judge Murphy further asserted that the requisite duty flows
from the possession of property, rather than the ownership of it.49
Relief of the duties associated with the possession occurs when an
owner relinquishes possession. 50 However, as the majority noted, the
former possessor cannot escape liability by claiming that the injury
occurred while the plaintiff trespassed on property that it no longer
possessed because the tort of trespass, by definition, requires infringement on an owner's right of possession. Applying such a rationale
to the facts at hand, the court concluded that Lane did not trespass on
the spool because BGE lost both actual and constructive possession of
the object prior to the time of the alleged trespass.5 2
The court reemphasized the inappropriate nature of summary
judgment in its discussion of proximate cause.5" Citing Lashley v. Dawson,54 the majority noted that "[t]he true rule is that what is proximate
cause of an injury is ordinarily a question for the jury. It is only when
the facts are undisputed, and susceptible of but one inference, that
the question is one of law for the court."5 5 A reasonable fact-finder,
according to ChiefJudge Murphy, could find it foreseeable that, when
BGE left the spool near a residential neighborhood, children would
use the object for recreational purposes. 56 Thus, the majority held
that the matter of foreseeability was an issue of material fact that required jury determination.5 7
Judge Chasanow, joined by Judge Bell, concurred with the majority's holding but wrote separately to provide an alternative legal analy48. Id. at 45, 656 A.2d at 312.
49. Id. The court stated that "[p]ossession involves both the present intent to control
to object and some ability to control it." Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS
§§ 216, 328E (1965); Rowley v. Mayor of Baltimore, 305 Md. 456, 464, 505 A.2d 494, 498
(1986) (defining liability of a landowner as dependent upon whether the device causing
injury was in his possession and control)).
50. Id. at 46, 656 A.2d at 313.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 47-48, 656 A.2d at 313-14. The court provided two alternative explanations
for BGE's loss of possession: (1) that BGE had vacated the construction site and had given
up all physical control over the spool; or (2) that BGE lost possession of the object when
the other neighborhood children, prior to Lane, moved the spool and took possession of it
for recreational purposes. Id. at 47 n.6, 656 A.2d at 313 n.6.
53. Id. at 53, 656 A.2d at 316.
54. 162 Md. 549, 160 A. 738 (1932).
55. Lane, 338 Md. at 52-53, 656 A.2d at 316 (citing Lashley v. Dawson, 162 Md. 549, 160
A. 738 (1932)).
56. Id. at 53, 656 A.2d at 316.
57. Id.
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sis.58 Judge Chasanow expressed concern regarding the majority's
reasoning, commenting that "the majority fails to critically analyze the
applicability of real property trespasser rules to children trespassing
on personal property."5 9 The concurrence argued that the attractive
nuisance doctrine provided a preferable approach to establish BGE's
liability.6" Recognizing that Maryland courts previously have rejected
the doctrine where children are trespassers or licensees on the defendant's real property, Judge Chasanow suggested a limited application of the rule when both the child, as invitee, and the chattel have
equal rights on the realty.6 1
4. Analysis.a. Attractive Nuisance-A Reasonable Solution to the Need to Protect Children.-In Baltimore Gas & Electric v. Lane, the Court of Appeals
determined that BGE could be liable for injuries that occurred after
one of the utility company's empty cable spools rolled over and injured a child.6 2 Although the court's holding-reversal of the circuit
court's summary judgment order in favor of BGE-is proper, the rationale underlying the decision is unsound.
The majority based its holding on the assertion that Lane was not
a trespasser and, therefore, deserved a higher standard of care.6 3
ChiefJudge Murphy contended that Lane could not be a trespasser to
the spool because "BGE, at the time of the alleged trespass, had given
up all physical control over the spool and had indeed lost possession
of it (actual and constructive)."" Because a person can only trespass
on personal property that is in another's possession, the key inquiry
rests on when BGE lost possession of the spool. The majority failed to
provide an adequate response to this question.
The court proposed two possible explanations for BGE's loss of
possession.6 5 First, possession may have ceased when the utility employees left the object unattended in the neighborhood.6 6 In a footnote, Chief Judge Murphy recognized that such an argument may

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 54, 656 A.2d at 316 (Chasanow, J., concurring).
Id., 656 A.2d at 317.
Id. at 58, 656 A.2d at 318.
Id. at 59, 656 A.2d at 319.
Id. at 53, 656 A.2d at 316.
Id. at 47-48, 656 A.2d at 313-14; see also supra note 52 and accompanying text.
Lane, 338 Md. at 47, 656 A.2d at 313.

65. See supra note 52.
66. Lane, 338 Md. at 47 n.6, 656 A.2d at 313 n.6.
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cause inconsistencies in the understanding of possession,6 v because
temporary release of physical control does not equate abandonment.6 8 Rather, an owner retains possession through a present intent
and ability to control the object.6 9 In this instance, however, the rec70
ord provided no evidence that BGE intended to relinquish control.
On the contrary, Lane acknowledged that BGE had worked in the
neighborhood for a week before the injury, during which time the
spool remained on the worksite.7 '
Second, the court suggested that the intervening act of the other
children moving the spool broke the link of possession. 72 Despite adherence to this argument, the majority conceded that this theory may
yield an unintended result, exposing BGE to liability based solely on
an intervening act.73 The concurrence identified the faulty logic of

such an assertion.7 4 Judge Chasanow remarked:
[T] he Court fails to explain why BGE should be liable since
when BGE had possession, the spool was on its base on level
ground and not dangerous to children. It was only after the
spool was turned on its side and rolled by the initial trespassers to the top of a hill that it became dangerous to eight-yearold Lane.7 5
67. Id. ("[Riuling that BGE lost possession of the spool when the employees left it
unattended in the neighborhood might be inconsistent with concept of possession as it is
generally applied in other areas of the law.").
68. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 216 cmt. c (1965):
Cases arise in which one who has been in possession of a chattel temporarily
relinquishes physical control of it, without abandoning the chattel. In such a
case, so long as no other person has obtained possession by acquiring physical
control over the chattel with the intention of exercising such control on his own
behalf, or on behalf of another, the law protects the property interest by attributing the possession to the original possessor.
Id.
69. Id. § 216; see aLso Rowley v. Mayor of Baltimore, 305 Md. 456, 464, 505 A.2d 494, 498
(1986).
70. Lane, 338 Md. at 41, 656 A.2d at 310.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 47, 656 A.2d at 313 ("[T]he finder of fact could conclude that BGE had lost
possession of the spool when some other neighborhood children-not including Lanetook possession of it for recreational purposes .... ").
73. Id. at 47 n.6, 656 A.2d at 313 n.6 ("We recognize that deeming BGE to have been in
possession of the spool until it was moved might generate the somewhat strange result of
increasing BGE's exposure to liability based solely on the existence of an intervening
event-the moving of the spool.").
74. Id. at 56, 656 A.2d at 318 (Chasanow, J., concurring) ("[T]he most unusual aspect
of the majority's opinion is the apparent implication that the first group of children who
used the spool were trespassers, and BGE would not be liable to them for simple negligence, but since Lane was a subsequent user, BGE is liable to Lane for negligence.").
75. Id. at 57, 656 A.2d at 318.
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Instead of adopting the attractive nuisance doctrine, the court applied
a convoluted analysis that in effect created an elevated standard of
care to subsequent trespassers.
The court's continued refusal to acknowledge any version of the
attractive nuisance doctrine fails to recognize the societal value of protecting children from foreseeable injury. In fact, Maryland provides a
trespassing child no greater protection than a trespassing adult, despite the legally recognized distinction in levels of maturity and judgment.76 Maryland's long-standing position is based on Mergenthalerv.

Kirby,7 7 an 1894 decision. Since that time, however, many jurisdictions
have adopted some form of the Restatement rule in an attempt to balance the interests of property owners and unsuspecting children.7 8
Nonetheless, Maryland has failed to reevaluate its position in light of
the recent developments in tort law.
In 1939, the Court of Appeals refused to apply the attractive nuisance doctrine to impose liability for the drowning death of a child
who trespassed on the defendant's raft.79 The court applied the enticement argument and clearly opposed creating any undue burden
upon the landowner.80 This holding was founded on a theory that the
Restatement evolved to replace. The Restatement discarded the notion of
allurement and couched the doctrine in general negligence terms.8 1
Maryland courts, however, refuse to examine the current interpreta76. Comment c of § 339 reads, in pertinent part:

[1]n our present hazardous civilization some types of danger have become common, which an immature adolescent may reasonably not appreciate, although an
adult may be expected to do so. The [attractive nuisance] rule.., is not limited
to "young children," or to those "of tender years," so long as the child is still too
young to appreciate the danger ....
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 339 cmt. c (1965); see also Laser v. Wilson, 58 Md. App.
434, 442, 473 A.2d 523, 527 (1984) (recognizing the distinction between the judgment of a
child and an adult); Huffman v. Appalachian Power Co., 415 S.E.2d 145, 153 (W. Va. 1991)
("[C]hildren are often heedless and, because of their inexperience and immaturity, cannot fully appreciate the harm that can occur from a dangerous condition or instrumentality. These considerations are not present with an adult trespasser."); PROSSER, supra note
26, § 76, at 438 ("Because of his immaturity and lack ofjudgment, the child is incapable of
understanding and appreciating all of the possible dangers which he may encounter in
trespassing, and he cannot be expected to assume the risk and look out for himself.").
77. 79 Md. 182, 28 A. 1065 (1894); see supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
78. See supra note 30.

79. State v. Baltimore Fidelity Warehouse Co., 176 Md. 341, 350, 4 A.2d 739, 743
(1939).
80. Id. at 348, 4 A.2d at 742 ("[The landowner's] lawful use of the raft in the course of
its lawful business was other than what was reasonably necessary and permitted, if owners
are to have the ordinary beneficial use of property within the limits of their own property
rights.").
81. KEETON ET ., supra note 15, § 58, at 401. Discussing conditions that are highly
dangerous to trespassing children, the Restatement notes:
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tion of the rule and continue to summarily dismiss the applicability of
the doctrine.
In Mondshour v. Moore," the Court of Appeals rejected the use of
the attractive nuisance doctrine out of respect for precedent.a3 The
Mondshour court cited concern with consistent application of established legal principles.8 4 This rationale, however, directly opposes the
decision in Lane, which created "a novel new exception for children
who would seem to be trespassers to chattels, but who are not deemed
trespassers because someone else trespassed before they did." 85 The
Lane approach neither maintained stability in the interpretation of
legal theory nor adopted a doctrine recognized by a majority ofjurisdictions. To the contrary, by rejecting the attractive nuisance doctrine, the Court of Appeals created the sort of inconsistencies that it
has sought to avoid.
b. The Concurrence'sCompromise.-Although the concurrence
in Lane recognized Maryland's previous rejection of the attractive nuisance doctrine, Judge Chasanow nevertheless urged the court to
adopt a compromise theory.86 Judge Chasanow's suggestion required
neither outright acceptance nor rejection of the Restatement theory.8 7
Instead, he contended that when both the child and the personal
property have an equal right to be on a piece of land, the attractive
nuisance doctrine should apply, thereby imposing liability for foreseeA possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm to children trespassing
thereon caused by an artificial condition upon the land if
(a) the place where the condition exists is one upon which the possessor
knows or has reason to know that children are likely to trespass, and
(b) the condition is one of which the possessor knows or has reason to know
and which he realizes or should realize will involve an unreasonable risk of death
or serious bodily harm to such children, and
(c) the children because of their youth do not discover the condition or
realize the risk involved in intermeddling with it or in coming within the area
made dangerous by it, and
(d) the utility to the possessor of maintaining the condition and the burden
of eliminating the danger are slight as compared with the risk to children involved, and
(e) the possessor fiails to exercise reasonable care to eliminate the danger or
otherwise to protect the children.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF TORTS §

339 (1965).

82. 256 Md. 617, 261 A.2d 482 (1970); see supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
83. Mondshour, 256 Md. at 624, 261 A.2d at 485.
84. Id.
85. Lane, 338 Md. at 54, 656 A.2d at 317 (Chasanow, J., concurring).
86. Id. at 59, 656 A.2d at 319.
87. Id. at 57-63, 656 A.2d at 318-21. Judge Chasanow stated: "[W]e could, and should,
adopt the doctrine at least for children injured by personal property which is left on real
property where the children have a right to be." Id. at 58, 656 A.2d at 318.
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able injury."8 Thus, if a child enters the land as an invitee, the possessor of any object on the land that caused injury to the child would be
subject to liability if the possessor knew or had reason to know of the child's
presence.8 9 This doctrine would still permit application of the trespasser rule when an individual, regardless of age, trespassed on another's real property. This compromise is not inconsistent with
existing case law.9"
Prior to Judge Chasanow's suggestion, the court did not distinguish between a person injured while trespassing on real property and
a person injured while trespassing on an object located on real property to which he was an invitee. This theory represents a necessary
advance in Maryland's understanding of tort law; it balances the
rights of property owners with society's need to protect children from
foreseeable injury.
5. Conclusion.-The Lane court held that a utility company
could be liable for a child's injuries caused by an empty cable spool
left by a utility company near a residential area and moved onto a
playground by neighborhood children. This case provided an ideal
situation for the Court of Appeals to adopt a limited version of the
attractive nuisance doctrine; nevertheless, the court rejected this legal
theory and instead created an exception to the trespasser rule that
likely will prove untenable.
Tort law has evolved since Maryland initially rejected the attractive nuisance doctrine in 1894.91 The Restatement has abandoned the
notions of "allurement" and "enticement,"9 2 and many jurisdictions
have prudently adopted the doctrine9" as society has become more
threatening for children.94 Nevertheless, Maryland steadfastly clings
to its antiquated property theories. When the opportunity next arises,
the Court of Appeals should take affirmative steps toward modernizing its approach to tort law.
HOLLY L.

DRUMHELLER

88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See State v. Baltimore Fidelity Warehouse Co., 176 Md. 341, 348, 4 A.2d 739, 742

(1939) ("Notwithstanding the adoption of this doctrine in numerous States, the tendency
is to restrict its application."); Grube v. Mayor of Baltimore, 132 Md. 355, 361, 103 A. 948,
951 (1918) ("The doctrines of attractive nuisances . . . may be justly applied in some
cases.").
91. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
92. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
93. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
94. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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C. Loss of Consortium and the Cap on Noneconomic Damages
In Oaks v. Connors,' the Court of Appeals held that Maryland's
statutory cap on noneconomic damages applies in the aggregate to
noneconomic damages awarded to the marital unit for loss of consortium and to noneconomic damages awarded to the physically injured
spouse for personal injuries.2 In so holding, the court effectuated the
intent of the legislature.3 The court examined the language of the cap
statute,4 the legislative history of the statute,5 and the case law defining the parameters of a loss of consortium claim.6 Oaks represents a
broadening of the application of the statutory cap to personal injury
claims.
1. The Case.-While driving to work on July 5, 1989, Willie James
Oaks lost control of his car, causing it to cross the center line of Maryland Route 176 and to strike the van in which Anna Connors was a
passenger.7 The collision, which was caused by Oaks's driving
through an accumulation of rain water at an excessive rate of speed,
resulted in severe injury to Connors.8 In addition to serious neurological and psychological damage, Connors sustained multiple fractures
to her right hand and arm.9 These injuries rendered her incapable of
providing care for her invalid husband, Herbert Connors, in the same
manner she had prior to the accident."0
The Connorses filed a complaint against Oaks alleging that the
accident and resulting injuries to Anna Connors were attributable to
Oaks's negligent driving." Anna Connors individually sought dam1. 339 Md. 24, 660 A.2d 423 (1995).
2. Id. at 38, 660 A.2d at 430.
3. Id. at 34-36, 660 A.2d at 428-29.
4. Id. (examining MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JuD. PROC. §§ 11-108 to -109 (1989)
(amended 1994)).
5. Id. at 34-35, 660 A.2d at 427; see also Franklin v. Mazda Motor Corp., 704 F. Supp.
1325, 1327-28 (D. Md. 1989) (describing the research on insurance availability in Maryland
conducted by the Governor's Task Force to Study Liability Insurance and the Joint Executive/Legislative Task Force on Medical Malpractice Insurance); Murphy v. Edmonds, 325
Md. 342, 368-70, 601 A.2d 102, 114-16 (1992) (describing the insurance availability crisis
that led to the enactment of the cap statute).
6. Oaks, 339 Md. at 33-37, 660 A.2d at 428-30. See generally Deems v. Western Md. Ry.
Co., 247 Md. 95, 231 A.2d 514 (1967) (clarifying the definitional and procedural parameters of a claim for loss of consortium and extending the right to assert that claim to the
wife of a physically injured man).
7. Oaks, 339 Md. at 27-28, 660 A.2d at 425.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 28, 660 A.2d at 425.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 29, 660 A.2d at 425. The Connorses' complaint also asserted respondeat
superior liability against Oaks's employer, Giant Food, Inc., for the negligent driving of its
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ages for the personal injuries she sustained, 12 and she and her husband jointly sought damages for harm caused to their marital
relationship."t At the close of a jury trial in the Circuit Court for
Anne Arundel County, Anna Connors was awarded $84,200 in economic damages and $350,000 in noneconomic damages for her personal injury claim.' 4 The jury also awarded the Connorses $130,000 in
noneconomic damages for their loss of consortium claim. 15 The trial
court vacated the Connorses' loss of consortium award so that the
judgment rendered by the jury would comply with Maryland's statutory cap on noneconomic damages. 6 The trialjudge determined that
employee while allegedly in the course of his employment Id. In addressing the respondeat superior issue, the court considered the following facts: (1) Oaks was operating his
personal vehicle en route to his job with Giant when he negligently collided with Connors;
(2) Giant required Oaks to have a personal vehicle in the event that travel was necessary,
yet Giant did not specify the type of vehicle required, nor pay for the vehicle, its fuel, or its
maintenance; and (3) the accident occurred prior to Oaks's scheduled work hours, and
Oaks was not performing any duties for Giant at the time of the accident. Id. at 28-29, 660
A.2d at 425. In light of these facts, the Court of Appeals concluded that Giant was not to
be held vicariously liable for Oaks's negligence. Id. at 30-33, 660 A.2d at 426-28. In so
concluding, the court vacated the decision of the Court of Special Appeals as to Giant. Id.
at 38, 660 A.2d at 430. The court stated that "[t]he doctrine of respondeatsuperior, in Maryland, allows an employer to be vicariously liable for the tortious conduct of its employee
when that employee was acting within the scope of the employment relationship." Id. at
30, 660 A.2d at 426 (citing Dhanraj v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 305 Md. 623, 506 A.2d 224
(1986)). The court held Oaks not to be acting within the scope of his employment at the
time of the accident, because his employer at that time did not have the "right to control"
Oaks's actions, nor did Giant either expressly or impliedly consent to Oaks's use of the
automobile. Id. at 31, 660 A.2d at 426-27. Consent and right to control, the court stated,
are essential in finding an employer vicariously liable in the automobile context. Id. In
addition, driving to and from work generally does not constitute acting within the scope of
employment for the purpose of respondeat superior liability because it does not involve
advancing the interests of the employer. Id. at 32, 660 A.2d at 427. The Court of Appeals's
decision with regard to the respondeat superior claim is entirely consistent with relevant
precedent
12. Id. at 29, 660 A.2d at 425.
13. Id.
14. Id., 660 A.2d at 426.
15. Id.
16. Id. The trial court ordered that the Connorses' aggregate noneconomic damages
award be reduced by $130,000 to comply with Maryland's statutory cap on noneconomic
damages. Id. at 30 n.5, 660 A.2d at 426 n.5. It did not, however, specify which
noneconomic damages award-the award for personal injury or the award for loss of consortium-should be reduced. Id. This decision was reserved for the Connorses, who
elected to have the $130,000 in noneconomic damages for loss of consortium reduced to
zero, rather than having the $350,000 in noneconomic damages for personal injury reduced by $130,000. Id.
Section 11-108(b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article provides that "[iln
any action for damages for personal injury in which the cause of action arises on or after
July 1, 1986, an award for noneconomic damages may not exceed $350,000." MD. CODE
ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 11-108(b) (1995).
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the cap applied "in the aggregate" to an award of noneconomic damages for personal injury and an award of noneconomic damages for
loss of consortium.' 7 Consequently, the total award for noneconomic
damages for both of the Connorses' claims could not exceed the statutorily imposed limit of $350,000.18
The Connorses appealed that part of the judgment vacating their
loss of consortium award.19 In the Court of Special Appeals, they
maintained that the cap should be applied separately, rather than in
the aggregate, to noneconomic damages for personal injury and to
noneconomic damages for loss of consortium.2" That court agreed
with their contention,2 ' stating that "[a]lthough a claim for loss of
consortium must be adjudicated concurrently with the individual
claim of the physically injured spouse, the claim for loss of consortium
is a separate and distinct cause of action."2 2 Because a loss of consortium claim is a distinct cause of action, and because the statute man17. Connors v. Oaks, 100 Md. App. 525, 530, 642 A.2d 245, 248 (1994).
18. Id. The General Assembly amended the statutory cap on noneconomic damages in
1994. Oaks, 339 Md. at 34 n.6, 660 A.2d at 428 n.6. The amendment raised the statutory
cap on noneconomic damages to $500,000: Id. The $500,000 cap went into effect on
October 1, 1994 and is, therefore, inapplicable to the Oaks case, which was instituted prior
to that date. Id. The Oaks case is governed by the $350,000 statutory cap on noneconomic
damages that applies to all causes of action arising afterJuly 1, 1986, but before October 1,
1994. MD. CoDE ANN., CTS. &JUn. PROC. § 11-108(b).
19. Oaks, 339 Md. at 29-30, 660 A.2d at 426. The Connorses also appealed from the
judgment rendered in favor of Oaks's employer, Giant, on the issue of respondeat superior
liability. Id. at 30, 660 A.2d at 426; see supra note 11. The Connorses contended that, contrary to the ruling of the trial court, Oaks was furthering the interest of his employer at the
time of the accident. Connors, 100 Md. App. at 530, 642 A.2d at 248. The Court of Special
Appeals agreed with this contention and held Giant liable on the theory of respondeat
superior. Id. at 531-41, 642 A.2d at 248-53. The Court of Appeals subsequently vacated this
finding in favor of Giant. Oaks, 339 Md. at 38, 660 A.2d at 430; see supra note 11.
20. Connors, 100 Md. App. at 530-31, 642 A.2d at 248. The Connorses also argued that
the trial court erred in its application of the cap statute because the award constituted
economic rather than noneconomic damages and, therefore, was not subject to the damage cap. Id. at 541, 642 A.2d at 253. While the court recognized that "an award for loss of
consortium may encompass both economic and noneconomic elements," it maintained
that the award under consideration was one for purely noneconomic damages. Id. at 542,
642 A.2d at 254. Of probative value to the court in making this determination were the
trial judge's instruction to the jury on the consortium claim, the verdict sheet presented to
the jury, and the closing argument made by counsel for the respondents. All characterized
the damage to the Connorses' marital relationship in terms of loss of affection, society,
companionship, and sexual relations-the quintessential noneconomic injuries in a loss of
consortium claim. Id. at 542-44, 642 A.2d at 254-55. Absent was any discussion of "the
nature of the household and caretaking functions Mrs. Connors could no longer perform
and the pecuniary impact on the marriage of those limitations," these functions being the
pertinent areas of inquiry in assessing economic damages in a loss of consortium claim. Id.
at 544, 642 A.2d at 255.
21. Id. at 544-51, 642 A.2d at 255-58.
22. Id. at 547, 642 A.2d at 256-57.
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dates that "[i]n any action for damages for personal injury . . . an
award for noneconomic damages may not exceed $350,000, " 23 the
court held that the statutory cap of $350,000 must necessarily apply
individually to a cause of action in loss of consortium.2 4 The court
affirmed the judgment in favor of Anna Connors and ordered the reinstatement of the Connorses' loss of consortium award of $130,000.25
The Court of Appeals granted certiorari 26 to determine whether
Maryland's statutory cap on noneconomic damages applied separately
to the individual claim of the injured spouse and to the loss of consor27
tium claim by the marital unit.

28
2. Legal Background.-In Deems v. Western Maryland Railway Co.,
the Court of Appeals did not create a new cause of action with respect
to loss of consortium.2 9 Nonetheless, it did extend the right to make a
consortium claim to a wife,"0 thereby creating an important new "substantive right."" l In so doing, the court clarified the nature of a claim
for loss of consortium, both definitionally and procedurally.12 The
Deems court defined loss of consortium to be "the loss of society, affection, assistance, and conjugal fellowship."13 Such loss the court characterized as derivative of, rather than distinct from, the injuries caused
to one spouse through the tortious conduct of a third party. 4 Procedurally, in order to avoid the potential for double recoveries, the
court mandated that a consortium claim be filed jointly by the marital
unit and be tried concurrently with the physically injured spouse's
35
claim for personal injury.

23. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 11-108(b) (1995).

24. Connors, 100 Md. App. at 549, 642 A.2d at 257.
25. Id. at 552, 642 A-2d at 259.
26. Oaks, 339 Md. at 30, 660 A.2d at 426.
27. Id. at 27, 660 A.2d at 425.
28. 247 Md. 95, 231 A.2d 514 (1967) (holding that either a wife or a husband could
assert loss of consortium claim against third party whose tortious conduct caused the harm
suffered by physically injured spouse; such claims must be asserted in joint action by the
marital unit and must be tried concurrently with the claim of the physically injured
spouse).
29. See generally Travelers Indem. Co. v. Cornelsen, 272 Md. 48, 50, 321 A.2d 149, 150
(1974) (clarifying the court's decision in Deems).
30. The right to assert a claim for loss of consortium was, prior to Deems, already available to the husband of a physically injured woman. Deems, 247 Md. at 100, 231 A.2d at 517.
Deems extended this right to the wife of a physically injured man. Id. at 114, 231 A.2d at
525.
31. Oaks, 339 Md. at 34, 660 A-2d at 428.
32. Deems, 247 Md. at 100-11, 231 A.2d at 517-23.
33. Id. at 100, 231 A.2d at 517.
34. Id. at 108-11, 231 A.2d at 521-23.
35. Id.
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In 1986 the General Assembly enacted section 11-108 of the
Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article mandating a $350,000 cap on
noneconomic damages awarded in personal injury actions.3 6 Both the
Governor's Task Force to Study Liability Insurance3 7 and the Joint Executive/Legislative Task Force on Medical Malpractice Insurance had
recommended the cap statute.3 8 The task forces were responding to
what the governor and legislature perceived to be a crisis in insurance
availability in Maryland. 9 Each task force concluded that a cap on
noneconomic damages would have a positive effect on the insurance
industry and would enable insurance carriers to set rates more accurately by increasing the predictability of damage awards.' Perhaps
most important was the belief that the damage cap would "lend
greater stability to the insurance market and make it more attractive
1
to underwriters."

4

Having concluded that an insurance crisis necessitated the implementation of a damage cap, the task forces determined, and the General Assembly agreed, that the appropriate type of damages to limit
were those awarded for noneconomic lOSS. 4 2 Noneconomic damages
were deemed to be the "primary source of overly generous and arbitrary liability claim payments. " 4 The Governor's Task Force report
attributed such exorbitance and arbitrariness in the granting of
noneconomic damages to the emotional and subjective elements involved in rendering such awards, as well as to the fact that
noneconomic losses are not "easily amenable to accurate, or even approximate, monetary valuation."4 4
Despite challenges to the cap's constitutionality, the cap statute
has been applied in a number of cases to limit the amount of
noneconomic damages recoverable in a personal injury action.4' In
36. Act of May 27, 1986, ch. 639, 1986 Md. Laws 2347, 2350.
37. GovERNOR's TASK FORCE TO STUDY LIABILrY INSURANCE, REPORT TO THE GEN. ASSEMBLY OF 1986 (1985) [hereinafter GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE].
38. JOINT EXECUTIVE/LEGISLATIVE TASK FORCE ON MEDICAL MALPRACTrICE INSURANCE,
REPORT TO THE GEN. ASSEMBLY OF 1986 (1985) [hereinafter JOINT EXECUTIVE/LEGISLATIVE
TASK FORCE].

39. Franklin v. Mazda Motor Corp., 704 F. Supp. 1325, 1327 (D. Md. 1989) (holding
that the cap on noneconomic damages did not violate either the state or federal constitunon and explaining the history of the cap statute).
40. Id. at 1328 (quoting the GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE, supra note 37).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1327.
43. Id. at 1328.
44. Id.
45. See generally Catherine M. Giovannoni, Note, The Inapplicability of the Cap on
Noneconomic Damages to Wrongful Death Actions, 53 MD. L. REv. 999 (1994).
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Franklin v. Mazda Motor Corp.,' the United States District Court for the
District of Maryland applied the rational basis test4 7 in determining
that section 11-108 did not violate either the Maryland or the United
States Constitution.4 8 In particular, the court held that the damage
cap did not violate either the separation of powers doctrine or the
plaintiffs right to a jury trial.4 9
More recently, in Murphy v. Edmonds," the Court of Appeals also
invoked the rational basis test in determining that the cap statute did
not violate either the state or federal Constitution.5" The court determined that the General Assembly enacted the statute "to assure the
availability of sufficient liability insurance, at a reasonable cost, in order to cover claims for personal injuries to members of the public."5 2
This satisfied the requisite legitimate governmental interest that initially must be established for a statute to pass the rational basis test.5"
In addition, the court found the damage cap to be a means reasonably
related to achieving this legitimate interest;5 4 consequently, the court
upheld the constitutionality of the cap statute.5 5
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Oaks v. Connors, the Court of Appeals held that a loss of consortium claim by the marital unit was de5 6
rivative of a personal injury claim by the physically injured spouse.
The two claims, therefore, constituted a single action and as such were
46. 704 F. Supp. 1325 (D. Md. 1989).
47. The rational basis test is a judicial standard of review used when determining the
constitutionality of governmental action. Murphy v. Edmonds, 325 Md. 342, 355-57, 601
A.2d 102, 108-09 (1992). It represents the most deferential standard of review and is typically employed in instances where a statute is being challenged on equal protection
grounds. Id. at 355, 601 A.2d at 108. For a statutory provision to pass the rational basis test
and withstand a constitutional challenge, the government must be pursuing a legitimate
governmental objective in enacting the statute. Id. at 355-57, 601 A.2d at 108-09. The
statute also must be rationally related to the achievement of that objective. Id.
48. Franklin, 704 F. Supp. at 1337. In Franklin, the court concluded that "[rieducing
uncertainty in damages awards and increasing the availability of insurance through reduced costs in Maryland surely are valid legislative goals. And the method chosen, that is
by imposing an economic limitation on damages not otherwise measurable economically,
is reasonably related to these goals." Id.
49. Id. at 1334-36.
50. 325 Md. 342, 601 A.2d 102 (1992).
51. Id. at 361-62, 601 A.2d at 111-12.
52. Id. at 369, 601 A.2d at 115.
53. See id. at 361-62, 601 A.2d at 111-12.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 370, 601 A.2d at 116. The Oaks court deferred to Murphy in order to dispose
of the constitutional arguments made by the Connorses in opposition to the statutory cap
on noneconomic damages. Oaks, 339 Md. at 37, 660 A.2d at 429. In so doing, the court
reaffirmed Murphy. Id., 660 A.2d at 430.
56. Oaks, 339 Md. at 38, 660 A.2d at 430.

1996]

MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS

825

subject to a single cap for noneconomic damages.5 7 In so holding,
the court relied on statutory interpretation to ascertain and effectuate
the intent of the General Assembly in adopting the cap statute.5" The
court rejected the Connorses' argument that the loss of consortium
claim was separate from the claim of the physically injured spouse.5 9
Proceeding on the premise that the language of a statute should
be given effect if it is clear and unambiguous when construed according to its everyday meaning, the court examined the language of section 11-108.6' Section 11-108(a) (1) (i) defines noneconomic damages
as "pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, disfigurement, loss of consortium, or other nonpecuniary injury."61 The court
treated this provision as dispositive of the legislature's intent that
noneconomic damages for loss of consortium be treated in the same
manner as all other noneconomic damages for the purpose of applying section 11-108.62 In particular, the General Assembly's express inclusion of loss of consortium under the heading of noneconomic
damages indicated that
damages for loss of consortium [were] governed by the same
$350,000 limit as the other items enumerated in Sec. 11108(a) (1) [(i)]. It would be illogical to conclude that a separate cap should apply to loss of consortium damages and not
to the damages awarded for the other items listed in Sec. 11108(a)(1)[(i)] as the Connorses' argument
suggest[ed] .6

The court found further support for its holding in section 11108(b), which provides that "[i]n any action for damages for personal
injury . . . an award for noneconomic damages may not exceed
$350,000."64 Focusing on the singular nature of the terms "any ac-

tion" and "an award," the court determined the ordinary meaning of
these terms to be that in each individual personal injury action,
"which includes the injured individual's underlying claim for damages
along with all claims arising therefrom," a single award of
noneconomic damages should be made and this award should be
made in accordance with the damage cap.6 5 Thus, the court con57. Id.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 34-38, 660 A.2d at 428-30.
Id. at 37-38, 660 A.2d at 430.
Id. at 34-38, 660 A.2d at 428-30.
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 11-108(a) (1) (i) (1995).

Oaks, 339 Md. at 36, 660 A.2d at 429.
Id.
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JuD. PROC.

§ 11-108(b)(1) (1995) (emphasis added).

Oaks, 339 Md. at 36, 660 A.2d at 429.
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cluded that, because a loss of consortium claim arises from the injured spouse's claim for personal injuries, the two claims constituted a
single action for damages for personal injury and together were subject to the $350,000 cap on noneconomic damages.'
To buttress its conclusion that the General Assembly intended
noneconomic damages for loss of consortium to be subject to the
same cap as noneconomic damages for those other injuries enumerated in section 11-108(a)(1)(i), the court examined the statutory
scheme in which section 11-108 was passed.6 7 The court noted the
provisions of section 11-109(b), which state:
As part of the verdict in any action for damages for personal
injury ... the trier of fact shall itemize the award to reflect
the monetary amount awarded for:
(1) Past medical expenses;
(2) Future medical expenses;
(3) Past loss of earnings;
(4) Future loss of earnings;
(5) Noneconomic damages; and
(6) Other damages.6"
In itemizing the preceding damage categories, the drafters of section
11-109 did not make a distinction among the several types of
noneconomic damages.6 9 In particular, the drafters declined to distinguish consortium damages from the other types of noneconomic
damages delineated in section 11-108(a) (1) (i). 7 ° This inclusion of
consortium damages under the general rubric of noneconomic damages was taken by the court as more evidence that the General Assembly intended that consortium damages be treated in the same manner
as other noneconomic damages for the purposes of applying the cap
on noneconomic damages.7"
In addition to examining the language of sections 11-108 and 11109 to determine legislative intent with regard to loss of consortium
damages and the cap statute, the court also relied on its decision in
Murphy.7 2 In Murphy, the court attributed the promulgation and enactment of section 11-108 in large part to the "legislatively perceived
crisis concerning the availability and cost of liability insurance" due to
66. Id.

67. Id.
68. MD.

CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 11-109(b) (1995).
69. Oaks, 339 Md. at 36, 660 A.2d at 429.

70. Id.
71. Id.

72. Id. at 35, 660 A.2d at 428.
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large noneconomic damage awards in personal injury suits." Allowing the application of a separate cap to noneconomic damages
arising out of a loss of consortium claim would effectively permit
double recoveries by the injured spouse in an action for personal injuries.7 4 Rather than receiving the maximum $350,000 in noneconomic
damages allowed by the statute, the injured spouse potentially could
receive up to $525,000 if a separate cap were applied to the marital
unit's loss of consortium claim.7 5 Such excessive recoveries, the court
reasoned, were precisely what the legislature sought to prevent in enacting section 11-108.76
Finally, while confirming that harm caused to the marital relationship as a result of physical injury to one spouse is a compensable
injury,7 7 the Oaks court rejected the Connorses' assertion that a loss of
consortium claim was separate and distinct from the claim made by
the physically injured spouse. 78 Rather, the court maintained, a loss
of consortium claim by the marital unit was derivative of a personal
injury claim by the injured spouse and the two constituted a single
cause of action. 79 Because the injuries at issue in both claims arose
from a "single source," the harm sought to be remedied by the loss of
consortium claim was "inextricably intertwined" with the harm sought
to be remedied by the physically injured spouse." The court believed
that the derivative-as opposed to separate and distinct-nature of
the loss of consortium claim was further evidenced by the requirement, first articulated in Deems, that a consortium claim be filed jointly
by the marital unit and tried concurrently with the claim of the physi81
cally injured spouse.

73. Murphy v. Edmonds, 325 Md. 342, 368, 601 A.2d 102, 114 (1992).
74. Oaks, 339 Md. at 35, 660 A.2d at 428-29.
75. Id. at 38, 660 A.2d at 430. Of the $525,000, $350,000 would be for the
noneconomic damages awarded to the physically injured spouse for her personal injury
claim while the remaining $175,000 would be attributable to her half of the $350,000 in

noneconomic damages for loss of consortium. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 33, 660 A.2d at 428. Relying on the seminal case of Deems v. Western Md. Ry.
Co., 247 Md. 95, 231 A.2d 514 (1967), and its progeny, the court defined the relationship
between the loss of consortium claim by the marital unit and the individual claim of the
physically injured spouse. Oaks, 339 Md. at 33-34, 660 A.2d at 428.
78. Oaks, 339 Md. at 37, 660 A.2d at 430. In a cursory fashion, the court disposed of

the constitutional question raised by respondents. Id.; see supra notes 45-55 and accompanying text.
79. Oaks, 339 Md. at 37-38, 660 A.2d at 430.
80. Id. at 37, 660 A.2d at 430.
81. Id. at 34, 660 A.2d at 430.
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4. Analysis.-In reaching a decision contrary to that reached by
the Oaks court, the Court of Special Appeals made several compelling
policy arguments regarding the propriety of applying a single cap to
noneconomic damages awarded for a loss of consortium claim by the
marital unit and for a personal injury claim by the physically injured
spouse.8a The most compelling argument that the Court of Appeals
failed to address is that "the application of a single cap may have the
effect of eviscerating the award for loss of consortium, making such a
claim a meaningless procedural existence."83 For example, in instances where the physically injured spouse has been so severely injured that her own recovery for noneconomic damages arising out of
her personal injury claim reaches the $350,000 statutorily imposed
ceiling, the uninjured spouse, under the rule articulated in Oaks, will
be left without the possibility of any remedy whatsoever.8 4 This would
effectively render the uninjured spouse's substantive right to recover
for loss of consortium an illusory right. Allowing for a right where
there is potentially no remedy is unsound policy."5 It creates an expectation of compensation that cannot be realized. It should be
noted that the General Assembly's 1994 amendment of section 11108, increasing the maximum amount of noneconomic damages recoverable in a personal injury action to $500,000, ameliorates somewhat the seeming injustice to the uninjured spouse that may be
occasioned by capping damages.8 6
Despite the Court of Special Appeals's compelling policy arguments, the legislature's intent in enacting the cap statute supports the
Court of Appeals's conclusion. The court's primary duty in deciding
whether or in what manner to enforce a statutory provision is to ascer-

82. Connors v. Oaks, 100 Md. App. 525, 550-51, 642 A.2d 245, 258 (1994). The court
stated that application of a single cap to the noneconomic damages arising from the claim
for loss of consortium and the claim for personal injury places the trial court in a precarious position whereby it will, "without statutory guidance, [have to determine] how the
award of $350,000 is to be allocated between two distinct plaintiffs." Id. at 550, 642 A.2d at
258. Such a determination cannot be made by the plaintiffs themselves, the court continued, because "[i]t cannot be assumed that [the husband and wife] will always reach an
amicable solution." Id.
83. Id.

84. Id. at 550-51, 642 A.2d at 258.
85. "Without an available and enforceable remedy, a right may be nothing more than a
nice idea. Any meaningful discussion of rights, therefore, must focus on remedies available to implement the rights." Barry Freidman, Wien Rights Encounter Reality: Enforcing
FederalRemedies, 65 So. CAL. L. REv. 735, 735-36 (1992).
86. See supranote 18.
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tain and effectuate the legislature's intent regarding that provision.8 7
The Court of Appeals accomplished this end by employing the tenets
of statutory construction.88 Having ascertained the intent of the legislature through an examination of the plain meaning of sections 11108 and 11-109, the Oaks court reached a conclusion that was consistent with that intent: The cap statute applies in the aggregate, rather
than separately, to an award of noneconomic damages for loss of consortium and an award of noneconomic damages for personal injury.8 9
The relevant statutory provisions make clear that damages for loss
of consortium are to be treated in the same manner as all other types
of noneconomic damages for the purposes of applying section 11108.90 The legislature brought noneconomic loss of consortium damages within the purview of the larger category of noneconomic damages in section 11-108 when it defined noneconomic damages as
"pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, disfigurement,
loss of consortium, and other nonpecuniary injury."9 1 As the court
recognized, no attempt was made to distinguish between loss of consortium damages and other types of noneconomic damages, such as
pain and suffering.9 2 Consequently, loss of consortium damages
should be treated in the same manner as the other damages enumerated in the statute. For the purposes of section 11-108, this means
that noneconomic damages for loss of consortium are to be subject to
the same cap as other noneconomic damages.9"
An examination of the plain meaning of section 11-109 further
substantiates the court's determination that damages for loss of consortium are to be treated like all other noneconomic damages for the
purpose of applying the cap. 94 Section 11-109 mandates itemizing the
damages that make up an award rendered in a personal injury action. 5 Damages for loss of consortium are not among those damages
that must be itemized; nonetheless, general noneconomic damages
must be itemized. 96 This suggests that awards for loss of consortium
87. See, e.g., Parrison v. State, 335 Md. 554, 559, 644 A.2d 537, 539 (1994) (stating that
"[ilt is well settled that the cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and
effectuate legislative intent").
88. Oaks, 339 Md. at 34-38, 660 A.2d at 428-30.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. MD. CODE ANN., C-rs. &JuD. PRoc. § 11-108(a)(1)(i) (1995).
92. See id.
93. Oaks, 339 Md. at 34-38, 660 A.2d at 428-30.
94. Id.
95. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 11-109(b) (1995). For the text of § 11-109(b),
see supra text accompanying note 68.
96. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. Paoc. § 11-109(b) (5).
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are included under the more inclusive category of general
noneconomic damages. 97 It also suggests that awards for loss of consortium are an element of damages in a personal injury action, rather
than being an element of damages in a separate and distinct loss of
consortium action, as the Court of Special Appeals concluded.9 8
Finally, section 11-108(b) provides that "in any action for damages for personal injury ...

an award for noneconomic damages may

not exceed $350,000."' As section 11-109 indicates, loss of consortium damages are implicated in, rather than separate from, an action
for damages for personal injury."°° Because the derivative claim for
loss of consortium by the marital unit and the underlying claim for
personal injuries by the physically injured spouse constitute one action, the total dollar amount of damages awarded for both claims may
not exceed the statutory cap in order to comply with section 11-108.101
The Oaks court need not have relied exclusively on the language
of the cap statute, however, to ascertain the intent of the General Assembly in enacting section 11-108. It had before it ample evidence
indicating that the legislature intended to limit the amount of
noneconomic damages awarded in personal injury actions so that insurance might be made more affordable throughout the state. 10 2 Evidencing this intent were the findings of the Governor's Task Force,
03
upon which the General Assembly relied in drafting the statute.1
Particularly persuasive to the legislature was the Task Force's finding
that
[t]he ceiling on noneconomic damages will help contain
awards within realistic limits ....

The limitation is designed

to lend greater stability to the insurance market and make it
more attractive to underwriters. A substantial portion of the
verdicts being returned in liability cases are for
noneconomic losses. ...
There is a common belief that these awards are the primary source of overly generous and arbitrary liability claim
payments....

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. § 11-108(a)(1)(i).
Connors v. Oaks, 100 Md. App. 512, 551, 642 A.2d 245, 258 (1994).
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 11-108(b) (1).

Oaks, 339 Md. at 36, 660 A.2d at 429.
Id. at 34-38, 660 A.2d at 428-30.
Murphy v. Edmonds, 325 Md. 342, 368-70, 601 A.2d 102, 114-16 (1992).
See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
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A cap on allowable pain and suffering awards will help
reduce 0the
incidents of unrealistically high liability jury
4
awards.'

Supplementing this finding was the report of the Joint Executive/Legislative Task Force similarly stating that "[s] everity of awards... [is] a
primary factor causing escalating premiums [and] states which have
imposed a ceiling ... have experienced a reduction in the severity of
the awards."' 0 5 Thus, the purpose of the cap was to limit what the
General Assembly perceived to be unwieldy and arbitrary
noneconomic damages awards.'0 6 The decision in Oaks, which limits
the amount of noneconomic damages recoverable in personal injury
actions, recognizes and is in accord with this intent.
Perhaps an even more compelling indication that the decision in
Oaks comports with the intent of the General Assembly are the
amendments made to section 11-108 by the 1994 General Assembly. 1 7
Although the Oaks court interpreted the 1986 version of the cap statute, subsequent amendments further evidence the intent of the legislature to limit noneconomic recovery.' 8 In addition to raising the
cap to $500,000, the 1994 General Assembly enacted amendments
that reversed a Court of Appeals ruling"0 9 that held that noneconomic
damages awarded in wrongful death actions were not subject to section 11-108.110 More important, the legislature pronounced that, contrary to the decision in Bartucco v. Wright,111 the cap would apply in the
aggregate to "all persons who claim injury by or through... [the tort]
victim."112 This provision, although formulated in the context of
wrongful death actions, seems equally applicable to the loss of consortium claim of the marital unit and the personal injury claim of the
physically injured spouse. Both claims, and the damages awarded pur104.

GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE,

supra note 37, at 10-11.

105. JOINT EXECUTIVE/LEGISLATIVE TASK FORCE, supra note 38, at 26, 28.

106. Murphy, 325. Md. at 368-70, 601 A.2d at 114-16.
107. See supra note 18. See generally Diana M. Schobel, Note, The Application of the Cap on
Noneconomic Damages to Wrongful Death Actions, 54 MD. L. REv. 914 (1995).
108. See supra note 18.
109. United States v. Streidel, 329 Md. 533, 620 A.2d 905 (1993) (holding that Maryland's statutory cap on noneconomic damages awarded in personal injury actions is inapplicable to wrongful death actions).
110. Judgments-Limitations on Noneconomic Damages Act, ch. 477, 1994 Md. Laws
2292 (codified as amended at MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. §§ 11-108 to -109 (1995)).
111. 746 F. Supp. 604 (D. Md. 1990) (holding that cap on noneconomic damages applied separately to each parent in a wrongful death action).
112. SENATE JUD. PROC. COMM., FLOOR REP., S. 283, Maryland Gen. Assembly (1994)
(codified in MD. CODE ANN., CTs, &JUD. PROC. § 11-108(b) (3) (1995)).
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suant to those claims, arise from "injury by or through... [the tort]
victim,""' that is, the physically injured spouse.

The plain meaning of sections 11-108 and 11-109, in conjunction
with explicit indications by the legislature that it intended to limit recoveries for noneconomic damages, warrant the conclusion that the
legislature intended that a single cap should apply to noneconomic
damages for loss of consortium awarded to the marital unit and to
noneconomic damages for personal injury awarded to the physically
injured spouse. The Court of Appeals merely effectuated that intent.
5. Conclusion.-In Oaks, the Court of Appeals limited the
amount of noneconomic damages recoverable for loss of consortium
by holding that Maryland's statutory cap on noneconomic damages
applies in the aggregate to the noneconomic damages awarded for a
loss of consortium claim and to the noneconomic damages attributed
to the underlying claim of the physically injured spouse." 4 This holding effectively means that the total award of noneconomic damages in
a personal injury action consisting of both a loss of consortium claim
by the marital unit and a negligence claim by the injured spouse may
not exceed the statutorily imposed limit."1 The holding accurately
reflects the intent of the General Assembly in drafting the cap statute,
which was to curtail large noneconomic damage awards to ensure the
availability of liability insurance in the State of Maryland.1 16
MARY H. KEYEs

D. Maryland Refuses to Abrogate ParentalTort Immunity
In Warren v. Warren,1 the Court of Appeals reaffirmed the viability
of parent-child tort immunity.2 In reaching this conclusion, the court
underscored its belief that the abolition of parental immunity would
interfere with domestic tranquility and parental discretion in determining appropriate discipline for their children. 3 Because of this belief, the court refused to create an exception to parental immunity for
motor vehicle torts.4 The court reasoned that compulsory motor vehi113. Id.
114. Oaks, 339 Md. at 38, 660 A.2d at 430.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 35, 660 A.2d at 428.
1. 336 Md. 618, 650 A.2d 252 (1994).
2. Id. at 619, 650 A.2d at 252.
3. Id. at 626, 650 A.2d at 256.
4. Id. at 627, 650 A-2d at 256. Forty-two states and the District of Columbia permit
suits between parents. and children for motor vehicle torts. See id. at 627 n.2, 650 A.2d at
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cle insurance is required by legislative creation and therefore any exception affecting this type of insurance should be approved by the
legislature.5 The court also declined to extend parent-child immu6
nity to stepparents, regardless of whether they stand in loco parentis.
Here, the court found that because stepparents have no legally imposed duties, extending parental immunity to stepparents would
grant an undeserved benefit.7
In so holding, the court refused to acknowledge the changes that
have occurred in society since parental immunity was first adopted in
Maryland in 1930.8 Rather than abolishing the arcane doctrine completely and replacing it with a more appropriate standard, the court
drew a bizarre line, allowing only biological parents the protection of
parental immunity.9
This Note will argue that Maryland should judicially abrogate the
parental immunity doctrine. In its place, the court should employ a
reasonable parent standard to determine tort liability between parents
and children.
1. The Case.-Albert Downes Warren III (Albert) was born to
Christina Warren (Christina) and Albert Downes Warren, Jr. (Warren) on June 4, 1984.1' The Warrens were divorced on January 3,
1986, and received joint custody of Albert.11 Albert lived with his
mother, and his father had liberal visitation rights.1" Warren married
Elizabeth McNeill (Elizabeth) on January 18, 1991. i" Subsequently,
on March 8, 1991, Albert and Elizabeth were involved in an automobile accident due to Elizabeth's negligence.' 4 Albert suffered numerous injuries in the accident, including irreversible brain damage and
partial paralysis.' 5
Albert's biological parents filed suit on behalf of Albert against
Elizabeth in the Circuit Court for Queen Anne's County, seeking
256 n.2. Only Maryland and seven other states continue to apply parental immunity for
motor vehicle torts. See id. at 621 n.1, 650 A.2d at 253 n.1.
5. Id. at 626-28, 650 A.2d at 256-57.
6. Id. at 628, 650 A.2d at 257.
7. Id. at 629, 650 A.2d at 257.
8. Schneider v. Schneider, 160 Md. 18, 23, 152 A. 498, 500 (1930), was the first Maryland case to recognize parental immunity. See infra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
9. Warre?, 336 Md. at 628-30, 650 A.2d at 257-58.
10. Id. at 620, 650 A.2d at 253.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.

14. Id.
15. Id.
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monetary damages for the injuries Albert suffered in the accident.16
Elizabeth asserted parental immunity as an affirmative defense.1 7 The
only issue before the trial court was whether Elizabeth should receive
the benefit of parental immunity. 8 The trial court held that Elizabeth was not protected by immunity and entered judgment in favor of
Albert for the amount of $1,750,000.19 Elizabeth filed an appeal with
the Court of Special Appeals, but the Court of Appeals issued a writ of
certiorari prior to consideration of the case by the intermediate court
of appeals.2 °
2.

Legal Background.-

a. The Inception of Parent-ChildImmunity.-Parent-childimmunity is a common-law rule that prevents suits within families. The
first case to recognize parent-child tort immunity was Hewellette v.
George.2 1 In Hewellette, the Mississippi Supreme Court, without legal
precedent, refused to maintain a minor's cause of action against her
mother for false imprisonment after the mother maliciously attempted to institutionalize the minor in an insane asylum.2 2 The
court reasoned,
[S] o long as the parent is under obligation to care for, guide,
and control, and the child is under reciprocal obligation to
aid and comfort and obey, no such action as this can be
maintained. The peace of society ... forbid[s] to the minor
child a right to appear in court in the assertion of a claim to
civil redress for personal injuries suffered at the hands of the
parent. The state, through its criminal laws, will give the minor child protection from parental violence and wrong-doing, and this is all the child can be heard to demand. 3
Along with Hewellette, McKelvey v. McKelveyP4 and Roller v. Roller 5
established the foundation for the modem parental immunity doc16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.

19. Id. The parties stipulated that Albert's injuries resulted from Elizabeth's negligence and that the present value of the damages sustained by Albert was $1,750,000. Id.
20. Id.

21. 9 So. 885, 887 (Miss. 1891).
22. Carolyn L. Andrews, Comment, Parent-ChildTorts in Texas and the ReasonablePrudent
Parent Standard, 40 BAYLOR L. Rav. 113, 114 (1988).
23. Hewellette, 9 So. at 887.
24. 77 S.W. 664, 664 (Tenn. 1903) (barring a child's action against her father or stepmother for cruel and inhuman treatment inflicted upon her by her stepmother), overruled
by Broadwell v. Holmes, 871 S.W.2d 471 (Tenn. 1994).
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trine. 26 These cases are credited with establishing the major rationales upon which courts based their reasoning in applying and
upholding the parental immunity doctrine. 27 These include:
(1) the fear of fraudulent or collusive claims, (2) the interest
in maintaining family harmony, (3) the protection of parental discretion, authority, and control, (4) the protection of
the family exchequer, (5) the possibility of inheritance from
the child-decedent by the parent-tortfeasor, and (6) the similarity between
interspousal immunity and parental
28
immunity.
For approximately thirty years these rationales were used "for the perpetuation of the parental immunity doctrine in the United States."'
Legal commentators eventually began to question the validity of
the doctrine, charging that "these policy concerns are either too nebulous or outdated."" ° While uniform in their belief that traditional
parent-child tort immunity should be abrogated, these commentators
have offered differing solutions. Many advocate the doctrine's complete abrogation," while others suggest significant amendment to the
doctrine. 2 The Restatement (Second) of Torts 3 adopted still another ap25. 79 P. 788, 789 (Wash. 1905) (stating that a child who was raped by her father could

not sue him for the pain and suffering she endured).
26. Gail D. Hollister, Parent-ChildImmunity: A Doctrine in Search ofJustification,50 FoRDHA" L. REv. 489, 495 n.41 (1992).
27. Id.
28. Andrews, supranote 22, at 114-15.
29. Id. at 115.
30. Note, Parent-ChildImmunity, 50 MD. L. REv. 1325, 1327 (1991) (foomote omitted)
[hereinafter Parent-ChildImmunity 1].
31. See Rhonda I. Framm, Comment, Parent-ChildTort Immunity: Time for Maryland to
Abrogate an Anachronism, 11 U. BALT. L. REv. 435, 466 (1982) (advocating the Court of
Appeals as the appropriate forum to abrogate Maryland's parental immunity); Christine V.
Pate, Comment, Parent-ChildImmunity: The Casefor Abolition, 6 SAN DIEGO L. Rav. 286, 296
(1969) (arguing that the public policy reasons for abrogating husband-wife immunity
should also serve as the basis behind abrogating parent-child immunity); Virginia B.
Townes, Note, The First DistrictDeclines to Adopt the Doctrineof ParentalImmunity, 10 FLA. ST.
U. L. REv. 185, 196 (1982) (calling for the Florida Supreme Court to abolish its parental
immunity doctrine).
32. See William E. McCurdy, Torts Between Parent and Child, 5 VILL. L. REV. 521, 559-60
(1960) (arguing that parental immunity should be abolished in personal injury cases due
to automobile liability insurance); William E. McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic
Relation, 43 HARV. L. REv. 1030, 1077-82 (1930) (stating that parental immunity should be
confined to areas of parental control and discipline); Martin J. Rooney & Colleen M.
Rooney, Parental Tort Immunity: Spare the Liability, Spoil the Parent, 25 NEw ENc. L. REv.
1161, 1179-84 (1991) (arguing that parental immunity should be retained for discretionary
actions of parents toward their children, including instruction, discipline, and any necessary provisions); Kathryn W. Lovill, Note, Frye v. Frye: Maryland Sacrifices the Child for the

836

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 55:529

proach s4 Another proposal is the creation of a new rule based on a
"reasonable parent" standard.3 5
Over the past century, many jurisdictions have either completely
abolished the doctrine 6 or never judicially recognized it. 7 Other
courts continued to follow the rule with significant exceptions. The
most common exceptions to the rule are in cases involving emanci-

Sake of the Family, 46 MD. L. REv. 194, 203-08 (1986) (criticizing Maryland's failure to abrogate parental immunity for negligent activities outside of the parent-child relationship).
33. The Restatement provides:
Parent and Child: (1) A parent or child is not immune from tort liability to the
other solely by reason of that relationship. (2) Repudiation of general tort immunity does not establish liability for an act or omission that, because of the parent-child relationship, is otherwise privileged or is not tortious.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895G (1979).
34. See ThomasJ. Herthel, Comment, ParentalImmunity inAlabama: Let's Not Let Parents
Get Away with Murder-An Argument to Reexamine the Issue, 25 CUMB. L. REv. 409, 415 (1995)
(noting that "the Restatement adopted a reasonable person standard, yet took into consideration the unique relationship between parent and child") (footnote omitted).
35. See Hollister, supra note 26, at 525-27 (arguing that parental immunity should be
replaced with a reasonable parent standard); Caroline E. Johnson, A Cyfor Help: An Argument for Abrogation of the Parent-ChildTort Immunity Doctrine in Child Abuse and Incest Cases, 21
FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 617, 654-55 (1993) (maintaining that the reasonable parent standard
allows the balancing of parents' rights to discipline their children against the children's
rights to seek redress); Isabel Wingerter, Parent-Child Tort Immunity, 50 L- L. REv. 1131,
1141-42 (1990) (calling for Louisiana to abandon parental immunity in favor of a reasonable and prudent parent standard); Carla M. Marcolin, Comment, Rousey v. Rousey The
District of ColumbiaJoins the National Trend Towards Abolition of ParentalImmunity, 37 CATH. U.
L. REv. 767, 787-89 (1988) (asserting that the reasonable parent standard would lend predictability to measuring liability in the wake of the abolition of parental liability); Note,
Parent-ChildImmunity, 49 MD. L. REv. 761, 772-73 (1990) (advocating that Maryland should
replace the parental immunity doctrine with a parental conduct reasonableness test)
[hereinafter Parent-ChildImmunity I]].
36. Ten jurisdictions have abrogated parental immunity. California, in Gibson v. Gibson, 479 P.2d 648, 648 (Cal. 1971) (en banc); Minnesota, in Anderson v. Stream, 295
N.W.2d 595, 601 (Minn. 1980); Missouri, in Hartman v. Hartman, 821 S.W.2d 852, 858
(Mo. 1991) (en banc); New Hampshire, in Briere v. Briere, 224 A.2d 588, 591 (N.H. 1966);
New Mexico, in Guess v. Gulf Ins. Co., 627 P.2d 869, 871 (N.M. 1981); New York, in
Geibman v. Gelbman, 245 N.E.2d 192, 194 (N.Y. 1969); Ohio, in Shearer v. Shearer, 480
N.E.2d 388, 390 (Ohio 1985) (reaffirming the standard set in Kirchner v. Crystal, 474
N.E.2d 275 (1984)); Oregon, in Winn v. Gilroy, 681 P.2d 776, 785-86 (Or. 1984); Pennsylvania, in Falco v. Pados, 282 A.2d 351, 355 (Pa. 1971); and South Carolina, in Elam v.
Elam, 268 S.E.2d 109, 111-12 (S.C. 1980).
37. The following jurisdictions have never adopted parental immunity: the District of
Columbia, Hawaii, Nevada, North Dakota, Utah, and Vermont. For a discussion on each
jurisdiction's reasoning behind not adopting the parental immunity doctrine, see Rousey v.
Rousey, 528 A.2d 416, 420-21 (D.C. 1987) (en banc); Petersen v. City and County of Honolulu, 462 P.2d 1007, 1008-09 (Haw. 1969); Rupert v. Stienne, 528 P.2d 1013, 1017-18 (Nev.
1974); Nuelle v. Wells, 154 N.W.2d 364, 365-67 (N.D. 1967); Elkington v. Foust, 618 P.2d
37, 40 (Utah 1980); Wood v. Wood, 370 A.2d 191, 193 (Vt. 1977).
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pated children, 8 intentional torts or gross negligence, 9 children who
41
are employed by their parent(s),4° and motor vehicle torts.
b. The Development of Parent-ChildImmunity in Maryland.Maryland adopted the parent-child immunity doctrine in Schneider v.
Schneider.42 In Schneider, the court held that a mother was barred from
recovery of damages for her injuries suffered in an automobile accident caused by her son's negligence. 3 Since Schneider, the Court of
Appeals has been exceedingly unwilling to make changes to the parent-child immunity doctrine, allowing only two exceptions to the doctrine.' First, in Waltzinger v. Brisner,4 ' a mother sued her adult son for
injuries sustained in an automobile accident caused by her son's negligence. 46 The Court of Appeals held that children emancipated at the
time of the tortious conduct could bring suits against their parents
and vice versa.4 7
Second, in Mahnke v. Moore,48 the Court of Appeals held that children who are victims of cruel and inhuman, or wanton and malicious
conduct, will not be prevented from recovering from their parents for
their injuries.4 9 In Mahnke, the plaintiff was allowed to recover from
her father's estate for shock, mental anguish, and permanent nervous
and physical injuries after the father shot the mother in the child's
presence, left the child with the mother's body for six days, and then
committed suicide in front of her. ° The court reasoned that " [w] hen
...

the parent is guilty of acts which show complete abandonment of

the parental relation, the rule giving him immunity from suit by the
child .... cannot logically be applied, for when he is guilty of such acts
38. Martinez v. Southern Pac. Co., 288 P.2d 868, 873 (Cal. 1955) (holding that an
emancipated child may bring a suit in tort against his parent(s)).
39. Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 68, 77 A.2d 923, 926 (1951) (holding that a child in
Maryland has a right of action against a parent for injuries resulting from an intentional
tort).
40. Trevarton v. Trevarton, 378 P.2d 640, 643 (Colo. 1963) (adopting the business or
employment exception to parental immunity).
41. Ooms v. Ooms, 316 A.2d 783, 785 (Conn. 1972) (noting Connecticut's statutory
abrogation of parental immunity for motor vehicle negligence).
42. 160 Md. 18, 21-24, 152 A. 498, 499-500 (1930). Schneider "fashioned a broad reciprocal immunity under which parents and children could not assert any claim for civil redress." Warren, 336 Md. at 622, 650 A.2d at 254.
43. Schneider, 160 Md. at 21-24, 152 A. at 499-500.
44. Smith v. Gross, 319 Md. 138, 145, 571 A.2d 1219, 1222 (1990).
45. 212 Md. 107, 128 A.2d 617 (1957).
46. Id. at 110-11, 128 A.2d at 618.
47. Id. at 126, 128 A.2d at 627.
48. 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951).
49. Id. at 69-70, 77 A.2d at 927.
50. Id. at 63, 77 A.2d at 924.
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he forfeits his parental authority and privileges, including his immunity from suit."51
Since establishing these exceptions to the doctrine, Maryland
courts have refused on five separate occasions to amend the rule or to
reconsider its public policy principles.5 2 Each time, the court has deferred to the legislature as the appropriate body for change.5" In Latz
v. Latz,5 4 the Court of Special Appeals refused to create an exception
for motor vehicle torts when the driver had insurance.5 5 The court
stated that "[i] f there is a need for change let it come by legislative
enactment."56
In Montz v. Mendoloff57 the Court of Special Appeals declined to
make an exception for torts involving alleged gross negligence.5 8
Again, the court cited the legislature's inaction, finding that "[the
rule] is now more firmly embedded in the law of Maryland and [we]
decline to change it."5"
Similarly, the Court of Special Appeals in Shell Oil Co. v. Ryckman,6 0 refused to find a business exception to parental immunity.6
This case involved an oil company's claim for contribution from a
lessee of one of its gas stations for damages paid to the lessee's son
after he was injured at the place of business. 62 The court held that
parent-child immunity prevented the indemnification action after the
6
company had settled with the child. 1
In Frye v. Fye,64 the Court of Appeals refused to abolish parental
65
immunity despite the court's abrogation of interspousal immunity.
51. Id. at 68, 77 A.2d at 926.
52. See Parent-ChildImmunity I, supra note 30, at 1329.
53. Id.
54. 10 Md. App. 720, 272 A.2d 435 (1971).
55. Id. at 729-30, 272 A.2d at 440.
56. Id. at 734, 272 A.2d at 443.
57. 40 Md. App. 220, 388 A.2d 568 (1978).
58. Id. at 224-25, 388 A.2d at 571. The court found that the tortious action in this case
did not fall within the Mahnke standard for wanton and willful misconduct and found no
indication of abandonment of parental authority. Id. at 225, 388 A.2d at 571.
59. Id. at 224, 388 A.2d at 570.
60. 43 Md. App. 1, 403 A.2d 379 (1979).
61. Id. at 4, 403 A.2d at 381. But see Hatzinicolas v. Protopapas, 314 Md. 340, 358-59,
550 A.2d 947, 956 (1988) (creating an exception for a child against her father's business
partnership for injuries sustained at the place of business). For a detailed discussion of
Hatzinicolas,see Parent-ChildImmunity II, supra note 35, at 761.
62. Ryckman, 43 Md. App. at 2, 403 A.2d at 380.
63. Id. at 4-5, 403 A.2d at 381.
64. 305 Md. 542, 505 A.2d 826 (1986). For a detailed discussion of this case, see Lovill,
supra note 32, passim.
65. Frye, 305 Md. at 557-58, 505 A.2d at 834. The court abrogated interspousal immunity in Boblitz v. Boblitz, 296 Md. 242, 260, 462 A.2d 506, 515 (1983). The court held that
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The court again reasoned that the legislature would be a more proper
place to determine the scope of parental immunity, stating, "[W]ho
can best resolve [the issues], the seven judges of this Court or the
members of the General Assembly?"6 6 Finally, the Court of Appeals
reaffirmed the Frye holding in Smith v. Gross,6 7 explaining that despite
changing values, "'both this Court and the legislature have been faithful to the promotion of the stability, harmony and peace of the family
and to the preservation of parental authority and the family unity as a
matter of public policy in the best interests of society.""'6
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In affirming the holding of the trial
court, the court in Warren considered three issues:
(1) whether Maryland should follow the growing number of
jurisdictions that have completely abrogated parent-child
tort immunity; (2) whether the immunity should be partially
abrogated in cases involving motor vehicle torts; and (3) if
the doctrine is not abrogated, whether it should be extended
to protect stepparents as well as biological parents.6 9
The court answered all three questions in the negative. v
The court was not persuaded by the plaintiffs' argument that
Maryland should completely abrogate parental immunity.7 ' Rather,
the court chose to reiterate its holding in Frye "that the policy justifications previously expressed by this Court continue[ ] to support parent-child tort immunity."7 2 The court determined that, along with
the preservation of family harmony, parent-child immunity rests on
three generally accepted policy justifications: "preservation of parental discipline and control, prevention of fraud and collusion, and the
threat that litigation will deplete family resources." 73 The court considered the "'shifting values in [our] changing world,"' 74 but determined that adhering to the stated policy of promoting family stability,
the reasons for abrogation of interspousal immunity "are... not pertinent or relevant with
respect to the abrogation of parent-child immunity." Frye, 305 Md. at 553, 505 A.2d at 832.
66. Frye, 305 Md. at 566, 505 A.2d at 838.
67. 319 Md. 138, 571 A-2d 1219 (1990). For a detailed discussion of this case, see

Parent-ChildImmunity I, supra note 30, passim.
68. Smith, 319 Md. at 147, 571 A.2d at 1223 (quoting Frye, 305 Md. at 561, 505 A.2d at
836).
69. Warren, 336 Md. at 621, 650 A.2d at 253.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 626, 650 A.2d at 256.
72. Id. at 625, 650 A.2d at 255.
73. Id. (citations omitted).
74. Id. at 624, 650 A.2d at 255 (quoting Frye v. Frye, 305 Md. 542, 561, 505 A.2d 826,
836 (1986)).
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harmony, and peace was .still. in the best interest of society.7 5 The
court quoted its decision in Fye that "'[i] t is clear that today's parent-child relationship, as recognized by this Court and the legislature,
furnishes no compelling reason to abrogate the rule."'7 6 The court
found that "[f]amily life and values" had not significantly changed
since the court last addressed the issue in Frye and it therefore believed that the best interests of both parents and children would be
served by retaining the immunity." The court reasoned that abrogating the immunity would cause greater disruption within the family,
infringe upon parental discretion in raising and disciplining children,
and would "allow the courts to become the arbitrator of parent-child
disputes and the overseer of parental decisions.""8
The court also refused to abrogate parent-child immunity in
cases involving motor vehicle torts.7 9 The court reasoned that any
such exception must be created by the General Assembly."° The court
again relied upon its holding in Frye where it found that "'compulsory
motor vehicle liability insurance . . . is exclusively a creature of the
legislature ....
The exclusion of motor torts from the parent-child

immunity rule would inevitably have some impact on the insurance
scheme and the social policy it furthers."'8 1 The Fye court determined that this impact should be resolved by the legislature rather
82
than the court.

While the court refused to abolish parent-child immunity completely or to partially abrogate the immunity for motor vehicle torts,
the court also was unwilling to extend parent-child immunity to stepparents, regardless of whether they stand in loco parentisto the injured
child.8 3 The court, while noting that stepparenting is more common
today than when parent-child immunity was first adopted by the
court, recognized "the many duties imposed by the biological relationship between natural parents and children." 4 The court stated that
"[n]o such duties are imposed upon stepparents by law."8" The court
75. Id.
76. Id. (quoting Fye, 305 Md. at 561, 505 A.2d at 836).
77. Id. at 626, 650 A.2d at 256.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 627, 650 A.2d at 256.
80. Id. at 627-28, 650 A.2d at 256-57.
81. Id. at 626, 650 A.2d at 256 (quoting Frye v. Frye, 305 Md. 542, 567, 505 A.2d 826,
839 (1986)).
82. Frye, 305 Md. at 567, 505 A.2d at 839.
83. Warren, 336 Md. at 628, 650 A.2d at 257.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 629, 650 A.2d at 257. The court continued, "Neither side in a stepparent-

stepchild relationship is obligated to the other; stepparents are free to leave the family via
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reasoned that a suit between a stepchild and stepparent is akin to a
suit between two individuals who have no legal obligations to each
other.8 6 Thus, the court held "that the lack of reciprocal legal obligations between stepparent and stepchild mandates that parent-child
immunity not be extended to that relationship.""7
In a strongly worded concurring opinion, Judge Raker disagreed
with the majority's holding that a stepparent standing in loco parentis
should not receive parental immunity. 8 This determination did not
affect Judge Raker's opinion in the instant case because she found
that, as a matter of fact, Elizabeth did not attain that status.8 9
In her concurrence, Judge Raker emphasized her dissatisfaction
with the court's continued use of the parental immunity doctrine. Referring to the court's decision in Fye, she stated, " [ o ] bserving that this
state is out of step with the rest of the nation, this Court nonetheless
refused to change the rule, holding that the change, if at all, should
come from the General Assembly."9" Nonetheless, she recognized the
need to follow precedent. "I believe the principle of stare decisis and
the inaction of the legislature militate against abolition of parent-child immunity today.... [W]ere we writing on a clean slate,
however, I might find otherwise," she wrote.9 1
While Judge Raker refused to advocate the abolition of parental
immunity, she did not find, as the majority had, any justification for
refusing to apply the rule to a stepparent who stands in loco parentisto
a stepchild." Judge Raker was persuaded by the California Supreme
Court's holding in Trudell v. Leathrby,a3 where that court held that
stepparents were immune from suit for tortious actions against their
stepchildren.9 4 The court in Trudell wrote that parental immunity
protects against intrafamily suits that cause discord among the family
and disrupt the peace and harmony that should exist in a housedivorce and incur no further obligations to the child, and the child is free to make his own
choices, subject only to limitations set by his biological parents." Id. at 630, 650 A.2d at
257-58 (footnote omitted). The court failed to mention the status of adoptive parents or

relatives such as grandparents, aunts, and uncles who often raise a relative's child as their
own.
86. Id., 650 A.2d at 258.
87. Id. at 631, 650 A.2d at 258.
88. Id. (Raker, J., concurring).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 632, 650 A.2d at 259 (citations omitted).
92. Id.
93. 300 P. 7 (Cal. 1931).

94. Warren, 336 Md. at 632-33, 650 A.2d at 259 (Raker, J., concurring); see also Trudel.
300 P. at 9-10.
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hold.9 5 The court then found that these same concerns exist when a
stepparent is sued by a stepchild.96
Judge Raker agreed with the majority's concern for giving a benefit to stepparents who had no duties to their stepchildren; however,
she noted that a rule considering the in loco parentisstatus of a stepparent would cure the potential of giving a stepparent an unjust benefit.9 7 Judge Raker reasoned that it seemed contrary to public policy to
discourage a stepparent from assuming parental duties to a child in
need of such care, particularly in today's world where stepparenting
has become increasingly commonplace. 98
4. Analysis.-In Warren, the Court of Appeals held that the need
to maintain domestic tranquility in the family remains the basis for
the parent-child immunity doctrine.9 9 The court grounded its reluctance to completely abrogate parent-child immunity on this belief
and on its refusal to make policy determinations on an issue that it
believed to be in the province of the General Assembly. ' °° Unfortunately, the court's determination that parental immunity continues to
be of value fails to consider today's ever-changing society and its resulting public policy concerns. Furthermore, the court's insistence
upon recognizing parental immunity solely for biological parents is
illogical.
a. Abolition of ParentalImmunity. -Maryland has become one
of the nation's most conservative states on the issue of parental immunity.10 1 While other states have refused to abrogate parental immunity for many reasons, 102 Maryland has relied on two reasons for
continuing to adhere to this antiquated doctrine.
One of the primary justifications that the Court of Appeals employed for retaining parent-child immunity is the desire to preserve
domestic tranquility."0 ' Given the prevalence of liability insurance in
today's society, however, this basis for the immunity makes little
95. Trudel, 300 P. at 9.

96. Id.
97. Warren, 336 Md. at 633, 650 A.2d at 259 (Raker, J., concurring).
98. Id. at 633-34, 650 A.2d at 259-60.
99. Id. at 626, 650 A.2d at 256.
100. Id. at 626-30, 650 A.2d at 256-58.
101. See supranotes 4, 36 (showing that Maryland is one of the few states without abrogation for motor vehicle torts or complete abrogation of the doctrine).
102. See Andrews, supra note 22, at 120-24 (discussing common reasons why states have
refused to abrogate the parental immunity doctrine).
103. Warren, 336 Md. at 626, 650 A.2d at 256.
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sense.' 04 One commentator has argued that "'virtually no [parent-child] suits are brought except where there is insurance. And
where there is [insurance], none of these threats to the family exists at
all.'" 1" 5 Furthermore, it is hard to believe that an uncompensated tort
truly adds to the harmony and peace of an otherwise happy household. Arguing that parental discipline and domestic tranquility would
be disturbed by these types of suits seems to suggest "that an uncompensated tort makes for peace in the family and respect for the
1 06
parent."
Moreover, this justification is tenuous, as
none of these arguments has been held sufficient to bar an
action by or against an unemancipated minor for a tort
against property, although they are all quite obviously
equally applicable in such a case. Nor . . . have they been
sufficient to prevent an action for a personal tort between
minor brothers
and sisters, which uniformly has been
10 7
allowed.
In fact, the harm to domestic tranquility seems greater in property
suits, where parents usually pay for damages, whereas the parents' insurance company typically pays for tort claims. 1
The second major justification for refusing to abolish parental
immunity is that it is the legislature's prerogative to change the
rule." 9 This argument carries little weight given that, as the court
recognized, parent-child immunity is ajudicially created rule adopted
by the Court of Appeals in 1930.110 Moreover, despite its stated policy
of deference to the legislature, the Court of Appeals has seen fit to
amend the rule in other circumstances where it believes public policy
is no longer served."' While Judge Raker expressed her dissatisfaction with the doctrine of parental immunity in her concurring opinion,"' it is unfortunate that she joined the majority and hid behind
the veil of stare decisis and the inaction of the legislature.
104. Parent-ChildImmunity II, supra note 35, at 771.
105. Id. (quoting Fleming James, Jr., Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability
Insurance,57 YALE L.J., 549, 553 (1948)) (alteration in original).
106. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 122, at 905

(5th ed. 1984).
107. Id. at 905-06.
108. Parent-ChildImmunity II, supra note 35, at 772 (citations omitted).
109. Warren, 336 Md. at 622, 650 A.2d at 254.
110. Id. at 622, 650 A.2d at 254; see also supranote 42 and accompanying text (discussing
the court's adoption of the rule).
111. See supra notes 45-51 and accompanying text (discussing the court's decisions in
Waltzinger and Mahnke).
112. Warren, 336 Md. at 631-34, 650 A.2d at 258-60.
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b. Stepparents StandingIn Loco Parentis.-The court further
muddled this arcane doctrine by refusing to extend the rule to include those stepparents standing in loco parentis to an injured
stepchild.11 While a complete abrogation of parental immunity
would be preferable, if the court must insist on continuing to apply
the doctrine, it should have made some concession to stepparents
who have taken on parental duties to their stepchildren.
The court made much of the fact that while biological parents
clearly have legal obligations to their children, stepparents have no
such obligations to their stepchildren. 1 14 However, stepparents often
take on obligations to their stepchildren although not legally required
to do so. It is nonsensical that biological parents retain this immunity
after they leave the biological child and play no further role in the
biological child's upbringing, while a stepparent who is involved with
the child's everyday life receives no immunity.
Judge Raker proposed a more workable solution in her concurring opinion. She endorsed the view taken by the Minnesota
Supreme Court" 5 in London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Smith, which
recognized immunity for stepparents who stand in loco parentisto their
spouses's child from another marriage." 6 The majority never discussed this alternative. This is unfortunate given that public policy
should encourage stepparents to take on increased parental obligations toward their stepchildren.
c. The Reasonable and Prudent Parent Standard.--Otherstate
courts have adopted a number of alternatives to parental immunity." 7
If Maryland finally abrogates parent-child tort immunity, it should
adopt the standard first announced by the California Supreme Court
113. Id. at 631, 650 A.2d at 258.
114. Id. at 629, 650 A.2d at 257.
115. Id. at 634, 650 A.2d at 259-60.
116. 64 N.W.2d 781, 785 (Minn. 1954).
117. The "parental supervision" approach has been used in Texas where immunity has
been granted "only where the parent's conduct could be characterized as the exercise of
parental authority, discipline, supervision, or discretion." Andrews, supra note 22, at 124
(footnote omitted); see, e.g., Farley v. MM Cattle Co., 529 S.W.2d 751, 758 (Tex. 1975)
(holding that, in giving instructions to his employee son, a father was acting outside of the
sphere of parental duties and thus, a suit by the son was not barred by the parental immunity doctrine); Felderhoff v. Felderhoff, 473 S.W.2d 928, 933 (Tex. 1971) (holding that
parental immunity did not bar a son's action where he sustained injuries when his father
accidentally engaged farm equipment that the son was cleaning as an employee of the
father's business partnership). The NewYork Court of Appeals has held that parents have
no legal duty to supervise their children properly. Holodook v. Spencer, 324 N.E.2d 338,
344 (N.Y. 1974).
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in Gibson v. Gibson.11 8 The Gibson court held that a child could sue her
parents for ordinary negligence." 9 Specifically, "the proper test of a
parent's conduct is this: what would an ordinarily reasonable and prudent parent have done in similar circumstances?"'
This standard
permits a child to recover if the parent falls to meet the standard of
care required by parents, 1 while still recognizing that parents need
some discretion regarding their children.1 2 The standard provides a
child recourse only against a parent who fails to act as a reasonable
parent would have under similar circumstances.123 The reasonable
parent standard applies a uniform method in determining the propri1 24
ety of holding a parent responsible to his child for negligence.
Although this standard has received almost universal academic
approval, 2 5 it has drawn some judicial criticism.12 6 Idaho's Supreme
Court, for example, rejected the reasonable parent standard, finding
that it would be impossible to adopt a single standard for its citizens
because of the "diversity in [their] religious, ethnic, and cultural backgrounds."1 27 This argument ignores the usage of the reasonable person standard in all tort actions, regardless of the defendant's
background.' 28 Also, reasonableness is determined by viewing a reasonable parent's behavior in a similar situation to that encountered by
the defendant.1 29 Finally,juries can be instructed to take into consid1 30
eration any variables that will differ from parent to parent.
5. Conclusion.-In Warren v. Warren,13 1 the Court of Appeals refused to abrogate parental tort immunity, to abrogate it partially for
motor vehicle torts, or to allow stepparents the protection of the immunity. a3 2 The rationale behind this holding is grounded in the be118. 479 P.2d 648 (Cal. 1971) (en banc).
119. Id. at 653.
120. Id.
121. Hollister, supra note 26, at 525-26.
122. Id. at 526.
123. Andrews, supra note 22, at 125.
124. Marcolin, supra note 35, at 787.
125. See supra note 35 (listing the legal commentators who support the use of the reasonable parent standard to determine tort liability between parents and children).
126. Marcolin, supra note 35, at 787 n. 173. For a further discussion of criticism of the
reasonable parent standard, see id. at 787-88.
127. Pedigo v. Rowley, 610 P.2d 560, 564 (Idaho 1980).
128. Marcolin, supra note 35, at 788.
129. Id.
130. Id.; see also Andrews, supra note 22, at 126 (discussing the use of the reasonable
parent standard with juries).
131. 336 Md. at 618, 650 A.2d at 252.
132. Id. at 621, 650 A.2d at 253.
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lief that allowing intrafamily suits would cause great disruption to
domestic tranquility. 33 This holding fails to recognize the changes
that have taken place in a society that would be better served by an
abrogation of parent-child immunity. Maryland should follow the
lead of the many other states that have abolished this doctrine and
replaced it with a reasonable and prudent parent standard. This standard would not preclude injured children from filing tort actions
against their parents and, at the same time, would preserve the unique
relationship between parents and their children.
DAVID

133. Id. at 626, 650 A.2d at 256.

A.

LEIB

Recent Developments
The Maryland General Assembly
I.

A.

CRIMINAL LAW

Maryland's Child Sexual Offender Notification and Registration Law

In 1995, the General Assembly passed legislation that requires
any child sexual offender' to register with a local law enforcement
agency.' The law requires that school principals in the county where
the child sexual offender resides be notified immediately of the registration statement' and authorizes the local law enforcement agency to
notify certain community organizations or individuals of the offender's registration.4 This new law applies prospectively to offenders
convicted of offenses occurring after October 1, 1995.' After a discussion of the public policy and historical background of child sexual
offender registration and notification laws, this Note will detail the key
provisions of Maryland's new law. It then will discuss the possible constitutional challenges and recommend changes to the new law.
1. "Child sexual offender" is defined as: a person who has been convicted of child
sexual abuse, as defined in MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35C (1995); first or second degree
rape, as defined in id. §§ 462, 463; first, second, or third degree sexual offense, as defined
in id. §§ 464, 464A, 464B; or fourth degree sexual offense as defined in id. § 464C; and
ordered by the court to register as part of a sentence or condition of probation. "Child
sexual offender" also includes one found not criminally responsible for any of the abovelisted offenses, or one convicted in another state of an offense that, if committed in Maryland, would constitute one of the above-listed offenses. Act of May 9, 1995, ch. 142, 1995
Md. 1820, 1822 (codified as amended at MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 692B (1995)).
2. Act of May 9, 1995, ch. 142, 1995 Md. Laws 1820 (codified as amended at Mo. ANN.
CODE art. 27, § 692B (1995)). A "Local Law Enforcement Agency" is defined as the "law
enforcement agency in a county that has been designated by resolution of the county governing body as the primary law enforcement unit in the county." MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§ 692B(a) (3).
3. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 692B(d)(1)-(2).
4. "[A] local law enforcement agency may provide notice of a registration statement
to the following organizations if the agency determines that such notice is necessary to
protect the public interest:
(I) A community organization;
(II) A religious organization; and
(III) Any other organization that relates to children or youth." Id § 692B(d) (3).
5. Act of May 9, 1995, ch. 142, 1995 Md. Laws 1820, § 4 (codified as amended at MD.
ANN. CODE art. 27, § 692B (1995)).
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1. Background.a. History of Sexual Offender Registration and Notification
Laws.-Many state legislatures have found that sex offenders pose a
high risk of recidivism and a danger to their communities. 6 In response, these states require sex offenders to register with the local law
enforcement agency in the jurisdiction where they live in order to assist law enforcement personnel in protecting their communities, conducting investigations, and quickly apprehending offenders who
commit new sex offenses.7 Some statutes further allow the local law
enforcement agency to notify certain segments of the public regarding the sex offender's presence in their community in order to "provide a public awareness whereby members of the community might be
more vigilant in protecting themselves and their children."8
Often, states have adopted their sex offender registration and notification laws in reaction to public outrage over specific heinous sexual crimes committed by previously convicted sexual offenders. For
example, a drive toward community registration and notification laws
began in Washington State in 1989, after the arrest of child sex offender Earl Shriner.9 Shriner had kidnapped a seven-year-old boy,
took the boy into the woods, raped him, stabbed him, and cut off his
penis.' The young victim survived and was able to identify Shriner as
his attacker.' After the attack, state residents were shocked to learn
that prison authorities had released Shriner at the end of an earlier
sentence, despite their knowledge that he still might be dangerous.' 2
In response to the public outcry, then Governor Booth Gardner
6. Rowe v. Burton, 884 F. Supp. 1372, 1375 (D. Alaska 1994); People v. Adams, 581
1991); Doe v. Poritz, 662 A-2d 367, 373 (N.J. 1995); State v. Ward, 869
N.E.2d 637, 640 (Ill.

P.2d 1062, 1065 (Wash. 1994).
7. ALASKA STAT. §§ 12.63.010, 18.65.087 (1995); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 730, para.
150(1) (a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1995); NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:7-1 to 7-11 (West 1995); WASH.
REv. CODE ANN. §§ 9A.44.130, 4.24.550, 71.09.010-.230 (West Supp. 1996).
8. Artway v. Attorney Gen., 876 F. Supp. 666, 669 (D.N.J. 1995), aff'd in part, vacated in
part, Nos. 95-5157, -5194, -5195, 1996 WL 170671 (3d Cir. Apr. 12, 1996); see, e.g., NJ. STAT.
ANN,. § 2C:7-8 (West 1995).
9. James Popkin et al., Natural Born Predators,U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 19, 1994,
at 63-64.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. Shriner had a history of violent crimes. He killed a schoolmate at the age of 16.
After Shriner's release from a mental institute, he kidnapped and assaulted two teenage
girls. Shriner once told a prison cellmate that he wanted a van equipped with cages so he
could capture children, sexually abuse them, and then murder them. Jerry Seper, Official
Defends Not Committing Child Molester, WASH. TIMES, July 24, 1984, at A3.
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formed a task force to study community protection.13 Acting on the
task force's recommendation, the Washington legislature adopted a
statute requiring all convicted sex offenders to register with the
county sheriff. 4
This unfortunate scenario was repeated in California. When
twelve-year-old Polly Klaas was snatched from her bedroom in
Petaluma, California, the community searched for her and waited anxiously for two months.' 5 Richard Allen Davis was eventually charged
with her kidnapping and murder. 16 Davis had been "convicted for
two earlier kidnappings of women and arrested in twenty-one incidents, including assault with a deadly weapon, burglary and grand
theft." 7 Polly Klaas's murder inspired tough repeat-offender statutes,
new registries, and public notification laws for sexual crimes.' 8
Likewise, NewJersey enacted a sexual offender registration act in
response to the public outcry following the rape and murder of sevenyear-old Megan Kanka by Jesse Timmendequas, a convicted sex offender who lived across the street from Megan's home.' 9 At the time
of the murder, New Jersey had no mechanism by which residents or
police could be notified that a convicted sex offender lived in their
neighborhood. The nation's attention was drawn to the tragedy, and
New Jersey subsequently enacted a sex offender registration law that
required sexual offenders to register with the local law enforcement
agency and mandated public notification. 21 In memory of Megan
Kanka, these types of laws are commonly referred to as "Megan's
13. State v. Ward, 869 P.2d 1062, 1065 (Wash. 1994). The public was deeply affected
by the case:
Public concern continued to mount as the media relayed stories about Shriner,
the system's failure to protect the public from him, and the seven-year-old's slow
recovery.... Thousands of letters and calls were received in the Governor's ofPublic forums were held about child sexual assault and
fice about Shriner ....
proposed legislation. Indeed, Shriner's vicious crime finally galvanized the Wash-

ington legislature to enact a new civil commitment system.
Raquel Blacher, Comment, HistoricalPerspective of the "Sex Psychopath" Statute: From the Revolutionay Era to the Present Federal Crime Bil4 46 ME. L. REv. 889, 909-10 (1995).
14. Ward, 869 P.2d at 1065; see WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.130 (West Supp. 1996).
15. Peter Hecht, Memories of PoUy Burn Brightly in Petaluma, SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 3,
1995, at Al.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.; see CAL. PENAL CODE § 290 (West 1995).
19. Artway v. Attorney Gen., 876 F. Supp. 666, 668 (D.N.J. 1995), affd in part, vacated in
part Nos. 95-5157, -5194, -5195, 1996 WL 170671 (3d Cir. Apr. 12, 1996); see, e.g., NJ. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:7-1 to 7-11 (West 1995).
20. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:7-1 to 7-11 (West 1995); see also Artway, 876 F. Supp. at 668;
Robert L. Jackson, Sex Offender Notification Laws Facing Legal Hurdles, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 8,
1995, at A5.
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laws." 1 Forty-seven states have Megan's laws requiring sexual offender registration.2 2 In addition, Congress recently enacted a federal
Megan's law.23
b. Public Policy and PoliticalDebate RegardingMegan's Laws.Megan's laws are based on the belief that mandatory registration and
public notification better equip a community to protect its children
from sex offenders. 24 Because of their high rate of recidivism and low
rate of successful rehabilitation,2 5 child molesters are viewed by many
people as society's most dangerous threat to children. 6 Although
conflicting data exist, the New Jersey Supreme Court recently found
there is no dispute: . . . the
that "[c]oncerning the basic facts ....
is
relative recidivism rate of sex offenders high compared to other offenders; treatment success of sex offenders exhibiting repetitive and
compulsive characteristics is low; and the time span between the initial
offense and reoffense can be long."2 7 Studies suggest that the recidivism rate for child28sex offenders is somewhere between thirty and seventy-five percent.
21. Artway, 876 F. Supp. at 668.
22. See Michele L. Earl-Hubbard, The Child Sex Offender Registration Laws: The Punishment, Liberty, Deprivation, and Unintended Results Associated with the Scarlet Letter Laws of the
1990s, 90 Nw. U. L. Rav. 778, 862 & n.6 (1996). The three states that have no such laws
are: Nebraska, Carolina, and Vermont. See id.
23. See infra note 45.
24. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text. Maryland Delegate Dana Lee Dembrow, D-Montgomery County, said that there are two natural advocates to a Megan's law.
"Get tough on crime types say this is the proper.., punishment for this type of crime."
Bradley A. Kukuk, Maryland's "Megan'sLaw" Takes Effect Absent Legal Challenge, DAILY REc.,
Oct. 14, 1995, at 19. The other group is motivated by "improving the deterrent value and
helping an individual with unhealthy mental urges to conduct themselves in such a way
that children are not hurt." Id.
25. See infra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
26. "Serial child abductors and molesters pose one of the most dangerous threats to
the safety of our children.... [E]ach of these criminals typically has a very large number
of victims and a long history of criminal behavior." ANN WOLBERT BURGESS ET AL., CHILD
TRAUMA I, ISSUES & RESEARCH 443 (1992); see also Poritz, 662 A.2d at 372-77 (stating that "as
far as society is concerned, sex offenses of the kind covered by [Megan's] law are among
the most abhorrent of all offenses.").
27. Poritz, 662 A.2d at 374 n.1.
28. BURGESS ET AL., supra note 26, at 423. Data based on treatment program for child
molesters conducted during a four-year follow up of 53 untreated and 64 treated child
molesters. Id. The study found a recidivism rate of 32% and 14% respectively. However,
the study included only incest offenders, and indicated that the recidivism rate if incest
offenders were dropped would be 40% to 42%. Id. Attorney General Janet Reno stated
that "convicted child molesters have a recidivism rate as high as 40% to 75%, according to
some studies." JusticeDepartment to Defend Megan's Law from News Service Reports, REc. N. NJ.,
Feb. 10, 1995, at A-17.
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While studies suggest that treatment does lower the recidivism
rate for sexual offenders, the post-treatment rate of recidivism is nevertheless still high.2 9 Although sexual offenders undoubtedly can be
helped by treatment, it is questionable whether they can ever be
cured."0 Many child molesters are as addicted to their sexual behavior
as an alcoholic is to alcohol."1 In her book, Treating Child Sex Offenders
and Victims, Dr. Anna Salter states that many child molesters "are more
frightened of being without the addiction than of continuing it. Thus
the [child molester's] goal . .. may not be to cease molesting children" but merely to complete training in order to qualify for release
or end his mandatory rehabilitation training.3 2
The treatment of sex offenders, even if effective, often is not offered to the majority of sex offenders in jail. 3 Although innovative
treatments are being shown to lower drastically the rates of recidivism,
the vast majority of sex offenders in prison receive little or no treatment.3 4 Fay Honey Knapp, director of the Safer Society Program in
Orwell, Vermont, a national referral service for sex offenders seeking
therapy, said that "[b]y conservative estimate, more than seventy-five
percent of jailed sex offenders get no help at all." 5
Finally, violent sexual crimes against children have severe social
repercussions. 3 6 The effects of child sexual abuse on the victim include a variety of long-term emotional, behavioral, social, and sexual
29. Over a five-year period, 25% of treated offenders were charged with a serious sexual offense. BURGESS ET AL., supra note 26, at 422.
30. "Child sexual abuse is a treatable problem. Treatable is defined as helping the
offender learn ways of minimizing the risk of reoffense. It does not imply cure." DR. ANNA
C. SALTER, TREATING CHILD SEX OFFENDERS AND VIcrTIMs 67 (1988); see also ABC News Forum:
Men, Sex, & Rape (ABC television broadcast, May 5, 1992). Dr. Fred Berlin, Director of the
Sexual Disorders Clinic at Johns Hopkins University, testified:
I don't think you can cure rapists. I don't think everybody can be helped. I think
there are some people too dangerous to be in the community. The reality is,
though, that sooner or later-and this is a fact-the majority of people who commit sex offenses do come back out .... It's very dangerous to the community that
many of them come out more-worse [sic] than the way in which they went in....
Julia A. Houston, Sex Offender Registration Acts: An Added Dimension to the War on Crime, 28
GA. L. REv. 729, 732 n.22 (1994)).
31. SALTER, supra note 30, at 87-88.
32. Id.
33. For example, California, with more than 15,000 jailed sex offenders, offers treatment in only one experimental program for 46 rapists and child molesters. NewYork, with
over 3800 jailed sex offenders, has a treatment program in only one prison. Daniel
Goleman, Therapies Offer Hope for Sex Offenders, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1992, at C1 (quoting
Fay Honey Knapp, Director of the Safer Society Program in Orwell, Vermont).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. The sexual abuse of a child constitutes a major crisis for child victims and their
parents. BURGESS ET AL., supranote 26, at 252-53.
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problems, including "sleeping and eating disorders; psychological reactions of fears and anxiety, depression, mood changes, guilt, and
shame ... suicide attempts, substance abuse, gender identity confusion and sexual dysfunction." 7 In addition, parents of the victims experience high levels of psychological distress that may exacerbate the
victim's condition. 8
2.

Maryland's Megan's Law.-

a. Legislative Histoy.-As in other states, Maryland's new law
was partly prompted by public outrage over a specific incident of child
sexual abuse. In the summer of 1993 a young Dundalk child was sexually assaulted by a nineteen-year-old next-door neighbor.3 9 The man
was charged, pled guilty, and was sentenced to serve six years in jail.'
After thirteen months, the convicted child molester was released and
returned home to his former residence.4 1 The victim and his parents
only became aware of the child molester's release when they saw him
walking into his house next door.4 2 The victim's parents, outraged
that a known child molester could be released back into their neighborhood without their knowledge, lobbied Maryland Senator Norman
43
Stone, D-Baltimore County, to propose a Megan's law in Maryland.
The General Assembly was also motivated by the federal Jacob
Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexual Violent Offender Registration Program (Crimes Against Children Act).' According to the
Crimes Against Children Act, "[a] person who is convicted of a criminal offense against a victim who is a minor or who is convicted of a
sexually violent offense [must] register.., with a designated State law
enforcement agency for [ten years after release]

....

,

Any person

37. Id.at xv.
38. Id. at 251-52.
39. Letter from Mr. Anthony Taylor, father of the sexually assaulted Dundalk child, to
the Senate Judiciary Committee (undated) (on file with the Md. Senate Judiciary
Committee).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Telephone Interview with Senator Norman Stone, D-Baltimore County (Sept. 12,
1995).
see 42 U.S.CA § 14071 (West 1995), amended by Pub. L. No. 145, 110 Stat. 1345
44. Id.;
(1996).
45. 42 U.S.CA § 14071(a)(1)(A), (b)(6)(A) (West 1995), amended by Pub. L. No. 145,
110 Stat. 1345 (1996). The term "sexually violent offense" means any offense consisting of
defined types of sexual abuse or physical contact with intent to commit such abuse. Id.
§ 14071 (a)(3)(B).
In addition to this registration requirement, Congress recently enacted legislation requiring police to notify the public when dangerous offenders move into their neighbor-
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designated a "sexually violent predator" is required to register indefinitely.4 The Crimes Against Children Act requires each state to enact
a law that complies with the federal guidelines by 1998 or lose up to
ten percent of federal funding received under the Omnibus Crime
Control Act of 1968. 4 7
On January 18, 1995, Senator Stone introduced Senate Bill 79.48
The bill required convicted child sex offenders to register for ten
years with the local law enforcement agency where the child sex offender lives.4 9 Senate Bill 79 further required the local law enforcement agency to notify the local school superintendent of the child sex
offender's release and allowed the law enforcement agency to notify
community, religious, or youth organizations if necessary to protect
the public.5 ° Senate Bill 79 also required the offender to send written
notice to his neighbors to inform them of his name, address, and a
brief description of the crime for which he was convicted, along with a
recent photograph of himself.5 On March 24, 1995, the Senate unanimously approved the bill. 2
On January 27, 1995, Delegate Dana Lee Dembrow, D-Montgomery County, introduced House Bill 230, using the Crimes Against Children Act as a template.5" Unlike Senate Bill 79, House Bill 230
required child criminal offenders and all violent sex offenders to register with the local law enforcement agency, as was mandated in the
hoods. Megan's Law, Pub. L. No. 145, 110 Stat. 1345 (1996). This federal Megan's law
penalizes states for noncompliance with a loss of federal funding. Sex Offender Bill Is Sent to
Clinton, WASH. POST, May 10, 1996, at A4; see also infra note 47 and accompanying text.
46. The term "sexually violent predator" means "a person who has been convicted of a
sexually violent offense and who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder
that makes the person likely to engage in predatory sexually violent offenses." Id.
§ 14071 (a) (3) (C). The determination that a criminal is a sexually violent predator is made
by the sentencing court guided by a state board composed of experts in the field of behavior and treatment of sexual offenders. Id. § 14071(a)(2). The indefinite registration requirement ends upon a determination that the person is no longer a sexually violent

predator. Id.
47. Id. § 14071(f) (2) (A). If Maryland fails to comply, the state could lose $800,000 in
1998. MARYLAND GEN. ASSEMBLY, DEP'T OF FiscAL SERVS., FiscAL NOTE ON S.B. 79 (1995).
48. Md. S.B. 79, 1995 Sess.

49. Act of May 9, 1995, ch. 142, 1995 Md. Laws 1829 (codified as amended at MD. ANN.
art. 27, § 692B (1995)).
50. Id. at 1826-27.
51. Id. (proposed amendment not part of final enactment). The bill required the offender to send written notice to each residence within: (1) a one mile radius if the offender resided in a rural area or, (2) a three block radius if the offender resided in an
urban area. Id.
CODE

52. Arlo Wagner, Maryland Mulls a Megan's Law, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1995, at C3.

53. Id.; Kukuk, supra note 24, at 19.
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Crimes Against Children Act.5 4 House Bill 230 did not require the
offender to notify any segment of the public, but allowed the local law
enforcement agency to release registry information as it determines
necessary to protect the public.5 5 On March 28, 1995, the House
passed the bill by a vote of 132 to 1.56
In early April, the House-Senate Conference Committee met to
craft a compromise measure.5 7 The Committee agreed that the offender only would be required to notify the police, and that the police
could notify certain community organizations as they determined necessary for public safety.5 8 The Committee further agreed that the new
law would apply prospectively,5 9 and would pertain only to child sex
offenders.6 0 Delegate Dembrow approved of the final version, saying
"I think that this bill is crafted in such a way that it will withstand
constitutional scrutiny. I believe that we... ultimately came out with
a conservative approach that would at least create a statewide registry
for child sex offenders."6" On May 9, 1995, the governor signed Senate Bill 79 into law. 62
b. Statutory Provisions.-Maryland's new law includes two
main requirements, child sex offender registration and limited public
notification.6 3 The statute prospectively applies to all offenders who
commit offenses after October 1, 1995,' and requires any Maryland
resident convicted6" as a child sexual offender 6 6 to register with the
54. Md. H.B. 230, 1995 Md. Laws 4071; see supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
55. Md. H.B. 230, 1995 Md. Laws 4071, 4077. Delegate Dembrow rejected the idea of
community notification. He said, "It's intended to drive the offender out of the state. As
more states passed that kind of law, offenders would move to other states that didn't have
that law." Kukuk, supra note 24, at 19. Instead, Dembrow said, "We took the middle-of-theroad approach. The police take the information and they are the agency that disseminates
it to anyone with good cause." Id.
56. Wagner, supra note 52.
57. Kukuk, supra note 24, at 19.
58. Id.
59. I.
60. Act of May 9, 1995, ch. 142, 1995 Md. Laws 1820 (codified as amended at MD. ANN.
CODE art. 27, § 692B (1995)).
61. Kukuk, supra note 24, at 19.
62. The final vote on S.B. 79 in the Senate was 47-0. The final vote on S.B. 79 in the
House was 128-1. Telephone Interview with Md. Dep't of Legis. Reference (approx. Dec.
1, 1995).
63. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 692B (1995).
64. Id.
65. "Convicted" is defined as including probation before judgment if the court orders
registration as a condition of probation and a finding of not criminally responsible. Id.

66. See supra note 1 for a definition of "child sex offender."
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local law enforcement agency 67 where the offender resides within
seven days after his release 6" from the custody of a supervising authority.69 An offender who is not a Maryland resident must register within
seven days after establishing a residence in Maryland or applying for a
Maryland driver's license.7" The registration consists of a sworn statement by the offender consisting of the offender's name, address, place
of employment, Social Security number, description of the crime for
which he was convicted, date and jurisdiction of the crime, list of any
aliases the offender used, fingerprints, and a photograph.7" The offender must register within seven days after changing residences and
must register annually with the local law enforcement agency for a
period of ten years.72 A knowing violation of the registration requirement is a misdemeanor and is punishable by a fine of up to $5,000
and imprisonment for up to three years.7 3
The second part of Maryland's Megan's law provides for several
layers of limited public notification that serve both to facilitate the
registration process and to alert those primarily responsible for the
safety of children. When the offender is released from the custody of
a supervising authority, 74 that authority must notify the local law enforcement agency of the county where the offender resides. 75 The
local law enforcement agency must, in turn, notify the Department of
Public Safety and Correctional Services, the department tasked with
67. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 692B(a) (2) (iv). "Local law enforcement agency" is defined as the law enforcement agency in a county that has been designated by resolution of
the county governing body as the primary law enforcement unit in the county. Id.
68. Id. § 692B(a) (4) (i)-(iii). "Release" is defined as any type of release from the custody of a supervising authority to include release on parole, mandatory supervision, work
release, and any type of temporary leave other than leave that is granted on an emergency
basis. Release does not include escape. Id.
69. Id. § 692B(a) (5) (i)-(vi). "Supervising authority" includes: the Secretary of Public
Safety and Correctional Services; the administrator of any local or regional detention
center; the court that grants probation before judgment, probation after judgment, or a
suspended sentence; the director of the Patuxent Institution; the Secretary of Health and
Mental Hygiene; or the court that convicts the sex offender but does not include a term of
imprisonment. Id.
70. Id. § 692B(c)(2)(ii). A supervising authority must notify a sexual offender in writing of the requirement to register and must obtain a signed statement from the offender
acknowledging receipt of such notice. Id.
71. Id. § 692B(b) (2).
72. Id. § 692B(h).
73. Id. § 692B(k). The original Senate bill proposed that failure to register would constitute a felony and would be punishable by up to 10 years in prison and a fine of not more
than $10,000. Md. S.B. 79, §J, 1995 Md. Laws 1820, 1829. Senator Stone stated that the
change to misdemeanor and $5,000 was one of the comprises reached by the General
Assembly. Telephone Interview with Senator Norman Stone (Sept. 14, 1995).
74. See supra note 69.
75. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 692B(b).
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maintaining a central registry of all child sexual offenders required to
register in Maryland.7 6 After being released, the offender must register within seven days, and the local law enforcement agency can initi7 7
ate criminal action for failure to do SO.
Additionally, the offender's supervising authority must notify certain individuals and organizations of the offender's release. The supervising authority must notify any victim of the crime for which the
offender was convicted or any witness who testified against the offender if that person sends written notification to the state's attorney
requesting that he be notified of the offender's release. 78 The state's9
7
attorney may also mandate notification of individuals as he sees fit.
Within five days of offender registration, the local law enforcement
agency must notify the county superintendent of schools, who must in
turn notify the county school principals within five days.8 0 Finally, the
local law enforcement agency may notify religious, community, or
other organizations related to children and youth if the law enforcement agency determines such notice necessary to protect the public
81
interest.
3. Constitutional Challenges Facing Maryland's New Law.-Maryland's new law faces several potential constitutional challenges-that
it violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, the offender's right to privacy, and the Fourteenth
Amendment right to due process.8 2
a. Eighth Amendment Prohibitionon Cruel and UnusualPunishment. -The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment.8" The original
intent of the Eighth Amendment was to protect Americans from tor76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id.
Id.
Id
Id.
Id.
Id.

§ 692B(g) (3).
§ 692B(k).
§ 692B(b) (3).
§ 692B(d)(1)-(2).
§ 692B(d) (3). The decision to release registration information is not entirely

discretionary. The new law requires the local law enforcement agency to establish procedures that include "the circumstances under.., which notification shall be provided." Id,
§ 692B(d) (4). However, the statute provides civil immunity for local officials and employees who carry out the notification requirements, unless it is proven that the official acted in
bad faith or with gross negligence. Id § 692B(d) (5).
82. Maryland avoided any challenge based on the Constitution's Ex Post Facto Clause

by making the law prospective. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
83. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
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ture and barbarous punishment. s4 As the Eighth Amendment has matured, however, the Supreme Court has broadened its coverage to
prohibit punishment that involves "unnecessary and wanton infliction
of pain"" or "punishment that is grossly disproportionate to the offense."8 6 In determining whether government action violates the
Eighth Amendment, a court must ask whether the action constitutes
punishment and if so, whether it is cruel and unusual.8 7
In DeVeau v. Braister,as the Supreme Court stated that in order to
determine whether a law is punishment, the court must decide
"whether the legislative aim was to punish that individual for past activity."8 9 In United States v. Ward,9" however, the Supreme Court noted
that even when the legislative purpose is regulatory, the courts must
ask "whether the actual effect of the statute is so punitive as to negate
the legislature's regulatory intent."91
In order to determine if a legislative act is punitive or regulatory,
the Supreme Court laid out factors to be considered in Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martinez.9 The factors include: (1) whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint; (2) whether historically it
has been regarded as a punishment; (3) whether it comes into play
only on a finding of scienter; (4) whether its operation will promote
the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence; (5)
whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime; (6)
whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it; and (7) whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned.93 Using the Kennedy factors,
84. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976).
85. Id. at 102-03.
86. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 288 (1983).
87. Artway v. Attorney Gen., 876 F. Supp. 666, 678 (D.NJ. 1995), affid in part, vacated in
part, Nos. 95-5157, -5194, -5195, 1996 WL 170671 (3d Cir. Apr. 12, 1996).
88. 363 U.S. 144 (1960).
89. Id. at 160 (determining whether the New York Waterfront Commission Act of 1953,
which prevented any laborer convicted of a felony from holding office in any waterfront
labor organization, was punitive in order to decide if the law was an ex post facto law).
90. 448 U.S. 246 (1980).
91. Id. at 248-49.
92. 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963). Some courts have rejected the Kennedy factors for
determining whether a restriction is punitive. Instead, these courts have used a test outlined by the Supreme Court in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958). See, e.g., People v.
Adams, 581 N.E.2d 637, 640 (11. 1991). In Trop, the Supreme Court looked exclusively to
the purpose behind the statute. Tp, 356 U.S. at 96. If the statute imposes a disability for
the purpose of punishment, it is punitive, but if the statute imposes a disability for any
other legitimate government purpose, it is nonpenal. Id.
93. Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168-69 (citations omitted).
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lower courts have reached differing conclusions regarding whether
4
sexual registration and notification laws are punitive or regulatory.1
Once a court determines a law to be punitive, the next step is to
determine whether the restriction imposed by the law is cruel and unusual. The Supreme Court outlined the test for determining whether
punishment is cruel and unusual in Solem v. Helm.9 5 In Solem, the
Court considered whether a sentence of life imprisonment without
possibility of parole for bouncing a $100 check constituted cruel and
unusual punishment.9 6 After noting that the idea of proportionality
was implicit in the Eighth Amendment and that the Eighth Amendment proscribes grossly disproportionate punishment,9 7 the Court
considered three factors to determine whether the punishment was
cruel and unusual: "i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of
the penalty; ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same
jurisdiction, that is whether more serious crimes are subject to the
same penalty or to less serious penalties; and iii) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions. " "
(i) Application to Sex Offender Registration Statutes.-One of
the most recent cases to determine whether a sex offender registration and notification law is punitive is Artway v. Attorney General.9 9 In
Artway, the United States District Court of New Jersey considered
whether New Jersey's Megan's law violates the Constitution's Ex Post
Facto Clause and the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and
unusual punishment. 10 Considering all of the Kennedy factors to94. See, e.g., State v. Noble, 829 P.2d 1217, 1224 (Ariz. 1992) (holding that Arizona's
statute requiring sex offender registration was not punitive); State v. Ward, 869 P.2d 1062,
1074 (Wash. 1994) (holding that the Washington statute requiring sex offender registration and limited public notification was not punitive). But see In re Reed, 663 P.2d 216, 220
(Cal. 1983) (concluding that California's registration law was punitive).
95. 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
96. The individual received such severe punishment because of his six prior felony
convictions. Id. at 277.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 278. The Court found a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of
parole significantly disproportionate to respondent's crime, and therefore prohibited by
the Eighth Amendment. Id.
99. 876 F. Supp. 666 (D.N.J. 1995), affid in part, vacated in part, Nos. 95-5157, -5194, 5195, 1996 WL 170671 (3d Cir. Apr. 12, 1996).
100. Id. at 668. New Jersey's Megan's law requires sex offenders to register with the
police and allows the police to release "relevant and necessary information concerning
registrants when ... necessary for pubic protection." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-1 to -11 (West
1995).
The Third Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment insofar as it held that the
registrations provisions of NewJersey's law were constitutional. Artway, 1996 WL 170671, at
*2. Because Artway's challenge to the notification provisions was unripe, the Third Circuit
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gether, the district court determined that while the registration portion of Megan's law is nonpunitive, the "public notification provisions
of Megan's law constitute more a form of punishment than a regula10 1
tory scheme."
Applying the first Kennedy factor, the Artway court found that
Megan's law involved an affirmative disability or restraint. 10 2 The
court stated that although a convicted sex offender's record might
leave the offender subject to periodic investigation or suspicion by the
police, public access to judicial proceedings would grant police the
same information obtainable through mandatory registration, implying that "registration" alone is not an affirmative disability or
restraint. 103

However, the court also found that the public notification portion of the law far exceeds public access to criminal records.' 4 "This
information, under Megan's Law, is available not just to those who
take the time and effort to search out courthouse records, telephone
books, or other sources of public information, but to each and every
member of a registrant's community, whether they are interested or
not."10 5 Citing the Arizona Supreme Court's analysis of Arizona's sex
offender registration law in State v. Noble,' the district court found
that the "public dissemination of a registrant's information may well
affect his employability, his business associations if he is self-employed
.... his associations with his neighbors, and thus his ability to return
to a normal private law-abiding life in the community."107 Accordingly, the court found that the notification portion of Megan's law
involved an affirmative disability or restraint.'0 8
vacated the district court's holding that the notification aspects of the law were unconstitutional. Id. at *1. The Third Circuit did note, however, that Artway's argument that notification constitutes punishment "is prima facie quite persuasive." Id. at *1.
101. Artway, 876 F. Supp. at 688, 692. Generally other jurisdictions using the Kennedy
factors recognize registration as regulatory, while notification is considered punitive. See,
e.g., State v. Noble, 829 P.2d 1217, 1224 (Ariz. 1992) ("[O]n balance, requiring convicted
sex offenders to register . . . is not punishment."); State v. Ward, 869 P.2d 1062, 1074
(Wash. 1994) (finding restriction not punitive). But see Reed, 663 P.2d at 220 (finding
registration without notification punitive).
102. Artway, 876 F. Supp. at 689.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. 829 P.2d 1217 (Ariz. 1992).
107. Artway, 876 F. Supp. at 688-89.
108. Id.; cf. In re Reed, 663 P.2d 216, 218 (Cal. 1983) (holding lifetime registration imposed affirmative disability or restraint, even though the information is restricted to police
access, because "the ignominious badge carried by the convicted sex offender can remain for
a lifetime").
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Analyzing the second through fifth Kennedy factors, the court first
stressed that notification historically has been regarded as punishment.10 9 For the second factor, the court found that in light of the
long history of "branding," public notification can be historically perceived as punitive.1 10 For the third factor, the Artway court found that
Megan's law comes into play only after a finding of scienter because
registration and notification were predicated on conviction of a sexual
offense that requires scienter."' For the fourth factor, the court concluded that the registration and notification requirements of Megan's
law promote the traditional aims of punishment-namely retribution
and deterrence-because the advertised aim of Megan's law is an effort to increase the vigilance of parents in protecting their children
and to deter reoffense by sex offenders.1 2 The court noted that the
"stated objective, regardless of how innocuously it has been couched
by the Legislature, clearly constitutes a traditional element of punishment: deterrence." 1 3 Finally, for the fifth factor, the court found
that the behavior to which sex offender registration and notification
laws apply, a convicted sex offense, obviously is already a crime. 1 4
Applying the sixth and seventh factors, the court concluded that
the alternative purpose assignable to registration and notification
mandated by Megan's law was to protect the public by increasing community awareness of the risk of having a convicted sex offender with a
high proclivity towards reoffense living in its neighborhood. 5 The
court found, however, that the alternative purpose was so closely
aligned with the fourth factor, deterrence, that the alternative purpose was still punitive. '
Weighing all the Kennedy factors, the court found that the registration provision of Megan's law was not punitive.' 1 7 However, the
court found that the notification provision was punitive, stating that
the notification requirement of "Megan's Law is an excessive intrusion
into the realm of punishment sufficient to find that its effect, if not its
purpose, is punitive." '
109. Artway, 876 F. Supp. at 689.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.at 690.
113. Id.But seeState v. Ward, 869 P.2d 1062, 1072-73 (Wash. 1994) (refusing to hold
that the secondary deterrent effect outweighed the legislature's primary intent to "aid law
enforcement agencies' efforts to protect their communities").
114. Artway, 876 F. Supp. at 691.
115. Id.
116. Id.at 692.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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The next step is to determine whether sexual offenders registration laws are cruel and unusual. In In re Reed,11 9 the California
Supreme Court applied the Solem factors to conclude that requiring
someone convicted of a sexual misdemeanor to register for life with
the police department was cruel and unusual punishment. 120 First,
the court noted that the petitioner's offense was not very grave and
that his punishment was extremely harsh. 12 1 He was arrested for violation of section 647(a) of the California Penal Code, which criminalized "lewd and dissolute acts, or loitering in or about public toilets in
public parks." 12 2 Second, the court noted that in California, far more
heinous crimes do not trigger police registration-for example child
pornography, bigamy, bestiality, and prostitution. 2 Third, the court
noted that at that time, 1983, only five states required convicted sex
offenders to register with police departments.124 Finding all three factors persuasive, the court ruled that the registration statute was cruel
and unusual because it imposed excessive punishment on relatively
minor crimes.125 However, the majority conceded that notification is
valid as applied to offenses that are more heinous, such as child
26
molestation.'
(ii) Application to Maryland'sLaw.-Applying the tests above,
Maryland's new law does not impose cruel and unusual punishment.
Balancing the Kennedy factors,' 2 7 Maryland's new law likely would be
determined punitive. Using the rationale applied by the district court
in Artway, a court could find that Maryland's ten-year registration and
public notification requirement (1) constitutes an affirmative disability or restraint, (2) historically has been regarded as punishment, (3)
comes into play only after conviction of a sexual offense requiring scienter, (4) promotes a traditional aim of punishment--deterrence, (5)
applies to behavior that is already a crime, and (6)-(7) has no alternative purpose not closely aligned with deterrence.
119. 663 P.2d 216 (Cal. 1983).
120. Id. at 222.
121. Id. at 221.
122. CAL. PErNAL CODE § 647(a) (West 1995).
123. Reed, 663 P.2d at 221-22.
124. Id. at 222. The court may have reached a different conclusion today, when 47
states have adopted sex offender registration laws, many states have some sort of accompanying public notification, and the federal government has adopted the Crimes Against
Children Act urging every state to require sex offender registration and limited public
notification. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
125. Reed, 663 P.2d at 221-22.
126. Id. at 224 (Kaus,J., dissenting).
127. See supra text accompanying note 93.
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However, application of the three Solem factors1 28 suggests that
Maryland's new law is not cruel and unusual. The Supreme Court in
Solem emphasized that the Eighth Amendment proscribes grossly disproportionate punishment considering the gravity of the offense and
the harshness of the penalty.12 9 Unlike the offense considered by the
California Supreme Court in In re Reed, 3 ' all offenses that trigger the
Maryland notification and registration requirement are felonies that
carry a minimum sentence of at least ten years injail.3 Additionally,
the harshness of the penalty imposed by Maryland's Megan's law is
lessened by several factors. While notification of certain individuals
may be mandatory in some cases, the provision for notifying community organizations is proportional to the severity of the crime. Law
enforcement agencies are not required to notify the public regarding
every offense automatically, but may only release information "necessary to protect the public interest" 13 2 according to the agency's estab33
lished procedures.
Considering the third Solem factor, a reviewing court could determine that Maryland's statute imposes punishment similar to that in
other jurisdictions. Sexual offender registration and notification statutes are commonplace today. Forty-seven states have some form of
3 4
registration, while many states have some form of notification.'
Recent Fourth Circuit case law indicates that the court would not
be receptive to an Eighth Amendment challenge to the law. In United
States v. Polk,133 Polk argued that his sentence of five consecutive fiveyear terms for mail fraud was cruel and unusual punishment.' 3 6 The
Fourth Circuit rejected Polk's argument, stating that "Solem does not
require a proportionality review of any sentence less than life imprisonment without possibility of parole."137 The court cited its previous
holding in United States v. Whitehead,13 1 where it recognized that
"[t] rial courts are vested with broad discretion in sentencing and, if a
sentence is within statutory limits, it will not be reversed absent ex128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 288 (1983).
663 P.2d 216 (Cal. 1983); see supra notes 119-125 and accompanying text.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 464 (1994).
Act of May 9, 1995, ch. 142, 1995 Md. Laws 1820, 1827 (codified as amended at MD.
ANN. CODE art. 27, § 692B (1995)).
133. Id.; see also supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
134. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
135. 905 F.2d 54 (4th Cir. 1990).
136. Id. at 55.
137. Id. (quoting United States v. Whitehead, 849 F.2d 849, 860 (4th Cir. 1988)).
138. 849 F.2d at 849.
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traordinary circumstances."'3 9 Recently, in United States v. Lockhart,n140
when the defendant claimed that his 120-month sentence violated the
Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment,
the Fourth Circuit cited Polk and declined to consider his
argument.

141

b. Invasion of Privacy.-The next constitutional challenge
Maryland's new law may face is invasion of privacy. Sex offenders
could charge that a requirement to register with the police department and, more importantly, having their registration information
publicly released, violates their right to privacy. Although the United
States Constitution provides no express guarantee of privacy, in Griswold v. Connecticut,'4 2 the Supreme Court recognized that there are
certain "zones of privacy" that the government cannot invade.' 43 In
Roe v. Wade,' 4 4 the Supreme Court defined this penumbral right to
privacy, stating that "only personal rights that can be deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' are included" in
the constitutional guarantee of personal privacy. 45 The Court in Roe
listed several areas that deserve protection under this right to privacy:
"marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child
rearing, and education.'

46

Four years later, in Whalen v. Roe, 1 47 the

Supreme Court explained that the right to privacy includes48 the indi1
vidual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters.
In Walls v. City of Petersburg,"9 the Fourth Circuit discussed disclosure of personal matters. In that case, Walls, a city employee of Petersburg, Virginia, was discharged after she refused to complete a
background questionnaire including questions about her previous arrests and personal financial information. 15 0 Walls alleged that by requiring her to answer the questionnaire, the City of Petersburg
violated her right to privacy.'
The Fourth Circuit stated that in or139. Id at 860.
140. 58 F.3d 86 (4th Cir. 1995).
141. Id. at 89.
142. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (finding a Connecticut law restricting the use of contraceptives
by married couples to be unconstitutional).
143. Id. at 485.
144. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
145. Id. at 152 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
146. Id. at 152-53 (citations omitted).
147. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
148. Id. at 599-600.
149. 895 F.2d 188 (4th Cir. 1990).
150. Id. at 190.
151. Id. at 189.
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der to determine whether matters of personal information are entifled to privacy protection, courts must first decide whether the
individual had a reasonable expectation of confidentiality.' 5 2 "The
more intimate or personal the information, the more justified is the
expectation that it will not be subject to public scrutiny."' 5 3 The court
found that because questions regarding Walls's prior arrests were
available from public records, she had no expectation of privacy.' 54
However, the court also found that she did have a reasonable expectation of confidentiality concerning her private financial information
and therefore had a constitutional right to privacy over those
155
matters.
The court did note, however, that the right to privacy is not abso15
lute. 6 It must be balanced against the state's interest in disclosing
the information.'5 7 The court determined that Walls had considerable responsibility as administrator of the Community Diversion Incentive program. 5 The court held that the "strong public interest in
avoiding corruption... outweighs [the] limited privacy expectations
in this financial disclosure requirement," 5 9 and that consequently,
the city had demonstrated a compelling interest in requiring her to
160
disclose the information.
More recently, in Hodge v. Jones,"' the Fourth Circuit considered
whether the state could maintain records and release information pertaining to suspected child abuse after the allegedly abusive parents
had been cleared of the charges.162 While recognizing the parents'
right to keep certain information private, the court noted that the
"maxim of... privacy is neither absolute nor unqualified, and may be
outweighed by a legitimate governmental interest." 6 ' The court held
that the "legitimate interest in curtailing the abuse and neglect of its
minor citizens" outweighed the "pale shadow briefly cast over the
Hodges by the state's actions."' 4
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id. at 192.
Id.
Id. at 194.
Id.

156. Id. at 192.
157. Id.
158.
159.
1987)).
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id. at 194 (citations omitted).
Id. (quoting Fraternal Order of Police v. Philadelphia, 812 F.2d 105, 116 (3d Cir.
Id.
31 F.3d 157 (4th Cir. 1994).
Id, at 157-58.
Id. at 163-64.
Id.
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One other consideration in weighing the competing interests of
the government and the individual is the possibility of unauthorized
disclosure of information entitled to privacy protection.1 6 5 The
Fourth Circuit has stated that "[w]hen there are precautions to prevent unwarranted disclosure, an individual's privacy interest is weakened."1 66 In Walls, the information obtained through a background
investigation was kept in a private filing cabinet to which only a limited number of people had access.' 6 7 The court believed that such
precautions were "reasonable and sufficient"1 68 to protect Walls's privacy interests, but noted that "if this type of information had been
more widely distributed, our conclusions might have been
9
6

different." 1

In Doe v. Poritz,17 0 the Supreme Court of New Jersey decided that
a sexual offender registration and notification statute does not violate
an offender's right to privacy. 7 ' Citing the Fourth Circuit's approach
in Walls, the court first determined that a sex offender had no reasonable expectation of privacy concerning the registration statute because "[r]equiring disclosure of plaintiff s prior arrest and conviction
...
does not implicate the right to privacy, as those records are publicly available."' 7 2 The court explained, however, that a sex offender
does have a reasonable expectation of privacy concerning the notification statute. 7 3 Although the disclosed information may have been
available to the public prior to police dissemination,
[i]n exposing those various bits of information to the public,
the Notification Law links various bits of informationname, appearance, address, and crime-that otherwise
might remain unconnected. However public any of those individual pieces of information may be, were it not for the
Notification Law, those connections might never be
made....

[A] privacy interest is implicated when the gov-

ernment assembles those diverse pieces of information into a
single package and disseminates that package to the public....

Those convicted of crime may have no cognizable

privacy interest in the fact of their conviction, but the Notifi165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Id. (citations omitted).
Walls v. City of Petersburg, 895 F.2d 188, 194 (4th Cir. 1990).
Id.
Id.
I.
662 A.2d 367 (NJ. 1995).
Id. at 407.
Id.
Id. at 408.
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of incation Law, given the compilation and dissemination
1 74
formation, nonetheless implicates a privacy interest.
The New Jersey court next determined that the state's interest
justifying public disclosure substantially outweighed the plaintiff's interest in privacy.1 7 ' The court said that "[t]here is an express public
policy militating toward disclosure: the danger of recidivism posed by
sex offenders. The state interest in protecting the safety of76members
of the public from sex offenders is clear and compelling."'
The court was, in part, persuaded by the fact that
the degree and scope of disclosure is carefully calibrated to
the need for public disclosure: the risk of reoffense. The
greater the risk of reoffense, the greater is the scope of disclosure. .

.

. Only that information necessary to alert the

public of, and protect177the public from, the risk posed by the
offender is released.

Thus, the Supreme Court of New Jersey determined that neither the
statutes violated the plaintiffs constituregistration nor notification
17
tional right to privacy.

1

Maryland's law also should pass constitutional muster if challenged as an invasion of privacy. The logic in Doe v. Poritz,17 9 Hodge v.
Jones, 8 ' and Walls v. City of Petersburg"8 ' reveals that although a sex
offender has no reasonable expectation of privacy concerning the registration provision, the offender may have a reasonable expectation
of privacy concerning Maryland's notification provision. When convicted sex offenders register in Maryland, they must provide their full
name, address, and place of employment; a description of the crime
for which they were convicted; the date of and jurisdiction in which
they were convicted; a list of any aliases used; a photograph; and fingerprints."8 2 While most of the information is available to the diligent
public, "a privacy interest is implicated when the government assembles those diverse pieces of information into a single package and disseminates that package to the public." '8 3
174. Id. at 411.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 412.
177. Id,
178. Id. But see infra notes 192-197 and accompanying text (noting that the court found
that the law violated sex offender's Fourteenth Amendment due process rights).
179. 662 A.2d at 367.
180. 31 F.3d 157 (4th Cir. 1994).
181. 895 F.2d 188 (4th Cir. 1990).
182. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 692B(b)(2) (1995).
183. Poritz, 662 A.2d at 411.
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Even though the sex offender may have a reasonable expectation
of privacy regarding Maryland's public notification provision, the
state's compelling interest outweighs the offender's privacy concerns.
The high rate of recidivism1 8 4 and the high number of victims18 5 assignable to sex offenders pose a great risk of reoffense to the community. The General Assembly's interest in protecting the public and in
preventing reoffense outweighs the inconvenience and loss of privacy
borne by the convicted sex offender.
c. Fourteenth Amendment Guarantee of Due Process.-The final
potential constitutional challenge facing Maryland's registration and
notification law is whether it violates the offender's right to due process. The United States Constitution provides that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law." 8 6 In 1976, the Supreme Court decided Paul v. Davis,18 7 in
which Davis claimed that the chief of police of Louisville, Kentucky,
violated Davis's right to due process 188 by circulating a flier to the businessmen of Louisville containing Davis's name and picture and identifying him as an active shoplifter. 8 9 Davis claimed that the flier
deprived him of his "liberty" because he could not enter the local
stores without fear of being suspected of shoplifting. 9 ° The Supreme
Court denied Davis's claim, stating that "reputation alone, apart from
some more tangible interests such as employment, is [neither] 'liberty' [nor] 'property'" and by itself, is not "sufficient to invoke the
procedural protection of the Due Process Clause."19 1
In Doe v. Poritz,'9 2 the Supreme Court of New Jersey concluded
that New Jersey's Megan's law violated a sex offender's Fourteenth
Amendment right to due process.1 93 Recognizing that Paulv. Davis19 4
held that mere damage to reputation alone is not actionable under
the Due Process Clause, the court stated that the proper test is therefore "whether plaintiff has established damage to reputation and im184. See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text.
185. One study estimates that the "average adolescent sex offender may commit 380 sex
crimes over his lifetime." BURGESS ET AL., supra note 26, at 418.
186. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
187. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
188. Id. at 696-97.
189. Id at 695.
190. Id. at 697.
191. Id. at 701.
192. 662 A-2d 367 (N.J. 1995); see supra notes 170-178 and accompanying text.
193. Poritz, 662 A.2d at 420-21.
194. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
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pairment of some additional interest."' 9 5 The court said that the
"additional interest" that was impaired was the offender's right to privacy.19 6 Therefore, the court concluded that the "harm to plaintiffs
reputation, when coupled with the incursion on his right of privacy,
although justified by the compelling state interest, constitutes a protectable interest " "' and therefore entitles the plaintiff to a right of
due process that was violated by the law.
In Hodge v. Jones,1 9 the Fourth Circuit reached the opposite holding. The Hodges claimed that the Carroll County Department of Social Services violated their right to due process by maintaining records
of alleged child abuse after the Hodges had been cleared of all
charges. 199 After clarifying that Paul v. Davis requires "loss of a tangible interest" in order to evoke the due process guarantee, 0 the
Fourth Circuit stated that the Hodges "neither alleged nor demonstrated any alteration of legal status or injury resulting from any purported defamation that would warrant a finding of a deprivation of a
liberty interest otherwise shielded by the substantive and procedural
guaranties of the Fourteenth Amendment. "201
If challenged, Maryland's new law should not be found to violate
the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due process. Unlike New
Jersey's law, Maryland's new law allows only limited public notification
of the victim, witnesses, and certain community organizations.20 2
Even if the sex offender's reputation is injured, this injury is neither
loss of property nor liberty as defined by Paul v. Davis and Hodge v.
Jones, and thus does not evoke the Fourteenth Amendment's right to
due process.20 3
4. Analysis.-In adopting Maryland's Megan's law, the General
Assembly appears to have benefited from constitutional challenges
facing similar statutes in other jurisdictions and adopted a statute that
will avoid these challenges.2 0 4 However, Maryland's new law does not
comply with the federal guidelines issued in the Crimes Against Chil195. Porit4,662 A.2d at 419 (emphasis added).
196. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 173-174.
197. Poritz, 662 A.2d at 419.
198. 31 F.3d 157, 164 (4th Cir 1994); see supra notes 161-164 and accompanying text.
199. Hodge, 31 F.3d at 157-58.
200. Id. at 165 (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 708-09 (1976)).
201. Id. The opinion suggests that if the defamation was great enough to cause alteration of legal status or personal injury (perhaps satisfied by loss of property or employment), the court would find that reputational injury would violate due process. Id.
202. See supra text accompanying notes 78-81.
203. See supra notes 191, 200-201 and accompanying text.
204. See supra text accompanying note 61.
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dren Act." 5 In order to avoid losing approximately $800,000 in funding,2 0 6 Maryland must make several changes to the new law. The
legislature must require that all sexual offenders register for a period
of ten years and further require that sexually violent predators register
for life.20 7 Maryland's law requires only child sex offenders to register.20 8 In order to comply with the Crimes Against Children Act, the
General Assembly should amend Maryland's new law by adopting sections (A) (8) and (9), and sections (H) and (I) of House Bill 230, as
originally amended. 0 9
Section (I), as originally amended, of House Bill 230 required all
sex offenders to register for a minimum of ten years.21 0 The bill also
provided that if a sex offender is convicted of a sexually violent offense, the court must determine whether the offender is a sexually
as a sexually violent
violent predator.2 1 ' Any offender designated 212
predator would be required to register for life.
Amending Maryland's new law will not subject it to greater constitutional challenge. The heightened registration requirement will
withstand allegations that it constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, invades the privacy of the sexually violent predator, or violates
his guarantee of due process.
Requiring a sexually violent predator to register for life will defeat a challenge that it constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.
Punishment is only deemed cruel and unusual if it is grossly disproportionate to the offense.2"' By designating an offender as a predator,
the court is concluding that he was not only convicted of a violent
205. 42 U.S.CA. § 14071 (West 1995); see supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
206. See supra note 47.
207. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text. Maryland must also ensure that its
law complies with the notification requirements of the recently enacted federal Megan's
law. See supra note 45.
208. See supra text accompanying note 60.
209. Md. H.B. 230, 1995 Md. Laws 4071, 4074, 4077-78. Section (A) (8) defined "sexually violent offense" as first or second degree rape, first or second degree sexual offense, or
assault with intent to commit the same against child or adult victim. Id. at 4074. Maryland's new law only applies to offenses "involving an individual under the age of 15 years."
Act of May 9, 1995, ch. 142, 1995 Md. Laws 1820, 1822 (codified as amended at MD. ANN.
CODE art. 27, § 692B (1995)). Md. H.B. 230, 1995 Md. Laws 4071, 4074, § (A)(9) separately defined a "sexually violent predator" as a sex offender who "suffers from a mental
abnormality or personality disorder that makes the offender likely to commit a sexually
violent offense." Id. Md. H.B. 230, §§ (H)-(I) required lifetime registration for sexually
violent predators. Id. at 4077-78.
210. Md. H.B. 230, 1995 Md. Laws 4071, 4078.
211. Id. at 4077; see also supra note 46 (discussing how the court determines if the offender is a sexually violent predator).
212. Md. H.B. 230, 1995 Md. Laws 4071, 4078.
213. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 288 (1983).
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sexual offense, but that he is likely to reoffend. 1 1 4 As the Supreme
Court noted in Solem v. Helm," 5 the legislature is granted substantial
deference in determining appropriate punishments and "outside the
context of capital punishment, successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences [will be] exceedingly rare."" 6
Lifetime registration for sexual predators equally will withstand a
challenge that it invades the predator's privacy. The Crimes Against
Children Act requires that predators register until the court finds the
offender is no longer a predator.2 7 The Act recognizes that the more
dangerous sexual offenders remain a threat to the public longer than
ten years. According to the Forum on Corrections Research, although
the greatest risk period appears to be the first five to ten years following release "almost one quarter of the recidivists were reconvicted
more than 10 years after being released.2 2" The state's compelling
interest in protecting the public from the danger posed by a predator
outweighs the invasion of the sexually violent predator's privacy.
Finally, the heightened registration requirement does not violate
predators' due process rights. Lifetime registration does not deny the
predator of any "liberty" or "property" necessary to evoke the due process clause. 21 9 However, even if lifetime registration is found to evoke
due process concerns, House Bill 230 satisfies the requirements of due
process. The bill requires that the court designate an offender as a
predator.22 ° The bill further provides the predator with a chance to
petition the court to reevaluate his designation and to introduce evidence during his hearing. 2 Thus, requiring predators to register for
life does not make Maryland's new law more vulnerable to constitutional challenge.
5. Conclusion.-Maryland'sChild Sexual Offender Registration
and Notification law was adopted in order to comply with the Crimes
Against Children Act and to provide greater protection for the public
from the unique danger posed by sexual offenders. In its current
form, the new law does not comply with the Crimes Against Children
Act and only protects the public from child sexual offenders. When
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

H.B. 230, § (A)(9), 1995 Md. Laws 4071, 4074.
463 U.S. 277 (1983); see supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
Solem, 463 U.S. at 289-90 (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980)).
42 U.S.CA § 14071(b) (6) (B) (West 1995).
5 FORUM ON CORRECTIONS RESEARCH, WHEN ARE SEX OFFENDERS AT RISK FOR REOFFENDING? 9 (1995).
219. See supra notes 186-203 and accompanying text.
220. Md. H.B. 230, 1995, Md. Laws 4071, 4077.
221. Id. at 4078.
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the General Assembly amends the new law to affect all sexual offenders and to require sexually violent predators to register for life, the
General Assembly will fully meet its original goal.
GREGORY

G.

GILLETTE
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OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH LAW

Reining in the OccupationalHealth Regulators: The Ban on Smoking
in the Workplace

Following an arduous battle between the governor and state legislators, and their subsequent concessionary efforts, the 1995 General
Assembly enacted House Bill 1368, the "Smoking in the Workplace
Act,"1 which was expressly designed to curtail the Division of Labor
and Industry's2 (the Division) pervasive workplace smoking regulations. 3 The Act amended the statutes granting authority to the Secretary of the Department of Labor, Licensing, and Regulation 4
(Secretary) and the Commissioner of the Division of Labor and Industry5 (Commissioner) to adopt regulations to carry out their duties,
which include removing health hazards from the workplace.6 The
1995 amendments preclude the Secretary and Commissioner from
regulating the smoking of tobacco products in certain locations, most
notably bars, restaurants, and hotel sleeping rooms.7 Following a
brief summary of the impact of tobacco smoke on health, this Note
will review the complex history of this legislation, discuss the smoking
ban's procedural distinctiveness compared with efforts by other states
as well as its substantive effectiveness, and raise questions unanswered
by the new law.
1. Public Health Background.-For several decades, the medical
and scientific communities have stressed the adverse health effects of
tobacco smoke. Epidemiological studies dating back to the 1930s8
have examined the relationship between smoking and lung cancer.
1. Act of March 27, 1995, ch. 5, 1995 Md. Laws 350 (section 1 codified at MD.CODE
§ 2-105 (Supp. 1995); MD.CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. §§ 2-106, 5-314 (Supp.
1995)).
2. The Division is a unit within the Department of Labor, Licensing, and Regulation.
3. MD.REGS. CODE tit. 9, §§ 12.23.01 to .05 (1995).
4. At the time of the bill's enactment, the agency was known as the Department of

ANN., Bus. REG.

Licensing and Regulation.
5. MD.CODE ANN., Bus. REG. § 2-105 (1992 & Supp. 1995); MD.CODE ANN., LAB. &
EMPL. §§ 2-106, 5-314 (1991 & Supp. 1995).

6. The Commissioner is responsible for fulfilling the mandates of the Maryland Occupational Safety and Health (MOSH) Act. MD.CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL § 5-201 (1991).
The MOSH Act of 1973 commands, "to the extent practicable, that each working man and
woman in the State has working conditions that are safe and healthful." MD.CODE ANN.,
LAB. & EMPL. § 5-102(b) (1991). The Secretary has authority over all program planning
within the Department's units. MD.CODE ANN., Bus. REG. § 2-104 (1992).
7. See infra notes 94-101 and accompanying text.
8. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., DHHS
PUB. No. (CDC) 89-8411, REDUCING THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING, 25 YEARS OF
PROGRESS, A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 5 (1989).
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The magnitude of research increased throughout the 1950s, and investigations have continued since then at an untiring pace.9 The federal government periodically has reported exhaustive research
summaries and new scientific findings. The United States surgeon
general released the first Public Health Service report on smoking
and health in 1964.10 This report confirmed the link between cigarette smoking and lung cancer.'1 In a 1971 report, the surgeon gen2
eral described the association between smoking and heart disease.'
In a 1986 report, the surgeon general concluded that environmental
tobacco smoke (ETS) 13 is causally related to disease, including lung
cancer, in healthy nonsmokers.1 4 In 1991, the Public Health Service's
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health reported the
dangers of ETS in the workplace 15 and recommended that employers
ban workplace smoking.' 6 In 1992, the Environmental Protection
17
Agency classified ETS as a Group A (known human) carcinogen.
Maryland citizens have not escaped the consequences of smoking
tobacco or inhaling ETS. 8 According to the latest American Cancer
Society report, Maryland has the fourth highest cancer mortality rate
9. See id. at 5-10.
10. PUBLIC HEALTH SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, PHS PUB. No.
1103, SMOKING AND HEALTH, REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE SURGEON GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE 6 (1964).

11. Id. at 31.
12. HEALTH SERVS. & MENTAL HEALTH ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, DHEW PUB. No. (HSM) 71-7513, THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING, A REPORT
TO THE SURGEON GENERAL: 1971, at 8-9 (1971).

13. ETS is composed mainly of sidestream smoke (smoke from the burning end of the
cigarette), along with exhaled mainstream smoke. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., DHHS PUB. No. (CDC) 87-8398, THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF INVOLUNTARY SMOKING, A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 7 (1986). ETS
contains more than 4000 chemicals. OFFICE OF HEALTH & ENVT'L ASSESSMENT, U.S. ENVr'L
PROTECTION AGENCY, PUB. No. EPA/600/6-90/006F, RESPIRATORY HEALTH EFFECTS OF PASSIVE SMOKING: LUNG CANCER AND OTHER DISORDERS § 3.1 (Dec. 1992).
14. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, supra note 13, at 7. Epidemiological studies have
also linked ETS with an increased risk of death from heart disease. Stanton A. Glantz &

William W. Parmley, PassiveSmoking and Heart Disease: Epidemiology, Physiology, and Biochemistry, 83 CIRCULATION 1, 10 (1991).
15. NATIONAL INST. FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., DHHS PUB. No. (NIOSH) 91-108, CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULL. No. 54,
ENVIRONMENTAL TOBACCO SMOKE IN THE WORKPLACE:

LUNG CANCER AND OTHER HEALTH

EFFECTS 12 (June 1991).
16. Id. at 12-13.
17. OFFICE OF HEALTH & ENVI'L ASSESSMENT, supra note 13, § 1.4.
18. In 1993, the total smoking-related direct care cost, indirect mortality cost, and indirect morbidity cost was estimated at $1.5 billion. Norma F. Kanarek et al., Md. Dep't of
Health & Mental Hygiene, Changes in the Prevalence and Costs of CigaretteSmoking and Smoking-AttributableDeaths, Maryland 1987-93, 44 MD. MED. J. 823, 826-27 (1995).
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in the United States. 19 Lung cancer accounts for the largest propor-

tion of the state's cancer mortality,"° and eighty percent of the state's
lung cancer deaths are primarily attributable to smoking.2 1 Furthermore, cardiovascular disease (CVD) is the most prevalent cause of
death in Maryland,2 2 and sixteen percent of the state's CVD deaths
are primarily attributable to smoking.23 In 1993, at least a thousand
deaths in Maryland resulted from exposure to ETS.24 In that same
year, the State's Cancer Council recommended that Maryland,
through its occupational safety and health act, regulate cigarette
smoking in the workplace.25
2. Legal Context.-To date, neither Congress nor the United
States Department of Labor's Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) has regulated smoking in the workplace.2 6
Although local smoking restrictions exist in many Maryland counties," prior to the current statutes and regulations, the State of Maryland did not have a broad-based workplace smoking standard.2 8
19. AMERICAN CANCER SOCIETY, CANCER FACTS AND FIGURES-1995, at 8 (1995) (report-

ing combined data for the years 1987 through 1991). In 1991 Maryland had the highest
cancer mortality in the nation. MARYLAND CANCER CONSORTIUM & MD. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
MENTAL HYGIENE, MARYLAND CANCER CONTROL PLAN 3 (Jan. 1991) (reporting data from
1940 to 1987). This change in rank has been ascribed to an increase of lung cancer cases
in other states, rather than to a decrease of cases in Maryland. Kanarek et al., supra note
18, at 823 (citations omitted).
20. See DIVISION OF HEALTH STAT., MD. DEP'T OF HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE, MARYLAND
VITAL STATISTICS, PRELIMINARY REPORT 23 (1993).
21. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs.,
Smoking Attributable Morbidity, Mortality, and Economic Cost (SAMMEC) Software
[hereinafter SAMMEC] (unpublished data); DIVIsION OF HEALTH STAT., supra note 20, at
23 (providing data for SAMMEC calculation).
22. See DMvtsON OF HEALTH STAT., supra note 20, at 23-24.
23. SAMMEC, supranote 21; DIVISION OF HEALTH STAT., supra note 20, at 23 (providing
data for SAMMEC calculation).
24. Glenn E. Schneider, Md. Dep't of Health & Mental Hygiene, Clearingthe Air: Physician Supportfor Clean Indoor Air, 44 MD. MED. J. 403, 403 (1995) (citation omitted).
25. MARYLAND STATE COUNCIL ON CANCER CONTROL, ANNUAL REPORT 41 (1993).
26. OSHA has proposed rulemaking on indoor air quality in work environments that
includes standards for tobacco smoke. Indoor Air Quality, 59 Fed. Reg. 15,968, 16,037
(1994) (to be codified at 29 CFR pts. 1910, 1915, 1926, 1928) (proposed Apr. 5, 1994).
27. See, e.g., ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY, MD., CODE §§ 8-101 to -109 (1993); HOwARD
COUNTY, MD., CODE §§ 12.600 to .613 (1995); MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE §§ 24-9 to 9A (1994); PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, MD., CODE §§ 19-151 to -159 (1987); TALBOT
COUNTY, MD., CODE §§ 23-1 to -13 (1993) (passed by referendum in 1994).
28. Maryland has prohibited smoking in the public area of a retail store employing 20
or more full-time persons, MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. §§ 24-501 to -505 (1990 & Supp.
1995), hospitals, MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 24-205 (1990 & Supp. 1995), public mass
transportation vehicles, MD. CODE ANN., TRANsp. § 7-705(b) (2) (1993 & Supp. 1995), intrastate motor bus carriers while in public service, MD. ANN. CODE art. 78, § 35A (1991), pub-
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Several smoking-related bills were introduced during the 1994 session
of the General Assembly.29 House Bill 1044 would have allowed smoking to be regulated as a hazard in the workplace, but it was later withdrawn."0 The standing committees never reported on House Bill 143,
the Clean Indoor Air Act, and reported unfavorably on House Bill
120, the Smoking in Public Places Act.3 ' Finally, Maryland has no appellate precedent in which an employee has sued an employer for fail2
ure to provide a smoke-free workplace.1
a. The Regulations.-On November 1, 1993, in response to
safety concerns, 3 Maryland's high cancer mortality rate, and the
hazards of ETS, then Secretary of the Department of Licensing and
Regulation (Department), William A. Fogle, Jr., requested that the
Maryland Occupational Safety and Health (MOSH) Advisory Board
34
(Board) consider the issue of regulating smoking in the workplace.
The Board held two public hearings in December 1993 a3 and deliberlic elevators, MD. ANN. CODE art. 89, § 64 (1991), state government buildings, MD. REGs.
CODE tit. 1, § 01.01.1992.20 (1993).
29. See COUNSEL FOR THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE, EXECUTIVE, AND LEGISLATIVE REVIEW, MD. GEN. ASSEMBLY, ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED REGULATION 7 (May 11, 1994)
[hereinafter COUNSEL FOR THE JOINT COMmITEE] (on file with Department of Legislative

Reference, Annapolis, Md.).
30. Id.
31. Id. H.B. 143 would have provided a smoke-free work area for nonsmoking employees and prohibited smoking in restaurants. Md. H.B. 143, 1994 Sess. Employers would not
have been required to make structural changes to create the smoke-free area. Id. H.B. 120
would have prohibited smoking in enclosed public places, including workplaces, with exceptions for a separately enclosed private office of one individual and for restaurants. Md.
H.B. 120, 1994 Sess.
32. In many jurisdictions, plaintiffs have litigated this issue under numerous theories,
including the common-law duty to provide a safe workplace, workers' compensation,
Americans with Disabilities Act, and constitutional law. Christine W. Lewis & SaraJ. Bliss,
Are You Treating Your Employees Like Prisoners? Employers' Liability for Environmental Tobacco
Smoke, MicH. B.J. 416, 416 (May 1994).

33. Three Baltimore City school employees were killed on the job in an explosion ignited by a cigar match. John W. Frece, Workplace Smoking Under Attack, Top State Official
Preparesto Issue Emergeny Ban, BALT. SUN, Oct. 29, 1993, at Al. The Secretary later modi-

fied his original plan and decided not to issue the regulation as an emergency measure.
Kim Clark, Public HearingDec. 9 on Workplace Smoking, BAaT. SUN, Nov. 12, 1993, at D10.
34. Letter from William A. Fogle, Jr., Secretary, Department of Licensing and Regulation, to Robert L. Lawson, Maryland Occupational Safety and Health Advisory Board (Nov.
1, 1993) (on file with Division of Labor and Industry, Department of Labor, Licensing, and
Regulation, Baltimore Md.). The Secretary drafted a straightforward regulation. In three
sentences, the Secretary prohibited an employee from smoking while in the place of employment. Record at 1, Fogle v. H & G Restaurant, Inc., 337 Md. 441, 654 A.2d 449 (1995)
(No. 69) [hereinafter Record].
35. Decision of Commissioner of Labor and Industry on Proposed Regulation to Prohibit Smoking in Enclosed Workplaces, 21 Md. Reg. 1336, 1336 (1994) [hereinafter Decision of Commissioner]. Approximately 70 wimesses testified at these hearings, including
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ated during three meetings in early 1994.36 The Board submitted its
report to the Commissioner of the Division of Labor and Industry (Division), recommending that smoking be prohibited in enclosed workplaces with exceptions for the "hospitality industry."3 7 The exceptions
were a result of the Board's concern about a smoking prohibition's
economic impact on businesses in this industry. 38
The Commissioner disagreed with the Board's concerns 9 and
drafted regulations similar to the Board's proposal, but without exfederal and state health officials, scientists, physicians, employers, employees, Action on
Smoking and Health (a health advocacy group), the Tobacco Institute (a tobacco company
trade association), and Phillip Morris Companies, Inc. Id. The Board received volumes of
supporting documents. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.; REPORT OF THE MARYLAND OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADVISORY BOARD
REGARDING ToBAcco SMOKE IN THE WORKPLACE 55 [hereinafter BOARD REPORT], available in

Record, supra note 34, at 2-57. The Board quickly concluded that ETS is detrimental and
warrants regulation. Id. at 32-33 (citing MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 5-308 (1991),
which requires that the condition be regarded as detrimental to safety and health in order
to be regulated). The Board stated that "the appropriate and legally permissible approach
is to prohibit smoking in indoor workplaces, with certain workplaces excluded." Id. at 52.
In reaching this conclusion, the Board referred to the "reasonably necessary" guidelines
and feasibility stipulations in MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. §§ 5-101(e), 5-309(c) (1991 &
Supp. 1995). See BOARD REPORT at 44-45 (footnote omitted). The Board explained that,

"[w]ith respect to feasibility, because tobacco smoke has an indispensable role in virtually
no production process or in the delivery of few services and because a smoking prohibition
is not costly, in the case of most industries there is no question that the regulation is feasible." Id.
The Board drafted proposed regulations that required employers to prohibit smoking
in enclosed workplaces except within a designated smoking area. Record, supra note 34, at
58-60. Employers may permit smoking in a smoking area that must be a separately enclosed room with ventilation that exhausts directly to the outdoors. Id. These regulations
exempted bars, restaurants, hotel sleeping rooms, and convention or conference establishments while in use for a private function. Id. The regulations also exempted tobacconist
establishments that engage in the sale of tobacco, vehicles used during the course of employment when occupied by only one person, and analytical laboratories if smoking is a
necessary part of their research to determine the health effects of tobacco smoke. Id.
38. The Board stated that "applying a smoking prohibition to the hospitality industry
could affect patron behavior and hence may have an economic impact on the industry."
BOARD REPORT, supra note 37, at 54. The Board cautioned that because employees in this
industry face great risks from ETS, further investigation into the economic feasibility of
extending the prohibition is warranted. Id. at 55-56.
39. The Commissioner stated that once a substance is deemed a hazard to employees,
"it must be regulated in a manner ensuring that no employee... suffers material impairment of health or functional capacity ....
An industry may be excluded on grounds of
economic infeasibility only if the cost of compliance would threaten the economic viability
of the industry." Letter from Henry Koellein, Commissioner, Division of Labor and Industry, to Howard Marshall, Chairman, Maryland Occupational Safety and Health Advisory
Board (Mar. 7, 1994), in Record, supranote 34, at 61-62 (referring to "economic feasibility"
as interpreted in American Iron & Steel Inst. v. Occupational Safety & Health Admin., 577
F.2d 825, 835 (3d Cir. 1978)). The Commissioner concluded that any economic impact on
restaurants, bars, and other establishments would not materially threaten the industry. Id.
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cepting the hospitality industry.' The Commissioner held a public
hearing on the proposed regulations. 4 Based on all of the testimony
and documents submitted, the Commissioner determined that there
was sufficient workplace risk to warrant regulation,4" and that the appropriate scope of the regulations was to prohibit indoor smoking unless an employer constructed a specially ventilated smoking area.4"
The Commissioner also concluded that it was economically feasible
for restaurants and bars to comply with the regulations." The Commissioner published notice of final action on Code of Maryland Administrative Regulations (COMAR) 09.12.23: Prohibition on Smoking
in an Enclosed Workplace, effective August 1, 1994."5
b. The Cases.-On July 22, 1994, the same day the regulations were published, plaintiffs consisting mainly of Maryland restauWhile the Commissioner's efforts were in progress, the General Assembly's Joint Committee on Administrative, Executive, and Legislative Review (AELR) conducted its own
review of the proposed regulations, pursuant to MD.

CODE ANN.,

STATE GOv'T § 10-110

(1993). As part of this review, the General Assembly's Department of Fiscal Services prepared a fiscal impact statement. Fiscal Services took issue with the statement that most
small businesses should have no problem meeting the requirements of the regulation. DEPARTMENT OF FiscAL Smitvs., MD. GENERAL ASSEMBLY, CONTROL No. 0074, PROPOSED REGULATION (AELR REviEw)-FscA.L ANA.ysis (Mar. 11, 1994) (on file with Department of
Legislative Reference, Annapolis, Md.) (referring to a statement made in the Commissioner's notice of proposed action to be published in the Maryland Register on April 15,
1994, see infranote 40). Fiscal Services stated that small businesses will not be able to afford
the great expense of building a separately ventilated smoking area, and they will be forced
to ban smoking. Id.
The AELR Committee counsel's analysis of the validity of the regulations raised issues
concerning the extent of the Division's statutory authority and the regulations' consistency
with legislative intent. COUNSEL FOR THEJOINT COMMrITEE, supra note 29, at 1-2. Pursuant
to its authority, the AELR Committee may suggest changes to a proposed regulation, but
has sole veto power only when the regulation is an emergency measure. CompareMD. CODE
ANN., STATE GOV'T § 10-111(b) (1993 & Supp. 1994) with MD. CODE ANN., STATE Gov'T
§ 10-111.1 (1993) (granting the governor ultimate decision-making power over a nonemergency measure).
40. The proposed regulations were published in the Maryland Register. Prohibition
on Smoking in an Enclosed Workplace, Notice of Proposed Action, 21 Md. Reg. 682, 68283 (Apr. 15, 1994).
41. Decision of Commissioner, supra note 35, at 1336. Approximately 47 witnesses provided testimony, including physicians and scientists appearing at the request of Phillip
Morris Co., the Tobacco Institute, or the Commissioner; representatives from the American Industrial Hygiene Association, the American Cancer Society, Action on Smoking and
Health, and the Coalition for Smoke Free Maryland Workplaces; restaurant and bar owners; employers involved in the tobacco industry; and representatives from the Restaurant
Association of Maryland and the Maryland State Licensed Beverage Association. Id. at
1336-37, 1349-50.
42. Id. at 1344-48.
43. Id. at 1348-49.
44. Id. at 1349-51.
45. 21 Md. Reg. 1304 (1994).
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rant, bar, and hotel owners; trade associations; and cigarette
manufacturers initiated an action in the Circuit Court for Talbot
County requesting injunctive and declaratory relief.4 6 On July 27, the
circuit court granted a ten-day ex parte injunction to stay the implementation of COMAR 09.12.23. 4 7 The circuit court renewed this ex
parte injunction,4 8 and, applying the test outlined in Department of
Transportationv. ArmacoSt, 49 granted the plaintiffs' motion for an interlocutory injunction."0 The State appealed, and the Court of Appeals
granted certiorari prior to adjudication by the Court of Special Appeals. 5 ' On February 24, 1995, the Court of Appeals held that the
circuit court abused its discretion in granting the interlocutory injunction, vacated the injunction and remanded the case for further
52
proceedings.
46. Record, supra note 34, at 91-118 (citing Complaint, H & G Restaurant, Inc. v. Fogle
(Cir. Ct. Talbot Co. 1994) (No. CG 2460), vacated 337 Md. 441, 654 A.2d 449 (1995)).
A health advocacy group, Action on Smoking and Health (ASH), filed suit in Baltimore City before the plaintiffs in H & G Restaurantfiled their suit in Talbot County. Petition of Action on Smoking and Health (ASH) (Cir. Ct. Bait. City 1994) (No. 94-194013).
ASH's suit requested the court to determine the legality of the regulation. Id. Both sides
accused each other of forum-shopping. Tom Stuckey, Fight Over Smoking Ban Heats Up,
DAILY RECORD, July 26, 1994, at 9. In H & G Restaurant, the State moved to transfer the
plaintiffs' action to Baltimore City Circuit Court to be consolidated with Petition ofASH, but
later withdrew its motion. Transcript at 91-92, H & G Restaurant,Inc. (No. CG 2460) (July
27, 1994).
ASH moved for an emergency stay of one of the new regulations that authorized the
establishment of designated smoking areas within enclosed workplaces. Emergency Motion for Stay of Regulation 09.12.23, Petition of ASH (July 22, 1994) (No. 94-194013). The
court denied ASH's motion, noting its decision was not inconsistent with the Talbot
County Circuit Court's decision to grant an ex parte injunction. Order, Petitionof ASH, No.
94-194013 (July 28, 1994); see infra text accompanying note 47. The court explained that
ASH's challenge was limited to one regulation whereas H & G Restaurant's challenge encompassed the series of five smoking regulations, and each suit involved different classes of
petitioners having different interests. Order, Petition of ASH, No. 94-194013 (July 28, 1994).
The stay granted by the Talbot County Circuit Court was controlling. Id.
47. Order, H & G Restaurant, Inc., No. CG 2460 (July 27, 1994).
48. Order, H & G Restaurant, Inc., No. CG 2460 (Aug. 5, 1994).
49. 299 Md. 392, 404-05, 474 A.2d 191, 197 (1984); see infra note 50.
50. Order, H & G Restaurant, Inc., No. CG 2460 (Aug. 12, 1994), available in Record,
supra note 34, at 311. Under the Armacost test, the court examined the likelihood of
plaintiffs' success on the merits, the balance between injury to the defendants by granting
the injunction and injury resulting from its refusal, whether the plaintiffs would suffer

irreparable harm if the injunction were not granted, and the public interest. Record, supra
note 34, at 307-08 (citing Transcript at 909-15, H & G Restaurant,Inc., No. CG 2460 (Aug.

12, 1994)). The court held that all four factors favored granting the plaintiffs' motion for
interlocutory injunction, including the likelihood of success on the merits because the
plaintiffs had raised questions as to the validity of the regulations and the adequacy of the
Commissioner's feasibility and economic impact analyses. Id. at 308.
51. Fogle v. H & G Restaurant, Inc., 336 Md. 224, 647 A.2d 444 (1994).
52. Fogle v. H & G Restaurant, Inc., 337 Md. 441, 469-70, 654 A.2d 449, 463 (1995).
On remand to determine the merits of the case, the Circuit Court for Talbot County found
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The appellees (plaintiffs) maintained that the Commissioner exceeded his authority to promulgate the occupational safety and health
standard by failing to comply with the substantive and procedural requirements for the adoption of such regulations and by appropriating
power belonging to the legislature.5" The appellees further contended that the Commissioner issued regulations that violated the
United States Constitution and the Maryland Declaration of Rights. 5'
To avoid substituting its judgment for that of the agency's, the court
limited its review to the question of whether the Division, in promulgating regulations under Title 5 (Occupational Safety and Health),
performed within the scope of its quasi-legislative duty, as delegated
by the General Assembly.5 5 The court concluded that the appellees
had "little likelihood" of success in challenging the Commissioner's
actions, and should not have been granted an interlocutory
injunction. 6
The court found that there was ample scientific evidence for the
Commissioner to have concluded that "ETS constitutes a 'significant
risk' to the health of Maryland employees."57 The court also found
that there was sufficient evidence to support the Commissioner's decision that a complete prohibition against smoking in enclosed workplaces, with allowance for a separately ventilated smoking area, was an
appropriate method of handling the ETS health risk.5' Furthermore,
as statutorily required, the Commissioner had conducted an adequate
assessment of the economic impact and feasibility of the proposed
regulations 59 and provided for a meaningful opportunity for public
comment.6 0 The court held that the General Assembly had not legis-

that "[e]xcept as preempted by the enactment of HB 1368, the ETS Regulation, COMAR
.09.12.23, is valid and enforceable." Opinion and Order at 20, H & G Restaurant, Inc., No.
CG 2460 (Apr. 3, 1995).
53. H & G Restaurant,337 Md. at 457-65, 654 A.2d at 457-61.
54. Id. at 465-69, 654 A.2d at 461-63; see infra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
55. H & G Restaurant,337 Md. at 454, 654 A.2d at 455 (quoting Department of Natural
Resources v. Linchester Sand & Gravel Corp., 274 Md. 211, 224, 334 A.2d 514, 523 (1975)).
A regulation adopted by the Commissioner under Title 5 is deemed prima facie lawful
and reasonable. Id. at 452-53, 654 A.2d at 455 (citing the presumption defined by MD.
CODE Ar., LAB.& EMPL. § 5-215(c) (3) (1991)). Courts generally defer to the promulgating agency because of its sphere of expertise. Id. at 455, 654 A.2d at 456 (citing Givner v.
Commissioner of Health, 207 Md. 184, 192, 113 A.2d 899, 903 (1954)).
56. Id. at 457, 654 A.2d at 457.
57. Id. at 459, 654 A.2d at 458.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 461-62, 654 A.2d at 459.
60. Id. at 462-63, 654 A.2d at 459-60.
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lated smoking in an inclusive way, and thus there was no implied pre6
emption of the regulation of smoking in the workplace. 1
The court easily disposed of the appellees' remaining claims: violation of the products clause of the MOSH Act,6 2 violation of due process," violation of the right to privacy,' and violation of the First
Amendment.6 5 Because there was virtually no likelihood of success
based on any of the claims, the court did not examine the other
Armacost factors.66 The regulations were slated to take effect on
March 27, 1995.67
3. Political and Legislative Histoy.-Amidst fears of economic
repercussions in the hospitality industry and charges of "bureaucratic
overreach,"6" Maryland legislators introduced virtually identical emergency bills into the House of Delegates and the Senate, on March 2
and March 6, respectively.69 The purpose of the bills was to prohibit
61. Id. at 464, 654 A.2d at 460.
62. Id. at 464-65, 654 A.2d at 460. The appellees argued that the regulations unduly
burdened interstate commerce in violation of MOSH's products clause. Id. at 464, 654
A.2d at 460. The products clause refers, in pertinent part, to a situation where the standard set by local regulation needs to be different from an existing federal standard. MD.
CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 5-309(a) (2) (1991 & Supp. 1995). Because the federal government has not yet adopted a workplace ETS standard, the court stated that the products
clause was inapplicable. H & G Restaurant, 337 Md. at 465, 654 A.2d at 461.
63. H & G Restaurant, 337 Md. at 465-67, 654 A.2d at 461-62. The appellees argued
that because the Commissioner did not submit the regulations to OSHA for approval,
there was no opportunity for public comment, and they were deprived of their due process
right to be heard by OSHA. Id. at 465-66, 654 A.2d at 461-62. The court stated that the
Commissioner did not need OSHA approval, and therefore the appellees were not deprived of due process. Id. at 466, 654 A.2d at 461. The appellees also asserted that the
regulations were unconstitutionally vague in scope and application, but the court found
that the regulations' wording was reasonable and understandable. Id. at 466-67, 654 A.2d
at 461-62.
64. Id. at 467-68, 654 A.2d at 462-63. In response to the appellees' argument that the
regulations could prohibit smoking in private homes, the court stated that this was simply a
misinterpretation of the scope of the regulations. Id. at 468, 654 A.2d at 463.
65. Id. at 469, 654 A.2d at 463. The appellees argued that requiring the posting of"no
smoking" signs in enclosed workplaces is a violation of freedom of speech. Id. The court
responded that "[t]he sign posting requirement was clearly designed to protect the health
and safety of workers and cannot be construed as an attempt to compel employers to use
their private property as a billboard for the State's ideological message." Id.
66. Id. at 457, 654 A.2d at 457; see supra note 50.
67. H & G Restaurant, 337 Md. at 470, 654 A.2d at 463.
68. Barry Rascovar, Vwtory Cigarsfor All!, BALT. SUN, Apr. 2, 1995, at F3; see also John
Roll, Governor's Decision to Ban Workplace Smoking Draws Both Support, Criticism, DAILY RECORD, Mar. 3, 1995, at 12 ("'I think the regulations are Orwellian in nature,' said Senate
President Thomas V. Mike Miller (D-Prince George's County). 'It's Big Brotherism at its
worst. It's a classic example of government going too far.'").
69. These proposed bills would amend Business Regulation, section 2-105 and Labor
and Employment, sections 2-106 and 5-314. House Bill 1368 was introduced by Delegate
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the Department's Secretary and the Division's Commissioner from restricting smoking under certain circumstances, as well as to authorize
the Secretary and Commissioner to adopt regulations under certain
limited conditions.7 House Bill 1368 and Senate Bill 860 were to apply retroactively, and thus would affect any regulations already proposed or adopted, including COMAR 09.12.23.71
On March 2, Governor Parris N. Glendening announced his decision to support the Division's workplace smoking ban.72 The governor emphasized that he would veto any effort to exempt
establishments other than small taverns.7 3 The legislators intended to
override a veto by the governor, and demonstrated their ability to do
so with the large number of cosponsors on each bill.7 4 A period of
vigorous compromise efforts began between the legislators and the
governor while the bills moved through the legislative process.7v
76
Both bills emerged from their respective standing committees
and second and third readings with nearly identical amendJohn S. Amick (D-Balt. County), and cosponsored by 83 delegates (one additional cosponsorship made 84 cosponsors). See Md. H.B. 1368, 1995 Sess. (first reader). Senate Bill 860
was introduced by Senator George W. Della, Jr. (D-Balt. City) and cosponsored by 29 Senators. See Md. S.B. 860, 1995 Sess. (first reader). The bills differed by title only.
70. See, e.g., Md. H.B. 1368, 1995 Sess. (first reader). The Secretary and Commissioner
were unauthorized, with provisional exceptions, to regulate smoking in establishments or
restaurants that possess an alcoholic beverages license, bars and taverns, and hotels and
motels. Id. § 1. The Secretary and Commissioner could regulate smoking in certain areas
of those businesses, provided that the remaining area where smoking is permitted was at
least as large as the area where smoking is prohibited, and the smoking area must not
require modifications to structural or atmospheric conditions. Id.
71. See Md. H.B. 1368 § 2, 1995 Sess. (first reader); Md. S.B. 860 § 2, 1995 Sess. (first
reader).
72. See Roll, supra note 68, at 12.
73. See id.
74. See id.; see alsoJohn Roll, Senate Gives Tentative Approval to Smoking Ban Exemptions,
DAILY REc., Mar. 15, 1995, at 9.
75. See Charles Babington &Justin Gillis, Bars, RestaurantsSparedfrom Md. Smoking Ban,
Glendening, Legislators Reach Accord, WASH. Posr, Mar. 28, 1995, at Al.
76. The Senate assigned S.B. 860 to the Finance Committee; the House re-referred
H.B. 1368 to the Environmental Matters Committee. Each committee held its own public
hearing, receiving testimony from both proponents and opponents of the bills. The opponent witnesses included representatives from the American Cancer Society, American
Heart Association, American Lung Association, ASH, the Governor's Cancer Council and
Maryland's Secretary of the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, Martin P. Wasserman. Witness List, Hearings on H.B. 1368 Before the House Envtl. Matters Comm., Md. Gen.
Assembly (Mar. 8, 1995); Witness List, Hearingson S.B. 860 Before the Senate Fin. Comm., Md.
Gen. Assembly (Mar. 10, 1995). The proponent witnesses included representatives from
the restaurant, tourism, hotel, and bar trade associations, but unlike the earlier hearings
on the regulations, tobacco industry lobbyists did not testify. Witness List, Hearingson H.B.
1368 Before the House Envtl. Matters Comm., Md. Gen. Assembly (Mar. 8, 1995); Witness List,
Hearings on S.B. 860 Before the Senate Fin. Comm., Md. Gen. Assembly (Mar. 10, 1995).
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78
Both passed their respective chambers by a wide margin.
Senate Bill 860 was introduced in the House on March 15, and passed
with minor amendments. 79 House Bill 1368 was introduced into the
Senate on March 17.80 At this point, the bills' paths diverged.
The Senate concurred with the House amendments to Senate Bill
860, and the bill was enrolled on March 20.81 On March 27, the effective date of the regulations, the governor vetoed Senate Bill 860.82 On

ments.7 7

77. At this juncture, both bills enumerated the areas in which the Secretary and Commissioner could not restrict smoking: in a private residence that is not open to the public
for business purposes; in the area where alcohol is consumed in an establishment (excluding restaurants and hotels as defined by MD. ANN. CODE art. 2B, § 1-102 (1994) that possess
an alcoholic beverages license; in the area where alcohol is consumed in a hotel or motel
bar; and in the area where alcohol is consumed in a club that possesses an alcoholic beverages license. Md. H.B. 1368 § 1, 1995 Sess. (third reader); Md. S.B. 860 § 1, 1995 Sess.
(third reader). Between the first and third readers, the main differences in the proposed
exemptions were the addition of "clubs," the addition, for clarity's sake, of"private homes,"
and greater specificity of smoking-permitted areas in each of the enumerated businesses.
Cf supra note 70.
The Secretary and Commissioner were permitted to adopt regulations to prohibit
smoking in areas of a restaurant that possesses an alcoholic beverages license and a hotel
or motel subject to the following restrictions: that between 50% and 60% of the area of
the restaurant or of the hotel or motel rooms be subject to the smoking prohibition and
that structural or atmospheric conditions do not have to be modified. Md. H.B. 1368 § 1;
Md. S.B. 860 § 1. Compared with the first reader, the third reader allowed the Secretary
and Commissioner to prohibit smoking over a slightly larger area in certain establishments. See supra note 70. Furthermore, these provisions did not prevent the owner of any
establishment from restricting smoking to a greater extent. Md. H.B. 1368 § 1; Md. S.B.
860 § 1. The Secretary and Commissioner were also allowed, pursuant to the same criteria
for restaurants, to restrict smoking in fraternal, religious, patriotic, or charitable organizations; fire companies; or rescue squads, if these entities were subject to their authority,
during an event open to the public on the entity's property. Id.
78. On third reading, the Senate Bill passed by a margin of 34 to 12. VOTING RECORD,
Md. S.B. 860 (Mar. 15, 1995). The House Bill passed by a vote of 99 to 38. VOTING REG_
ORD, Md. H.B. 1368 (Mar. 16, 1995).
79. VOTING RECORD, Md. S.B. 860 (Mar. 18, 1995).
80. LEGISLATVE HISTORY, Md. H.B. 1368 (1995) (computer report generation).
81. VOTING RECORD, Md. S.B. 860 (Mar. 20, 1995).
82. Letter from Parris N. Glendening, Governor, State of Maryland, to Thomas V.
"Mike" Miller, President, Maryland Senate (Mar. 27, 1995) in Advance Sheets VI, 1995 Md.
Laws 3641. In his veto letter, the governor discussed his views on the technical and legal
problems with Senate Bill 860. Id. (relying on analyses provided by the attorney general
(published in 22 Md. Reg. 692 (1995))). The retroactivity clause in the bill might be construed to displace not only COMAR 09.12.23 in its entirety, but other smoking-related regulations (for example, regulations that prohibit smoking where workers are exposed to
asbestos). Id. The governor expressed his concern over the language of the bill that
permitted the Commissioner to adopt additional regulations. Id. Permissible regulations
necessarily would be delayed until the process of promulgating these additional regulations was complete, and thus they could not take effect simultaneously with the statutory
exemptions. Id. Finally, the governor was concerned that the bill did not expressly prevent preemption of more restrictive local ordinances, and did not require smoking areas to
be separately enclosed. Id.
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this same day, major amendments to House Bill 1368 were offered on
third reading by the Finance Committee, adopted by8 3the Senate, accepted by the House, and approved by the governor.
Several factors culminated in the ability to reach agreement by
"the deadline." The governor wanted a strong smoking prohibition. 4
The governor was also motivated to strive for a compromise bill rather
than rely on his veto power, which he knew would result in a humbling override.8 5 While many legislators were concerned with the economic impact on certain businesses, there were moderates in the
legislature who were willing to negotiate.8 6
The governor and the legislators arrived at a successful compromise facilitated in part by health advocates whose strategy was to secure as much protection as possible for those employees who were
most at risk from ETS.8 7 The time had come, albeit abruptly, for a
ban on smoking in most places of employment. A smoking prohibition was not hotly controversial in office workplaces, and already many
such workplaces were prohibiting smoking.8 8 While bars and taverns
were non-negotiable, restaurants provided an opportunity for reconciliation.8 9 The governor gradually relinquished his stance in the restaurant debate,9" and legislators conceded the criteria for the
designated smoking areas, the removal of the retroactivity language,
and the addition of the local preemption prohibition.9 1 House Bill
1368, as amended, took effect on March 27, 1995.92

The governor's veto letter indicated that his concerns were addressed by the House
version of the bill. Id. It was evident that successful negotiations already had taken place,
and the legislature reached its goal without having to override a gubernatorial veto.
83. See Amendments to H.B. 1368, Senate Fin. Comm., Md. Gen. Assembly, 1995 Sess.
(third reading file bill). The final House vote was 128 to 7. VOTING RECORD, Md. H.B.

1369 (Mar. 27, 1995).
84. See Babington & Gillis, supra note 75 (noting that the governor had worred that
the General Assembly would carve out larger exceptions to the bill if he did not
compromise).
85. Id.
86. Telephone Interviews with Eric S. Gally, Communications/Public Policy Director,
American Cancer Society, Maryland Division, Inc. (Sept. 21, 1995; Nov. 19, 1995).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See Babington & Gillis, supra note 75.
91. See supra note 82; see also Babington & Gillis, supra note 75 (discussing the criteria
for the designated smoking area).
92. Act of March 27, 1995, ch. 5, 1995 Md. Laws 350. The attorney general had issued
an opinion discussing the effective date of the statute (published in 22 Md. Reg. 688
(1995)). The attorney general stated that the statutes should take effect on June 1, 1995.
Id. He based his decision on MD. CONST. art. XVI, § 2 which states that "[n]o measure
creating or abolishing any office, or changing the salary, term or duty of any officer, or
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4. Impact of the Statute.-Although the language in the statute
focuses on permitting smoking rather than restricting the Secretary's
and Commissioner's authority,9" the effect is nonetheless limiting.
The General Assembly carved out key exceptions to the sweeping protections afforded by the Division's regulations; the Secretary and the
Commissioner no longer have regulatory control over the smoking of
tobacco products in restaurants, bars, clubs, and hotel sleeping
rooms.9 4 Restrictions on smoking in these workplaces have been legislatively defined.
The statute permits smoking in a bar or tavern, in a hotel or
motel bar, in a club that possesses an alcoholic beverages license and
allows consumption on the premises, and in a private residence not
open to the public for business.9 5 The statute limits the size of the
smoking area in restaurants with an alcoholic beverages license to
forty percent of the total area of the restaurant, to be comprised of a
bar or bar area, a separately enclosed room, or a combination of the
two.

6

The statute does not require modification of atmospheric con-

granting any franchise or special privilege, or creating any vested right or interest, shall be
enacted as an emergency law." Id. The attorney general reasoned that "House Bill 1368
... eliminates what had been the statutory duty of the Commissioner to provide the maximum protection possible against ETS for an entire class of employees-those who work in
hospitality industry establishments." Id.
Because this opinion was written before the major amendments to the bill, it is debatable whether the analysis remained viable. If the analysis held, this distinction between
emergency and nonemergency laws would be important if Maryland voters had opted to
petition for a referendum. If the bill were an emergency law, the bill would have become
effective on the day of enactment and would have remained in effect until the referendum.
See MD. CONST. art. XVI, § 2. If the bill were a nonemergency law and the voters gathered
enough signatures for a referendum, the enacted bill would not go into effect in June
1995, but would await the outcome of the referendum in November 1996. See id. Citing
the impossibility of separating the restaurant issue (where a majority of citizens want smoking prohibited) from the bar issue (where most citizens want smoking permitted), antismoking groups decided not to put the bill on a referendum. Smoking Foes Won't Challenge
Hospitality Industry's Exemption, BAIT. SUN, Apr. 1, 1995, at B4.

93. See Md. H.B. 1368, 1995 Sess. (enrolled bill). The title of the bill was changed from
"Smoking-Prohibition on Adoption of Regulations to Restrict Smoking" to "Smoking in
the Workplace." Id.
94. Id. Local governments have not been similarly limited. The Act expressly states
that it does not preempt local authorities from restricting workplace smoking to a greater
extent. Act of March 27, 1995, ch. 5, 1995 Md. Laws 350, § 2 (uncodified). For an application of this section, see 22 Md. Reg. 1773 (1995).
95. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., Bus. REG. § 2-105(d) (1) (i) 1-4 (Supp. 1995). These stipulations are similar to those in the pre-compromise bill. Cf supra note 77.
96. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., Bus. REG. § 2-105(d)(1)(i)5B. In comparison with the
pre-compromise bill, this represents a reduction in the proportionate size of the smoking
area. Cf supra note 77. The requirement that the smoking area must be in separately
enclosed room (except if the smoking area is the bar or bar area) was the direct result of
the gubernatorial-legislative compromise. See supra notes 82, 91 and accompanying text.
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ditions in the separately enclosed designated smoking area.9 7
Unenumerated establishments that possess an alcoholic beverages license and allow consumption on the premises may permit smoking in
a separately enclosed room.98
For restaurants without an alcoholic beverages license, the statute
permits the size of the smoking area to be no more than forty percent
of the total area of the restaurant.' The statute limits the smokingpermitted sleeping rooms in a hotel or motel to forty percent.1 "' Finally, the statute permits smoking in up to forty percent of the premises of a fraternal, religious, patriotic, or charitable organization; a fire
company; or rescue squad, if the organizations are subject to the authority of the Secretary or Commissioner, during a public event."0 '
The remainder of COMAR 09.12.23 still exists; it has not been
preempted in its entirety.' 0 2 Employers in all enclosed workplaces
covered by the regulations and not included in the statute must prohibit smoking or provide a designated smoking area that must be a
separately enclosed room with a ventilation system that exhausts directly to the outdoors. The Division remains in charge of enforcing
the regulations and is also responsible for enforcing the statutory
restrictions.
5. Analysis of the Statute's Genesis and Consequences.-The procedure leading to the passage of Maryland's smoking ban was unique.
Maryland is the only state to attempt to restrict smoking in all private
sector workplaces through its occupational safety and health regulatory agency.10 3 In New York, regulations promulgated by the state's
Public Health Council were voided by the Court of Appeals of New
York,"0 4 resulting in the subsequent legislative enactment of a clean
97. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., Bus. REG. § 2-105(d)(1) (ii).
98. See, e.g., id. § 2-105(d)(1)(i)7.
99. See, e.g., id. § 2-105(d)(1)(i)5A. In contrast with the pre-compromise bill, the statute includes smoking restrictions for restaurants without an alcoholic beverages license,
adding to the businesses to which the Commissioner's regulations do not apply.
100. See, e.g., id. at § 2-105(d)(1)(i)6. In comparison with the pre-compromise bill, this
represents a reduction in the percentage of smoking rooms. Cf supra note 77.
101. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., Bus. REG. § 2-105(d)(1)(i)8.
102. Because the statute does not include the pre-compromise bill's retroactivity clause,
it is unlikely that other regulations previously adopted by the Division have been
preempted.
103. Although the means were different, the end result of Maryland's attempt is procedurally similar to Washington State's. Washington's office workplace smoking is governed
by its Department of Labor and Industries' administrative regulations. See infra note 123.
Smoking in restaurants and bars is governed by statute. See infra note 123.
104. Boreali v. Axelrod, 517 N.E.2d 1350 (N.Y. 1987). The court stated that through
efforts aimed at protecting nonsmokers from the harms of ETS, the Public Health Council
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indoor air act. 1°5 Minnesota statutorily limited smoking in the workplace, and granted authority to the Commissioner of the Department
of Labor and Industry to adopt rules to implement the statutory provisions. 10 6 New Hampshire granted authority to the director of its Public Health Services Division to adopt rules to implement specific
sections of its statutes. 10 7 California and Wisconsin have restricted
workplace smoking as a labor matter, but have done so by statutory
1 08
means.
Because Maryland chose an unconventional route to achieve its
workplace smoking ban, the process was replete with uncertainty. In
addition to facing a controversial regulatory beginning, Maryland's
smoking ban was confronted with judicial challenges that were subsequently overshadowed by legislative action. After the regulations were
promulgated successfully and passed judicial scrutiny, it was unclear
whether the smoking ban would survive the statutory recasting. Once
survival became likely, it was still unpredictable in what form the regulations, and the authority of the promulgating agency, would
emerge. 109
Unlike other states' laws, Maryland's smoking statute was not motivated primarily by a desire to protect employees from the dangers of
tobacco smoke.1 10 Instead, Maryland's statute originated out of ecohas "in reality, constructed a regulatory scheme laden with exceptions based solely upon
economic and social concerns." Id. at 1355. The exemptions "demonstrate the agency's
own effort to weigh the goal of promoting health against its social cost and to reach a
suitable compromise." Id. The court continued by stating that "[s]triking the proper balance among health concerns, cost and privacy interests, however, is a uniquely legislative
function." Id.
105. See generally Elayne G. Gold, New York State's Clean Indoor Air Ac 63 N.Y. ST. B.J. 18
(Mar./Apr. 1991).
106. MiN. STAT. ANN. § 144.417 (West 1989 & Supp. 1995). A 1984 amendment transferred the granted authority from the Commissioner of Labor and Industry to the Commissioner of Health. Id.
107. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 155:71 (1994).
108. See infra notes 119, 126.
109. The conflict between the legislators and the governor made a strong smoking ban
seem unlikely. The legislators and the governor differed on central issues. See supra note
73 and accompanying text. If necessary, the legislature was prepared to override a gubernatorial veto of the proposed bill. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. The result
would have been a more lenient smoking ban, by way of a further weakening of the
regulations.
110. Other states' legislators acknowledged the harmful effects of tobacco smoke in conjunction with enacting workplace smoking standards. This acknowledgement has been
communicated either expressly, by stating that the statute's purpose is to protect citizens'
health, or impliedly, leaving it to be gleaned at the very least from the statute's name, such
as "clean indoor air act," and its placement under a code's health titie.
For example, California's legislature stated that its intent was to reduce employee exposure to ETS to a threshold level tolerating only insignificantly harmful effects. CAL.
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nomic concerns for the businesses affected by the Division's smoking
regulations, as well as allegations that the regulatory agency exceeded
its delegated authority.1 1 ' Maryland's statute was created specifically
to supersede the Division's actions and to overlay the administrative
regulations. The legislature reined in the Division, and the resulting
statute weakened, but did not negate, the regulations." 2 Maryland's
smoking ban now exists as a patchwork combination of regulations
and statutes.
To succeed in restricting workplace smoking, it may well have
been necessary for Maryland to use a procedurally novel strategy and
to make the concomitant modification in the role of its regulatory
agency. Previous legislative efforts to create a smoking ban had failed
just one year earlier."' Maryland is a tobacco-producing state, and
the tobacco lobby is highly influential." 4 Furthermore, when legislators tend to focus on the perceived adverse economic effects a smok-

6404.5(a) (West Supp. 1995). The Vermont legislature stated that smoking
is a health hazard, and its purpose was to protect employers and employees by restricting
smoking in the workplace. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, subch. 2 (Supp. 1995). New Hampshire
enacted its indoor smoking act to protect the health of the public by regulating smoking in
enclosed workplaces. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 155.64 (1994). In Washington, the legislature recognized the danger of ETS and the necessity of prohibiting smoking to protect the
health of its citizens. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.160.010 (West 1992). The purpose of
New York State's clean indoor air act is to protect nonsmokers from involuntary exposure
to ETS. See Gold, supra note 105. Minnesota stated that its policy is to protect the public
health by prohibiting or limiting smoking in public places. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.412
(West 1989). Minnesota also has a policy promoting nonsmoking. Id. §§ 144.391-.393
(West 1989).
111. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. The amendments to Labor and Employment § 5-314, although under an occupational safety and health title, are not expressly nor
impliedly related to health.
112. Had the regulations retained their full effect, Maryland would have had the strongest workplace smoking ban in the United States. Cf. infra note 119 (discussing California's
smoking ban, currently the most restrictive in the nation).
113. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
114. PeterJacobson and his colleagues have suggested that the success or failure of antismoking legislation can be traced to the framing of the legislative debates over such laws.
Peter D.Jacobson et al., The Politics of Antismoking Legislation, 18J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L.
787, 800-01 (1993). Jacobson suggested that the debates are steered by the tobacco industry. Id.
In 1995, in addition to the gubernatorial influence and the active health advocacy
groups providing a counterbalance to the powerful tobacco lobby in Maryland, the smoking restrictions had the support of the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene. See
generally Amy Goldstein, Smoking Under the Gun in Md., Study Tracks Cancer, Cigarette Use,
WASH. POST, Mar. 23, 1995, at MI (citing steadfast support by Martin P. Wasserman, Maryland's Secretary of Health and Mental Hygiene).
LABOR CODE §
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ing ban might have on businesses, public health concerns inevitably
take a back seat."1 '
The resulting patchwork of regulations and statutes has left several gaps in Maryland's antismoking laws. Nonetheless, Maryland has
become one of four states with the staunchest workplace smoking re1 17
strictions in the nation. 1 6 The Coalition on Smoking OR Health
has categorized the fifty states according to the breadth of their laws
governing smoking in public places."' Maryland received the highest
restrictions rating of "comprehensive," along with California," 9 Ver115. A frequently cited study reported that a smoking ban had no effect on restaurant
revenue. Stanton A. Glantz & Lisa R-A. Smith, The Effect of Ordinances Requiring Smoke-Free
Restaurants on Restaurant Sales, 84 AM.J. PUB. HEALTH 1081 (1994). It may be inappropriate, however, to extrapolate these findings to predict the effects in Maryland because the
study focused on city ordinances, not statewide legislation.
116. See COALITION ON SMOKING OR HEALTH, STATE LEGISLATED ACTIONS ON TOBACCO

ISSUES app. b, (Jessica Bartelt ed., 2d prtg. 1994) (updatedJune 1995). As ofJune 1995, 23
states had laws restricting smoking in private sector workplaces. Id. The laws in all but one
of these states included restrictions on smoking in restaurants. Id.
117. The Coalition on Smoking OR Health is a Washington, D.C.-based health advocacy
coalition of the American Cancer Society, American Lung Association, and American
Heart Association.
118. COALrTION ON SMOKING OR HEALTH, supra note 116, at app. c. The Coalition determined states' comprehensiveness of smoking restrictions by analyzing restrictions in indoor "public places" including government workplaces, private sector workplaces (such as
offices), schools and day care centers, health care facilities, places of public access (means
of transportation, retail stores, grocery stores, libraries, museums), and restaurants. Id. at
app. b. Those states offering the upper echelons of protection can be distinguished by
their protection against ETS in bars, restaurants, and private sector workplaces.
It is important to note that the rating system is based on an overall "smoking restrictiveness" score, which is a total of the individual restrictiveness scores achieved in the various public places. See id. at apps. b, c. Because private sector workplaces are generally
regulated later rather than earlier in a state's chronology of restricting smoking, an overall
rating of "comprehensive" will correlate with a strong smoking ban in private sector workplaces. See id. passim. However, an overall rating of "extensive" does not necessarily correlate with a strong smoking ban in these workplaces. See id. Thus, a rating category of
"extensive" consists of states that have stringent smoking restrictions in many public places.
See id. These "public places" are likely to include, but do not necessarily include, private sector
workplaces. See, e.g., infra note 127. It is unlikely, however, that limiting an analysis to
states that received a rating of "comprehensive" or "extensive" would overlook a state that
had strong smoking restrictions in private sector workplaces, but regulations weak enough
in other public places so that the state would not receive either of these highest overall
ratings.
119. See CAL. LABOR CODE § 6404.5 (West Supp. 1995). California has the toughest antismoking law in the nation. Smoking of tobacco products is prohibited in all enclosed
places of employment, id. § 6404.5(b), except for designated breakrooms that are separately ventilated to the outdoors, id. § 6404.5(d)(13). Sixty-five percent of hotel guest
rooms are excepted. Id. § 6404.5(d) (1). Restaurants are not excepted. Smoking in bars
and taverns will be permitted until the earlier of either Jan. 1, 1997, or adoption of a
regulation by the federal Occupational Safety and Health Standards Board. Id.
§ 6404.5(0(1).

1996]
mont, 120

York,

1 24

MARYLAND GENERAL ASSEMBLY

and Utah. 121
1

Minnesota,

25

New Hampshire,

and Wisconsin

1

26

122

Washington, 123

New

received a rating of "exten-

120. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 1421-1428, 1741-1746 (Supp. 1995). Employers are
required to establish, or negotiate through the collective-bargaining process, a written
smoking policy to prohibit smoking throughout the workplace or restrict smoking to designated enclosed areas. Id. § 1422. An employer may permit smoking in a designated unenclosed area if three-fourths of the employees agree and if smoking will not cause physical
irritation to nonsmoking employees. Id. § 1423. Since July 1, 1995, smoking has not been
permitted in restaurants, bars, and common areas of hotels. Id. § 1744.
121. See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 26-38-1 to -9 (1995 & Supp. 1995). In nonpublic workplaces, an employer must establish or negotiate through the collective-bargaining process a
written smoking policy that prohibits smoking in the workplace, restricts smoking to a
designated enclosed area, or restricts smoking to a designated unenclosed area if threefourths of the employees agree and smoke does not enter the work areas of nonsmoking
employees. Id. § 26-38-5. If the local health department determines that restricting smoking to designated areas does not prevent smoke in the work areas of nonsmoking employees, it shall require the employer to prohibit smoking in the workplace. Id. § 26-38-5(3).
Furthermore, smoking is prohibited in restaurants, id. § 26-38-2(1)(c), but hotel guest
rooms and taverns are excepted, id. § 26-38-3(2).
122. See N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 155:64-:77 (1994 & Supp. 1994). In all private workplaces with four or more employees or volunteers, smoking is restricted to effectively segregated areas. Id. § 155:65(XVII), :66(I). If smoking cannot be effectively segregated, it
must be banned. Id. § 155:66(I). Exemptions from these restrictions include restaurants
with a seating capacity of fewer than 50 people and hotel guest rooms. Id. § 155:67.
123. See WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 70.160.010-.900 (West 1992); WASH ADMIN. CODE
§§ 296-62-12000 to -12007 (1995). Employers must prohibit smoking in office workplaces
except in designated enclosed smoking rooms that must be ventilated directly outdoors.
WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 296-62-12005. Some public places such as restaurants and bars may
designate their entire area to be a smoking area provided that this designation is posted
conspicuously on all entrances normally used by the public. WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 70.160.040(b).
124. See N.Y. PUB. HEATH LAW §§ 1399-n to -x (McKinney 1990 & Supp. 1995). Employers must adopt and implement a written smoking policy for the workplace. Id. § 1399-o(6).
The policy must require that the employer provide nonsmoking employees with a smokefree work area, id. § 1399-o(6) (a), however, the employer is not required to make any
expenditures or structural changes to create this area, id. § 1399-o(6) (h). Owners of restaurants with seating capacities greater than 50 people must designate a contiguous nonsmoking area sufficient to meet customer demand, but not greater than 70% of the indoor
seating capacity. Id. § 1399-o(5). Hotel guest rooms and bars are exempted from these
restrictions. Id. § 1399-q.
125. See MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 144.411-.417 (West 1989 & Supp. 1995). Smoking is prohibited in workplaces except in designated smoking areas. Id. § 144.414. Private, enclosed
offices occupied exclusively by smokers are excluded. Id. § 144.413. Restaurants are not
excluded. Id. The criteria for the designated smoking area can be met by existing physical
barriers and a ventilation system. Id. § 144.415.
126. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 101.123 (West 1988 & Supp. 1994). Smoking is prohibited in
offices except in designated smoking areas. I. § 101.123(4). Employers are not required
to make any structural or ventilation changes to create a smoking area. Id.
§ 101.123(4) (c). Restaurants with a liquor license and a seating capacity of over 50 people
are excepted if the sales of alcoholic beverages account for more than 50% of receipts. Id.
§ 101.123(3)(d).
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sive. '"127 Prior to its current workplace smoking ban, Maryland had
received a rating of "moderate."121
Interestingly, there is vast disparity between Maryland and other
states in penalties for violating smoking restrictions. In Maryland, an
employer can be fined up to $7000 for a violation, and not less than
$5000 for a willful violation. 'I A willful and repeated violator can be
fined up to $70,000.s ° With the exception of New York, the fines in
other states generally range from $100 to $500.13
The threat of high fines notwithstanding, consistent implementation of Maryland's smoking restrictions may be difficult. No additional funds have been allocated to the Department for enforcement
to accommodate the expected increase in workload.1 32 Moreover, because the smoking ban's purpose is to protect workers, rather than
13 3
patrons, only complaints received by employees will be investigated.
Despite its comprehensive workplace smoking ban, Maryland
must still grapple with the reality that some of its citizens who are most
at risk from ETS remain at risk. The protection afforded to bar and
restaurant employees under the regulations was eliminated by the statutory enactments. Scientific studies have shown that under nonsmoke-free conditions, the levels of ETS in restaurants are approximately 1.6 to 2 times higher than in office workplaces and that ETS
127. COALmON ON SMOKING OR HEALTH, supra note 116, at app. c. Michigan and Hawaii were also rated as having extensive smoking restrictions in public places. Id. Because
neither state has restrictions in private sector workplaces, id. at app. b, both were excluded
from the discussion.
128. Id. at 63.
129. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 5-810 (1991 & Supp. 1995).
130. Id.

131. In California and Utah, the fines range from $100 to $500. CAL. LABOR CODE
§ 6404.5 0) (West Supp. 1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-38-8 (1995). In Vermont, the fine is
$100. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1426 (Supp. 1995). In New Hampshire, the minimum fine
is $100, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 155:76 (1994), and in Washington, the maximum fine is
$100, WASH. Ray. CODE ANN. § 70.160.070 (West 1992). New York's fine is up to $2000, if
issued by the Commissioner. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 1399-v (McKinney 1990 & Supp.
1995) (citing to provisions in N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 12(1) (McKinney 1990 & Supp.
1995)).
132. Angela Zimm, Kicking the Habit to Take Time After No-Smoking Ban Kicks In, State Inspectors Brace for Cloud of Complaints as the Deadline Nears to Begin Enforcement of the Nation's
Toughest Workplace Smoking Ban, DAILY RECORD, Sept. 20, 1995, at 1.
133. Id. After the six-month grace period ended, alleged violations had been filed
against 21 businesses, mostly restaurants. Charles Babington, Glendening's Shift on Smoking
Ban Sparks Outcry, WASH. PosT, Nov. 4, 1995, at B1. Conflict has arisen between the legislators and the governor. See id. Not all of the alleged violations were filed on behalf of
employees. Id. The governor stated that he is in favor of a "'common sense'" approach to
enforcement. Id. The legislators, however, believe that a promise made to them and to
employers to investigate only complaints filed by employees, which they say was pivotal
during the compromise negotiations, has been broken. Id.
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levels in bars are 3.9 to 6.1 times higher than in offices.13 4 One study
concluded that ETS is a significant health hazard for employees in
these workplaces l3 5 and that smoking should be banned in restaurants
and bars.13 6 This differential in protection from ETS may spawn future litigation by Maryland employees making an equal protection
13 7
claim or Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) argument.
Resolution of this issue may take many forms within the state. Local jurisdictions may enact stronger laws.'3 8 Employers, of their own
accord, may institute stricter smoking prohibitions. Legislators may
tighten the exceptions granted by the statute. It is yet unclear
whether the Division will be able to promulgate other regulations to
restrict smoking that will not conflict with the new statute.
Eventually, state solutions may be mooted by the federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) or the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA). OSHA published notice for comment
on its proposed regulation of ETS. 3t' After declaring that nicotine in
cigarettes is a drug, the FDA published notice inviting commentary on
the jurisdictional issue between the FDA and its regulation of tobacco
products. 4 ° Federal interventions, should they occur, will not be realized soon. In the meantime, Maryland is responsible for providing for
the safety and health of its citizens.
134. Michael Siegel, Involuntay Smoking in the Restaurant Workplace, A Review of Employee
Exposure and Health Effects, 270J. AM. MED. ASS'N 490, 490-91 (1993).

135. Id. at 491-92. An estimated 50% increase in lung cancer among food service workers is in part attributable to ETS. Id.
136. Id. at 492-93.
137. Bar or restaurant employees may argue under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause that the state should protect them from ETS to the same extent as the
state protects other employees. The same employees might argue that, because of their
constant exposure and ensuing sensitivity to ETS on the job, they are "disabled" under the
ADA. See John C. Fox, An Assessment of the Current Legal Climate Concerning Smoking in the
Workplace, 13 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 591, 597-99 (1994). The employer would then have

to respond by providing a "reasonable accommodation" in the work environment. Id. at
600.
Furthermore, owners of small restaurants without an alcoholic beverages license may
make "discrimination" claims. These restaurants do not have bars and are too small to
build a separately enclosed smoking area. Thus, these restaurants will necessarily have to
become smoke-free. The Restaurant Association of Maryland approved of the Commissioner's proposed draft of the regulations precisely to avoid this discrepancy. Decision of
Commissioner, supra note 35, at 1349. The Commissioner's draft provided for equal treatment of all restaurants and bars. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 39-40.
138. Relying on stronger local laws, however, results in geographic disparities in protection against ETS. Jacobson et al., supra note 114, at 816.
139. See supra note 26.

140. 60 Fed. Reg. 41,453 (1995).
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6. Conclusion.-After the ban's complicated and laborious journey through all branches of government, Maryland succeeded in
achieving workplace smoking restrictions for its workers. As a byproduct, the General Assembly deprived the Division of Labor and
Industry of some of its authority. In order for Maryland to attain
broad protection against ETS in the workplace, this concession may
have been essential.
For nearly one-half century, scientists have been verifying the
health hazards of tobacco smoke. Nevertheless, significant numbers
of smoking-related diseases and deaths are still occurring today. Restaurant and bar workers are at particularly high risk of suffering from
the hazardous effects of ETS. Although Maryland's smoking ban is
one of the toughest in the nation, restaurant and bar employees are
left partially or wholly unprotected from tobacco smoke in the workplace. Given these facts, public health concerns should trump any
balancing test weighing these considerations against monetary
interests.
Despite the possibility that workplace smoking ban issues at the
state level may be mooted with federal action by OSHA or FDA, Maryland should act now. At a minimum, Maryland should institute just as
strong a ban on smoking in restaurants and bars as it has in other
workplaces. This step would complete the bold venture that Maryland
has undertaken to reduce harmful conditions in its workplaces.
CLAUDIA J. ZUCKERMAN

1996]

MARYLAND GENERAL ASSEMBLY

III.
A.

893

TORTS

Delegates Deliver a Deathblow to Maryland's Health Claims
Arbitration System

In response to the medical malpractice crisis of the mid-1970s,
the General Assembly enacted the Health Care Malpractice Claims
Act in 1976,1 requiring plaintiffs to submit medical malpractice claims
to nonbinding arbitration before filing suit in court.2 Since its inception, the Health Claims Arbitration (HCA) system has been criticized
for perceived weaknesses by health care providers and both the plaintiffs' and defendants' bar.'
During the 1995 session, the General Assembly unanimously4 enacted House Bill 1049, permitting either party to unilaterally waive
arbitration and proceed to circuit court in cases filed on or after October 1, 1995.' Because both plaintiffs' and defendants' attorneys dislike the arbitration system, parties are likely to waive the
overwhelming majority of cases, effectively destroying the health
claims arbitration system.6
The irony of House Bill 1049 is that health claims arbitration has
been far more successful than its critics have acknowledged. 7 The end
1. Health Care Malpractice Claims Act, ch. 235, 1976 Md. Laws 495 (codified as MD.
CODE ANN., CTS. &JuD. PROC. §§ 3-2A-01 to -09 (1995)).
2. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-04(a).
3. See, e.g., Attorney Gen. v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 277, 385 A.2d 57, 59 (considering a
challenge of HCA's constitutionality on separation of powers, due process, and equal protection grounds), appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 805 (1978), overnded in part by Newell v. Richards, 323 Md. 717, 728-35, 594 A.2d 1152, 1158-61 (1991); GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON
HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS' PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY INSURANCE, REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S

COMMISSION ON HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS' PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY INSURANCE passim (Jan.
25, 1984) [hereinafter LIEBMANN REPORT] (enumerating problems and recommending ab-

olition of HCA and enacting of other reforms); MEDICAL MALPRACrICE TASK FORCE, FINAL
REPORT passim (Jan. 1983) [hereinafter McGuIPK REPORT] (identifying criticisms and recommending further study).
4. Telephone Interview, Barbara Minnick, Maryland General Assembly, Office of Legislative Reference (Nov. 20, 1995).
5. Md. H.B. 1049, ch. 582, 1995 Md. Laws 3336 (codified as MD. CODE ANN., Crs. &
JUD. PROC. §§ 3-2A-06A(F), -06B (1995)). The General Assembly had provided for waiver
by mutual agreement by the parties in 1987. See infra note 48 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 190-194 and accompanying text.
7. Compare James K MacAlister & Alfred L. Scanlan, Jr., Health Claims Arbitration in
Maryland: The Experiment Has Failed, 14 U. BALT. L. REv. 481 (1985) (criticizing health
claims arbitration) with Laura L. Morlock & Faye E. Malitz, The Process of Medical Liability

Claims Resolution in Maryland: Testimony Before the State of Maryland House of Delegates Judiciary Committee (Mar. 8, 1995) (on file in the General Assembly's Office of Legislative Reference, file number 1995 H.B. 1049) [hereinafter Morlock & Malitz, Testimony]
(finding evidence that health claims arbitration reduces the number of cases filed in
court).
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of health claims arbitration in Maryland is in sight, not because the
system achieved none of its objectives, but rather because it failed to
gain the political support it required to survive. 8
Section 1 of this Note will briefly describe the malpractice crisis
that gave rise to the Health Care Malpractice Claims statute. Section 2
will summarize the enactment and subsequent evolution of health
claims arbitration in Maryland. Section 3 will examine the criticisms
leveled against health claims arbitration and assess the system's efficacy. Section 4 will examine the impact of the unilateral waiver statute on the practice of medical malpractice law in Maryland.
1. The Medical Malpractice Crisis.-In the late 1960s and early
1970s the number of paid medical malpractice claims per physician
("frequency") and the amount paid on such claims ("severity")
soared. 9 This led insurers to seek dramatic rate increases in many
states,1 0 and prompted the withdrawal of insurers from many medical
malpractice insurance markets."1 In response, almost every state legislature enacted some sort of tort reform.1 2 The causes of the 1970s
torts crisis, and the subsequent torts crisis in the mid-1980s,1 3 defy easy
explanation and are beyond the scope of this Note.14
8. See infra text accompanying notes 183-186.
9. Kenneth S. Abraham, Medical Malpractice Reform: A PreliminaryAnalysis, 36 MD. L.
REV. 489, 490 (1977).

10. Patricia M. Danzon, The Effects of Tort Reforms on the Frequency and Severity of Medical
MalpracticeClaims, 48 OHIO ST. LJ. 413, 413 (1987); Duane H. Heintz, Arbitrationof Medical

Malpractice Claims: Is It Cost Effective?, 36 MD. L. REv. 533, 533 (1977).
11. Heintz, supra note 10, at 533 n.3 (reporting that by mid-1975 at least 12 states had
experienced the withdrawal of a major carrier from the medical malpractice market); see
infra notes 15-19 and accompanying text (discussing the Maryland experience).
12. Abraham, supra note 9, at 489; Danzon, supra note 10, at 413. The terms "tort
reform" and "crisis" are used without endorsing the merits of the statutory changes and
without accepting or denying the existence of a crisis situation.
13. See generally Symposium: Issues in Tort Reform, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 317 (1987). In Maryland, for instance, 20 of 37 hospitals experienced rate increases of 250% from 1984 to
1985. REPORT OF THEJOINT EXECuTIVE/LEGISLATIVE TASK FORCE ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
INSURANCE 11 (Dec. 1985).
14. James W. Hughes, The Effect of Medical MalpracticeReform Laws on Claim Disposition,9
INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 57, 57-59 & nn.1-10 (1989); see also Kenneth S. Abraham, Making
Sense of the Liability Insurance Crisis, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 399, 399 (1987) (emphasizing the
complexity of the medical malpractice crisis and criticizing its over-simplification in the
public debate over solutions); PATRICIA M. DANZON, NEW EVIDENCE ON THE FREQUENCY AND
SEVERITY OF MEDICAL MALPRACrICE CLAIMS viii (1986). For a general discussion of the potential causes of the malpractice crises, see generally Abraham, supra note 9; DavidJ. Nye et
al., The Causes of the Medical Malpractice Crisis: An Analysis of Claims Data and Insurance Company Finances, 76 GEO. L.J. 1495 (1988); Joseph Sanders & Craig Joyce, "Off to the Races":
The 1980s Tort Crisis and the Law Reform Process, 27 Hous. L. REV. 207 (1990).
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The Medical Malpractice Crisis in Maiyland.-

a. The Birth of Health Claims Arbitration.--OnJune 17, 1974,
St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company ("St. Paul"), the malpractice carrier for eighty-five percent of physicians then practicing in the
state,15 informed the Maryland Medical and Chirurgical Faculty, the
leading organization of doctors in the state, that because the Insurance Commissioner had refused its requested rate increase, it would
withdraw from the Maryland medical malpractice market effective no
later than January 1, 1975.16 So began the Maryland medical malpractice crisis.
Under an insurance regulation statute,1 7 the Insurance Commissioner of Maryland ordered St. Paul to continue coverage at current
rates."8 Although St. Paul eventually had the order overturned,19 the
General Assembly used the intervening period to respond to the crisis.
Three major malpractice initiatives were enacted during the 1975 session. The General Assembly created the Medical Mutual Liability Insurance Society to provide malpractice insurance to Maryland health
care providers,2 ° shortened the "tail" effect2 1 by modifying the statute

15. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Insurance Comm'r, 275 Md. 130, 133, 339 A.2d
291, 293 (1975).
16. Id Maryland was one of at least 12 states experiencing the withdrawal of at least
one major medical malpractice carrier. Heintz, supra note 10, at 533 n.3.
17. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 234A (1972 & Supp. 1974).
18. St. PaulFire & Marine, 275 Md. at 135, 339 A-2d at 294.
19. Id. at 144, 339 A.2d at 299.
20. HarryJ. McGuirk & F. Thomas Rafferty, Medical Malpracticeand the MarylandLegislature, 6 U. MD.L.F. 9, 10 (1976); Kevin G. Quinn, The Health Care Malpractice Claims Statute:
Maryland'sResponse to the Medical MalpracticeCrisis, 10 U. BALT. L. REV. 74, 78 (1980); see also
MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, §§ 548-564 (1994).
21. McGuirk & Rafferty, supra note 20, at 10. Unlike injuries from other torts, injuries
resulting from negligent medical care may not surface until years later. Abraham, supra
note 9, at 492-94. Under the discovery rule, the statute of limitations for filing tort claims
does not start running until the injury is discovered or should have been discovered by the
exercise of reasonable diligence. BLACK's LAw DICrIONARY 466 (6th ed. 1990). The "long
tail" effect occurs because medical malpractice insurers find it difficult to predict how
many malpractice incidents will occur per year and what amount of reserves will suffice to
pay all claims. Commentators differ as to whether shortening the statute of limitations can
substantially reduce the total claims paid by insurers. Compare McGuirk & Rafferty, supra
note 20, at 18-19 (finding "no merit in the proposition advanced (principally by the insurance industry) that there is a long 'tail' in injury recognition for a significant number of
claims") and Nye et al., supra note 14, at 1529 (finding the long tail explanation of the
malpractice insurance crisis "not sufficient") with Danzon, supra note 10, at 416-17 (finding
that shortening the statute of limitations reduced claim frequency). But see Sanders &
Joyce, supra note 14, at 260-61 (discussing the limitations of Danzon's methodology).
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of limitations for medical malpractice cases, 2 2 and attempted to improve the quality of health care by strengthening the peer review process. 23 Proposals to create a mandatory arbitration proceeding with
limited judicial review were considered but rejected because of their
24
questionable constitutionality.
A revised, nonbinding arbitration procedure, the Health Care
Malpractice Claims Act, was enacted the following year. 25 The Act
made submission of malpractice claims to an arbitration panel a precondition for filing suit against a health care provider. 26 To avoid depriving parties of their right to a jury trial,
the arbitration
proceeding is nonbinding. At the conclusion of the arbitration, either
party may reject the panel's finding and file suit in circuit court to
nullify the panel's award.2 8 In the circuit court proceeding, the panel
award may be admitted into evidence, and is presumed correct, unless
vacated because of error. 29 A party who rejects the panel award and
receives a less favorable result in court must bear the costs of the court
30
proceeding.
The arbitration system is administered by the Health Claims Arbitration Office.3 l Arbitration panels consist of an attorney, a physician
(preferably of the same specialty as a defendant health care provider),
and a layman. 3 2 The attorney member is appointed first and serves as
panel chair. He is empowered to rule on all matters of procedure and
law. 33 The Maryland Rules of Procedure apply to arbitration proceed22. McGuirk & Rafferty, supra note 20, at 11. Claims must now be filed within five years
of the injury or within three years from discovery of the injury, whichever is shorter. See
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JuD. PROC. § 5-109(a) (1995).
23. McGuirk & Rafferty, supra note 20, at 10; see MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH OCC. § 14-504
(1994) (providing immunity from civil liability for those reporting suspected negligence to

the appropriate authorities).
24. McGuirk & Rafferty, supra note 20, at 11.
25. Health Care Malpractice Claims Act, ch. 235, 1976 Md. Laws 495 (codified as MD.
CODE ANN., Cs. &JUD. PROC. §§ 3-2A-01 to -09 (1995)).
26. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JuD. PROC. § 3-2A-02 (a).
27. See infra note 39 and accompanying text.
28. MD. CODE ANN., Cs. &JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-06.
29. Id. § 3-2A-06(d) ("The award shall be presumed to be correct, and the burden is on
the party rejecting it to prove that it is not correct."). Maryland is the only state that not
only admits the panel's decision into evidence, but also accords it a presumption of correcmess. Jean A. Macchiaroli, Medical MalpracticeScreening Panels: ProposedModel Legislation
to Cure Ills, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 181, 193 (1990).
30. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-06(g).
31. Id. § 3-2Ar02.
32. Id. § 3-2A-03(c).
33. Id. § 3-2A-05(a), (c). The authority of the panel chairman, as originally defined in
§ 3-2A-05(c), with regard to all "prehearing procedures, including issues relating to discovery," was construed narrowly in Stifler v. Weiner, 62 Md. App. 19, 488 A.2d 192 (holding
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ings, with the exception of provisions relating to time for discovery3 4
and some evidentiary rules.3 5 The panel is required to make its award
within one year of the date on which all defendants are served.3 6
b. The Evolution of Health Claims Arbitration.--Since its enactment, the Health Claims Arbitration Act has been the subject of much
litigation. In Attorney Generalv. Johnson, 7 the Court of Appeals upheld
the constitutionality of the arbitration statute, finding that the statute
is not an impermissible delegation of judicial power to an executive
agency,3 8 does not place an unconstitutional burden on the right to a
jury trial, 39 and does not deprive litigants of their due process or equal
protection rights.' Since the failure of this constitutional challenge,
appellate courts have addressed the need to submit claims to arbitration in a variety of contexts. 4 '
that the panel chairman's authority to decide matters of law did not permit him to unilaterally issue summary judgment, because summary judgment amounted to an award and
only the full panel could render an award), cert. denied, 304 Md. 96, 497 A.2d 819 (1985).
In response the General Assembly amended § 3-2A-05 in 1985 to make it clear that the
panel chairman had the authority to rule on all questions of law. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &
JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-05 (a); see also McClurkin v. Maldonado, 304 Md. 225, 234, 498 A.2d 626,
631 (1985) (noting panel chairman has authority to issue summary judgment if no issues
of fact are present).
34. Discovery must be completed within 270 days of service of defendants, rather than
in the time as determined by the Maryland Rules. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 32A0-5(b) (2); see also MD. RECS. CODE tit. 01, § 03.01.09B (1987).
35. MD. CODE ANN., CM. &JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-05(b) (3) (allowing for admission of hospital and health care records); MD. REGs. CODE tit. 01, § 03.01.11D ("The arbitration panel
is not bound by the technical rules of evidence.").
36. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-05(g). But see Health Care ArbitrationSystem in Maryland Still Evokes Controversy, in ALTERNATIVE DispuTE RESOLUTION: PRACTICE AND
PERSPECrVES (BNA Special Rep.) 122, 122 (Martha A. Matthews ed,, 1990) [hereinafter
Controversy] (quoting the Director of the Health Claims Arbitration Office: "Sometimes
people seem to ignore almost totally time limitations imposed by the act, and there seems
to be no way to enforce them; they file their cases and then sit on them."). Amendments
to the statute permit extension of the time limits "for good cause shown." MD. CODE ANN.,
CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-05(j).
37. 282 Md. 274, 385 A.2d 57, appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 805 (1978), overruled in part by
Newell v. Richards, 323 Md. 717, 594 A.2d 1152 (1991). See generally Matthew Zimmerman,
Comment, The Constitutionality of Medical MalpracticeMediation Panels: A Maryland Perspective, 9 U. BALT. L. REv. 75 (1979).
38. Johnson, 282 Md. at 283-90, 385 A.2d at 63-65.
39. Id. at 290-305, 385 A.2d at 67-75; see MD. CODE ANN., CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS arts.
19, 23.
40. Johnson, 282 Md. at 306-13, 385 A.2d at 75-80.
41. See, e.g., Davison v. Sinai Hosp., 462 F. Supp. 778, 780 (D. Md. 1978) (holding that
the Health Claims Arbitration Act is substantive and not procedural, and thus pursuant to
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), and its progeny, the Act applies to all malpractice cases, regardless of diversity of citizenship of the parties), affd, 617 F.2d 361 (4th Cir.
1980) (per curiam); Bailey v. Woel, 302 Md. 38, 42-44, 485 A.2d 265, 267-68 (1984) (holding that claimant who has attempted to speed arbitration and move on to circuit proceed-
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Since 1976, the General Assembly has enacted several statutes affecting health claims arbitration.4 2 Responding to a second malpractice crisis,4 3 in 1986 the General Assembly enacted a cap of $350,000
on noneconomic tort damages,' and attempted to curtail meritless
claims by requiring that a plaintiff provide an expert's affidavit (the
"certificate of merit") attesting to the merit of his contentions.4 5
In 1987 the General Assembly passed several provisions intended
to reduce the total claims paid by insurers. The General Assembly
abolished the collateral source rule, permitting the panel to reduce
ings by not presenting any evidence to the arbitration panel has not complied with the
statutory requirement that he submit his dispute to arbitration); Brown v. Rabbitt, 300 Md.
171, 175-76, 476 A.2d 1167, 1169-70 (1984) (holding that claims framed as breaches of
express and implied warranties were based on deviations from the standard of professional
care and thus required arbitration); Cannon v. McKen, 296 Md. 27, 34, 459 A.2d 196, 200
(1983) (holding that suits against health care providers that do not allege malpractice,
including intentional torts, premises liability, and strict liability, do not fall within the
Health Claims Arbitration Office's jurisdiction and need not be arbitrated); Group Health
Ass'n v. Blumenthal, 295 Md. 104, 111,453 A.2d 1198, 1203 (1983) (holding that although
defendant corporation, a health maintenance organization, did not fit the statutory definition of a health care provider, because its liability, if any, was based on its agency relationship with a health care provider, the dispute was subject to mandatory arbitration); Bishop
v. Holy Cross Hosp., 44 Md. App. 688, 690, 410 A.2d 630, 632 (1980) (holding that plaintiff
cannot bypass the Health Claims Arbitration Office by alleging punitive as well as compensatory damages because the arbitration panel has the authority to award both);.
42. The following list of statutory amendments affecting arbitration is by no means
exhaustive.
43. See Diana M. Schobel, The Application of the Cap on Noneconomic Damages to Wrongful
Death Actions, 54 MD. L. REv. 914, 914 (1995).
44. Act of May 27, 1986, ch. 639, 1986 Md. Laws 2347 (codified as Mn. CODE ANN., CTS.
&JUD. PROC. §§ 11-108 to -109 (1995)). In 1994, the cap was raised to $500,000 for claims
where the injury occurred after October 1, 1994, with the cap rising by $15,000 each year.
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JuD. PROC. § 11-105(b)(2). If two or more claimants file, damages
are limited to 150% of the amount allowed for an individual. Id. § 11-108(6) (3) (ii); see also
Schobel, supra note 43 (discussing the amendments to the cap).
45. Act of May 27, 1986, ch. 640, 1986 Md. Laws 2353, 2356-57 (codified as MD. CODE
ANN., CTS. & JuD. PROC. § 3-2A-04(b) (1995)). Although the statute calls the affidavit a
"certificate of qualified expert," practitioners commonly refer to it as a "certificate of
merit." A certificate must be filed in all cases except where the sole claim is the lack of
informed consent. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JuD. PROC. § 3-2A-04(b). Claimant's certificate
must state that a deviation from the standard of care occurred, and that this deviation was
the proximate cause of the alleged injury. Id. § 3-2A-04(b) (1) (i). A defendant health care
provider must file an expert's statement that either no deviation occurred, or that the
deviation, if any, did not proximately cause claimant's injury. Id. § 3-2A-04(b) (2). Failure
of either party to comply within the requisite time period may result in a dismissal of plaintiff's claim or an adjudication against the defendant on the issue of liability. Id. § 3-2A04(b) (1), (2). To avoid the "hired gun" problem, no expert may spend more than twenty
percent of his professional time as an expert witness. Id. § 3-2A-04(b) (4). Where the defendant is a physician, the Director of the Health Claims Arbitration Office must forward a
copy of both certificates to the State Board of Physician Quality Assurance, the state body
that investigates physician malpractice. Id. § 3-2A-04(b) (6).
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the amount of the award by any payments plaintiff has received from
other sources, such as insurance.4 6 It also permitted periodic payments to allow payment of economic damages without the need to
estimate life expectancy. 4 7 Finally, for those cases where neither the
plaintiff nor the defendant wishes to go through arbitration, the General Assembly permitted the parties to proceed directly
to court if all
48
parties mutually waive the arbitration proceeding.
Finally, in 1993, the General Assembly modified the standard of
care applicable to medical malpractice cases.49 Although it appears
that the statute is a return to the locality rule,5 ° no Maryland appellate
court has confirmed this to date.
3. Judging Health Claims Arbitration.a. Evaluation Difficulties.--Submission of medical malpractice claims to an alternative forum is by no means unique to Maryland.
Approximately half of the states have health claims arbitration.5 1
Some states have had enormous success with HCA; other states have
repealed their statutes. 2 Evaluating the efficacy of HCA first requires
46. Act of June 2, 1987, ch. 596, 1987 Md. Laws 2721, 2724 (codified as MD. CODE
ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-05(h) (1995)).
47. Id.
48. Id. (codified as MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JuD. PROC. § 3-2A-06A (1995)). Once parties agree to waive, their agreement is binding, MD. CODE ANN., Cs. &JUD. PROC. § 3-2A06A(b) (2), and the plaintiff must file a complaint within 60 days of waiver or face the
possibility of dismissal, id. § 3-2A-06A(c) (3).
49. MD. CODE ANN., Cs. &JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-02(c) (1995) (adopting as the standard
of care "standards of practice among members of the same health care profession with
similar training and experience situated in the same or similar communities at the time of
the alleged act giving rise to the cause of action").
50. The locality rule required that an expert witness in medical malpractice cases be
from the same community as the defendant health care provider to ensure that the witness
was familiar with the standard of care required of the defendant. Abraham, supra note 9,
at 496. Because many physicians were loathe to testify against colleagues or friends, and
feared repercussions from other physicians if they did testify, plaintiffs faced a "conspiracy
of silence," in which egregious cases of malpractice were not litigated for want of an expert.
See generally W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS § 32 (5th
ed. 1984). The "nationalization" of the standard of care through medical school accreditation and the propagation of medical journals led most states to reject the locality rule in
favor of a national standard of care. Id.; see also Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp.
Ass'n, 276 Md. 187, 192-202, 349 A.2d 245-53 (1975) (rejecting the locality rule for a national standard of care in Maryland).
51. Macchiaroli, supra note 29, at 186 & n.11, 188. The United States Department of
Health and Human Services has recommended the adoption of such alternative dispute
resolution mechanisms by all states. Id at 187. The details vary from state to state, but
virtually all such statutes encourage or require submission of medical malpractice disputes
to a panel of health care providers, attorneys, and sometimes laymen. Id. at 189-90.
52. See Debra L. Fortenberry, Note, Screening Panels: Corrective Surgery or Amputation, 4
OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 255, 260-61, 264-66 (1989) (describing the repeal of Ohio's
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determining its objectives, a process not as easy as many commentators have suggested.
If health claims arbitration is to be judged by the intent of the
legislators who enacted it, then the text of the law itself provides the
best source of that intent. Unfortunately, the Health Care Malpractice Claims statute contains no legislative findings or statement of purpose. While some inferences may be gleaned by examining the
reports and testimony considered during the 1976 legislative session,
the value of such inferences is limited, because committee reports and
testimonies express the views of their authors, not the General Assembly as a whole, and because the record is mixed and ambiguous.5"
Indeed, even the Court of Appeals had great difficulty divining the
legislature's intent, finding that the task force that drafted the HCA
statute "was ambiguous as to the precise purpose arbitration would
serve."54 The best the court could do was to adopt the vague formulation of the trial court, that the legislature hoped HCA would "reduce
the cost of medical malpractice claims, thus reducing the cost of liability insurance and stabilizing the [medical malpractice insurance] market."5 5 The academic literature yields nothing more: commentators
fervently dispute the purposes of HCA systems enacted across the
country,5 6 and this lack of consensus extends to Maryland.5 7
Certainly few would dispute that the General Assembly enacted
the Health Care Malpractice Claims Act as a response to the medical
malpractice crisis.5 " Considering that St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company had recendy withdrawn coverage for eighty-five perHCA statute and the success of Arizona's and Indiana's); Macchiaroli, supra note 29, at
196-97 (discussing the repeal of Rhode Island's statute and the ineffectiveness of
Pennsylvania's).
53. See generally WiLLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 1-47 (1994)
(exploring the limits of legislative history in statutory interpretation).
54. Attorney Gen. v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 307-08, 385 A.2d 57, 76, appeal dismissed,
439 U.S. 805 (1978), overruled in part &yNewell v. Richards, 323 Md. 717, 594 A.2d 1152
(1991).
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., Fortenberry, supra note 52, at 256-57 (HCA's primary purpose to ensure
availability of malpractice insurance); Macchiaroli, supra note 29, at 186 (HCA's purpose to
expedite resolution process to reduce transactional costs); Neil D. Schor, Health Care Providers and Alternative Dispute Resolution: Needed Medicine to Combat Medical MalpracticeClaims, 4
OHIO ST.J. ON Disp. RESOL. 65, 66 (1989) (HCA's purpose to reduce the number of claims
filed and reduce the awards given to plaintiffs).
57. Two advocates of the original statute, for instance, cannot agree as to whether the
legislature expected HCA to diminish verdict size. See infra notes 64-65 and accompanying
text.
58. See supra notes 15-25 and accompanying text; McGuirk & Rafferty, supra note 20, at
10 (quoting Senator McGuirk, Chairman of the Economic Affairs Committee: "Through-

out its deliberations, the General Assembly acted in a crisis atmosphere."); see alsoAttorney
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cent of the physicians in the state,5 9 the Court of Appeals's conclusion
that the General Assembly hoped to reduce costs and stabilize medical
malpractice premiums was a reasonable one.60 The actual mechanisms by which HCA might obtain this end, however, continue to be
debated.
Measuring the effect of HCA on frequency and severity of claims
is a difficult task. Merely examining the availability of malpractice insurance in Maryland is insufficient. Because measuring the impact of
tort reforms on premiums also requires consideration of insurance
cycles, interest rates, the reinsurance market, and many other variables, it is nearly impossible to determine whether any changes in malpractice premiums are a product of HCA or some other factor. 6
Without sophisticated analyses, it is impossible to determine whether
insurance remains available because of health claims arbitration, or in
spite of it.
Few studies have ever attempted to control for the many variables
involved. Those evaluations that have attempted to control for external factors to determine the efficacy of HCA and other tort reforms
have been forced to grapple with the tension inherent in uncertain
and sometimes conflicting goals. If, for instance, a given HCA scheme
resolves claims with less expense, but does so erroneously, has the goal
of keeping costs down been achieved only at the expense ofjustice? If
HCA reduces the costs of litigating a claim, insurers will expend less
per lawsuit-but if this encourages claimants with marginal cases to
file suit, increasing the volume of cases, are the savings partially offset,
62
or even entirely surpassed, by expenditures on these new cases? Assessing the success of health claims arbitration requires going beyond
the question of whether HCA has decreased the frequency and severity of claims paid by insurers, and exploring how HCA might achieve
such goals.
b. Reforming the Decision-Making Process.-Some commentators have suggested that the General Assembly intended for RCA to
Gen. v. Johnson, 282 Md. at 307-08, 385 A.2d at 76; MacAlister & Scanlan, supra note 7, at
487-90; Quinn, supra note 20, at 74-75; Zimmerman, supra note 37, at 75-76.
59. See supra text accompanying note 15.
60. See supra text accompanying note 55.
61. DANZON, supra note 14, at viii.
62. One study labeled this the "freeway principle": "adding more lanes does not simply move the current flow of traffic faster, because when the cost per trip falls, more traffic
enters the system." LIEBMANN REPORT, supranote 3, at 16; see also Abraham, supra note 9, at
516 ("[T]he availability of the informal and initially less expensive screening panel procedure may encourage the filing of claims that would not otherwise be made, thus adding to
the total cost of resolving claims.").
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diminish the total claims paid by defendants by removing the decision
from the "irrational" jury, and placing it in the hands of a panel of
"dispassionate, level-headed experts."6" A more "rational" decisionmaker, these commentators have argued, would produce fewer and
smaller plaintiffs' verdicts.' Others argue that the legislature had no
intention of altering the probability of a plaintiffs verdict or the size
of that verdict.6 5
(i) The Probability of Winning.--Critics of HCA argue that arbitration panels find for the plaintiff more frequently than do juries.
The Liebmann Report, a 1984 study, found that defendants win only
fifty-eight percent of cases in HCA, significantly lower than the eighty
to ninety percent national rate. 66 A comparison of the most recent
Maryland arbitration data available67 for those medical malpractice
cases mutually waived 6" and tried in circuit court confirms this: Maryland defendants win sixty-two percent of claims heard by panels, and
seventy percent of claims that are mutually waived and heard by juries.6 9 The causes of this difference are unclear. Perhaps, contrary to
63. See, e.g., MacAlister & Scanlan, supra note 7, at 500-01; Schor, supra note 56, at 68.
64. Controversy, supra note 36, at 122 ("It was felt that the damages would be more
reasonable when compared to those awarded byjuries."); MacAlister & Scanlan, supranote
7, at 500-01 & n.134; Thomas B. Metzloff, Alternative Dispute Resolution Strategies in Medical
Malpractice,9 ALASKA L. REv. 429, 435 (1991); Schor, supra note 56, at 66.
65. A legislator who participated in the enactment of the Health Care Malpractice
Claims statute insists that the Assembly would never have agreed to a statute that would
diminish the verdicts of meritorious claimants. Eileen Ursic, Maryland Health Claim Arbitration System, As Viewed by DelegateJoseph E. Owens, Walter R. Tabler, Esq., and Marvin Elin, Esq.,
12 U. BALT. L.F., Winter 1981-82, at 14-15 (quoting Delegate Joseph E. Owens: "I don't
think that the members of the legislature felt that there would be great reduction in the
awards.... I don't think we could have sold an arbitration board if the emphasis was on
'we'll reduce the awards.'").

66. MacAlister & Scanlan, supra note 7, at 502 nn.148-49 (citing LIEBMANN REPORT,
supra note 3, at 15).
67. Morlock & Malitz, Testimony, supra note 7. All works by Morlock and Malitz are
based on a database they constructed of all medical malpractice cases filed in Maryland
since the advent of Health Claims Arbitration. Interview with Laura L. Morlock, Professor,
& Faye E. Malitz, Research Associate, Johns Hopkins University School of Hygiene and
Public Health, in Baltimore, Md. (Sept. 21, 1995) [hereinafter Morlock & Malitz, Interview]. The testimony summarizes data for the 5665 claims closed as of 1992, although
claims which were tried in circuit court were followed until August 1994. Id. Certain
claims filed were distorting influences and were culled from the data. These include hundreds of asbestos cases, which were not tried in HCA and are not representative of medical
malpractice cases. Id.
68. See supra note 48 and accompanying text (discussing mutual waiver).
69. Morlock & Malitz, Testimony, supra note 7. This data provides a fairer comparison,
because contrasting Maryland with national data ignores the possibility that some factor
other than HCA accounts for the decreased percentage of defendant victories, i.e., Mary-
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expectations, 70 panels are pro-plaintiff. On the other hand, if panelists truly make more rational decisions, perhaps HCA panels are simply finding that defendants commit malpractice more frequently than
juries have heretofore recognized.
(ii) Reducing Verdict Size.-Early studies disputed the effect
of HCA on verdict size. The Liebmann Report concluded that panel
awards were significantly higher than jury awards. 71 A governor's task
force found panel awards similar to, or even slightly lower than, jury
verdicts.7 2 But the most recent published data show that HCA verdicts
tend to be substantially lower: of medical malpractice cases studied,
the average panel award was $289,561, while the average malpractice
jury award was $412,532.13 If the trend depicted in this data has continued, then regardless of the intent of the legislature, HCA has lowered the size of plaintiffs' verdicts. Medical malpractice attorneys
have recognized that panels award smaller sums: of respondents to an
informal survey of medical malpractice attorneys,7 4 six percent
thought that panel awards are generally higher, fifty-seven percent
land claimants might file an unusually low number of nonmeritorious cases, or Maryland

juries are unusually sympathetic to claimants.
70. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
71. LIEBMANN REPORT, supra note 3, at 13-14. As a former Director of the Health
Claims Arbitration Office noted, any increase may be a product not of HCA, but of a
national trend towards higher verdicts. Controversy, supra note 36, at 122.
72. McGuiRK REPORT, supra note 3, at 7.
73. Laura L. Morlock, Impact of State Reforms: The Maryland Experience, in PROCEEDINGS
OF DHHS RESEARCH CONFERENCE: HEALTH CARE IMPROVEMENT AND MEDICAL LIABILITY 59,
62 (1988) (on file with the author).
74. Author's Survey of Medical Malpractice Attorneys (Oct. 1995) [hereinafter Author's Survey]. The author conducted an informal survey of 114 medical malpractice attorneys. Attorneys were selected from those who listed medical or professional malpractice in
their 1995 Martindale-Hubbellbiography. Results are based on the replies received from 55
attorneys, 25 of whom represent primarily claimants, 28 of whom represent primarily defendants, and 2 of whom regularly represent both claimants and defendants. All figures
presented are rounded to the nearest percent, sometimes resulting in totals of 101%. "Unresponsive" refers both to respondents who claimed they had no basis for responding, and
to respondents who did not choose one of the provided responses.
The author acknowledges and emphasizes the informal nature of this study. Attorneys
were selected from Martindale-HubbeUbecause no comprehensive list of medical malpractice attorneys could be located. The attorneys who listed themselves in Martindale-HubbeU
are by no means representative of all Maryland malpractice attorneys. Furthermore, while
the number of practicing malpractice attorneys cannot be ascertained, 114 may not be an
adequate sample size to represent them.
While the survey cannot produce representative statistics that can pinpoint attorneys'
perceptions of HCA, it can provide descriptive statistics, suggestive of trends. The high
percentage of respondents who concurred on many survey questions, see infra notes 113,
114, 160, 161, 162, 168, may fairly portray the feelings of other practitioners.
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thought that awards are generally lower, with twenty-eight percent
perceiving no difference between panel awards and jury verdicts.7'
c. Filtering Meritless Claims.-While many claims are settled
with an indemnity paid to the claimant, many are voluntarily or involuntarily dismissed without payment.76 Of those unsettled claims that
do reach a jury or panel, most are won by the health care provider.77
This suggests that many meritless malpractice suits are filed by those
who hope either to play on juror sympathy or to induce insurers to
offer a low settlement to avoid litigation costs. 78 Commentators vary
widely in their estimates of the number of such cases, 79 but they do
agree that one major purpose of most health claims arbitration statutes is to deter claimants from filing meritless suits. 80 Advocates expected HCA would deter meritless claims, either by providing a forum
for early settlement, 81 or by encouraging claimants to drop doubtful
claims rather than to litigate them. 2 Its ability to do either is
questionable.
(i) Encouraging Settlement.-Nationally, insurers encourage
litigation by refusing to settle most claims until the claimant files
suit.8 3 Some commentators argue that HCA provides better opportu-

nities than traditional judicial settings for parties to resolve their dispute between filing and the hearing or trial.8 4 However, the evidence
does not support this premise; the Hughes study of 29,785 medical
malpractice claims from across the country shows that HCA systems
75. Author's Survey, supra note 74. All of those who thought panel awards are higher
were defense attorneys. Numbers do not total 100% because some respondents were
unresponsive.
76. Metzloff, supra note 64, at 431.
77. See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text; see also Harold A. Sakayan, Arbitration
and Screening Panels: Recent Experience and Trends, 17 FORUM 682, 686 (1982).
78. MacAlister & Scanlan, supra note 7, at 500-01.
79. Metzloff, supra note 64, at 431 n.8.

80. Id. at 431-32, 436-37; Sakayan, supranote 77, at 683; Schor, supra note 56, at 68. For
comparable arguments concerning Maryland's HCA, see MacAlister & Scanlan, supra note
7, at 500-01; Ursic, supra note 65, at 14-15..
81. Abraham, supra note 9, at 513-14; Macchiaroli, supra note 29, at 243; Metzloff, supra
note 64, at 436-37, apps. at 456-57; Sakayan, supra note 77, at 683.
82. See Abraham, supra note 9, at 514; MacAlister & Scanlan, supra note 7, at 500-01;
Macchiaroli, supra note 29, at 242 & n.337.
83. JAMES S. KAKALIK & NICHOLAS M. PACE, COSTS AND COMPENSATION PAID IN TORT
LITIGATION 31 (1986) (finding that of all dollars paid to medical malpractice claimants,

86% to 93.5% were paid only after a suit was filed, depending on the year and study examined). Between 1977 and 1992 only 7% of Maryland claims were settled with payment
without the claimant filing suit. Morlock & Malitz, Testimony, supra note 7.
84. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
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generally have no statistically significant impact on the proportion of
cases settled.8 5
Maryland rates of pre-adjudication settlement are similarly discouraging. The General Assembly's summary of the unilateral waiver
statute8 6 notes that only nine percent of claims required trial before
the enactment of HCA, and that now twenty-three percent require adjudication either by an HCA panel or jury. 7 Such an increase was
inevitable if, as its proponents hoped, HCA does indeed lower the
costs of litigation, because more claimants will be able to afford to
press their claims.8 8 Yet this seems an inadequate explanation, because Maryland attorneys surveyed believe that HCA raises the overall
costs of litigation. 9 Health claims arbitration does, however, seem to
encourage settlement between the panel hearing and the jury trial.9 0
However, researchers are unable to explore an equally important
piece of the settlement puzzle, the impact of HCA on the size of settlements. Unfortunately, only anecdotal data are available, as many parties make nondisclosure a condition of settlement to safeguard the
reputation of the health care provider. It has been suggested that
HCA may significantly reduce the levels of settlements that claimants
obtain.9" A plaintiff who wins in a circuit court proceeding may rest
fairly comfortably, because the only appeal available to the defendant
is the narrow question of whether harmful legal error occurred.
85. Hughes, supra note 14, at 71.
86. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
87. GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF MD., DEP'T OF LEGIS.' REFERENCE, 1995 SESSION REVIEW 203
(1995). But see infra text accompanying notes 163-167 (questioning the significance of
these numbers).
88. See supra note 62.
89. See infra note 168.

90. See infra notes 157-159 and accompanying text.
91. Macchiaroli, supra note 29, at 249 ("A defendant who does not prevail before the
panel may refuse to settle the action, thus forcing the plaintiff to incur the costs of trial.
The defendant may take this step with impunity .... [TI he defendant may be able to take
advantage of docket delays to wear down the plaintiff, thus increasing the likelihood of a
low settlement figure prior to verdict."); Metzloff, supra note 64, at 432 & n.13 (noting that
critics of HCA suggest the system forces patients to settle claims for significantly less than
the true value of their claims); Schor, supra note 56, at 72 & n.54 (noting that because
health care providers were winning nearly 80% of cases heard by screening panels in New
York, "providers are put in an advantageous position to force settlement or abandonment
of claims").
The type of injury may play a significant role in claimant's decision to settle because
claimants facing medical bills may not be able to wait long enough to go through an arbitration hearing, trial, and appeal. One government study suggests defendants abuse the
settlement process in tort cases. PAUL C. WEILER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL 54
(1991) (citations omitted). The average settlement for "grave" and "major" injuries was
approximately 25% of the total economic damages; settlements for the average "emotional" and "insignificant" injuries were 400% of the plaintiffs economic damages. Id.
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Thus, most plaintiffs who are victorious in circuit court should reasonably anticipate a settlement offer fairly close to the jury's verdict. A
claimant who wins in HCA, however, faces the necessity of having to
retry the entire case-in-chief, which includes incurring significant expert witness fees.9 2 Although the plaintiff has the advantage of the
presumption of correctness of the panel's award,9" a plaintiff may still
lose in circuit court. Rather than face the added expenses and the
possibility of losing, claimants may settle for significantly less than the
panel's award.9 4 While this may serve HCA's purpose of decreasing
the frequency and severity of awards, compelling plaintiffs to accept
smaller settlements for meritorious claims may contravene the fundamental purpose of the judicial system, the furtherance of justice.
(ii) Encouraging Claim-Dropping.-HCA advocates have argued that the extra level of procedure that HCA imposes and the lack
of a sympathetic jury discourage spurious claims.95 Proponents of this
argument draw support from the fact that four states that repealed
their HCA schemes experienced such an upsurge of malpractice filings that they reenacted alternative dispute resolution mechanisms.9 6
Relying on early data, critics of HCA responded that by speeding resolution,9 7 HCA actually encourages more filings.9 8 But an absolute increase in the number of cases does not itself prove HCA's failure to
deter filings: Only comparing Maryland's litigation rates to national
rates will permit determination of whether RCA is contributing to the
growth in suits filed. While no comprehensive post-1984 nationwide
data are available to determine whether Maryland's filing rate has
grown faster than the national rate, informal studies based on estimates and physician surveys suggest that the filing rate for Maryland
lies just below the national average. 9 9 Anecdotal data support this result: The largest physician carrier in Maryland discounted 1990 premiums by twenty percent, attributing the discount to a decrease in
92. Cf Fortenberry, supra note 52, at 265 (noting that the-Arizona screening panel
process increased the costs of litigation).
93. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. But see infra notes 151-153 and accompanying text (discussing the Court of Appeals's interpretation of that presumption to include
a continuing burden on plaintiff at trial to prove malpractice).
94. See supra note 91.
95. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
96. Controversy, supra note 36, at 125. The four states were Florida, Maine, Wisconsin,
and Nevada. Id.
97. See infra notes 169-174 and accompanying text.
98. MacAlister & Scanlan, supra note 7, at 502-03; LIEBWSANN REPORT, supra note 3, at
14-16. For a discussion of this "freeway principle," see supra note 62.
99. Morlock, supra note 73, at 61.
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claim filings."' 0 Whether HCA or some other factor has slowed the
growth in filings remains unclear.
The single most effective mechanism for discouraging claimants
may be the certificate of merit. 10 1 Since 1986, the statute has required
each litigant to file an affidavit from an expert attesting that in the
expert's professional opinion, the litigant has a meritorious claim or
defense. 102 This requirement may have contributed to a drop of approximately thirty-six percent in filing rates in the year after it took
effect.1 0 Filing rates are only now returning to their precertificate
levels.1 4 Critics of this requirement note that litigants who have perfectly good claims that could be supported by discovery are barred if
they cannot persuade a medical expert to sign an affidavit based on
limited information. 105 The requirement that an expert be retained
in all cases is particularly burdensome on the poor: the proportion of
suits dropped after the eneconomically disadvantaged litigants filing
10 6
actment of the certificate requirement.
HCA advocates hoped that HCA would encourage those with
meritless claims who do file suit to dismiss their cases early. 10 7 Hughes
found that although HCA does not encourage settlement, 0 it does
increase the rate of out-of-court resolution by increasing drop rates:
litigants compelled to submit their claims to HCA drop their claims
more often than those who may pursue their claims in court without
the intermediate step.' 0 9 Based on this data, one advocate of HCA
concluded that the claimants must have realized that their claims
lacked merit."' It seems equally plausible to conclude that the claimants abandoned meritorious claims rather than face the extra expenses and risks imposed by an extra level of litigation. Disincentives
to litigate impede meritorious claims as well as meritless ones.1 1 A
100. Faye E. Malitz et al., Impact of Legislative Actions on Malpractice Claims Filed in
Maryland, Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Public Health Association 6 (Oct. 22-26, 1989) (on file with the author of this Note).
101. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
102. See MD. CoDE ANN., CTs. &JuD. PROc. § 3-2A-04(b) (1995).
103. Malitz et al., supra note 100, at 2.
104. Morlock & Malitz, Testimony, supra note 7.
105. WEiLER, supra note 91, at 42; McGuixi REPORT, supra note 3, at 9.
106. Malitz et al., supra note 100, at 5-6. Of course most claimants would have had to
hire an expert wimess were the case taken to trial, but because so few cases settle before
filing of a claim, see supra note 83, the certificate of merit effectively requires retention of
an expert not merely before trial, but before insurers will consider settlement.
107. Macchiaroli, supra note 29, at 242.
108. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
109. Hughes, supra note 14, at 75-76.
110. Macchiaroli, supra note 29, at 242 n.337.
111. See, e.g., Metzloff, supra note 64, at 432 & n.13.
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bona fide malpractice victim might be willing to expend tens of
thousands of dollars in expert witness fees once, but might not be
112
willing to face the risk twice.
Despite the evidence of a decrease in claims filed, Maryland attorneys responding to the author's survey remain convinced that HCA
has no deterrent effect. While nine percent of claimants' attorneys
felt that HCA encouraged filing and thirty percent felt that HCA deters filing, fifty-two percent felt that HCA has no deterrent effect at
all."' Of defense attorneys, seven percent thought that claimants
were encouraged by HCA, seven percent thought that HCA deters filing, and sixty-one percent found no effect." 4
d. Reducing the Costs of Medical Malpractice Litigation.-Because of the highly technical nature of medical malpractice cases, litigation expenses tend to run much higher than in most other areas of
legal practice." 5 With few exceptions, medical malpractice cases require the use of an expert witness to help the jury determine the standard of care and whether the defendant deviated from that standard.
Expert witnesses often charge between $100 and $400 per hour, and
multiple experts in a complex suit may force each party to spend
more than $10,000 in expenses for experts in preparing trial testimony." 6 Both claimants' and defendants' insurers must incur these
costs whether they win or lose. In addition, the complexity of medical
malpractice litigation requires significant hours of attorney prepara117
tion time.
Medical malpractice litigation costs society billions of dollars each
year." 8 Accordingly, reducing litigation costs has great potential to
permit plaintiffs to receive compensation while holding down insurance costs. HCA advocates hoped to reduce attorneys fees and other
litigation costs by confining medical malpractice disputes to a more

112. See, e.g., WEILER, supra note 91, at 53-54; Fortenberry, supra note 52, at 269; Metzloff, supra note 64, at 432 & n.13.
113. Author's Survey, supra note 74. Remaining respondents were nonresponsive.
114. Id. The combined figures for claimants' and defendants' counsel show that 8% of
respondents thought that HCA encouraged filing, 19% felt it discouraged filing, 57% perceived no effect, and 17% were unresponsive. Id.
115. KAKALIK& PACE, supra note 83, at 41; MacAlister & Scanlan, supra note 7, at 485-86.
116. MacAlister & Scanlan, supra note 7, at 486.
117. Id.
118. KAALIK & PACE, supra note 83, at 28.
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informal, less costly forum,"1 9 and by reducing the time it takes to
resolve such disputes."' 0 Again, HCA's success is questionable.
(i) Attoneys' Fees.-Attorney compensation accounts for a
large portion of the total expenditures in malpractice litigation.
Plaintiffs' fees and expenses for claims in which suit was filed' averaged thirty-six percent of the average amount recovered. 12 2 Defense
costs, which include fees for cases where the insurer paid no indempaid, of which a
nity, 123 averaged 29.6% of the average compensation
1 24
full 87.2% consisted of attorneys' fees.
While the costs of medical malpractice litigation are higher than
those of most types of litigation, they are not disproportionately so,
considering the complexity of such suits.' 25 Attorneys' fees for tort
suits generally are estimated at thirty to thirty-one percent of total
compensation paid for plaintiffs, and thirty percent for defendants. 26
Although plaintiffs' fees do tend to run higher than those of defendants, 12 7 this seems a more than fair reward for the risk claimants' attorneys take: While defendants' attorneys receive a fee regardless of
the outcome, plaintiffs' attorneys typically collect their fee only when
they win. Of more concern are defendants' and their insurers' litigation costs. The medical malpractice insurance industry spends more
money defending claims than it does on all of its administrative costs
combined. 128 One study estimated that half of premium increases in
119. Schor, supra note 56, at 68.
120. MacAlister & Scanlan, supra note 7, at 501; Quinn, supranote 20, at 78-79; Sakayan,
supra note 77, at 683; Schor, supra note 56, at 66.
121. Data on attorneys' fees for suits that are resolved without the filing of a suit generally do not appear in court or insurance industry records and accordingly are difficult to
estimate. See genera!!y KAKAIaK & PACE, supra note 83, at 39.
122. Id. at 41. Expert wimess fees are included in the expense estimates provided. Considering that most plaintiffs contingency arrangements provide for plaintiffs counsel to
receive 33% to 40% of the recovery as fee, Kakalik and Pace's estimate seems realistic. Id.
at 38, 113.
123. Because plaintiffs almost always enter into contingency arrangements with their
attorneys, the overwhelming majority of fees paid to plaintiffs' counsel are paid on contingency. Though plaintiffs typically remain responsible for expenses incurred other than
attorney's fees, see KAKAuK & PACE, supra note 83, at 39, these expenses are difficult to track
because neither insurance data nor court records are likely to refer to them. Cf. id. at 1
(noting that most litigation expenses and compensation payments are private expenditures
and are not reported publicly).
124. Id. at 54-55.
125. Cf. id. (noting the complexity and expense of medical malpractice suits).
126. Id. at 42, 54.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 121-122.
128. Nye et al., supra note 14, at 1511-12 n.44. Of all medical malpractice expenses, 17%
were expended on administrative expenses of running the company, 18.4% were spent
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the 1970s malpractice crisis resulted from costs associated with malpractice defense, especially defense attorneys' fees.1 29 According to
1986 data, the Medical Mutual Liability Insurance Society of Maryland1 3 0 spent almost half of its legal expenditures on cases it closed
without payment. 13 ' Settling more cases may significantly lower legal
costs. However, if an insurer routinely offers low-level settlements to
meritless cases to avoid the nuisance of litigation, the insurer may find
many more meritless claims being filed. The line between cheaply
settling cases of arguable merit and needlessly settling specious claims
is by no means easy to define.
(ii) Keeping Cases Out of Cout.-Critics charge that HCA increases, not decreases, the delay and expense of medical malpractice
litigation.' 3 2 Systemic savings result only if three facts are true: (a)
HCA costs less than traditional litigation, (b) expenses saved are not
exceeded by the duplicative costs of those who seek a de novo court
hearing, and (c) HCA does not encourage additional litigants to submit their claims to a trier of fact.
(a) A Less Costly Forum?-ForHCA actually to reduce costs,
the HCA proceeding must be different in some significant way from
traditional litigation in a courtroom. Otherwise, HCA will not reduce
costs, but merely will require that the costs be incurred in a different
forum. Alternative dispute resolution mechanisms such as arbitration
and mediation are intended to achieve such savings by providing for a
more informal proceeding, with relaxed rules of procedure and evidence, and sometimes a prohibition against expert witnesses.13 3 In
Maryland, however, HCA differs little from a trial. Though the rules
of evidence are relaxed, the rules of procedure still apply.' 3 4 Parties
are limited to two experts of any single specialty, a35 but two experts at
over $250 per hour can add up quickly. Parties have little motivation
defending claims, and the remaining 64.6% of expenses went to successful claimants and
their counsel. Id.
129. McGuirk & Rafferty, supra note 20, at 15.
130. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
131. Controversy, supra note 36, at 124.
132. WEILER, supra note 91, at 42; MacAlister & Scanlan, supra note 7, at 500-04.
133. Cf Abraham, supra note 9, at 516 (noting that the informal procedures of HCA
have the potential to reduce transactional costs); Macchiaroli, supra note 29, at 186 (suggesting the purpose of HCA panels is to reduce transactional costs of litigation).
134. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text (describing procedural and evidentiary rules).
135. MD. CODE ANN., Crs. &JuD. PRoc. § 3-2A-05(d) (1995).
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to hold back"3 6 because an unfavorable panel award will be admitted
into evidence with a presumption of correctness in any appeal of a
panel's decision. 13 7 What were intended to be informal screening
panels have turned into full-blown trials, with little opportunity to reduce attorneys' or experts' fees.13 8 HCA does seem to decrease the
administrative costs of trying
a case,' 3 9 but these constitute only a tiny
40
portion of total expenses.1
(b) The Systemic Cost of De Novo Appeals.-If any costs saved by
health claims arbitration are surpassed by the costs of those who litigate a second time in a de novo appeal, then HCA has increased, not
decreased, the costs of medical malpractice litigation. 4 ' Critics
charge that the admissibility of the panel's decision, and even Maryland's unique presumption of correctness, 4 2 do little to deter either
party from continuing to circuit court, and that HCA accordingly increases delays and costs. 1 43 MacAlister and Scanlan, for instance, argue that claimants have little to lose, because claimants contesting the
presumption of the panel award's correctness must meet the same
burden, a preponderance of the evidence, as claimants face in the
arbitration proceeding. 1" In practical terms, however, it seems unlikely that a realistic claimant's attorney, having lost the first round,
would not consider seriously whether the case is worth the time and
effort of a second trial.' 45 Furthermore, not every attorney would
agree that the claimant's burden of proof is the same. An attorney
136. See WEILER, supra note 91, at 42 (finding screening panels a mere "dress rehearsal
for the real trial"); Abraham, supra note 9, at 516 (finding prehearing preparation panel
adjudication to be particularly rigorous where the panel award is admissible); MacAlister &
Scanlan, supra note 7, at 503 ("Because hearings before the arbitration panels are tried as
though they were being litigated in court... [t]he litigants must retain experts to testify,
conduct investigations, take depositions, and wage discovery battles.").
137. See supra text accompanying note 29. But cf infra notes 151-153 and accompanying
text (discussing the Court of Appeals's confusing interpretation of that presumption).
138. MacAlister & Scanlan, supra note 7, at 503.
139. MARYLAND DEP'T OF BUDGET & FiscAL PLANNING, Div. OF MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS &
AUDrrs, MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS STUDY OF THE HEALTH CLAIMS ARBITRATION OFFICE AND SELECTED ASPECTS OF THE ARBITRATION PROCESS

45-46 (Oct. 1984) [hereinafter

MANAGEMENT

STUDY].

140. KAKAIuK & PACE, supra note 83, at 65.

141. Attorney Gen. v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 281, 385 A.2d 57, 61, appeal dismissed, 439
U.S. 805 (1978), overruled inpartby Newell v. Richards, 323 Md. 717, 594 A.2d 1152 (1991);
Quinn, supra note 20, at 94 n.129.
142. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. But cf. infra notes 151-153 and accompanying text (discussing the Court of Appeals's confusing interpretation of that
presumption).
143. See, e.g., MacAlister & Scanlan, supra note 7, at 501.
144. Id.
145. Quinn, supra note 20, at 96.
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who attempts to prove his case without attempting to rebut the panel's
finding faces a compelling closing argument from the defendant:
"Ladies and gentlemen, a panel of experts considered the evidence
that you heard, and found my client not responsible for any injuries
alleged. Are you convinced that these experts were wrong?" Effectively, claimants must prove not only the elements of malpractice, but
also that the panel made so grievous an error that the jury should
contradict the panel's decision. 1" Despite MacAlister and Scanlan's
contentions, claimants across the country have found the additional
expenses, delays, and the admissibility of the panel's decision so serious an obstacle that they have alleged repeatedly that FCA places an
unconstitutional barrier on their right to a jury trial.14 7 Indeed, the
Court of Appeals agreed that HCA places significant additional burdens on claimants' right to ajury trial, although they found these burdens insufficient to render HCA unconstitutional."la
MacAlister and Scanlan also contended that a defendant facing a
panel award has little to lose by trying the case de novo. 14 9 This proposition seems no more plausible than the contention that an unfavorable award does not deter claimants. Under the original
understanding of the statute's presumption of correctness, a defendant not only had to incur significant additional attorney's fees, but
also had to rebut the findings of a panel that the defendant committed malpractice, causing injuries to the claimant. The presumption,
practitioners thought, required that the defendant health care provider disprove the claimant's case. 150 In doing so, the defendant
would have to prove that the plaintiff had failed to prove his case, and
to find a way to discredit the panel's decision, lest he face a closing
argument from the plaintiff similar to the one described above. However, Newell v. Richardsreconfigured the allocation of burdens in cases
where the panel found for the plaintiff.5 In Newell the Court of Appeals interpreted the presumption of correctness to mean that the
146. Id. ("A plaintiff's unsuccessful attack on a panel decision, about which he has little
information, will necessarily undermine his case with respect to primary negligence, and
juries are not likely to disregard entirely the evidence of the award unless the plaintiff
satisfactorily establishes why it was incorrect."). Anecdotal evidence offered by some respondents to the Author's Survey suggests that many practitioners attempt to undermine
the panel award by presenting some piece of new evidence and suggesting that the panel
would have concluded otherwise were they exposed to that evidence. See Author's Survey,
supra note 74.
147. See general/y Macchiaroli, supra note 29, at 197-222.
148. See supra note 39 and accompanying text; see also Quinn, supra note 20, at 97.
149. MacAlister & Scanlan, supra note 7, at 501.
150. See, e.g., id. at 501-02.
151. 323 Md. 717, 594 A.2d 1152 (1991).
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"burden is on the health care provider to show that the award is not
correct," but that the claimant retains the burden of proving the elements of malpractice. 5 2 Because in theory both the panel and jury
are adjudicating the same question, the distinction between the claimant's burden to prove malpractice and the defendant's burden to
prove that the panel incorrectly found malpractice seems a difficult
one, and certainly one most juries would find difficult to comprehend.155 By retaining the claimant's burden of proving malpractice,
however, the court in Newell necessarily alleviated some of the burden
on the defendant and placed it on the claimant.
By relieving the health care provider's burden of proof to some
degree in a de novo appeal, Newell certainly lowered a defendant's
disincentives to appeal. However, even after Newell, defendants face
the risk that ajury, which most defendants expect to be sympathetic to
plaintiffs," M will award even more damages to the claimant than the
panel did. Practically speaking, the burden of additional legal costs,
court costs, and the presumption of correctness makes a de novo appeal an uphill battle that neither claimants nor health care providers
would reasonably take lightly.
MacAlister and Scanlan pointed to what at first appears to be
powerful evidence to the contrary. They noted that actions to nullify
the panel award were filed in over half of the cases tried by the
panel.15 5 But this statistic is misleading. Any party who wishes to preserve the right to a de novo proceeding must file a notice of rejection
within thirty days after being served with the award, or the party forfeits the right to contest the award.15 Unless the parties agree to settle without further litigation within the first thirty days or his client
abandons his case, any attorney who fails to file the notice of nullification may be committing malpractice. The true test of the deterrent
152. Id. at 733-34, 594 A.2d at 1160.
153. In Newe/, the court provided a standard jury instruction for medical malpractice
cases: "The claim in this case was submitted to arbitration.... You are not bound by the
arbitrator's decision. However, under the law that decision is presumed to be correct and
the [health care provider] has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence
that the decision is wrong." Id. at 734, 594 A.2d at 1161 (quoting MARYLAND CRVIL PATTERN
JURY INSTRUCTION § 27:2, at 595). However, Newell also requires that, upon the defendant's
request, this instruction be preceded by an instruction that the plaintiff has the burden of
proving his case. Id. How a jury will interpret such apparently conflicting instructions is
difficult to ascertain, but certainly the pre-Newel! instruction, which omitted the plaintiff's
burden instruction, would leave a jury more likely to find that the panel's award for the
claimant was correct.
154. See MacAlister & Scanlan, supra note 7, at 500.01.
155. d. at 502.
156. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-06(a) (1995).
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effect of the panel's award is not the proportion of cases in which
notices were filed, but the proportion of cases that were actually tried
in a de novo proceeding. As Morlock and Malitz found, of the 5665
cases filed in HCA between 1977 and 1992, 1012 actions to nullify
were filed in circuit court.1 5 7 Of these, only 217 (21.4% of nullifications filed and 3.8% of total cases filed) were actually tried by ajury. 5 s
The large majority of cases in which nullifications were filed were settled or dismissed with prejudice. 15 9 Clearly, the admissibility of the
panel award holds far more deterrent effects for litigants than MacAlister and Scanlan suggest.
Despite the clear evidence that few litigants tried their cases in de
novo proceedings, ninety-three percent of respondents to the author's
survey thought that HCA did not deter claimants from litigating a second time, 160 and eighty-two percent thought that HCA did not deter
defendants from trying the case again.1 61 When asked to choose a
description that characterizes HCA in Maryland, forty-five percent
thought that most cases were heard by a jury, while only forty-three
appeals, but that
percent correctly understood that there were many
62
most appeals were settled before reaching a jury.'
157. Morlock & Malitz, Testimony, supra note 7.
158. Id. The General Assembly's Department of Fiscal Services estimates that the actual
number of cases heard by a jury is less than three percent. MARYLAND GENERAL ASSEMBLY,
DEP'T OF FISCAL SERVICES, FISCAL NOTE FOR H.B. 1049 (1995) [hereinafter FISCAL NOTE]
(on file in the General Assembly's Office of Legislative Reference, file number 1995 H.B.

1049).
159. Morlock & Malitz, Testimony, supra note 7. Many of the cases dismissed with prejudice are presumed to be settlements in which the health care provider did not want the
details of the settlement listed in the public record. They were, of course, successful,
preventing determination of precisely how many of these cases settled. Morlock & Malitz,
Interview, supra note 67.
160. Author's Survey, supra note 74. Respondents were asked, "Does the presumption
of correctness deter claimants from filing a de novo appeal and going to trial?" Of claimants' attorneys, 13% replied "yes" and the remaining replied "no." Of defendants' attorneys, none thought claimants were deterred, 96% thought they were not deterred, and the
remaining respondents were unresponsive. Id.
161. Id. Respondents were asked, "Does the presumption of correctness deter defendants
from filing a de novo appeal and going to trial?" Of claimants' attorneys, 4% replied "yes,"
76% replied "no," and the remaining respondents were unresponsive. Id. Of defendants'
attorneys, 11% thought defendants were deterred, 89% thought they were not deterred,
and none were unresponsive. Id.
162. Id. Of total respondents, 45% chose "Most cases heard by the Arbitration Panel are
appealed and heard by a circuit court jury"; 43% correctly chose "Most cases heard by the
Arbitration Panel are appealed, but are settled or otherwise disposed of before they are
heard by a circuit court jury"; and 12% chose "Most cases heard by the Arbitration Panel
are settled no later than the award, and few cases are appealed to circuit court." Id. Claimants' attorneys were approximately as likely as defense attorneys to choose each possible
response.
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(c) Are More Claims Tied ?-Even though few claims are tried
before both the HCA panel and a jury, if claimants are less likely to
settle or drop claims and more likely to submit their claims to either a
panel or jury, then the savings of HCA, if any, are surpassed by the
costs to society of hearing additional claims. The finding that the percentage of claims tried by panel or jury has risen from nine percent to
twenty-three percent 63 seems at first to offer conclusive proof that
HCA has indeed created a "freeway" effect, increasing the number of
claims heard by a finder of fact."6
However, this increase easily could be a product of the change in
the population of claims filed. If HCA has indeed encouraged many
plaintiffs to drop their claims,1 65 then the only remaining claims are
those that claimants and their attorneys thought highly likely to result
in an award. If HCA does not, as research shows, promote settlement,' 6 6 then logically these cases will be tried either by a panel or a
court. The increased percentage of cases tried may thus result not
from an increased willingness of litigants to try rather than settle or
drop claims, but from fewer plaintiffs filing poor claims that they
would later drop. The dramatic decrease in filing rates after the enactment of the certificate of merit requirement supports this
1 67

argument.

Without some means to control for the effects of HCA on the
population of claims filed, it is impossible to determine whether HCA
has increased or decreased the total costs of medical malpractice litigation in Maryland. However, the political viability of HCA depended
not on actual data, but on perceptions. Maryland medical malpractice
attorneys perceive that the system has completely failed to decrease
the costs of litigation. Of total responding attorneys, ninety-one percent thought that RCA raised the overall costs of medical malpractice
1 68
litigation.
4. Speeding Claim Resolution.-HCA advocates hoped that by
speeding the resolution of claims, HCA would resolve claims with less
163. See supra text accompanying notes 86-87.
164. See supra note 62 and accompanying text for an explanation of the "freeway
principle."
165. See supra notes 80, 107-112 and accompanying text.
166. See supra text accompanying note 85.
167. See supra text accompanying note 103. For a more in depth discussion of the impact of legislative reforms on the population of cases in the system, see Hughes, supra note
14.
168. Author's Survey, supra note 74. Of claimants' attorneys, 88% thought HCA increased systemic costs; of defendants' attorneys, 96% perceived an increase in overall litigation costs. Id.
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expense,16 9 but critics have contended that HCA further delays the
final resolution of the case. 170 MacAlister and Scanlan have suggested
that because of delays imposed by HCA, an "injured patient cannot
17 1
count on having his injuries redressed for at least seven years."
While the HCA statute requires that the panel shall make its award
within one year of service of defendants,1 7 2 this deadline has become
meaningless because litigants ignore it and panel chairs refuse to en1 73
force it.
In the small proportion of cases where the claim is heard by both
panel and jury, the duration of the litigation almost inevitably will be
prolonged, but the hard data again contradict MacAlister and Scanlan's assertions: while the national average length of time required to
resolve a malpractice dispute is 25 months, the average in Maryland is
1 74
23.5 months, and the median time in Maryland is only 19 months.
Again, despite the facts, both plaintiffs' and defense attorneys believe that HCA prolongs medical malpractice cases. Of all respondents, ninety-six percent thought that HCA slows resolution of
medical malpractice disputes, and only four percent correctly perceived that HCA speeds the process up. 7 5
5.

The Future of Health Claims Arbitration in Maryland.-

a. The Failure of Health Claims Arbitration.-Although evidence shows that HCA panels speed claim resolution 176 and are more
likely than juries to find for plaintiffs, 177 the burden that HCA places
on plaintiffs makes it no surprise that the plaintiffs' bar is generally

169.
170.
171.
172.

See, e.g., Fortenberry, supra note 52, at 257.
WEILER, supra note 91, at 42; L1EBMANN REPORT, supra note 3, at 13.
MacAlister & Scanlan, supra note 7, at 503.
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 3-2Ar05(g) (1995). This deadline can be ex-

tended, however, "for good cause shown." Id § 3-2A-05(j).
173. Controversy, supra note 36, at 122. Maryland is not unique in this respect: "nearly
every state has failed to meet its statutory time limit for convening a panel." Sakayan, supra
note 77, at 687.

174. Telephone Interview with Faye E. Malitz, Research Associate, Johns Hopkins University School of Hygiene and Public Health (Nov. 22, 1995).
175. Author's Survey, supra note 74. Asked to answer "In general, has arbitration quickened or slowed the ultimate resolution of the claim?" 92% of claimants' counsel and 100%
of defendants' counsel replied that HCA slows cases down. Id. The remaining 8% correctly thought HCA has sped resolution of medical malpractice disputes; no attorneys on
either side were unresponsive. Id.
176. See supra notes 169-174 and accompanying text.
177. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
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opposed to health claims arbitration. 17 ' But when evidence demonstrates that HCA reduces verdict size, 179 discourages claimants from
litigating,"' ° and results in few de novo appeals," s1 one would expect
the defense bar to support what has amounted to a significant barrier
to both meritorious and meritless claims. But many defense attorneys
18 2
have joined the plaintiffs' bar in opposing health claims arbitration.
The failure of HCA, then, is not that it fulfilled none of its goals. The
real failure of HCA is not one of substantive inadequacies, but of perception and politics. The proponents of Health Claims Arbitration
failed to persuade opponents of HCA and the legislators themselves
that HCA fulfilled its mission, and accordingly popular myths, not
hard data, informed the legislators' decision. Although panels speed
resolution, ninety-six percent of surveyed attorneys believe it slows resolution.'
Although HCA deters claimants, sixty-five percent of respondents think it either encourages claimants to file or has no
deterrent effects. 8 4 Although remarkably few cases are appealed to
circuit court, ninety-three percent of attorneys think the presumption
of correctness does not deter claimants from filing for a de novo trial,
and eighty-two percent think that the presumption does not deter
defendants.18 5
If these numbers represent the public's perception of health
claims arbitration, then it should come as no surprise that the General
Assembly passed the unilateral waiver statute unanimously.' 8 6 Indeed,
the only surprise is that none of the prior repeal bills were enacted,
and that the Assembly enacted a waiver bill rather than the original
bill, which would have repealed HCA outright.
The decision to permit waiver rather than repeal may have been a
concession to the only group that supported HCA, the insurance in-

178. The Maryland Trial Lawyers Association supported H.B. 1049. See Witness List for
H.B. 1049 (on file in the General Assembly's Office of Legislative Reference, file number
1995 H.B. 1049).
179. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 80, 107-112 and accompanying text.
181. See supra notes 145-159 and accompanying text.
182. One often-cited complaint added by respondents to the author's survey may help
to explain defendants' dislike of HCA. Many apparently perceive HCA as a discovery tool
for plaintiffs, where they can explore the details of the defendants' case before an actual
trial. Author's Survey, supra note 74.
183. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
184. See supra note 114.
185. See supra notes 160-161 and accompanying text.
186. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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dustry. 1 87 One of the bill's sponsors, Delegate Kenneth C. Montague
(D-Baltimore City), reported that the amendment was made in response to the testimony of one attorney that attorneys who handle
smaller cases prefer HCA overjury trials." as This may be an expensive
concession. Currently the Health Claims Arbitration Office staff handle more than 600 cases each year. If the majority of these cases waive
out of arbitration, the cost to the judicial system-and accordingly,
the state-may run more than $860,000.18'
b. The Impact of House Bill 1049.-To determine the fate of
health claims arbitration in Maryland, the author made two inquiries.
First, because House Bill 1049 affects only those claims filed after October 1, 1995,19° HCA filing rates were examined to determine if

claimants were holding back claims so that they could take advantage
of the new waiver provision. The rate for cases filed between January
1 andJune 30 increased by 3.8% from 1994 to 1995.191 A month after
Governor Glendening signed the bill into law, filing rates plummeted:
rather than following the previous trend of a 3.8% increase, the filing

187. See Witness List for H.B. 1049, supra note 178. It seems reasonable that insurers,
who subsist on numbers, percentages, and probabilities, would be more easily persuaded
by statistical proof than other interested parties.
188. Telephone Interview with Delegate Kenneth C. Montague, Jr., Chairman of the
House Judiciary Committee, Maryland General Assembly (Oct. 20, 1995). But see
McGuirk & Rafferty, supra note 20, at 16, discussing a study that found that HCA discourages the filing of small claims.
189. Although no reliable data comparing the cost ofjudicial and HCA resolution exist,
a comprehensive analysis performed in 1984, when the total cases filed for the previous
year was 578, conservatively estimated that the costs of additional judges and support staff
required to handle the medical malpractice workload would cost the State of Maryland
between $162,000 to $580,350. See MANAGEMENT STUDY, supra note 139, at 45-46. Current
filing rates are comparable to 1983, with claimants filing 616 cases in 1994. Morlock &
Malitz, Testimony, supra note 7. If dumping 600 cases per year into the judicial system
would conservatively cost as much as $580,350 in 1983 dollars, the cost of abolishing
Health Claims Arbitration today could easily exceed $860,000. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS
STATISTICAL ABSTRAcT OF THE UNIrED STATES 1995, at 491 (11 th ed. 1995) (estimating from

consumer price index Table No. 760).
The budget analysis prepared for H.B. 1049, see FiscAL NOTE, supra note 158, estimated that expenditures may rise by an "indeterminate" amount, and assumed that the
additional caseload could be handled "with[in] existing budget resources." This threepage note appears to ignore the added complexity of medical malpractice suits. See supra
text accompanying notes 115-117. Considering the Fiscal Note's lack of depth, the 1984
analysis seems a more reliable source.
190. Md. H.B. 1049 § 3, 1995 Sess.; see supra text accompanying note 5.
191. Data compiled by the author at the Health Claims Arbitration Office. Claimants
filed 290 cases between January 1 and June 30, 1994. During the same period in 1995,
claimants filed 301 cases. Id.
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rate plummeted by 44.8% compared to the same period in 1994.192
When this Note went to press it was too early to determine how many
of these claimants actually are waiving, but the fact that so many are
positioning themselves to have the option bodes poorly for the future
of health claims arbitration.
The second inquiry to assess the impact of House Bill 1049 was a
survey question, "For those cases filed after October 1, 1995, in which
unilateral waiver of Health Claims Arbitration is permitted, in approximately what percentage of your medical malpractice cases do you anticipate waiving?" ' An astounding eighty-four percent of claimants'
attorneys and seventy-eight percent of defendants' attorneys replied
194
that they expected to waive more than eighty percent of their cases.
The probability that both the claimants' and defendants' attorneys in
any given case will be among those who prefer HCA seems exceedingly low. If these numbers are at all representative, the majority of
HCA cases will waive. As the currently pending caseload is resolved, it
is likely that the Health Claims Arbitration Office may be forced to lay
off staff, and the General Assembly will have no choice but to finish
the task it started during the 1995 session, and finally repeal the
Health Care Malpractice Claims statute.
c. The End of Health Claims Arbitration in Maryland.--Despite
the tremendous unpopularity of health claims arbitration among lawyers, HCA has served health care providers and their insurers well.
The great success of HCA was not that it encouraged settlement, 95
but that it deterred many potential claimants from pursuing their
claims. Whether the claims were meritorious or meritless, this saved
insurers money. Health claims arbitration may cost less to administer
than courtroom trials,19 6 but it also threatens both litigants with significantly increased litigation expenses.' 9 7 Because health care providers
and their insurance companies are typically much better able to absorb the increased costs of such litigation, HCA may have created a
larger burden on claimants than on defendants. Rather than enacting the unilateral waiver provision, the legislature could have in192. Id. Between July 1 and September 30, 1994, 183 cases were filed; during the same
period in 1995, 101 cases were filed. Id.
193. See Author's Survey, supra note 74.
194. Id. Respondents were permitted to respond that they would waive in 0-20%,
21-40%, 41-60%, 61-80%, or 81-100% of their cases. Id.
195. See supra notes 157-159 and accompanying text.
196. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
197. See supra 115-168 and accompanying text.
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creased the informality of HCA to lower expenses1 98 and reduce this
burden on claimants while maintaining the system. Instead, the General Assembly has at long last removed one of the barriers it had erected between claimants and their rights to be compensated for
medical malpractice.
As for the increases in claims made and paid that prompted the
enactment of HCA,' 9 9 insurers need not worry about a new medical
malpractice crisis in Maryland. The number of claims filed will probably increase now that HCA no longer stands in their way.2"' But the
single best deterrent, the certificate of merit requirement, 20 1 remains
in effect, even for those cases that waive HCA.2 0 2 The measures that
most effectively decrease the amount that insurers must pay out-verdict caps, elimination of the collateral source rule, and shortening the
statute of limitations-remain the law in Maryland.2 °3 Insurer outlays
in Maryland are thus unlikely to increase more quickly than they have
over the past several years.
TERRY

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

L.

TRIMBLE

See supra text accompanying note 133.
See supra notes 15-25, 58 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying note 96.
See supra notes 101-106 and accompanying text.
Md. H.B. 1049, ch. 582, 1995 Md. Laws 3336 (codified as MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &
JUD. PROC. §§ 3-2A-06B(B) (3), -06B(C) (1995)).
203. Danzon, supra note 10, at 416-17 (finding that the three best methods of reducing
total claims paid are capping verdict size, eliminating the collateral source rule, and shortening the statute of limitations); see supra notes 22, 44, 46 and accompanying text.

Recent Decisions
The United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit
I.
A.

CIL RIGHTS

The Applicability of Administrative Claim Preclusion to 42 U.S. C.
§ 1983 Suits

In Dionne v. Mayor of Baltimore,1 the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit, addressing a question of first impression,' held that an
unreviewed administrative judgment will not have claim preclusive3
effect in a subsequent federal civil rights suit based on Title 42, § 1983
of the United States Code (section 1983).' In so holding, the Fourth
Circuit followed the lead established by the Eleventh Circuit in Gjellum
v. City of Birmingham.5 Significantly, the Ninth Circuit simultaneously
issued an opinion, Miller v. County of Santa Cruz,6 holding, in direct
contrast to Dionne, that an unreviewed administrative decision will be
accorded claim preclusive effect in a federal section 1983 suit.7 This
Note examines the purposes and reasons for preclusion, particularly
administrative preclusion, and its applications to federal suits based
on various federal civil rights statutes. This Note concludes that
Dionne is a logical decision and is legally well-grounded. In contrast,
the Millerdecision not only ignores many important policy considerations, but it fails to examine preclusion adequately in the section 1983
1. 40 F.3d 677 (4th Cir. 1994).
2. Id. at 681.
3. For purposes of this Note, claim preclusion is synonymous with "res judicata" and
issue preclusion is synonymous with "collateral estoppel." See Robert H. Smith, Full Faith
and Credit and Section 1983: A Reappraisa463 N.C. L. REv. 59, 59 n.1 (1984). Claim preclusion is a bar to litigation of any claims arising out of the same transaction or series of
transactions on which a prior suit was based when the claimant had an opportunity to raise
such claims in the prior action. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 24 (1982). This

procedural rule requires parties to consolidate all closely related matters into one suit.
More narrowly, issue preclusion is a bar to the relitigation of issues that were properly
before thejudicial body in the first suit between the same parties, actually adjudicated, and
essential to the judgment. Id. §§ 27-28.
4. Dionne, 40 F.3d at 681-82, 685.
5. 829 F.2d 1056 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding an unreviewed administrative proceeding
will not have claim preclusive effect in a same-transaction federal § 1983 suit).
6. 39 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 1994).
7. Id. at 1038.
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context.8 The Fourth Circuit's decision is significant for its protection
of an individual's right to a federal forum for section 1983 claims and
for its simultaneous promotion ofjudicial economy and of federalism.
1. The Case.-William Dionne began working for the City of Baltimore (the City) in 1985 as chief of Media Technical Services in the
mayor's Office of Cable and Communications. 9 He continued in that
position until October 11, 1990, when his supervisor, Joyce JeffersonDaniels, sent him a letter of termination for allegedly violating Baltimore Civil Service Commission (BCSC) Rule 56.10 The termination
was effective immediately."1 Dionne claimed that he did not receive
any notice of the alleged violation prior to the October 11 termination letter. 2 In compliance with BCSC disciplinary hearing regulations, Dionne filed a timely request for an investigation of his
1
discharge and the lack of proper BCSC pretermination protections. 3
In the ensuing hearing, the hearing officer found that the City
had violated Dionne's right to due process by breaching BCSC
pretermination rules and by failing to prove the Rule 56 allegations
made against Dionne.1 4 On April 16, 1991, the BCSC adopted the
findings of the hearing officer and his recommendations of reinstatement, back pay, and loss of benefits.'" Pursuant to the BCSC rules,
the City had thirty days to appeal the hearing officer's decision.1 6
The City did not appeal. 7 Dionne wrote the BCSC requesting
that it compel the City to obey the decision of the hearing officer, but
the City still did not take any action towards Dionne."8 On May 24,
1991, Dionne filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City
seeking a writ of mandamus directing the City and Jefferson-Daniels
to follow the orders of the BCSC. 9
8.
as that
9.
1992).
10.

See id. at 1030. The analysis in MilLer is not as fully developed and legally supported
in either GjeUum or Dionne. See infra notes 138-153 and accompanying text.
Dionne v. Mayor of Baltimore, No. 91-1770, 1992 WL 373149, at *1 (D. Md. Oct. 8,
Id. A Rule 56 violation refers to "fraud, theft, misrepresentation of work perform-

ance, misappropriation of funds, unauthorized use of City property, obstruction of an official investigation or any other act of dishonesty." Id. at *1 n.3.
11. Id. at *1.
12. Id
13. Dionne, 40 F.3d at 679-80.
14. Id. at 680.
15. Id.
16. I.

17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
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Jefferson-Daniels immediately sent Dionne a letter of reinstatement upon being served with Dionne's circuit court complaint on
May 29, 1991.20 The letter informed Dionne that he would receive all

of his back pay and lost benefits and that he would be reinstated to his
former position.2 1 The letter also informed Dionne that his position
would be eliminated as ofJune 30, 1991 due to budget cuts. 22 Dionne
2
resumed his position and worked until June 14, 1991. 1

On June 25, 1991, Dionne filed a section 1983 suit in the United
States District Court against the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore,
and against Jefferson-Daniels in her individual and official capacities,
for violation of his due process rights. 24 Dionne claimed that his termination and the elimination of his position violated his right to due
process, and that the City and Jefferson-Daniels eliminated his position as retaliation against him for demanding an administrative hearM 25 Together with the
ing, thus violating his First Amendment rights.
two constitutional claims, Dionne also asserted the state law claims of
wrongful discharge and intentional infliction of emotional distress.2 6
His claimed damages included back pay, lost benefits, future earnings,
future benefits, other compensatory damages, punitive damages,
costs, and attorney's fees.2 7
The City and Jefferson-Daniels moved for summary judgment,
and the district court dismissed Dionne's complaint. 28 The district
court dismissed the section 1983 claim based on the October 1990
termination, finding that Dionne had effectively waived his right to
bring such a cause of action by electing an administrative remedy,
therefore foreclosing a subsequent federal suit.' The district court
also found that legislative immunity barred Dionne's retaliation claims
against the City.5 0 With respect to the elimination of Dionne's position shortly upon his reinstatement, the court concluded that Dionne

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
1992).
30.

I.
Id.
Id.
Id
Id.
Id.
Id, at 680 n.6.
Id. at 680.
Id.
Dionne v. Mayor of Baltimore, No. 91-1770, 1992 WL 373149, at *5 (D. Md. Oct. 8,
Id. at *3. The City's budgetary power, exercised through creation, abolition, or

modification of city employment positions, gave rise to an effective legislative immunity
defense. Id.; see also infra note 118 and accompanying text.
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"enjoyed no property right in the continued existence of his job," 1
and therefore, he could not assert an actionable section 1983 claim on
that basis.3 2 Dionne appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit.3" The court of appeals framed the issue as whether the prior
unreviewed administrative hearing precluded Dionne from asserting a
section 1983 claim in federal court arising out of the same
transaction. 4
2. Legal Backgound.--Common-law preclusion principles were
developed by courts "to provide finality to the resolution of disputes,
to conserve judicial resources, and to relieve parties of the burden of
repetitious litigation."3 5 When a subsequent action is brought in a
different state court or in federal court the Constitution and federal
law require that "full faith and credit" must be given to the initial state
court decision. 6 The text of the full faith and credit statute 7 requires that federal and state courts respect the judgments of all states
and treat them as they would be treated by the issuing states.3 8 Effectively, this means that courts must apply the preclusion laws of the
state in which the court that rendered the earlier decision is located,
31. Dionne, No. 91-1770, 1992 WL 373149, at *3.
32. Id. at *3-5.
33. Dionne, 40 F.3d at 681.
34. Id. The court of appeals rejected the lower court's election-of-remedies analysis
and instead found the issue to be one of preclusion. The court cited Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 49, 51 n.14 (1974), in which the Supreme Court explained
that election of remedies better applies to cases where the plaintiff "pursues remedies that
are legally or factually inconsistent" or where there is a risk of double recovery. Id. The
court did not find these problems present in Dionne's suit. Dionne, 40 F.3d at 681; see also
18 CHARLEs A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4476 (Supp. 1994) (stating "the election label has traditionally been used to explain decisions that today seem
better explained in terms of claim preclusion").
35. Smith, supra note 3, at 59.
36. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. The article states: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in
each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And
the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and
Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof." Id. The constitutional provision is
implemented by 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1988), which states in part:
Such Acts [of the legislature of any State, Territory or Possession], records and
judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so authenticated, shall have the same full
faith and credit in every court within the United States and its Territories and
Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or
Possession from which they are taken.
Id. Neither the constitutional clause nor its implementing statute establishes interstate
preclusion rules. Smith, supra note 3, at 60.
37. 28 U.S.C. § 1738; see supra note 36.
38. See Smith, supra note 3, at 60-61 (explaining "'full faith and credit' considerations"
and preclusion rules and providing a historical discussion of full faith and credit and early
case law).
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and courts must accord the same finality to a prior judgment of a
court in another state as would be accorded to a prior judgment rendered by a court in the same state. 9 Claim preclusion and issue preclusion are thus the common-law procedural mechanisms by which
courts apply the principle of full faith and credit to state court
judgments.' °
In University of Tennessee v. Elliott,4 1 however, the Supreme Court
explained that the full faith and credit statute predates the existence
of administrative agencies.4 2 Therefore, the statute does not require
preclusion of claims previously adjudicated in unreviewed administrative decisions.4" Because there is no statutory rule, federal common
law governs.'
In the area of administrative preclusion, the Supreme Court has
opined that a state court review of administrative proceedings should
be treated as an original state court judgment for claim and issue preclusion purposes.4" In United States v. Utah Construction & Mining
Co.," the Court held that "[w] hen an administrative agency is acting
in a judicial capacity and resolves disputed issues of fact properly
before it which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate, the courts have not hesitated to apply res judicata to enforce
repose."4 7 When a state agency decision meets this standard and has
been reviewed by the state courts, the United States Supreme Court

39. Id.
40. Id.
41. 478 U.S. 788 (1986). The Elliott case involved a black employee of the University of
Tennessee who filed a Title VII and § 1983 suit in federal district court alleging that his
discharge was racially motivated. Id. at 790-91. These claims were pursued after the employee received partial relief from an administrative proceeding. Id. at 791-92. The Court
was faced with determining whether the unreviewed administrative proceeding precluded
the employee from maintaining his federal civil rights claims in federal court. Id. at 794.
The Court decided that the unreviewed state agency proceeding would not bar relitigation
of issues regarding the employee's Title VII claim, but would preclude the relitigation of
issues regarding the employee's § 1983 claim. Id. at 796, 799.
42. Id. at 794-95.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 794; see infra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
45. Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 465 U.S. 461, 465-67 (1982); see infra note 48
and accompanying text.
46. 384 U.S. 394 (1966).
47. Id. at 422 (citations omitted). The Court, concerned with due process, decided
that if an administrative agency conducted a quasi-judicial proceeding ensuring fairness in
procedures and legal analysis, and addressed those issues relevant to the dispute, claim
preclusion should apply in later federal suits. Id.
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has not hesitated to apply federal common-law rules of preclusion to
such decisions.4"
Section 1983 provides individuals with a statutory right to a federal forum to bring grievances arising from deprivations of right by
state and local officials.4" However, the Supreme Court has held that
the full faith and credit statute requires application of traditional rules
of claim and issue preclusion to prior state courtjudgments in federal
section 1983 suits.5" Thus, Supreme Court precedent squarely supports the application of issue and claim preclusion to both prior state
court decisions and administrative proceedings reviewed by state
courts in federal section 1983 actions.
The next logical question is whether unreviewed state agency decisions should be accorded the same preclusive effect as state court decisions and state-court-reviewed agency decisions. The Supreme Court
has dealt with this issue in a piecemeal fashion. Its decisions in the
civil rights arena have depended upon: (1) whether the subsequent
federal suit is based on Title VII,5 1 the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 2 section 1981,p or section 1983; and (2) whether
the issue in a given case involves applying claim preclusion or issue
preclusion.54 The Supreme Court has not yet issued an opinion on
every possible combination of the above factors, but some federal cir48. See, e.g., Kremer, 456 U.S. at 485 (holding that federal common laws of preclusion

would apply to administrative proceedings reviewed by state courts in federal Title VII
cases).

49. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) states in part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or

usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by

the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,

suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress....
Id.

50. See, e.g., Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 84-85 (1984)
(holding § 1983 actions are within the reach of state claim preclusion laws); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 101 (1980) (holding § 1983 actions are within the reach of state issue
preclusion laws). But see Smith, supra note 3, at 62 (suggesting Congress may have intended to exempt some § 1983 cases from state rules of preclusion).
51. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1988). A claimant may bring a Title VII action based
on discriminatory treatment by an employer or employment agency. Id. § 2000e-2.
52. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988). A claimant may bring an ADEA action based on
discriminatory treatment regarding one's age by an employer or a prospective employer in
the employment setting. Id. § 626(c) (1).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988). A claimant may bring a § 1981 action based on racial
discrimination with regard to contracts. Id.
54. See infra notes 60-76 and accompanying text.
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cuits have. 55 The rationales for issue preclusion and claim preclusion
have varied depending on the type of civil rights law at issue, resulting
in a "statute-specific" approach to preclusion principles.5 6 In most
cases, the Supreme Court and the circuits have found an administrative agency's fact-finding does not preclude relitigation of issues in a
subsequent federal civil rights suit, with the exception of subsequent
section 1983 actions.5 7 However, federal application of claim preclusion is more unsettled.5 8 The circuits have split regarding the claim
preclusive effect of unreviewed agency decisions in subsequent Title
VII, ADEA, section 1983, and section 1981 federal suits.59 The follow-

55. See, e.g., Gjellum v. City of Birmingham, 829 F.2d 1056 (11th Cir. 1987) (dealing
with the issue of an unreviewed administrative agency decision and claim preclusion in a
subsequent § 1983 suit).
56. The courts are able to be "statute-specific" with application of preclusion principles
because the Supreme Court has stated that the full faith and credit statute does not apply
to unreviewed state. agency proceedings, but rather that federal common-law rules of preclusion will apply, thereby giving the courts more flexibility in fashioning their doctrines.
See University of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 794-95 (1986) ("Title 28 U.S.C. § 1738 governs the preclusive effect to be given the judgments and records of state courts, and is not
applicable to the unreviewed state administrative fact-finding at issue in this case. However, we have frequently fashioned federal common-law rules of preclusion in the absence
of a governing statute.").
57. Id.
58. Id.; see also infra notes 60-67 and accompanying text.
59. See infra notes 61, 63, 65, 67, 77-80 and accompanying text.
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ing chart summarizes the current status of the law regarding issue preclusion and claim preclusion of unreviewed administrative decisions
in later federal civil rights suits:
CIVIL RIGHTS STATUTE

TITLE VII

42 U.S.C. § 1981
ADEA
42 U.S.C. § 1983

ISSUE PRECLUSION
No 60

Depends 62
64

No
Yes 66

CLAIM PRECLUSION

Yes and No6"

Yes and No6"
Yes and No6675
Yes and No

Different legislative histories, legislative intent, and specific purposes for enactment account for varied application of issue preclusion
and claim preclusion to unreviewed agency judgments in subsequent
federal suits. 6s For example, in the Title VII context, the statute itself
provides for Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) review of state agency decisions and a trial de novo in federal court.6 9
60. See Elliott, 478 U.S. at 796 (holding an unreviewed administrative proceeding does
not bar a subsequent Title VII suit in federal court).
61. See Garner v. Giarrusso, 571 F.2d 1330, 1335-38 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding an
unreviewed administrative proceeding does not bar subsequent Title VII and § 1981
actions in federal court). But see Buckhalter v. Pepsi-Cola Gen. Bottlers, Inc., 768 F.2d 842,
855 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding an unreviewed administrative proceeding bars adjudication
of Title VII and § 1981 actions in federal court).
62. See Kelley v. TYK Refractories Co., 860 F.2d 1188, 1195 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding the
findings of an unreviewed state agency have no issue preclusive effect in a subsequent
§ 1981 action in federal court when the standard of law in the agency decision is different
from § 1981).
63. See supra note 61.
64. See Astoria Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 106 (1991) (holding
an unreviewed administrative decision will have no issue preclusive effect in a subsequent
ADEA suit in federal court).
65. See Stillians v. Iowa, 843 F.2d 276, 282 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding an unreviewed
administrative proceeding will bar a later ADEA claim in federal court). But see Duggan v.
Board of Educ., 818 F.2d 1291, 1297 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding an unreviewed state agency's
fact-finding does not bar relitigation in a federal Title VII or ADEA suit).
66. See University of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 799 (1986) (holding an unreviewed
administrative agency's finding will have issue preclusive effect in a later § 1983 claim in
federal court).
67. See Gjellum v. City of Birmingham, 829 F.2d 1056, 1070 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding
an unreviewed agency decision does not have claim preclusive effect in a later federal suit);
Dionne, 40 F.3d at 685 (same). But see Miller v. County of Santa Cruz, 39 F.3d 1030, 1038
(9th Cir. 1994) (holding an unreviewed administrative proceeding is accorded the same
preclusive effect as a state court decision in a later § 1983 federal suit).
68. See generally Yvonne T. Kuczynski, Note: Administrative Res Judicataand the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1111 (1989); Garry G. Mathiason & Paula
Champagne, Interrelationshipof Administrative, Loca State, and FederalClaims and Procedures,
Issue Preclusion, and Statute of LimitationsProblems, 1988 A.LI.-A.B.A. Course of Study 1097.
69. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1988); see also Elliott, 478 U.S. at 795-96 (reasoning that an
unreviewed state agency's fact-finding that is subordinate to EEOC findings could not logically be accorded preclusive effect in a federal Title VII suit).
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This unique federal agency proceeding led the Court in Elliott to conclude that issue preclusion would not bar relitigation of state agency
fact-finding in subsequent Title VII suits in federal court.70 In the
same case, however, the Court noted that legislative histories of section 1983 and other Reconstruction-era civil rights statutes such as section 1981 were silent as to an "implied repeal" of the full faith and
credit statute.7 1 Thus, the Court found that the sound policy considerations of conserving judicial resources and preserving federalism
warranted a federal common-law rule of preclusion. 72 The Court held
that unreviewed state administrative proceedings did have preclusive
effect on the employee's claims under the Reconstruction-era civil
73
rights statutes.
Moreover, the courts have split on ADEA preclusion rules. 74 The
Seventh Circuit compared ADEA with Title VII to find that Congress
did not intend for an unreviewed state agency decision to foreclose a
claimant's right to a federal forum in either case.75 On the other
hand, the Eighth Circuit distinguished Title VII from ADEA, finding
no legislative intent to create an absolute right to a federal forum for
ADEA claims.76
Despite the apparent conflicts among the circuits as to the application of administrative claim preclusion to the various civil rights actions, the Supreme Court has yet to issue a decisive opinion. Besides
the Fourth Circuit, two circuits have issued conflicting opinions on
whether unreviewed administrative decisions will be accorded claim
preclusive effect in section 1983 actions.7 7 The Eleventh Circuit did
not apply administrative claim preclusion in the section 1983 context
in ,jelUm.78 In contrast, the Ninth Circuit's Millerdecision conflicted
70. Elliott, 478 U.S. at 795-96.
71. Id. at 796-97. The "implied repeal" analysis was used by the Supreme Court in
Elliott to justify application of administrative issue preclusion with respect to the § 1983
suit, but not to the Title VII claim. See id. at 795-96. The implied repeal doctrine involves
an examination into whether the language of the civil rights statutes in any way provides
for congressional intent to reject a full faith and credit application of preclusion principles.
Kuczynski, supra note 68, at 1114-15.
72. Elliott 478 U.S. at 797-99.
73. Id. at 799.
74. See supra note 65.
75. Duggan v. Board of Educ., 818 F.2d 1291, 1294-97 (7th Cir. 1987).
76. Stillians v. Iowa, 843 F.2d 276, 281-82 (8th Cir. 1988).
77. See Gjellum v. City of Birmingham, 829 F.2d 1056, 1064-65 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding that claim preclusion will not apply to an unreviewed state agency decision in a subsequent § 1983 federal suit). But see Miller v. County of Santa Cruz, 39 F.3d 1030, 1038 (9th
Cir. 1994) (holding that claim preclusion will apply to an unreviewed state agency decision
in a subsequent § 1983 federal suit).
78. Gjellum, 829 F.2d at 1065, 1070.
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with Gjellum both in its reasoning and outcome.7 9 In Dionne, the
Fourth Circuit concurred with the Eleventh Circuit; the Dionne court
did not consider the arguments raised in Miller, which was decided
shortly before Dionne."°
3. The Court's Reasoning.-The Dionne court held that an unreviewed administrative judgment does not preclude a later section 1983
action in federal court arising out of the same transaction."' The
court framed the issue not as one of election of remedies, 2 but rather
as one of res judicata.8" The Dionne court cited an Eleventh Circuit
case, Gjellum v. City of Birmingham, 4 for arguments in favor of denying
preclusive effect to unreviewed administrative decisions in section
1983 actions in federal court.8 5 The Dionne court also detailed the
logical steps it took to arrive at its holding.
The court first explained that the full faith and credit statute does
not require the application of issue or claim preclusion to unreviewed
state agency decisions.8 6 The Dionne court relied on the reasoning in
Elliott8 7 in enumerating several cogent purposes for applying issue preclusion to unreviewed administrative judgments in later section 1983
79. See Miller, 39 F.3d at 1038.
80. 40 F.3d at 681. The Dionnecase was decided on November 22, 1994, and the Miller
case was decided on November 8, 1994, and was amended on December 27, 1994.
81. Id. at 685.
82. The lower court rested its decision to award summaryjudgment to the defendants
on an election of remedies rationale. The court held that by successfully pursuing posttermination remedies, Dionne was precluded from filing a further cause of action in federal court. Dionne v. Mayor of Baltimore, No. 91-1770, 1992 WL 373149 at *6 (D. Md. Oct.
8, 1992).
83. Dionne, 40 F.3d at 681. The court agreed with a Ninth Circuit opinion, Haphey v.
Linn County, 953 F.2d 549, 552 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc), that found that "state claim and
issue preclusion rules should normally be employed when courts are considering whether
utilization of state court [or administrative agency] proceedings prevents later utilization
of federal proceedings." Id. In that case the plaintiffs, sheriffs deputies, were laid off and
filed an administrative grievance with the state employment relations board alleging discriminatory discharges based on their union activities. Id&at 550. The administrative body
awarded the plaintiffs reinstatement and back pay. Id. The plaintiffs then filed a § 1983
action in federal court. Id. The Ninth Circuit held that "when an employee of a state or
local governmental entity presents a claim for reinstatement to a state administrative
agency, that is not an election of remedies." Id. at 552. The court did not decide whether
claim preclusion would bar the plaintiffs from pursing their damage claims. Id; see also
supra note 34.
84. 829 F.2d 1056, 1065 (11th Cir. 1987).
85. Dionne, 40 F.3d at 681-82.
86. Id. at 682 (citing University of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 794 (1986) (explaining
that 28 U.S.C. § 1738 predates administrative proceedings and is therefore not binding on
such unreviewed judgments)); see also supra text accompanying notes 35-43.
87. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
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actions." Two of the foremost economical reasons to support application of issue preclusion in this situation are relieving crowded court
dockets and avoiding repetitive and costly litigation."9 Preserving federalism and providing for more uniformity in decisions also support
the application of state issue preclusion principles to unreviewed administrative judgments."°
The Dionne court distinguished the results of claim preclusion
from those of issue preclusion to show the need for different rules. 9 '
Claim preclusion aids in furthering economic and social values, as
does issue preclusion; however, claim preclusion results in a more
"drastic" outcome.9 2 A plaintiff must assert all possible causes of action in the original proceeding or forever lose the opportunity to raise
them.9 3 With this in mind, the court adhered to the test that a plaintiff must have a "fair opportunity to advance all its 'same transaction'
claims in a single unitary proceeding" 94 in order to grant a claim preclusion defense. 95
The court determined that Dionne did not have a fair opportunity to raise all causes of action in his administrative proceeding.9 6
The court contrasted administrative proceedings with state court proceedings, explaining that administrative hearings have a more "limited substantive and remedial scope."9 7 For example, Dionne was not
able to advance the section 1983 constitutional theories and remedies
in the state agency proceeding.9" The court relied on the Restatement
(Second) of Judgments, section 26(1) (c), in stating that "claim preclusion [is] inapplicable where plaintiff [is] 'unable to rely on a certain
theory of the case or to seek a certain remedy or form of relief in the
first action because of the limitations on the subject matter jurisdiction of the [administrative tribunal]. ' ' 9 The court concluded that
Dionne fell within this category of plaintiffs unable to assert all of his
88. Dionne, 40 F.3d at 682.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 683.
92. Id
93. Id.
94. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 26 cmt. c (1982).
95. Dionne, 40 F.3d at 683.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. Dionne was unable to claim remedies including lost benefits, loss of future
earnings, and benefits caused by emotional distress, punitive damages, and attorney's fees
in the administrative proceeding. Id. The administrative proceeding limited Dionne's
claims to reinstatement and back pay, based solely on the issue of whether Jefferson-Daniels had just cause to discharge Dionne. Id
99. Id.
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claims in a single administrative proceeding and, therefore, was not
precluded from filing a "same transaction" section 1983 suit. 100
The possibility of alternative forums presented another issue for
the Dionne court. 10 1 Dionne was free to bring his section 1983 action
straight to state court without any exhaustion of remedies problem
because section 1983 claims do not require a prerequisite administrative hearing.1 0 2 However, had Dionne brought the section 1983 claim
in state court along with the state law claim of wrongful discharge, the
entire suit likely would have been dismissed for failure to exhaust
available administrative remedies concerning the state law claim.' 03
The court also explained that if Dionne tried to bring the section
1983 action alone in state court, he most likely would have lost the
opportunity to commence the state agency proceeding regarding the
wrongful discharge claim within the short five-day statute of limitations. 1 0 4 Consequently, the court reasoned that because the administrative hearing did not provide Dionne with an adequate forum to
adjudicate all of his possible claims in a single proceeding, it would
not be appropriate to apply claim preclusion to bar his federal
action. 105
The Dionne court also found that enforcing the drastic measure of
claim preclusion in this case would not advance the judicial economy
benefits offered by issue preclusion." 6 The application of claim preclusion would force most plaintiffs to bring their claims initially in
federal court out of fear of losing certain causes of action by pursuing
the administrative route.'0 7 This would place a heavier financial and
100. bi
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.; see also Maryland Comm'n on Human Relations v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co.,
296 Md. 46, 51, 459 A.2d 205, 209 (1983) (holding that "[t]o exhaust administrative remedies, ordinarily a party must pursue the prescribed administrative procedure to its conclu-

sion and await its final outcome"). Judge Widener, in his dissent, argued that the state
court would not be compelled to dismiss the entire suit for failure to exhaust the adminis-

trative remedies regarding the wrongful discharge claim. Dionne, 40 F.3d at 687 (Widener,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). He cited Esslinger v. Baltimore City, 95 Md.
App. 607, 614-15, 622 A.2d 774, 778 (1993), which held that a plaintiff asserting a § 1983
cause of action in state court need not exhaust his administrative remedies prior to bringing the § 1983 action. Dionne, 40 F.3d at 687 (Widener, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
104. Dionne, 40 F.3d at 683-84. The BCSC rules provide five days within which to appeal
sanctions. Id. at 684.
105. Id.
106. I.
107. Id.
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time burden on the federal court system. l 8 The court did not want to
discourage plaintiffs from seeking administrative remedies, which are
generally cheaper, easier, and less time-consuming than litigation. 10 9
Through examining the legislative history of section 1983, the
court observed that this act was intended to increase federal jurisdiction and to provide a special route to the federal courts. 1 10 In light of
this historical information, the court found that section 1983 actions
should not be barred by earlier unreviewed state agency proceedings
because such a bar would take away the statutory right to a federal
111
forum.
Finally, the court noted another distinction between issue preclusion and claim preclusion. As the Supreme Court discussed in Elliott,
one of the purposes of applying issue preclusion to unreviewed state
agency decisions is to prevent inconsistent judgments."12 However,
the Dionne court anticipated "no appreciable risk of inconsistent decisions"" 3 from its refusal to apply state claim preclusion law to unreviewed administrative decisions." 4 The Elliott decision, barring the
relitigation of issues already addressed by the unreviewed administrative body, would also prevent the chance of inconsistent outcomes in
the later section 1983 suit." 5 The court further reasoned that there
would be no risk of double recoveries because any section 1983 award
6
would be reduced by any state agency award."l
The court found that the district court correctly dismissed
Dionne's second section 1983 claim that alleged that the City de108. Il; see infra notes 160-161 and accompanying text.
109. Dionne, 40 F.3d at 684; see also Frazier v. King, 873 F.2d 820, 824 (5th Cir. 1989)
(discussing the undesirable result of"encourag[ing] plaintiffs to bypass administrative proceedings in order to preserve their claims under § 1983"); Gjellum v. City of Birmingham,
829 F.2d 1056, 1064 (11th Cir. 1987) (noting "the desirability of avoiding the forcing of
litigants to file suit initially in federal court rather than seek relief in an unreviewed administrative proceeding").
110. Dionne, 40 F.3d at 684; see also Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972) (discussing the legislative history of § 1983).
111. Dionne,40 F.3d at 684.
112. Id.; see also University of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 799 (1986).
113. Dionne, 40 F.3d at 684.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 685 (citing Gjellum v. City of Birmingham, 829 F.2d 1056, 1069 (11th Cir.
1987)); see supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
116. Dionne,40 F.3d at 685. Allowing a claimant to recover in a § 1983 suit simply permits an individual the full remedial opportunities provided by law because any monetary
award won in the state agency proceeding will be deducted from the § 1983 award. See
generally Leon Friedman, Relationship Between Title VII, Section 1981, 1983, ADEA, the Equal
Pay Act and State Causes of Action for Employment Discrimination,1995 A.L.I.-A.BA Course of
Study 367 (discussing the procedures of several federal civil rights claims in relation to
employment discrimination).
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prived him of his due process rights by eliminating his position immediately upon his reinstatement."17 The court determined that
"Dionne enjoyed no property right in the continued existence of his
job and consequently his position could be abolished by the legislature without notice and a hearing."" 8 Because there was no due process violation, Dionne had no actionable section 1983 claim." 9
Judge Widener concurred in part and dissented in part. 20 He
disagreed with the majority's reasoning regarding the inapplicability
of the claim preclusion issue to unreviewed administrative decisions.1 2 ' He believed that the state court forum would in fact provide
a fair opportunity for Dionne to raise all his claims, including the section 1983 action. 2 2 Judge Widener concluded that Dionne waived his
section 1983 action because he elected the administrative remedy instead of filing suit in state or federal court.1 23 He insisted that this was
an election of remedies situation giving rise to the problems of piecemeal litigation and of subjecting defendants to defending 1 themselves
24
in two fora for claims arising out of the same transaction.
Judge Widener raised serious concerns regarding the role of the
states in deciding the scope of state agency proceedings. 125 He be-

lieved that this determination is clearly within the states' discretion
and the federal courts should remain uninvolved.' 26 He did not agree
with the majority's view that applying claim preclusion would en117. Dionne, 40 F.3d at 685.
118. Id.; see also Goldsmith v. Mayor of Baltimore, 845 F.2d 61, 64 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding that the state has the legislative power to create or abolish state jobs).
119. Dionne, 40 F.3d at 685.
120. Id. at 685-88 (Widener, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Widener agreed with part III of the opinion that Dionne had no property interest in the continued existence in his position and, therefore, had no actionable § 1983 claim. Id. at 685.
Judge Widener, however, disagreed with the majority's comment in dicta that if Dionne
should be successful on remand in showing that any damages from the elimination of his
job were "causally linked" to the discharge, he should be able to recover those damages as
well. Id. at 685 n.15. Judge Widener found a flaw in the logic of this comment because the
majority had already found Dionne to have no actionable property right. Id at 685-86.
121. Id. at 686-87.
122. Id. at 686; see also Maryland Nat'l Capital Park & Planning Comm'n v. Crawford, 307
Md. 1, 511 A.2d 1079 (1986) (involving a state court reviewed administrative adjudication
of a § 1983 claim); Shapiro v. Chapman, 70 Md. App. 307, 520 A.2d 1330 (1987) (allowing
claimants to assert § 1983 actions in state court without proceeding first to a state administrative body).
123. Dionne, 40 F.3d at 686 (Widener, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Judge Widener approached this case as an election of remedies issue. Dionne, instead of
filing a claim in state or federal court, chose the administrative route. Therefore, he
should be barred from relitigating the same claim in a different forum. Id. at 686-87.
124. Id. at 686 n.l.
125. Id. at 687.
126. Id. at 687 n.3.
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courage plaintiffs to file in the overburdened federal courts instead of
electing the cheaper, quicker administrative route, thus resulting in
less state agency adjudications.' 2 7 Judge Widener thought that allowing such a result would actually motivate states to use their discretion to broaden the scope of their agency proceedings so as to avoid
multiple litigation and reduce burdens on defendants.1 28 From this
analysis, Judge Widener maintained that the federal courts would not
become overburdened and the states would be able to exercise their
29
sovereign power to define the scope of state agency proceedings.
Finally, Judge Widener did not accept the majority's view that
Dionne's state law cause of action would have been dismissed for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. Judge Widener noted that
the Court of Special Appeals held in Esslingerthat a plaintiff suing
130
under section 1983 need not exhaust his administrative remedies.
Judge Widener believed that Dionne was not deprived of any substantive remedy by choosing the administrative route, as he obtained a
favorable verdict, back pay, and reinstatement.' 3 ' In judge Widener's
view, recovery under different theories of law and in different fora is
burdensome and should not be protected by federal law. Therefore,
he disagreed with the majority in its decision to allow Dionne's section
1983 action to go forward.' 32 Judge Widener believed that Dionne
had a choice of fora, that he chose the administrative route, and that
he should therefore be limited to the remedies available from his
33

choice.1

4. Analysis.--In light of relevant legal reasoning and a balancing
of competing policy issues, the Fourth Circuit held that an unreviewed
administrative decision will not bar a later same-transaction section
1983 suit in federal court.1 3 4 The court in Dionne also drew upon
Supreme Court and other federal circuit analysis in related preclusion
35
cases to support its decision.'
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 687 (citing Esslinger v. Baltimore City, 95 Md. App. 607, 614-15, 622 A.2d 774,
778 (1993)); see also supra note 103.

131. Dionne, 40 F.3d at 688 (Widener, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
132. Id.
133. Id.

134. Id. at 685.
135. See, e.g., University of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 799 (1986) (holding federal
courts in § 1983 actions must accord issue preclusive effect to an administrative agency's
fact-finding if the agency was acting in a judicial capacity); Kremer v. Chemical Constr.
Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 485 (1982) (holding no legislative intent in Title VII to depart from
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On the precise issue of administrative claim preclusion in section
1983 actions, the Fourth Circuit's opinion is more logical and legally
grounded than the contemporaneous Ninth Circuit decision in
Miller."3 6 Not only did the Ninth Circuit fail to analyze the issue in
light of other federal civil rights statutes, but it also failed to address
the reasoning used by the Eleventh Circuit seven years prior.13 7 The
Fourth Circuit, on the other hand, more thoroughly analyzed the precise issue of administrative claim preclusion in section 1983 actions
and was therefore more convincing. Dionne represents an appropriate
compromise between the compelling policy goal of promoting efficiency by respecting the competency of administrative agencies acting
in a judicial capacity and the equally important end of preserving a
federal judicial forum for section 1983 claimants.
a. Gjellum, Miller, and Dionne Compared.-In 1987, the
Eleventh Circuit became the first circuit to issue an opinion on the
claim preclusive effect of an unreviewed state agency decision in a subsequent federal section 1983 suit.1"' In that case,John Gjellum, a Birmingham police officer, was suspended for taping conversations
between himself and his superiors regarding police business and for
divulging that information to the public without police authority.13 9
Gjellum appealed his suspension to the Jefferson County Personnel
Board (JCPB), which ordered the City to reinstate him and award him
back pay.1 40 The City appealed the JCPB decision to the state court
system, which affirmed the agency decision. 4 1 Gjellum then filed a
section 1983 action in federal court. The court found that the administrative proceeding barred him from litigating the action in federal
court.1 4 2 The Eleventh Circuit reversed, however, finding that in
some cases, the federal courts are better able to be the final adjudicators of federal civil rights actions than are state agencies. 143 It found
traditional rules of issue and claim preclusion when an administrative proceeding received
state court review); United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 422 (1966)
(reiterating that "[w]hen an administrative agency is acting in a judicial capacity and resolves disputed issues of fact properly before it which the parties have had an adequate
opportunity to litigate, the courts have not hesitated to apply res judicata to enforce repose"); see also supra part 2.
136. 39 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 1994); see also supra text accompanying notes 6-7.
137. Gjellum v. City of Birmingham, 829 F.2d 1056 (11th Cir. 1987); see also infra text
accompanying notes 138-144.
138. OjeUum, 829 F.2d at 1070.
139. Id. at 1058.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1064-65.
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that the special nature of section 1983, which provides the federal government a right to "step in where the state courts were unable or unwilling to protect federal rights," supports denying administrative
In Dionne, the Fourth Circuit adopted many of
claim preclusion."
the policy arguments presented in Gjellum to arrive at the same outcome.14 5 Both the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits carefully analyzed
the competing policy interests and examined the issues in the cases in
the context of administrative preclusion, comparing section 1983 to
other federal civil rights statutes. This careful consideration makes
both the Gjellum and Dionne decisions convincing.
On the other hand, in Miller, the Ninth Circuit held that administrative claim preclusion would bar a subsequent section 1983 suit in
federal court."4 The Miller opinion was written at approximately the
same time as the Fourth Circuit opinion in Dionne,14 7 yet it takes a
completely different stance. The Miller case arose after Miller appealed the local civil service commission's decision to uphold his termination as a county sheriff's employee.' 4 8 He filed a section 1983
suit in federal district court, which granted summary judgment for the
county on resjudicata and collateral estoppel grounds.1 49 The Ninth
Circuit affirmed the judgment in light of precedent that convinced
1 50
the court that claim preclusion was appropriate in this context.
The Ninth Circuit based its analysis on the adequacy of the administrative agency adjudication, but otherwise appeared to have written
the opinion in a vacuum, neither mentioning the seven-year-old Eleventh Circuit decision nor addressing relevant case law regarding administrative preclusion in other contexts. 5 '
The Fourth Circuit's outcome in Dionne is in direct conflict with
the outcome in Miller. The Fourth Circuit considered the very same
144. Id. at 1064 (quoting Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1983)).
145. See Dionne, 40 F.3d at 681-82.
146. Miller v. County of Santa Cruz, 39 F.3d 1030, 1038 (9th Cir. 1994).
147. See supra note 80.
148. Miller, 39 F.3d at 1032.
149. Id.
150. I& at 1032-38. The Ninth Circuit relied on Plaine v. McCabe, 797 F.2d 713, 720-21
(9th Cir. 1986), which held that an unreviewed fairness determination in the securities law
area barred a subsequent federal suit because the agency was acting in a judicial capacity
and resolved disputed issues properly before it. Miller, 39 F.3d at 1033. The Miller court
also relied on Eilrich v. Remas, 839 F.2d 630, 632 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 819
(1988), in which the court held that whether the agency acted in a judicial capacity and
resolved disputed issues of fact properly before it was the only test needed for the application of claim preclusion. Miller, 39 F.3d at 1033. The Ninth Circuit failed to analyze the
whole legal issue-it did not examine the special status accorded to federally created civil
rights statutes, in particular § 1983.
151. Miller, 39 F.3d at 1033-38.
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issues regarding the adequacy of state agency proceedings; however, it
also considered many other factors including judicial economy, support for state sovereignty and federalism, and protection of an individ15 2
ual's right to a federal forum for adjudication of federal civil rights.
Moreover, the Fourth Circuit also addressed the uniqueness of section
1983 and the purpose of its enactment and concluded that claim preclusion would not be appropriate or beneficial in this context. 15 3 The
Dionne opinion, like Gjellum, is a more complete analysis of important
relevant issues and is better supported than Miller.
b. Reconciling Competing Policy Issues.-The issue facing the
Dionne court presented many strong policy arguments for and against
the application of claim preclusion in section 1983 suits. Supporters
of applying administrative claim preclusion to section 1983 suits present several solid arguments in its favor. The most important argument is the need to conserve judicial resources and avoid inconsistent
judgments. 5 4 Traditional preclusion principles were developed in
part to avoid repetitive litigation that could unduly burden defendants
by requiring them to mount costly and time-consuming defenses in
several fora while also risking inconsistent judgments and double penalties.' 5 - Consequently, the Supreme Court in Elliott found that findings of fact would be subject to issue preclusion in section 1983 suits,
which would serve to avoid unfair, "piecemeal"15 6 litigation.' 5 7
The Dionne holding does not deny the existence of strong economic and fairness arguments in favor of applying preclusion, but reasons that these benefits are not as significant when barring a
claimant's section 1983 action.1 58 Claim preclusion creates a more
"drastic" situation for claimants because, while it may enforce repose,
it eliminates a claimant's entire federal civil rights claim. 159 Therefore, the Dionnecourt reasonably examined more cautiously the benefits of preclusion, mindful of the extreme consequences preclusion
would impose on claimants.

152. Dionne, 40 F.3d at 681-85.
153. Id at 684-85.

154. Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153-54 (1979).
155. Id.; see also Dionne, 40 F.3d at 686 n.1 (Widener, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

156. Dionne, 40 F.3d at 686 n.1 (Widener, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
157. University of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 798-99 (1986); see supra notes 70-73 and

accompanying text.
158. Dionne, 40 F.3d at 682-83.
159. Id. at 683.
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Contrary to the judicial economy argument put forth in support
of the application of claim preclusion, had the Dionne court held that
claim preclusion applied to unreviewed administrative decisions in
section 1983 suits, the court believed it would have effectively discouraged claimants from using the cheaper, more efficient administrative
route in favor of going directly to federal court in order to preserve
their section 1983 claims. 160 Thus, preventing claim preclusion of unreviewed administrative decisions may provide for fewer federal section 1983 suits because claimants who are successful in the
administrative route may not need or desire to relitigate in federal
court.161

Another argument raised by supporters of claim preclusion
harkens back to the notions of federalism and comity.1 62 In support-

ing the finality and competency of state agencies, the federal government must give credence to their proceedings and findings. These
goals are furthered by according issue preclusive effect to state agency
fact-finding in most cases. Issue preclusion encourages the parties to
fully adjudicate their claims through the administrative route because
they will not have another chance to relitigate the issues. This situation is the optimum compromise between claim preclusion on the
one hand and de novo review by the federal district court on the
other. An agency's fact-finding is preclusive, but the statutory civil
right to bring a section 1983 action in a federal forum is still alive.
This situation also encourages more effective and efficient adjudication by the parties because they do not have another chance to relitigate crucial issues in federal court.

160. Id. at 684. The court feared that
[b]ecause plaintiffs might well choose to bypass the administrative agency and go
directly to federal or state court with a § 1983 claim rather than forfeit the right
to pursue that claim, the cost of litigation and the burden on the federal court
system could well rise, instead of fall, if claim preclusion applied.
Id.
161. It is plausible that Dionne himself would not have filed the § 1983 claim in federal
court hadJefferson-Daniels not ignored the administrative decision to reinstate him. Had
Jefferson-Daniels reinstated him, issued him back pay and benefits, and not abolished his
position, Dionne may have been satisfied with the four-day administrative hearing without
the need to file a burdensome § 1983 suit.
162. See, e.g., University of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 800-01 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (finding that claim preclusion in § 1983 suits does not advance the principles of
federalism and finality because to hold otherwise would discourage state agency litigation,
thus effectively not respecting state agencies); Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S.
461, 504-05 (1982) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (finding that in the Title VII area, issue
preclusion may cause plaintiffs to forego state court review of administrative decisions, thus
effectively disrespecting state judicial functions).
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Failing to apply claim preclusion to section 1983 actions does not
offend the ideals of state sovereignty because the factual findings of
the agencies are still accorded issue preclusive effect. A state agency
judgment is not nullified when a section 1983 suit is later filed because, assuming the administrative agency was "acting in a judicial ca1 63
pacity, and resolv[ing] disputed issues of fact properly before it,"

those findings have preclusive effect in the federal suit. The federal
courts, in fact, would be respecting the state agencies while also permitting a claimant to pursue the further statutorily created federal
civil right in federal court. The Dionne decision affirmatively supports
state agency competence by preventing situations where claimants,
fearful of losing their section 1983 right, would forego state agency
proceedings, opting instead to sue immediately in federal court.1 64
Perhaps the most important reason for denying claim preclusion
to an unreviewed state agency decision in a subsequent same-transaction federal lawsuit is the unique nature of section 1983.165 The generally accepted purpose for enactment of section 1983 and its
predecessor, section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, was to "afford a
federal right in federal courts because, by reason of prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise, state laws might not be enforced and the claims of citizens to the enjoyment of rights, privileges,
and immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment might be
denied by the state agencies." 166 Congress enacted the predecessor to
section 1983 during the post-Civil War Reconstruction Era, reflecting
a belief in a strong role for the federal government in protecting individual constitutional rights. 16 7 Fear of constitutional deprivations by
state officials and a belief that "state courts were being used to harass
and injure individuals" 16 ran deep enough for Congress to create a
"uniquely federal remedy against incursions under the claimed authority of state law."169 In light of this historical background, the
Dionne court reasonably believed that access to the federal courts for
section 1983 claims should not be foreclosed.1 7 ' Applying issue preclusion to unreviewed administrative decisions would sufficiently preserve traditional notions of federalism without the need to usurp an
individual's special federal claim.
163. United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 422 (1966).
164. Dionne, 40 F.3d at 684.
165. Id.

166. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180 (1961).
167.
168.
169.
170.

Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 238-39, 239 n.30 (1972).
Id. at 240.
Id. at 239.
Dionne, 40 F.3d at 684.
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5. Conclusion.-The decision by the Fourth Circuit in Dionne v.
Mayor of Baltimore fits properly within the framework of existing federal law regarding administrative preclusion. Dealing with an issue
previously addressed only by the Eleventh Circuit and, more recently,
the Ninth Circuit, the Dionne court upheld the basic legal reasoning
espoused by the Supreme Court and the majority of other circuits
with respect to the general issue of administrative preclusion. The
Dionne court also carefully examined the various policy arguments on
each side of the claim preclusion issue and determined that the greatest good would be served by barring claim preclusion of unreviewed
administrative decisions in section 1983 suits.

The Dionne holding allows an individual alleging deprivation of
constitutional rights by state officials under color of law to maintain
the option of pursing an administrative remedy without forfeiting the
right to a federal section 1983 suit. The Fourth Circuit's opinion respects the quasi-judicial functions of state agencies by not discouraging claimants from using the administrative avenue. State agencies do
not become useless, but in fact become essential mechanisms of adjudicating claims in an efficient manner, thus diminishing the need for
federal courts to adjudicate every civil rights suit.
After Dionne, litigants will not bypass the state administrative
route for fear of foregoing their right to a federal cause of action.
Conceivably, many litigants who receive favorable verdicts from administrative agencies will not feel the need to extend the litigation
process by filing a later civil rights suit in federal court. Thus, by effectively encouraging the use of administrative agencies, Dionnepromotes
judicial efficiency and respect for state agencies, without depriving individuals of the statutory right to a federal forum as prescribed in section 1983.
BRIDGET

B.

M.

ENG

Advancing Toward Color-Blind Application of Strict Scrutiny in
Higher Education

In Podberesky v. Kirwan,1 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the University of Maryland's (the University) merit1. 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994) [hereinafter Podberesky IV], cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2001
(1995). Both the Fourth Circuit and the district court handed down two opinions in the
Podbereskycase. To avoid confusion, this Note will refer to the Podberesky opinions in reverse
chronological order. Thus, the most recent adjudication of the case in the Fourth Circuit
will be referred to as Podberesky IV For a detailed discussion of the case's progression
through the trial and appellate court levels, see infra text accompanying notes 16-34.
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based scholarship program for African-American students cannot be
sustained as a remedial affirmative action measure under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 The court applied
a two-pronged test to evaluate the program's effectiveness in redressing the consequences of the University's past discrimination
against African-Americans.3 The test, set forth in two Supreme Court
cases involving challenges to affirmative action plans outside the educational context,4 requires the court to consider: (1) whether there is
a "strong basis in evidence" to support the conclusion that the remedial action is necessary;' and (2) whether the chosen remedy is "narrowly tailored" to meet the stated remedial goal.6 The Fourth Circuit
found that the University of Maryland's program failed both prongs.
This Note will argue that the Fourth Circuit correctly decided
Podberesky7 given the Supreme Court's emphatic prohibition of the use8
of race-based remedial measures to combat "societal discrimination."
While the record in Podberesky leaves no doubt that the University had
2. Podberesky IV,38 F.3d at 161; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Section I reads in
pertinent part, "[n]o state. .. shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." Id.
3. Podberesky IV 38 F.3d at 153.
4. Richmond v.JA Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 500, 507 (1989); Wygant v. Jackson Bd.
of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277 (1986) (plurality opinion). These cases dealt, respectively, with
a 30% set-aside quota for minority contractors, and with a layoff policy that favored minority teachers. The Supreme Court struck down both plans as violative of the Equal Protection Clause. See infra notes 54-58, 67-69 and accompanying text. The Fourth Circuit
recently applied the two-pronged test in Maryland Troopers Ass'n v. Evans, 993 F.2d 1072,
1076-77 (4th Cir. 1993). See infra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
5. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 277.
6. Id. at 279-80; see also United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171 (1987) (plurality
opinion). Paradiseset up a framework for addressing the "narrowly tailored" question,
identifying four criteria for judging the nexus between a remedial plan and the interest it
purports to serve: "the necessity for relief and the efficacy of alternative remedies; the
flexibility and duration of the relief, including the availability of waiver provisions; the
relationship of the numerical goals to the relevant labor market; and the impact of the
relief on the rights of third parties." Id.; see infra note 102 (discussing the Fourth Circuit's
comparison of the fact patterns in Paradiseand Podberesky IV and the resulting need to
adjust the Paradisefactors to fit a race-exclusive minority scholarship case); see also Podberesky v. Kirwan, 838 F. Supp. 1075, 1094 (D. Md. 1993) [hereinafter Podberesky III](listing
the Paradisecriteria), vacated, 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2001
(1995).
7. Podberesky IV, 38 F.3d at 156-58.
8. Id. at 155; see also Wygan 476 U.S. at 274 ("This Court never has held that societal
discrimination alone is sufficient to justify a racial classification. Rather, the Court has
insisted upon some showing of prior discrimination by the governmental unit involved
before allowing limited use of racial classifications in order to remedy such discrimination."); Croson, 488 U.S. at 499 (noting, in striking down Richmond's set-aside program for
minority contractors, that "an amorphous claim that there has been past discrimination in
a particular industry cannot justify the use of an unyielding racial quota").
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engaged in discriminatory practices in the past,9 the University nevertheless failed to establish a nexus between those past practices and its
current use of a racial classification. 10 The Supreme Court consistently has stated that, "of all the criteria by which men and women can
be judged, the most pernicious is that of race." 1 The Fourth Circuit's
decision thus represents an advance in Equal Protection jurisprudence toward the goal of color-blindness, and a recognition that fair
competition between qualified persons is the best assurance of societal equality.
The decision also highlights the incompatibility of the strict scrutiny test, as applied,1 2 with the Supreme Court's use in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education of the phrase "strong basis in evidence.""3 The
latter, somewhat ambiguous language suggests that a reviewing court
should adopt a deferential posture when evaluating race-based remedial measures. 4 Yet, such deference by a reviewing court is inconsis9. Podberesky II, 838 F. Supp. at 1077-81. The district court, on remand, discussed in
detail the unfortunate history of discrimination at the College Park campus and throughout the University of Maryland educational system. Judge Motz noted that the president of
the University in 1937 recommended privatization of the College Park campus as a way to
block the admission of African-American graduate students. Id. at 1078. Even following
the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954), which mooted the debate about the propriety of integrating the University of Maryland system, "the state did little to promote integration." Podberesky III, 838 F. Supp. at
1078. African-American students at the University's College Park campus during the early
1960s found themselves in a "notably inhospitable" environment. Id. African-American
student enrollment stayed below 1% of the undergraduate population from 1954 until the
end of the 1960s. Id. at 1079. The district court recounted how the problem persisted into
the 1970s, highlighting, among other things, the University's failure to provide financial
support for the building of fraternity and sorority houses for African-American students,
and a general lack of interest in attracting African-American students to College Park. Id.
at 1079-80.
10. Podberesky IV 38 F.3d at 154-55 (rejecting the University's analysis of present
effects).
11. Maryland Troopers Ass'n v. Evans, 993 F.2d 1072, 1076 (4th Cir. 1993) (citing
Croson, 488 U.S. at 500). The Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court that the standard of review of "such an overtly racial yardstick" as a race-based scholarship was strict
scrutiny. Podberesky IV, 38 F.3d at 152-53.
12. It is an oft-cited maxim that strict scrutiny is "the most exacting judicial examination." Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978) (opinion of Powell,

J.).
13. 476 U.S. 267, 277 (1986) (plurality opinion); see supra text accompanying note 5.
14. In his decision on remand, District Judge Motz noted that the parties had debated
the meaning of "strong evidentiary basis." Podberesky III, 838 F. Supp. 1075, 1083 n.49 (D.
Md. 1993), vacated, 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2001 (1995). The
University argued that this standard is the functional equivalent of the "substantial evidence" test, a deferential standard that generally is described as more than a scintilla, but
less than a preponderance of the evidence presented. Id.; see Laws v. Celebrezze, 368 F.2d
640, 642 (4th Cir. 1966) (describing the test); see also infra notes 145-149 (comparing the
"substantial evidence" and "arbitrary and capricious" standards of review).
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tent with the rigorous review inherent in strict scrutiny analysis.15
This Note therefore will argue that the Wygant language must be
reevaluated and refined so that the defendant's burden of production
in a reverse discrimination case is in line with the searching analysis
that a reviewing court must undertake in applying strict scrutiny.
1. The Case.-DanielJ. Podberesky, a Hispanic man, was admitted to the University of Maryland at College Park in the fall of 1989.16
Along with his application, Podberesky sought consideration for an
academic scholarship. 7 Podberesky did not qualify for consideration
under the University's Francis Scott Key Scholars Program; is however,
his credentials exceeded those required for consideration under the
Benjamin Banneker Scholarship Program, a system of merit-based
scholarships established in 1978 as a partial remedy for past discriminatory action by the State of Maryland. 9 Podberesky was not considered for the Banneker program, however, because only AfricanAmerican students were eligible."0
Podberesky sued in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, challenging the legality and constitutionality of the
Banneker program. 1 He sought injunctive and compensatory relief
under 42 U.S.C. §§ 198122 and 1983,23 and Title VI of the 1964 Civil
15. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 291 (opinion of Powell, J.) ("Racial and ethnic distinctions of
any sort are inherently suspect and thus call for the most exacting judicial examination.").
In CrosonJustice O'Connor stated thatjudicial inquiry into the justification for race-based
measures must be "searching." Richmond v. JA Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989)
(plurality opinion). Justice O'Connor further stated that the purpose of strict scrutiny is to
"'smoke out' illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the legislative body is pursuing a goal
important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool." Id.
16. Podberesky v. Kirwan, 956 F.2d 52, 53 (4th Cir. 1992) [hereinafter Podberesky Ill.
The Fourth Circuit set forth the facts of the case in its first opinion, handed down on
January 31, 1992, remanding the matter to the district court. Id. at 57.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 54 n.2. To be considered under the Key program, an applicant must have a
"predictive index" (calculated by reference to grade point average and Scholastic Aptitude
Test score) of 60. Podberesky's predictive index was 59; therefore, he was not entitled to
be considered for a Key scholarship. Id.
19. Id. at 54.
20. Id.
21. SeePodberesky v. Kirwan, 764 F. Supp. 364, 366 (D. Md. 1991) [hereinafter Podberesky 1], rev'd, 956 F.2d 52 (4th Cir. 1992).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994). Section 1981 guarantees "equal rights under the law" and
provides, in relevant part, that
[a]ll persons within thejurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right
... to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the
full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and
property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment,
pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
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Rights Act.24 Both Podberesky and the University moved for summary
judgment, and the district court held in the University's favor. 5
Podberesky appealed, and the Fourth Circuit reversed the grant of
summary judgment, remanding the action to the district court for a
specific determination as to the present effects of the University's past
discrimination. 6 Following remand, the University conducted an administrative fact-finding process to decide whether to continue the
Banneker program, resulting in the issuance in April 1993 of a decision and report in which the University concluded that the program
should be continued."7 Thereafter, the parties engaged in additional
discovery, culminating in another round of summary judgment motions, which were argued on October 22, 1993.8
The district court, finding that "strong evidence" supported the
University's findings in its April 1993 decision and report, 29 again
held in the University's favor.3 0 Podberesky again appealed to the
Id.
23. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). Section 1983 specifically addresses a deprivation of rights
occurring under color of authority, specifically, "any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory." Id.

24. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994). Tide VI states, in part: "No person in the United States
shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in,
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance." Id. Because the Fourth Circuit in Podberesky focused
on the constitutional issues, a discussion of Tide VI's applicability to race-based scholarships is beyond the scope of this Note. For such a discussion, see Jerome W.D. Stokes, RaceBased Scholarships and Title VI: Are They Friendsof Bil?, 82 ED. LAw REP. 17 (1993) (recounting the history, implementation, and interpretation of the statute with particular emphasis
on the educational context).
25. Podberesky I, 764 F. Supp. at 378.
26. Podberesky II, 956 F.2d 52, 57 (4th Cir. 1992). The Fourth Circuit stated that the
district court failed to identify with specificity any present effects of past discrimination, but
rather, "merely found that it would be prudent to keep the race-exclusionary scholarship
in place" pending the outcome of a study of Maryland's higher education system by the
Office for Civil Rights of the United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
(now the Department of Education). Id. The Fourth Circuit noted that while such an
approach may be deemed fair to the University, "it does not satisfy constitutional standards." Id.
27. Podberesky III, 838 F. Supp. 1075, 1076-77 (D. Md. 1993), vacated, 38 F.3d 147 (4th
Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. CL 2001 (1995).
28. Id. at 1077.
29. Id. at 1083. The decision and report identified four effects of the University's past
discrimination, which, Judge Motz found, persist into the present: "a poor reputation of
the university in the African-American community ... ; underrepresentation of AfricanAmericans in the student population; low retention and graduation rates of African-Americans; and perceptions of a campus climate that is hostile to African-Americans." Id. at
1082. The district court also found that the program was narrowly tailored to remedy
those four present effects of past discrimination. Id. at 1094.
30. Id. at 1099.
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Fourth Circuit, which heard argument on May 10, 1994.31 On October 27, 1994, the court vacated the district court's decision and remanded the matter to the district court for entry of an order granting
Podberesky's motion for summary judgment, and requiring the University to re-examine Podberesky's admission to the Banneker program.12 The Fourth Circuit denied petitions for rehearing,3 3 and the
Supreme Court denied certiorari on May 22, 1995. a4
2.

Legal Background.-

a. The Education Cases.-Podberesky highlights the omnipresent tension between the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal
protection "and the use of race-based measures to ameliorate the effects of past discrimination on the opportunities enjoyed by members
of minority groups in our society." 35 The problems associated with
discrimination in education repeatedly have been brought before the
nation's judiciary. 36 The recognition that education is critical in en37
abling citizens to enjoy fully other constitutionally protected rights
prompted the district court in Podberesky to observe "that discrimina38
tion in schooling is the most odious form of discrimination."
Under the doctrine of "separate but equal" set down in Plessy v.
Ferguson, 9 racial segregation in the nation's educational system was
31. Podberesky IV 38 F.3d at 147. The panel opinion did not address the statutory
claims specifically. Previously, the Fourth Circuit had held that the district court, in its
initial ruling, Podbereskyl, 764 F. Supp. 364 (D. Md. 1991), rev'd, 956 F.2d 52 (4th Cir. 1992)
correctly found that the Banneker program should be examined in light of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and subjected to a strict scrutiny test. Podberesky I, 956 F.2d 52, 55 (4th Cir. 1992); see also Podberesky , 764 F. Supp. at 371 (noting that
the Supreme Court has held that Title VI is coextensive with the Fourteenth Amendment)
(citation omitted).
32. Podberesky IV 38 F.3d at 162.
33. 46 F.3d 5 (4th Cir. 1994).
34. 115 S. Ct. 2001 (1995).
35. Richmond v.JA Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 476 (1989) (plurality opinion).
36. See United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 721 (1992) (noting that the Supreme
Court "has had many occasions to evaluate whether a public school district has met its
affirmative obligation to dismantle its prior de jure segregated system in elementary and
secondary schools"). See generally Andrea L. Bistline, Comment, PreferentialAdmissions Policies and Single-Minority Scholarships: The Legal Implications of Race-Preference in Higher Education, 97 DICK. L. REv. 283 (1993) (discussing background and history of educational
discrimination, desegregation, minority-preference admissions programs, and minority-

based scholarships).
37. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (discussing the fundamental
role of education in performance of basic public responsibilities, and its status as "the very

foundation of good citizenship").
38. Podberesky III, 838 F. Supp. 1075, 1097 (D. Md. 1993), vacated, 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 2001 (1995).
39. 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896).
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legally sanctioned until the Supreme Court's landmark decision in
Brown v. Board of Education.4" Brown expressly overruled the "separate
but equal" doctrine, insofar as it applied to education. 4' In the years
following Brown, the Supreme Court struggled to implement Brown's
directive without overstepping the bounds of the judiciary's equitable
powers.4'
Before Brown, the Supreme Court had addressed the issue of discrimination in institutions of higher education in a separate series of
cases.43 Thus, by the time the Supreme Court first addressed the issue
of reverse discrimination at the university level, in the seminal case of
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,' it was an established
principle of law that "decisions based on race or ethnic origin by faculties and administrations of state universities are reviewable under the
45
Fourteenth Amendment."
40. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding state-sponsored school segregation to be invalid
under the Constitution).
41. Id. at 495.
42. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300-01 (1955) (discussing the extent of the equitable powers of the federal courts with regard to school desegregation);
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 1 (1971) (noting that the
Supreme Court had granted certiorari "to review important issues as to the duties of school
authorities and the scope of powers of federal courts" with respect to implementing the
Brown mandate).
43. See, e.g., McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637, 642 (1950) (holding
that assignment of African-American plaintiff to a classroom row reserved for "colored"
students, and assignment to special tables in library and cafeteria, deprived plaintiff of
equal protection of the laws); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 633-34 (1950) (finding that
legal education equivalent to that offered to Caucasian students was not available in separate law school designated for African-Americans); Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S.
631, 633 (1948) (citing Gaines for the proposition that Oklahoma must provide AfricanAmerican applicant with legal education in conformity with the Equal Protection Clause);
Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 349-50 (1938) (holding that Missouri's
requirement that African-American students go outside Missouri to obtain legal education
was a denial of equal protection). As the Supreme Court noted in Brown, none of those
cases required a reexamination of the doctrine of Plessy. Brown, 347 U.S. at 492.
44. 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.).
45. Id. at 287. The issue of preferential minority admissions was raised, before Bakke, in
DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (per curiam opinion). Marco DeFunis, a Caucasian male denied admission at the University of Washington Law School, challenged the
school admissions policies as racially discriminatory. Id. at 314. The Supreme Court of
Washington reversed a trial court order that the school admit DeFunis, but this did not
occur until DeFunis was in his second year of law school. Id. at 315. The Supreme Court
stayed the judgment of the Washington Supreme Court pending final disposition of the
case, and, as a result, DeFunis was nearly finished with his law school education by the time
the matter reached the Supreme Court. Id. As a result, the Supreme Court refused to
decide the preferential admissions issue on moomess grounds. Id. at 319-20; see also
Bistline, supranote 36, at 289 (noting that DeFunis represented the first time the Supreme
Court was called upon to determine the validity of a minority-preference admissions
program).
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b. Bakke and the Issue of Reverse Discrimination.-In Bakke, the
Court confronted numerous issues, born of the uneasy commingling
of equal protection principles with the perceived need to ameliorate
the effects of past discrimination against minorities.4 6 Allan Bakke, a
Caucasian male denied admission to the Medical School of the University of California at Davis, challenged the legality of the University's
special admissions program, which was designed to guarantee admission of a specified number of students from certain minority groups.4 7
Employing a legal strategy similar to Podberesky's, Bakke alleged that
the special program operated to exclude him from the school on the
basis of his race, in violation of his rights under the Equal Protection
Clause; Article I, section 21 of the California Constitution; and Title
VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.4' The Supreme Court held that the
program was illegal, but that race may be one of a number of factors
considered by a school in passing on student applications.4 9
While Bakke's importance may be diluted somewhat by the
Court's inability to coalesce on pivotal issues,5" the Bakke Court nevertheless articulated important principles that later would figure prominently in cases such as Wygant, Croson, and Podberesky. Bakke, for
example, made it clear that while a racial preference may be remedial
in its purpose, such a preference "is undeniably a classification based
on race and ethnic background."5 1 Thus, strict scrutiny is implicated.5" Furthermore, in his opinion Justice Powell disapproved of
46. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 281 (noting that the parties "focused exclusively upon the
validity of the special admissions program under the Equal Protection Clause") (opinion of
Powell, J.).
47. Id. at 269-70.
48. Id. at 278 & nn.9-11.
49. Id. at 271-72.
50. Six separate opinions were filed in Bakke. This collection of opinions demonstrates
the difficulty of the issues with which the Court wrestled. On the two principal holdings,
the Court was fragmented, with Justice Powell representing a fragile middle ground. Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Rehnquist, and Stevens concurred in the judgment
with respect to the illegality of the race-based admissions program. Id. at 421 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). However, these Justices felt
that the medical school's preferential program was proscribed under Title VI. Id. Justices
Brennan, Marshall, White, and Blackmun, on the other hand, disagreed with the application of strict scrutiny. Id. at 357-58 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part). These justices agreed that government may take race into account
when it acts to remedy disadvantages caused by past racial prejudices, but would have upheld the medical school's affirmative action program. Id. at 325-26.
51. Id. at 289.
52. Id. In Bakke, the medical school urged the Court to adopt a more restrictive view of
equal protection, and hold that discrimination against members of the Caucasian majority
cannot be regarded as suspect if its purpose could be characterized as "benign." Id. at 294.
Justice Powell flatly rejected this proposition. Id. at 295. He adopted an absolutist stance
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using race-based classifications to remedy the effects of societal
discrimination."
c. Wygant and Croson: "SocietalDiscrimination"and the Application of Strict Scrutiny.-In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,5 4 the
Supreme Court held that a provision in a municipal collective bargaining agreement under which minority teachers benefitted from
preferential protection from layoffs violated the Fourteenth Amendment.55 Justice Powell, writing for a plurality, once again discussed
the insufficiency of societal discrimination as a basis for racial classifications." This time, he stated even more forcefully the unacceptability of this justification, noting that a purportedly remedial
racial classification cannot be upheld without "some showing of prior
discrimination by the governmental unit involved." 57 Justice Powell
found that the school board's interest in providing minority role models for its minority students was an insufficient justification for a racial
classification.58
Wygan's most significant contribution may have been Justice
Powell's discussion of the evidentiary support that will be required
before race-based remedial actions can be upheld.5 9 Such support is
critical when the constitutionality of the remedy is challenged by a
nonminority litigant.' "In such a case," Justice Powell wrote, "the
trial court must make a factual determination that the employer had a
'strong basis in evidence' for its conclusion that remedial action was
necessary. The ultimate burden remains with the employees to
demonstrate the unconstitutionality of an affirmative-action program-"6 However, unless the trial court makes the requisite factual
determination that the employer's conclusion was appropriately supported by sufficient evidence, Justice Powell explained, an appellate
regarding strict scrutiny, advocating its application in all cases involving race-based classifications, regardless of whether the classification purports to aid "relatively victimized
groups." Id. at 307.
53. See id. (stating that the "effects of 'societal discrimination'" constitutes an "amorphous concept of injury that may be ageless in its reach into the past").
54. 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (plurality opinion).
55. Id. at 273.
56. Id. at 274-76.
57. Id. at 274-75.
58. Id.; see also Podberesky IV, 38 F.3d at 159 (noting the plurality's rejection of the "rolemodel theory").
59. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 277-78.
60. Id. at 274.
61. Id. at 277-78.
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court reviewing a challenge to a remedial action will be unable to de62
cide whether the race-based action is justified.
Hence, under Wygant, it is possible that a race-based remedial action will be upheld if the employer satisfies its burden of producing a
strong basis in evidence,"6 3 and shows that the remedy adopted was
"narrowly tailored."6 4 This language, as District Judge Motz noted, is
significant for the party seeking to maintain a race-based remedial
measure. 65 It is readily interpreted to mean, in the words of Judge
Motz, that that party need not prove
present effects of past discrimination beyond a reasonable
doubt, by clear and convincing evidence, or even by a preponderance of the evidence. The standard... is less than a
preponderance of the evidence. To require any greater a
standard would be in explicit contradiction of the Court's
requirement in Croson that the burden of persuasion remain
with the plaintiff in reverse discrimination cases.6 6
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Richmond v. JA. Croson
Co." to consider Wygant's applicability to the minority set-aside program adopted by the City of Richmond, Virginia.68 Croson may be
viewed as having clarified the standard of review for remedial racebased measures by state and local governments, ruling in favor of an
application of strict scrutiny. 69 While commentators may question
whether the Croson Court truly embraced strict scrutiny in this context," neither the district court nor the Fourth Circuit in Podberesky
62. Id. Establishing the requisite "strong basis in evidence" constitutes the first part of
the two-pronged test under which racially restrictive scholarship programs are evaluated.
See Bistline, supra note 36 at 295. The scholarship programs also must be "narrowly tailored" to further their stated remedial goals. Id.; see supra note 6 and infra note 102 and
accompanying text (discussing the factors set forth in United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S.
149, 171 (1987) (plurality opinion), for deciding whether a measure is "narrowly
tailored").
63. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 277-78.
64. Id. at 279-80.
65. Podberesky III, 838 F. Supp. 1075, 1083 n.49 (D. Md. 1993), vacated, 38 F.3d 147 (4th
Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2001 (1995).
66. Id.

67. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
68. Id. at 477.
69. Id. at 493. Justice O'Connor stated that the judicial inquiry into the justification for
race-based measures must be "searching." Id.; see supra note 15 (discussing Croson).
70. See, e.g., Douglas D. Scherer, Affirmative Action Doctrine and the Conflicting Messages of

Croson, 38 U. KAN. L. REv. 281 (1990). In an article published approximately a year after
Croson was handed down, Scherer questioned whether there was a true consensus, despite
the fact that five members of the Court approved of strict scrutiny:
At first glance, the significance of Croson would seem to be the emergence of a
strict scrutiny approach to remedial race-conscious affirmative action plans. In
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raised the possibility of a less searching inquiry in a case involving a
governmental actor. 7 ' Moreover, any doubt as to the Fourth Circuit's
position was dispelled in 1993, when, in Maryland Troopers Ass'n v. Evans,7 2 a unanimous threejudge panel of the Fourth Circuit applied
strict scrutiny and struck down numerical racial hiring goals adopted
by the Maryland State Police.73 In so holding, the panel stated firmly
74
that "race is an impermissible arbiter of human fortunes."
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Podberesky, a unanimous threejudge panel 75 of the Fourth Circuit held that the district court erred
on two counts: (1) in finding that the University had produced sufficient evidence of present effects of past discrimination to justify the
Banneker program; and (2) in finding that the program was narrowly
tailored to its stated remedial purpose.7 6
a. Strict Scrutiny.-The Fourth Circuit emphasized the heavy
burden that strict scrutiny imposes upon a party seeking to uphold a
the Supreme Court it takes five to tango, but a close reading of the opinions
demonstrates that Justice Scalia hears a different beat. The strict scrutiny ofJustice O'Connor, in application, has more in common with the intermediate level
scrutiny of Justice Marshall than with the "Say No to Affirmative Action" position
ofJustice Scalia.
Id. at 315. Compare Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2110 (1995) (observing that, "[w]ith Croson, the Court finally agreed that the Fourteenth Amendment requires strict scrutiny of all race-based action by state and local governments") with United
States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 166 (1987) (plurality opinion) (noting, in a decision
reached prior to Croson, that the Court "has yet to reach consensus on the appropriate
constitutional analysis").
71. See Podberesky , 764 F. Supp. 364, 371 (D. Md. 1991), rev'd, 956 F.2d 52 (4th Cir.
1992). "Perhaps the central principle to emerge from the Supreme Court's affirmative
action cases is that courts must apply strict scrutiny to affirmative action plans implemented by state actors." Id.
72. 993 F.2d 1072 (4th Cir. 1993); see supra note 4 (discussing Maryland Troopers).
73. Maryland Troopers, 993 F.2d at 1074. Maryland Troopers, cited by the court in Podber-

esky, relied on Wygant and Bakke for the proposition that all racial and ethnic distinctions
are "inherently suspect." Id. at 1076 (quoting Wygant v.Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267,
273 (1986) (plurality opinion)). The rationale for using such a stringent standard, the
panel stated, is clear: "Of all the criteria by which men and women can be judged, the
most pernicious is that of race. The injustice ofjudging human beings by the color of their
skin is so apparent that racial classifications cannot be rationalized by the casual invocation
of benign remedial aims." Id. (citing Richmond v. JA Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 500
(1989)); see also Hayes v. North State Law Enforcement Officers Ass'n, 10 F.3d 207, 212
(4th Cir. 1993). "Classifications based on race violate the Equal Protection Clause unless
they can survive review under a standard of strict scrutiny." Id.
74. Maryand Troopers, 993 F.2d at 1076.

75. Argument was heard before Circuit Judges Widener, Wilkins, and Hamilton.
Podberesky IV 38 F.3d at 151.

76. Id. at 158.
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race-based classification.7 7 Because the University of Maryland chose
the Banneker program, which excludes from competition all races but
one, the University, at the outset, was "burdened with a presumption
that its choice cannot be sustained."7 8 The Fourth Circuit conceded
that the district court "correctly recited.., that the standard of review
of such an overtly open racial yardstick was strict scrutiny."7 9 But, the
panel went on to imply that the district court merely had paid lip service to strict scrutiny, and to criticize the district court's "restlessness
in compliance with that standard."8
The panel specifically rejected the district court's conclusion that
the University's own findings of present effects of past discrimination
"ipso facto" established the necessity for relief."1 In so holding, the
Fourth Circuit clarified what it will require as strong evidence of present effects of past discrimination: "[T] he party seeking to implement
the program must, at a minimum, prove that the effect it proffers is
caused by the past discrimination and that the effect is of sufficient
magnitude tojustify the program."8 2 Thus, the district court erred in
stating that if the University itself found strong evidence to support
any of its proffered effects, the race-based program would be justified.8" Instead, the Fourth Circuit held that a court charged with assessing the need for a race-based remedial measure must itself
examine the effects alleged to have been caused by discrimination
77. Id. at 152.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 152-53.
80. Id. at 153. The "restlessness" that the Fourth Circuit noticed in District Judge
Motz's opinion is illustrated by the following statement ofJudge Motz:
There is a danger (created in part by the images of microscope and magnifying
glass which the term "strict scrutiny" brings to mind) that a judge will become
myopic when confronted with statistics such as these and assume that a single
reference pool must be selected. In fact, such a narrowing of. perspective is
neither necessary nor proper.
Podberesky III, 838 F. Supp. 1075, 1089 (D. Md. 1993), vacated, 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2001 (1995). Judge Motz concluded that both he and the Fourth
Circuit "may have constructed too rigid a framework of analysis," and that "the various
restrictions that the Court has applied to affirmative action programs in the employment
context-particularly the prohibitions against remedying the effects of 'societal discrimination,' or discrimination that was done by another 'governmental unit'-appear inappropriate in the education context where the effects of past discrimination are obviously societal
in scope." Id. at 1097-98.
The Fourth Circuit, however, rejected Judge Motz's "alternate analysis." PodbereskyIV
38 F.3d at 153 n.1; see also Podberesky III, 838 F. Supp. at 1097-99 (discussing special concerns relative to discrimination in schooling).
81. Podberesky IV 38 F.3d at 153 (quoting Podberesky I/, 838 F. Supp. at 1094).
82. Id.
83. Podberesky IV, 38 F.3d at 154.

1996]

FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS

953

and make its own factual finding that "they were caused by the past
discrimination and [that] they are of a type that justifies the
program." 84
b. A Genuine Issue of MaterialFact.-In addition, the Fourth
Circuit found that the district court committed a procedural error in
granting summary judgment when both parties had filed cross-motions for summary judgment and there was a genuine issue of material
fact remaining.8 5 Reviewing the grant of summary judgment de novo,
the Fourth Circuit discerned an evidentiary dispute pertaining to the
second and third "present effects" that the University had asserted,
respectively, underrepresentation in the student population and low
retention and graduation rates for African-American students.8 6
Podberesky had offered evidence that the attrition rate for AfricanAmerican students resulted from economic and other factors unrelated to past discrimination. 8 7 Given this factual disagreement, the
Fourth Circuit said, summary judgment was inappropriate. 8 8 Citing
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56,89 the court stated, "[T]he rule's
language is clear that it is not enough for the district court to determine that the moving party has the winning legal argument; in accepting that argument, the district court must also ensure that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact before a grant of summary
judgment is proper."9"
With respect to the alleged underrepresentation of African-Americans, the Fourth Circuit first observed that the selection of the correct "reference pool" was critical.9 ' The panel stated that the district
84. Id.
85. Id. at 155.

86. Id.
87. Id. at 156. The district court rejected Podberesky's evidence, reasoning that economic concerns often are more pressing for African-American students because these students frequently come from less wealthy backgrounds. Id.; see Podberesky HI,838 F. Supp. at
1091-92.

88. Podberesky IV,38 F.3d at 156. The Fourth Circuit considered the facts in the light
most favorable to Podberesky, the nonmoving party. Id.
89. Rule 56 provides, in pertinent part, that "[t ] he judgment sought shall be rendered
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to ajudgment as a matter of law." FED. R. Civ. P.
56(c).
90. Podberesky IV 38 F.3d at 156.
91. Id. The reference pool refers to the larger control group of African-Americans
against which the representation or underrepresentation of African-American students at
the University of Maryland must be measured. Id. The district court tried to broaden its
analysis to account for the fact that "we still live in a time when many African-Americans of
college age are disadvantaged... because their forebears received an inferior education
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court correctly had determined the threshold legal issue of whether
the pool should consist of the general population or a smaller, qualification-specific group,9 2 and, appropriately, had rejected a pool of all
graduating high school seniors.9" However, the panel faulted the district court's attempt to resolve the factual dispute regarding the effective minimum admission criteria.9 4 According to the panel, the
district court erred in declining to decide the requisite qualification
for membership in the reference pool, and in examining instead the
statistics "as a whole to determine whether they provide strong evidence of present effects of past discrimination."9" Moreover, the
Fourth Circuit found, the district court also erred in resolving at the
summary judgment stage the factual dispute about the effective mini96
mum criteria for admission.
under Maryland's segregated school system, of which UMCP stood at the top." Podberesky
III, 838 F. Supp. at 1089. Thus, the district court rejected the use of a "reference pool" of
qualified applicants consisting of high school graduates who were, in fact, eligible for admission to the University, reasoning that "the admissions process contains too many variables to define the reference pool by inflexible objective criteria which, in fact, are not
mechanically applied by the University." Id.
92. Podberesky IV, 38 F.3d at 156.
93. Id.; see also Podberesky III, 838 F. Supp. at 1089.
94. Podberesky IV 38 F.3d at 156-57.
95. Id. at 157; Podberesky III, 838 F. Supp. at 1089. Judge Motz had rejected, as an improper and unnecessary narrowing of perspective, the notion "that a single reference pool
should be selected." Podberesky III, 838 F. Supp. at 1089. "Rather, the judge should look at
the statistics as a whole to determine if they provide strong evidence of the existence of
present effects of past discrimination." Id. Judge Motz did not decide the requisite qualification for membership in a particular reference pool, but instead focused on the relatively
low percentage of incoming African-American students at the College Park campus (13%)
compared to the percentage of African Americans that met general course curriculum
requirements (17.9%) and the percentage of African Americans who had taken the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) (22%). Id. After considering the evidenceJudge Motz had "no
difficulty in finding a strong evidentiary basis" for the finding that African-American students are underrepresented at College Park. Id.
96. Podberesky IV, 38 F.3d at 157. Notwithstanding its detailed discussion of the reference pool, the Fourth Circuit was primarily concerned with the district court's attempt to
resolve conflicts in the evidence at the summary judgment stage. Id. The district court's
resolution of these issues was complicated by the fact that the University did not submit
sufficient data to facilitate a determination of the percentage, in relation to all graduating
Maryland high school seniors, of African-American students who met the University's minimum admission requirements. Id. at 157 n.4. Podberesky proposed a reference pool composed of graduating seniors who met these requirements, which he listed as follows:
"completion of the required high school course curriculum, maintenance of a 2.0 grade
point average and attaining a verbal SAT. score of 270; and a math S.A.T. score of 380."
Podberesky III, 838 F. Supp. at 1087. One dispute in the case centered on whether these
minimum requirements should have defined the reference pool, as Podberesky had urged.
The Fourth Circuit suggested that the district court could have denied the University's
motion for summary judgment and given it more time to produce the relevant figures.
Podberesky IV, 38 F.3d at 157 n.4.
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Although a denial of summary judgment ordinarily is not appealable, the Fourth Circuit noted that the district court's orders on the
motions had disposed of all of the parties' claims, thus placing the
orders within the Fourth Circuit's appellate jurisdiction. 97 The panel
then turned its attention to the denial of Podberesky's motion for
summary judgment.9
c. Present Effects of Past Discrimination.-The Fourth Circuit
rejected the district court's conclusions regarding each of the present
effects articulated by the University.' At the outset, the panel disposed of the notion that the first alleged effect, the University's poor
reputation in the African-American community, and the fourth alleged effect, a perceived racially hostile campus climate, were sufficient, by themselves, to justify the Banneker program. 10 0 The panel
then concluded that the Banneker program was not "narrowly tailored to remedy the underrepresentation and attrition problems.""0 1
In determining whether the Banneker program was narrowly tailored"0 ' to ameliorate the present effects of past discrimination, the
97. Podberesky IV 38 F.3d at 157.
98. Id.
99. The panel addressed each of the proffered "present effects" individually. Id. at 15457.
100. Id. at 154. The panel commented that "any poor reputation the University may
have in the African-American community is tied solely to knowledge of the University's
discrimination before it admitted African-American students." Id. The hostile climate effect proffered by the University, the Fourth Circuit found, suffered from another flaw: its
main support was found in a survey of student attitudes and reported results of student
focus groups. Id. However, the panel pointed out that for an articulated effect to justify a
race-based program, there must be a nexus between the past discrimination and the effect.
ld.;
see also United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 729-30 (1992). The Fourth Circuit was
not satisfied that the requisite connection existed, and indicated that it was more likely that
the purported racial hostility on the campus resulted from present societal discrimination.
Podberesky IV 38 F.3d at 154.
101. Podberesky IV,38 F.3d at 158. Because the panel already decided that the alleged
poor reputation of the University among African-Americans and the hostile environment
on campus were not sufficient to justify the Banneker program, it was not necessary for it
to consider whether the program was narrowly tailored in relation to these problems. Id.
at 158 n.9.
102. See supra note 6 (discussing the four-part test set forth in United States v. Paradise,
480 U.S. 149, 171 (1987) (plurality opinion), for evaluating whether a program is "narrowly tailored"). In Podberesky, the Fourth Circuit commented that, because the Banneker
eligibility prerequisite of African descent does not establish the same type of racial quota as
the 50% promotion requirement in Paradise,the tests articulated in that case, and adopted
by the Fourth Circuit in Hayes v. North State Law Enforcement Officers Ass'n, 10 F.3d 207,
216 (4th Cir. 1993), required some adjustment to fit a race-exclusive minority scholarship
case. Podberesky X, 38 F.3d at 158 n.10. The court noted that, although Croson also involved an outright racial quota, it also dealt with a claim of present effects of past discrimination. Id. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit considered the factors used by the Croson Court.
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Fourth Circuit was empowered to consider possible race-neutral alternatives and whether the program actually furthered a different objective from the one it purported to remedy.10 3 The panel concluded
that, while the Banneker program claimed to address the attrition
problem by attracting high-achieving African-American students who
were more likely to stay through graduation,' such an analysis failed
to establish the requisite nexus between problem and remedy.' 5 The
court observed that, if the purpose of the program was to attract only
high-achieving African-American students, it could not be sustained. 10 6 "High achievers, whether African-American or not, are not
10 7
the group against which the University discriminated in the past."
Moreover, the court concluded that the district court erred in giving
no weight to Podberesky's argument that the Banneker program is
not narrowly tailored 0 8 because the scholarships are open to nonMaryland residents. °9 The Fourth Circuit also criticized the district
court's reasoning that Banneker scholars would serve as mentors and
role models for other African-American students," 0 noting that the
Supreme Court in Wygant "expressly rejected the role-model theory as
a basis for implementing a race-conscious remedy.""' Finally, the
Fourth Circuit criticized the district court's failure to account for rea-

Id.; see Richmond v. JA. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507 (1989) (considering possible raceneutral alternatives and whether the Richmond set-aside furthered any goal other than
"outright racial balancing").
103. Podberesky IV 38 F.3d at 158; see Croson, 488 U.S. at 507 (discussing Richmond's
failure to consider race-neutral measures).
104. Podberesky IV, 38 F.3d at 158.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 158 & n. 11. The Fourth Circuit observed that "awarding Banneker Scholarships to non-residents of Maryland is not narrowly tailored to correcting the condition that
the University argues, that not enough qualified African-American Maryland residents attend at College Park." Id. at 159; see also Richmond v.JA Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 508
(1989) (noting the importance of tailoring the relief "to those who truly have suffered the
effects of prior discrimination").
110. Podberesky III, 838 F. Supp. 1075, 1094-95 (D. Md. 1993), vacated, 38 F.3d 147 (4th
Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2001 (1995).
111. Podberesky IV 38 F.3d at 159; see Wygant v.Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276
(1986) (plurality opinion); cf. Podberesky /I, 838 F. Supp. at 1095 n.73. The district court
recognized that Wygant had held that a "role model theory" was an impermissible basis for
an affirmative action program, but reasoned that the program struck down in Wygant involved using role models to combat societal discrimination. Id. In this case, Judge Motz
wrote, "the role model function of the Banneker scholars is directly related to eliminating
specific present effects of past discrimination." Id.
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that prompt qualified African-Amerisons, other than discrimination,
112
cans to attend other colleges.
4. Analysis.a. The Mandatefor Strict Scrutiny.-In Podberesky, the Fourth
Circuit applied the two-pronged test of Wygant and Croson"1 to reject
a race-based measure calculated to compensate for the effects of past
discrimination by a governmental actor. The court applied strict scrutiny in a straightforward manner and rejected any attempt to tailor the
analysis to account for special concerns raised by discrimination in
education. The court also reiterated the unacceptability of the "role
model" justification for a race-based measure.
The Fourth Circuit's decision is in line with the Supreme Court's
consistent disapproval of unequal treatment of persons based on race,
whatever the stated purpose. Nearly two decades ago, in Bakke, Justice
Powell plainly stated this principle: "The guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one individual and
something else when applied to a person of another color. If both are
.not accorded the same protection, then it is not equal."'
It is true
that the Justices gave local courts wide latitude, following the decision
in Brown v. Board of Education,"5 to exercise their equitable powers to
eradicate public school segregation." 6 Nevertheless, "[r]acial classifications are simply too pernicious to permit any but the most exact
connection between justification and classification."" 7
The Supreme Court recently reinforced this notion in a postPodberesky case, Adarand Constructors,Inc. v. Pena."8 In Adarand,a case
that challenged the constitutionality of a federal program designed to
provide highway contracts to "disadvantaged" business enterprises," 9
112. Podberesky IV 38 F.3d at 159-60 & n.13. The district court, for example, did not
account for African Americans who choose to apply only to out-of-state colleges, or
predominantly African-American institutions. Id. While declining to speculate on the extent to which variables such as these might reduce the size of the reference pool, the
Fourth Circuit asserted that "the failure to account for these, and possibly other, nontrivial
variables cannot withstand strict scrutiny." Id. at 160.
113. See supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text.
114. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289-90 (1978) (opinion of
Powell, J.).
115. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
116. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971)
("Once a right and a violation have been shown, the scope of a district court's equitable
powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable
remedies.").
117. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 537 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
118. 115 S. Ct 2097 (1995).
119. Id. at 2101.
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the Court took the Croson analysis a step further. The Court held
"that all racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or
local governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court
under strict scrutiny."'1 20 Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court
concluded that the Court's affirmative action cases, from Bakke
through Croson, had established three propositions with respect to
governmental racial classifications. 121 The first of these is skepticism:
"'[a]ny preference based on racial or ethnic criteria must necessarily
receive a most searching examination.'

122

The second proposition, Justice O'Connor wrote, is consistency:
"'the standard of review under the Equal Protection Clause is not dependent on the race of those burdened or benefited by a particular
classification. '"12 The third proposition is congruence: "'[e]qual
protection analysis in the Fifth Amendment area is the same as that
under the Fourteenth Amendment.'

124

The first and second of these propositions, of course, figure most
prominently in an analysis of Podberesky, which involved action by a
state, rather than a federal, entity. Most significant, however, is Justice
O'Connor's conclusion that the three propositions, taken together,
mean that "any person, of whatever race, has the right to demand that
any governmental actor subject to the Constitution justify any racial
classification subjecting that person to unequal treatment under the
strictest judicial scrutiny."1 25 Thus, in Adarand, the Court overruled
Metro Broadcasting,Inc. v. FCC,12 6 a case that had held that "benign"
federal racial classifications need only satisfy intermediate scrutiny,
even in the face of Croson's conclusion that such classifications enacted by a state must satisfy strict scrutiny. 27
Justice O'Connor's Adarand analysis sends the message that
"good intentions" will not suffice in future cases to sustain race-based
classifications. In Adarand,Justice O'Connor drove this point home
with language borrowed from Justice Stevens in an earlier dissent:
"[E]ven though it is not the actual predicate for this legislation, a statute of this kind inevitably is perceived by many as
120. Id. at 2113.
121. Id. at 2111.
122. Id. (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273 (1986) (plurality
opinion)).
123. Id. (quoting Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989) (plurality
opinion)).
124. Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976)).
125. Id.
126. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
127. Adarand, 115 S.Ct. at 2111-12.
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resting on an assumption that those who are granted this
special preference are less qualified in some respect that is
identified purely by their race. Because that perceptionespecially when fostered by the Congress of the United
States-can only exacerbate rather than reduce racial prejudice, it will delay the time when race will12 become a truly irrelevant, or at least insignificant, factor." 1
Even before Adarand, the Fourth Circuit had acknowledged the
potential harm that may result from injudicious uses of race-conscious
remedies: "While the inequities and indignities visited by past discrimination are undeniable, the use of race as a reparational device
risks perpetuating the very race-consciousness such a remedy purports
to overcome. State-sponsored racial criteria in particular may sacrifice
129
the indivisible character of American citizenship."
Hence, given the clear mandate of the applicable precedents, the
Podberesky court had little choice. Its decision, which appears unassailable after Adarand, represents a recognition that, absent the most
compelling circumstances, a race-based measure moves equal protection jurisprudence backward rather than forward. Justice Powell
stated this eloquently in Bakke. In rejecting the medical school's position that discrimination against members of the white "majority" cannot be regarded as suspect if it has a "benign" purpose, Justice Powell
declared that "[t] he clock of our liberties ... cannot be turned back
....

."'

He noted the "serious problems ofjustice connected with the

idea of preference itself. 1" One such problem is that it may not always be clear that a preference is benign. 132 Moreover, preferential
programs may enforce stereotypical notions that certain groups cannot achieve success without special protection. 3 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Justice Powell noted that the constitutional
principle of equal protection cannot "vary with the ebb and flow of
political forces." 13 4 Tying the meaning of such a principle to shifting
political and social judgments of disparity in opportunity "undermines
the chances for consistent application of the Constitution from one
128. Id. at 2113 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 545 (1980) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)).
129. Maryland Troopers Ass'n v. Evans, 993 F.2d 1072, 1076 (4th Cir. 1993).
130. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 294-95 (1978) (opinion of
Powell, J.).
131. Id. at 298.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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b. The Problematic Language of Wygant: Deference v. Skepticism.-The Fourth Circuit appropriately imposed a weighty responsibility on reviewing courts to engage in a careful examination of the
perceived effects of past discrimination.1 3 6 This is consistent with the
notion in Adarand "that courts should take a skeptical view of all governmental racial classifications." 3 7 A court may not merely accept the
word of the party seeking approval for a race-based classification. 8
Thus, according to the Fourth Circuit, the district court in Podberesky
"was incorrect in stating that if the University found strong evidence
to support any of its proffered effects, the program would be justified.' 3 9 It was the district court's responsibility to examine each proffered effect and make a determination that the effect and the
classification were sufficiently connected. That connection, the
Fourth Circuit said, has two components. First, the effect must have
been caused by the past discrimination. 40 Second, the effect must be
141
of "sufficient magnitude" to justify the race-based program.
While this probing into the cause and effect relationship between
past discrimination and perceived present results is consistent with the
searching analysis implied by the phrase "strict scrutiny," it raises important questions about the phrase "strong basis in evidence."1

42

At

the trial court level, both the district court and the parties in Podberesky
wrestled with this language, and Judge Motz noted that there was furious debate about its meaning. 43 Ultimately, both sides agreed that
the University's burden required it "to produce something less than
the preponderance of the evidence."" 4
Significantly, the University had argued that "strong basis in evidence" is the functional equivalent of the "substantial evidence" test, a
deferential standard commonly applied in judicial review of administrative adjudications. The Fourth Circuit has described the "substantial evidence" test, somewhat obliquely, as either "'less than a
135. Id. at 299.
136. Podberesky I, 38 F.3d at 154.
137. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2113 (1995).
138. Podberesky IV, 38 F.3d at 154.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 153.
141. Id.
142. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277 (1986) (plurality opinion).
143. Podberesky I, 838 F. Supp. 1075, 1083 n.49 (D. Md. 1993), vacated, 38 F.3d 147 (4th
Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2001 (1995).
144. Id.
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preponderance but more than a scintilla,"' or as enough evidence "'as
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion
and .

.

. sufficient to justify a refusal to direct a verdict were the case

before a jury.' 14 5 That the Wygant terminology is subject to such an
interpretation is bolstered by Judge Motz's characterization of the
University's evidentiary burden: "They need not prove these present
effects of past discrimination beyond a reasonable doubt, by clear and
convincing evidence, or even by a preponderance of the evidence."146
Having established that "strong basis in evidence" implies a somewhat
deferential level of review, the district court apparendy concluded,
not unreasonably, that the University knew best its own past and present conditions with respect to race relations," 7 had engaged in selfstudy, and had crafted a reasonable and judicious response to its selfdiagnosed problems.1 4 s
The Fourth Circuit's criticism of this aspect of the district court's
analysis points to a fundamental area of disagreement that reaches
deep into the philosophical underpinnings of strict scrutiny analysis
with respect to race-based remedial measures. Podberesky has shown
that the language of Wygant should be clarified. The phrase "strong
basis in evidence" implies a level of deference, rather than the "skepticism" that Adarand suggests should govern a reviewing court's analysis. 149 Yet Adarands command that reviewing courts must be skeptical
145. Id. (quoting Laws v. Celebrezze, 368 F.2d 640 (4th Cir. 1966); Teague v. Califano,
560 F.2d 615 (4th Cir. 1977)). In Celebrezze, the Fourth Circuit explained that "substantial
evidence" consists of "evidence which a reasoning mind would accept as sufficient to support a particular conclusion .... If there is evidence tojustify a refusal to direct a verdict
were the case before ajury, then there is 'substantial evidence.'" Ceebrezz, 368 F.2d at 642.
146. Podberes y IH, 838 F. Supp. at 1083 n.49. Judge Motz emphasized that the standard
the University "must meet is less than a preponderance of the evidence. To require any
greater a standard would be in explicit contradiction of the Court's requirement in Croson
that the burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff in reverse discrimination cases."
Id. (citing Richmond v. JA Croson Co., 488 U.S. 464, 500 (1989)).
147. Id. at 1084-86.
148. In his November 18, 1993 opinion, Judge Motz demonstrated his belief that the
University's own findings of present effects of past discrimination were consistent with the
remedy it chose to address them:
The question posed in this case is whether a public university, racially segregated
by law for almost a century and actively resistant to integration for at least twenty
years thereafter, may-after confronting the injustice of its past-voluntarily seek
to remedy the resulting problems of its present, by spending one percent of its
financial aid budget to provide scholarships to approximately thirty high-achieving African-American students each year.
Id. at 1076.
149. Deference is implied because of the close resemblance between "strong basis in
evidence" and "substantial evidence." See supra notes 145-146 and accompanying text. The
"substantial evidence" test itself has been likened to the highly deferential "arbitrary and
capricious" standard of review. See Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Board
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of all governmental racial classifications is inconsistent with the practice of imposing a light evidentiary burden on a party seeking to uphold a race-based classification. It is, in sum, anomalous to suggest
that "the strictest judicial scrutiny ' can be applied honestly if the
defendant in a discrimination case is held to a standard of proof that
is even lower than a preponderance of the evidence. Thus, one
means of ameliorating the semantic confusion caused by the "strong
basis in evidence" prong of the Wygant test would be to require the
defendant in a reverse discrimination case to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that remedial action is necessary to remedy
the present effects of past discrimination.
5. Conclusion.-In Podberesky v. Kirwan, the Fourth Circuit recognized that the use of race as a "reparational device" perpetuates societal inequality."5
In striking down the Benjamin Banneker
Scholarship Program, the court reinforced the notion that strict scrutiny must apply to all racial classifications, regardless of the race or
social status of the purported beneficiary.
Nevertheless, the ambiguity of the Wygant evidentiary burden remains troubling. The issue appears to be settled in the Fourth Circuit,
by virtue of the court's unapologetic application of strict scrutiny.
However, the conflict between the Fourth Circuit and the district
court has revealed the need for clarification. The Supreme Court's
denial of certiorari in Podberesky 5 2 eliminated an opportunity to address this issue. It is to be hoped that a future case will provide the
vehicle for this much-needed revisitation of Wygant.
SUSAN A. WINCHURCH

of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 745 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1984). In Data Processing,
then CircuitJudge Scalia noted that the distinction between the "substantial evidence" and
'arbitrary and capricious" standards of review is "largely semantic." Id. at 684 (quoting
Aircraft Owners and Pilots Ass'n v. FAA, 600 F.2d 965, 971 n.28 (D.C. Cir. 1979)).
The scope of review under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard is narrow. Motor
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). "[U]nder this
standard, a reviewing court may not set aside an agency rule that is rational, based on
consideration of the relevant factors and within the scope of the authority delegated to the
agency by the [agency's enabling] statute." Id. at 42. As the preceding quote suggests, the
"arbitrary and capricious" standard is commonly applied to judicial review of the actions of
administrative agencies.
150. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2111 (1995).
151. Maryland Troopers Ass'n v. Evans, 993 F.2d 1072, 1076 (4th Cir. 1993).
152. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

A. Justifying Restrictions on Speech and Religion
In American Life League, Inc. v. Reno,' the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the Freedom of Access
to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994 (the Access Act or Act).' In reaching
this decision, the court held that the Act is a valid exercise of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause,3 and does not violate the
Free Speech Clause or the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.4 Rather, it serves substantial governmental interests of preserving the peace, maintaining access to reproductive health facilities,
protecting interstate commerce, and securing the constitutional rights
of citizens.5
The court further asserted that the Act did not violate the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA),6 holding that even if one assumes that the Access Act burdens religious exercise, it protects the
paramount interests of public safety and welfare. 7 The court examined the Act's stated purpose, definitions, and rules of construction, 8 and found the Act clear and precise, 9 and content and
viewpoint neutral."

1. 47 F.3d 642 (4th Cir.), cert. denied4 116 S. Ct. 55 (1995).
2. Id. at 645. The Act is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 248 (1994); see infra text accompanying notes 22-25 for the language and provisions of the statute. See also infra note 141 for
definitions of important statutory terms.
3. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. "The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes... ." Id. See infra notes 36-47, 104-119 and accompanying text for an overview of
Commerce Clause jurisprudence and the Fourth Circuit's application of the clause to this
case.

4. U.S. CONST. amend. I. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." Id.
5. American Life League, 47 F.3d at 647, 652.
6. Id. at 656. The RFRA is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (Supp. V 1994). See infra
text accompanying notes 75-79 for the significance and relevant language of the statute.
7. American Lfe League, 47 F.3d at 655.
8. Id. at 646, 649.
9. Id. at 653.
10. Id. at 651.
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While analyzing the First Amendment issues in detail," the court
dealt only briefly with the Commerce Clause issue.' 2 One federal district court has since ruled the Act an unconstitutional exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause power'l-a decision subsequently reversed
on appeal.' 4 However, the United States Courts of Appeals for the
Seventh,'" Eighth,' 6 and Eleventh Circuits 7 have followed the Fourth
Circuit's decision,'" and have buttressed the Commerce Clause argument by analyzing the Act under the recent Supreme Court Commerce Clause decision of United States v. Lopez. 9 All other district
11. The court, inter alia, applied the test of United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377
(1968) (holding that Congress may prohibit and punish conduct that has certain expressive elements in order to further substantial governmental interests). American Life League,
47 F.3d at 651-52. For a summary of the test and when it is applied, see infra notes 54-56
and accompanying text. For the Fourth Circuit's application of the test in this case, see
infra notes 127-133 and accompanying text.
12. American Life League, 47 F.3d at 647-48.
13. United States v. Wilson, 880 F. Supp. 621, 623, 634, 636 (E.D. Wis.) (holding that
the portion of the Act that prohibits nonviolent obstruction of clinic entrances is beyond
the scope of Congress's commerce power), rev'd, 73 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 1995).
14. United States v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675, 679-80 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that Congress
had authority under the Commerce Clause to pass the Act, which "is constitutional as a
regulation that substantially affects interstate commerce"), revg880 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Wis.
1995).
15. Id.
16. United States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913, 919 (8th Cir. 1996) ("We hold that [the
Access Act] is within Congress's commerce power and is not facially inconsistent with the
First Amendment.").
17. Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1521-22, 1524 (llth Cir. 1995) (holding that the Act
was within the Commerce Clause power of Congress, did not violate the Freedom of
Speech or Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment, did not violate the Tenth
Amendment or RFRA, and that claim asserting violation of Eighth Amendment was not
ripe).
18. Wilson, 73 F.3d at 677 ("Every other federal court to address the issue has upheld
the constitutionality of the Access Act, including two circuit courts ....

We agree with

these courts and reverse the district court's decision."); Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d at 924 ("[Like
every other court that has considered the question, [we] conclude that [the Act] does not
violate the First Amendment."); Cheffer, 55 F.3d at 1520 ("We agree with the Fourth Circuit
that the Access Act is within Congress's Commerce power.... ."); and id. at 1521 ("Unable
to improve on the Fourth Circuit's analysis, we follow American Life League and adopt its
rationale on the free speech issues.").
American Life League, Cheffer, and Wilson refer to the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act as the "Access Act," or "Act." American Life League, Inc. v. Reno, 47 F.3d 642,
645 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 116 S. Ct. 55 (1995); Cheffer, 55 F.3d at 1518; Wilson, 73 F.3d at
676. Dinwiddie refers to it as "FACE." Dinwiddie,76 F.3d at 916. This Note will follow the
lead of American Life League in referring to it as the Access Act or Act.
19. 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1626 (1995) (holding that the Gun-Free School Zones Act was an
unconstitutional exercise of the Commerce Clause). The Eleventh Circuit distinguished
Lopez, reasoning that the Act does regulate commercial activity, and noting the extensive
legislative findings supporting Congress's conclusion that the regulated activity substantially affects interstate commerce. Cheffer, 55 F.3d at 1520 (citing the discussion of legislative history in American Life League, 47 F.3d at 647).
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courts that have heard similar challenges to the Act have declared the
Act constitutional.2"
After reviewing the relevant history of First Amendment and
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, including the debate surrounding
the First Amendment and the expressive and religious elements of
abortion protest, this Note will discuss the integrity of the Fourth Circuit's decision. The decision illuminates recent and controversial
changes in the political and intellectual foundation of long-established judicial principles pertaining to the First Amendment and the
Commerce Clause.
1. The Case.-When the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances
Act was signed into law by President Clinton on May 26, 1994, the
American Life League and various individuals (plaintiffs) filed an action challenging its constitutionality in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. 21 The Act penalizes anyone
who
The Seventh Circuit reviewed the legislative findings in detail, and concluded that (1)
"it is plainly rational that reproductive health facilities are engaged in interstate commerce
and that obstruction of such facilities brings commerce to a halt," Wilson, 73 F.3d at 681;
(2) "[a] rational basis exists for finding that interstate travel of individuals seeking reproductive health services is substantial, and that obstructing those individuals therefore substantially affects interstate commerce," id.; (3) "the evidence Congress relied upon reveals
a substantial threat to the national reproductive health services market," id. at 682; and (4)
"the effort to close reproductive health facilities is organized on a national scale." Id. at
683. Wilson also distinguished Lopez "We agree with the Eleventh Circuit that the Access
Act, unlike the Gun-Free School Zones Act, regulates a commercial activity-the provision
of reproductive health services." Id.
The Eighth Circuit explained that Lopez did not require holding the Act invalid:
First, unlike the Gun-Free School Zones Act, FACE prohibits interference with a
commercial activity-the provision and receipt of reproductive-health services
....
Second, in Lopez, the Supreme Court did not overturn ... any... opinion
holding that Congress has the power to regulate conduct that reduces interstate
commerce in a good or service ....
Therefore, Lopez notwithstanding, FACE is a
valid exercise of Congress's power to regulate activity that substantially affects interstate commerce.
Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d at 921.
20. See, e.g., Reily v. Reno, 860 F. Supp. 693, 704, 708, 709 (D. Ariz. 1994) (holding,
inter alia, that Congress had authority under the Commerce Clause to enact the Act, and
that the Act does not violate the First Amendment); Cook v. Reno, 859 F. Supp. 1008, 101011 (W.D. La. 1994) (holding that the Act does not violate the First Amendment, and that
Congress did not abuse its commerce power and pass the Act to chill the protests of antiabortionists); Council for Life Coalition v. Reno, 856 F. Supp. 1422, 1431-32 (S.D. Cal.
1994) (holding that the Act does not violate the First Amendment and was a legitimate
exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause power).
21. American Life League, Inc. v. Reno, 855 F. Supp. 137, 139 (E.D. Va. 1994), affd, 47
F.3d 642 (4th Cir.), cert. denze4 116 S. CL 55 (1995).
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(1) by force or threat of force or by physical obstruction, intentionally injures, intimidates or interferes with or attempts
to injure, intimidate or interfere with any person because
that person is or has been, or in order to intimidate such
person or any other person or any class of persons from, obtaining or providing reproductive health services;
(2) by force or threat of force or by physical obstruction, intentionally injures, intimidates or interferes with or attempts
to injure, intimidate or interfere with any person lawfully exercising or seeking to exercise the First Amendment right of
religious freedom at a place of religious worship;
(3) intentionally damages or destroys the property of a facility, or attempts to do so, because such facility provides reproductive health services, or intentionally damages or destroys
the property of a place of religious worship.2 2
Both criminal penalties and civil remedies are available.2 3 The Act
provides definitions of crucial terms,2 4 and a rule of construction asserting, inter alia, that
[n]othing in this section shall be construed(1) to prohibit any expressive conduct (including peaceful
picketing or other peaceful demonstration) protected from
legal prohibition by the First Amendment to the Constitution; [or]
(2) to create new remedies for interference with activities
protected by the free speech or free exercise clauses of the
First Amendment to the Constitution, occurring outside a facility, regardless of the point of view expressed, or to limit
any existing legal remedies for such interference.
The district court rejected the plaintiffs' first complaint because it
did not allege that plaintiffs would engage in activity that would violate the Act. 26 The court ruled that an amended complaint by the
plaintiffs was ripe for judicial consideration, because it alleged that
while the plaintiffs did not condone violence, they intended to obstruct entrances to abortion facilities, and their activities were
designed to interfere with, intimidate, or injure those seeking or providing abortions.2 7
22. 18 U.S.C. § 248(a)(1)-(3) (1994).
23. Id. § 248(b) (c).
24. Id. § 248(e); see infra note 141 and accompanying text.
25. 18 U.S.C. § 248(d)(1)-(2).
26. American life League, Inc. v. Reno, 855 F. Supp. 137, 139 n.2 (E.D. Va. 1994),
affd, 47 F.3d 642 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 55 (1995).
27. Id.
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On June 3, 1994, the court allowed the National Abortion Federation, the Commonwealth Women's Clinic, Capitol Women's Clinic,
Dr. George Tiller, Dr. Susan Wicklund, and the National Organization
for Women to intervene on behalf of the defendants.2 8 The plaintiffs
filed a motion for class certification that was dismissed on June 10,
1994.29
The district court ruled that the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act (1) is a legitimate exercise of congressional authority
under the Commerce Clause; 0 (2) proscribes conduct that is not protected under the First Amendment; ' (3) is neither vague nor overbroad;3 2 (4) is clear, unambiguous, and viewpoint neutral;13 and (5)

does not violate either the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment or RFRA.1 4 The district court therefore granted the United
States' motion and dismissed the plaintiffs' second amended complaint with prejudice, rendering their preliminary injunction motion
moot.3 5 The plaintiffs appealed.

2. Legal Background.-There is a long and venerable history of
Commerce Clause and First Amendment jurisprudence. The debate
surrounding abortion has an equally compelling, albeit more recent,
jurisprudential and legislative history. In American Life League, principles generated by each of these three developments collide. The following discussion focuses on the most salient points necessary for
understanding the consequences of the Fourth Circuit's decision.
a. The Commerce Clause.-The Constitution grants Congress
the authority "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." 6 The nature
of the congressional commerce power originally was defined by Chief
Justice Marshall as "the power to... prescribe the rule by which commerce [concerning more than one state] is to be governed."3 7 The
Supreme Court has frequently shifted its focus in its Commerce

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.

139 n.1.
141.
142.
141-43.
144.

36. U.S. CONST. art. I,

§ 8, cl.3.

37. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 194-96 (1824).
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Clause jurisprudence."8 Mid-twentieth century decisions expanded
congressional authority. 9 With Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n,4 Katzenbach v. McClung,4" and Heart of Atlanta Motel,
Inc. v. United States,42 the Court adopted a rational basis test for determining whether Congress had the authority to regulate an activity.4 3
Most recently, in United States v. Lopez, the Supreme Court asserted that three categories of activity are subject to congressional regulation under the Commerce Clause:
First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce.... Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate
commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce,
even though the threat may come only from intrastate activities ....

Finally, Congress' commerce authority includes the

power to regulate those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce.... i.e., those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. 44
Lopez emphasized that Congress must clearly indicate its purpose
when invoking the Commerce Clause.4 5 The Court asserted that a
comprehensive legislative history, while not normally required, provides important evidence that an activity substantially affects interstate
commerce.' This evidence is necessary for the Court properly to determine whether the judgment of the legislature is sound.4 7
38. At different times throughout its history, the Court has focused on state laws that

restricted interstate commerce, as well as congressional regulation of activities that mingled interstate and intrastate aspects of commerce, affected interstate commerce directly
and indirectly, had a "close and substantial relation to interstate commerce," and passed a

rational basis for regulation test. For an excellent summary of the history of Commerce
Clause jurisprudence, see the recent Supreme Court decision United States v. Lopez, 115
S. Ct. 1624, 1626-30 (1995). See also supra note 19 and accompanying text.
39. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1628.
40. 452 U.S. 264, 268 (1981) (holding that the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977-designed to protect the environment from the harmful effects of surface
mining-was constitutional under the Commerce Clause).
41. 379 U.S. 294, 304-05 (1964) (holding that Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
and its application to restaurants serving food in interstate commerce was a constitutional
exercise of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause).
42. 379 U.S. 241, 258, 261-62 (1964) (holding that Title II of the Civil Rights Act of
1964-as applied to public accommodations serving interstate travelers-was a constitutional exercise of Congress's commerce power).
43. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629.
44. Id. at 1629-30.
45. Id. at 1631-32.
46. Id. at 1632.
47. Id.
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b. The First Amendment: Conduct and Freedom of Speech.-The
First Amendment does not protect acts of force or violence, 48 true
The message expressed
threats of force,4' or physical obstructions.'
by conduct, however, is the focus of First Amendment inquiry.5 1
When a law prohibiting conduct is content and viewpoint based (i.e.,
the law restricts conduct because of its expressive elements), then the
court must subject the law to strict scrutiny.5" The strict scrutiny test
requires that the law serve a compelling state interest and be narrowly
tailored to accomplish that interest.5
A law that is content and viewpoint neutral also is subject to First
Amendment scrutiny if the law potentially or incidentally affects conduct with protected expressive elements.5 4 A content and viewpoint
neutral law is subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny,5 5 and is
justified

48. See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194, 2196, 2199, 2201-02 (1993) (9-0 decision)
(holding that an enhanced penalty for a violent crime motivated by the victim's race, religion, color, disability, sexual orientation, national origin, or ancestry did not violate the
First and Fourteenth Amendments).
49. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (per curiam) (holding that a
threat to the life of the president was protected by the First Amendment because it was a
political statement and not a true threat). "What is a threat must be distinguished from
what is constitutionally protected speech." Id. at 707.
50. See Cameron v.Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 617 (1968) (holding that a state anti-picketing law prohibiting obstruction of and interference with ingress to and egress from public
property was a valid regulation).
51. See RAV. v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992) (holding that a
municipal ordinance prohibiting placement of symbols that one knows or reasonably
should know arouse anger or other strong feelings in others on the basis of race, color,
creed, nationality, religion, or gender violated the First Amendment because it censored
expressive element of conduct). "We have long held. .. that nonverbal expressive activity
can be banned because of the action it entails, but not because of the ideas it expresses
. ... "Id. at 385; see also Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2523,
2527 (1994) (holding, inter alia, that prohibiting anti-abortion demonstrations within a 36foot buffer zone around an abortion clinic did not violate the First Amendment); Ward v.
Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791, 803 (1989) (holding that sound-amplification
guidelines for bandshell use was a constitutional restriction on expression that served substantial governmental interests and was narrowly tailored to achieve its goals).
52. See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198 (1992) (plurality opinion) (citing Perry
Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)).
53. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. The Pery Court held that a contract between a public school
board and a local union, granting the union access to the interschool mail system, and
denying all rival unions such access, was constitutional. Id. at 55.
54. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) ("This Court has held that
when 'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a
sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms.").
55. American Life League, 47 F.3d at 651.
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if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if
it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest;
if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression
of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essen5
tial to the furtherance of that interest.
Conduct may not be restricted because of its message unless
there are compelling governmental interests and inadequate alternatives. 7 Conduct that symbolizes expression may be subject, however,
to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions. 51 In Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, the Supreme Court explained that "restrictions of this kind are valid provided that they are justified without
reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that
they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the
information." 59 These elements are very similar to those required for
intermediate-level scrutiny.6 °
When a court scrutinizes a law for potential violation of the First
Amendment, the court also examines it for vagueness and overbreadth. 6 1 The Supreme Court explained in Grayned v. City of Rockford 2 that a statute is unconstitutionally vague if it does not satisfy the
Court's criteria of (1) "fair warning," 65 (2) precise standards for application,' and (3) careful delineation of boundaries of areas forbidden
56. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
57. RAV. v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota, 505 U.S. 377, 395-96 (1992); see supra note 51
and accompanying text. For an example of a valid content-based restriction, see Burson v.
Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 193-94 (1992). The Burson Court held that a state law prohibiting a
vote solicitation and display or distribution of campaign items within 100 feet of a polling
place did not violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 211.
58. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (holding
that a regulation prohibiting sleeping in certain parks was a reasonable time, place, or
manner restriction on expression, was a reasonable regulation of symbolic conduct, and
served substantial governmental interests).
59. Id.
60. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377; supra text accompanying note 56.
61. The-Supreme Court has asserted that "[iut is a basic principle of due process that
an enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined." Grayned v.
City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972) (holding that an ordinance prohibiting picketing within the vicinity of a primary or secondary school violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that an ordinance restricting noise within the
vicinity of a primary or secondary school was a constitutional time, place, and manner
restriction). The Court has also indicated that "[a] clear and precise enactment may nevertheless be 'overbroad' if in its reach it prohibits constitutionally protected conduct." Id.
at 114.
62. Id. at 104.
63. Id. at 108.
64. Id.
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by the statute. 65 The Grayned Court indicated that a law is overbroad if

it "sweeps within its prohibitions what may not be punished under the
First and Fourteenth Amendments." 66 The Court established a stan-

dard for determining when a statute is overbroad on its face in
Broadrick v. Oklahoma:67 "the overbreadth of a statute must not only be

real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly
legitimate sweep."68
c.

The First Amendment: The Free Exercise Clause.-The Free

Exercise Clause of the First Amendment proclaims that "Congress
shall make no law.., prohibiting the free exercise [of religion] ."69 As
the Court held in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah,7" the

government "may not enact laws that suppress religious belief or practice."7 1 However, in Employment Division,Department of Human Resources
v. Smith,7' the Court held that the government may enact laws that
incidentally affect the exercise of religion as long as the laws are neutral and generally applicable.73 According to the Court in Smith, such
laws need not pass a compelling governmental interest test.74
In response to the Supreme Court's ruling in Smith,75 Congress
passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA).76 The
Act was intended to reestablish the test articulated in Sherbert v. Vernet,7 7 and Wisconsin v. Yoder 78 That test provides that "[g] overnment
65. Id. at 109.
66. Id. at 115.
67. 413 U.S. 601 (1973) (holding that an Oklahoma statute proscribing political activities of the state's civil servants was not vague or overbroad).
68. Id. at 615; see also Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 458 (1987) ("Only a statute that is
substantially overbroad may be invalidated on its face.").
69. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
70. 113 S. Ct.2217 (1993) (declaring that ordinances outlawing the killing of animals
for religious reasons violated the Free Exercise Clause).
71. Id. at 2222.
72. 494 U.S. 872, 878-79 (1990) (holding that criminal prohibition of the use of the
peyote drug and denial of unemployment compensation to persons dismissed because of
their use of that drug, even though such use was for religious purposes, did not violate the
Free Exercise Clause).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 885; see also infra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
75. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-79, 885.
76. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (Supp. V 1994). The Act refers to the case in its findings: "in
Employment Division v. Smith... the Supreme Court virtually eliminated the requirement
that the government justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws neutral toward
religion." Id. § 2000bb(a) (4).
77. 374 U.S. 398, 403, 410 (1963) (holding that denying unemployment benefits to an
individual because that individual refuses for religious reasons to work on her Sabbath
does not serve compelling state interests and is in violation of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments).
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may substantially burden a person's exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least
restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental
interest."

79

d. Anti-Abortion Activist Conduct and Passage of the Freedom of
Access to Clinic Entrances Act. -Congress passed the Access Act8 ° in response to "[a] nationwide campaign of anti-abortion blockades, invasions, vandalism and outright violence ...barring access to facilities
that provide abortion services and endangering the lives and well-being of the health care providers who work [at these facilities] ...and
the patients who seek their services." 1l Anti-abortion protestors have
resorted to using arson, bombs, and chemicals in their efforts to prevent access to reproductive health facilities.8 2 Tactics including blockades," threats of violence,8 4 and murder 5 are intended to prevent
women from receiving "safe and legal abortion services."86
Congress found that states and local jurisdictions were unable to
control such violent and obstructive activity.8 7 Congress asserted that
this activity violated federal and state statutory and constitutional
rights of citizens, 8 and burdened interstate commerce.8 9 The
Supreme Court decision in Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic9 °
also spurred Congress to pass the Act. Prior to Bray, claims against
such violent conduct were often brought successfully before the fed78. 406 U.S. 205, 215, 234-36 (1972) (holding that conviction of parents for refusing
for religious reasons to send their children to school beyond the eighth grade was in violation of the First Amendment). See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b) (1).
79. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-I (b).

80. 18 U.S.C. § 248 (1994). See supra text accompanying notes 22-25 for the language
and relevant provisions of the statute, and infra note 141 and accompanying text for definitions of important terms provided by the statute.
81. S.RrP. No. 117, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1993).

82. Id. at 5-7.
83. Id. at 7-10.
84. Id. at 10-11.
85. Dr. David Gunn in Florida and workers at abortion clinics in Massachusetts were
killed by anti-abortionists. See Christopher B. Daly, Gunman Kills 2,Wounds 5 in Attack on
Abortion Clinics; Suspect in Boston-Area Shootings Escapes, WASH. PosT, Dec. 31, 1994, at Al; S.
REP. No. 117 at 3-5.
86. S.REP. No. 117 at 11.
87. H.R. CoNF.REP. No. 488, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1994).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. 113 S.Ct. 753 (1993).
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eral judiciary under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).91 In Bray, however, the
Supreme Court held that victims harmed by the obstructive behavior
of anti-abortionists did not have a remedy under § 1985.92 Finally,
Congress concluded that such conduct may be prohibited and redress
for victims established "without abridging the exercise of any rights
guaranteed under
the First Amendment to the Constitution or under
93
law."
other
any
Those senators and representatives who opposed the Act expressed concern that it failed to distinguish adequately between violent and nonviolent behavior.9 4 Among their First Amendment
arguments, dissenters claimed the Act would "chill constitutionally
protected speech." 95 Some senators claimed the Act "would protect
illegal abortions" and elevate the right to abortion above the First
Amendment.9 6 Senators also asserted that "[t]he 'abortion-centric'
language of [the bill] ... may fail to deliver the promised protection
of pro-life facilities ....
[and that the bill] discriminates against the
pro-life viewpoint. " "
Dissenters in the House argued that the bill did not provide equal
protection to abortion and anti-abortion facilities.9 8 Representatives
questioned whether Congress ought to be legislating in this area at
all, 9 9 claiming that states already had laws to deal with illegal actions
by abortion protestors,1 °° and that there were federal statutes provid91. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 488 at 7. This statute was first enacted as the Ku Klux Klan
Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat. 13 (1873). Section 1985(3) of that Act provides:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on the
highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the
laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; ... in any case of
conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, or
cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby
another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and exercising
any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or
deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages occasioned by such
injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators.
Id.
92. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 758-64; see ahso H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 488 at 7.
93. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 488 at 8.
94. See S. REP. No. 117, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 46-47 (1993); H.R. REP. No. 306, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. 20-21 (1993).
95. S. REP. No. 117 at 49. The House Report also pointed out that "[tihe threat of
significant money DAMAGES, including punitive damages is likely to 'chill' speech, much
of which is protected under the first amendment." H.R. RPe. No. 306 at 26.
96. S. REP. No. 117 at 47-48.
97. Id. at 48.
98. H.R. REP. No. 306 at 19-20.
99. Id. at 21.
100. Id. at 21-22.
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ing the means by which states could ask for federal assistance. 1° ' Congressmen bemoaned the vague language of the bill, 11 2 and were
skeptical as to proponents' claims that the bill was modeled after 18
U.S.C. § 245 and 42 U.S.C. § 3631.103
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In American Life League, Inc. v. Reno,
the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that Congress had
the authority under the Commerce Clause to enact the Freedom of
Access to Clinic Entrances Act regulating certain violent, threatening,
or obstructive conduct affecting access to and provision of reproductive health services. 10 4 The court further held that the Act did not
0 5
violate the First Amendment of the Constitution.
After reviewing the facts of the case, the court considered the legislative history of the Access Act,10 6 and applied the Commerce Clause
test articulated in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,' °7 Katzenbach v. McClung,0 s and Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation
Ass'n:' °9 "[a] federal statute is valid under the Commerce Clause if
Congress (1) rationally concluded that the regulated activity affects
interstate commerce and (2) chose a regulatory means reasonably
adapted to a permissible end."'
The court found that "Congress rationally concluded that violence, threats of force, and physical obstructions aimed at persons seeking or providing reproductive health
services affect interstate commerce.""1
To support the first prong of the Commerce Clause test, the
court relied upon evidence that women travel interstate to receive reproductive health services, 112 doctors and staff work in an interstate
101. Id. at 23.
102. Id. at 26. "It is unclear if 'injury' includes psychological injury, pain and suffering,
whether 'physical obstruction ... intimidates' improperly regulates protected speech and
whether unlawful 'reproductive health services' are protected, e.g., third trimester abortions. A state official enforcing state law on late-term abortion could be exposed to liability." Id.
103. Id. at 26-27. The phrase "physical obstruction" is missing from both pieces of former legislation. Id.
104. American Life League, 47 F.3d at 645.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 646; see also H.R. REP. No. 306, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); S. REP. No. 117,
103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R. CONF. REP.No. 488, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
107. 379 U.S. 241, 258-59 (1964); see also supra note 42 and accompanying text.
108. 379 U.S. 294, 303-04 (1964); see also supra note 41 and accompanying text.
109. 452 U.S. 264, 276 (1981); see also supra note 40 and accompanying text.
110. American Life League, 47 F.3d at 647.
111. Id.
112. Id. "Many of the patients who seek services from these facilities engage in interstate

commerce by traveling from one state to obtain services in another." S. REP. No. 117, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1993).
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market, 11 3 and medical and office supplies are purchased through
channels of interstate commerce.1 14 Addressing the second prong of
the test, the court found the regulations and penalties of the Act permissible and designed to discourage violence, and obstructive and destructive behavior aimed at women seeking to exercise their
constitutional right to choose an abortion, 1 5 at doctors and other
health care providers working at reproductive health care facilities, 1 6
1 7
and at the physical plant and equipment of such facilities. 1
In essence, the court found the Act protective of "the free flow of
goods and services in commerce."' 1 8 The court rejected the plaintiffs'
arguments that the Act gave federal courts excessive jurisdiction, and
that regulation of conduct affecting public safety at clinics be left to
individual states.119
Turning to the First Amendment issue, the court found that
although the Act is intended to prohibit unprotected conduct, such as
the use of force or violence,1 20 true threats of force,'
and physical
obstructions,12 2 "[t]he Act might incidentally affect some conduct
with protected expressive elements, such as peaceful but obstructive
picketing." 12 ' The court therefore examined the Act to determine if
124
it violated the First Amendment.
The court found the Act to be content and viewpoint neutral because its prohibition of obstructive conduct was 'justified without ref113. American Life League, 47 F.3d at 647. The Senate reported that "[c]linic employees

sometimes travel across State lines to work .... Like Dr. David Gunn, the physician who
was killed in Pensacola, FL, some doctors who perform abortions work in facilities in more
than one State." S. REP. No. 117 at 31.
114. American Life League, 47 F.3d at 647. The Senate explained that "[c ] linics and other
abortion service providers... purchase medicine, medical supplies, surgical instruments
and other necessary medical products, often from other States; they employ staff; they own
and lease office space; they generate income." S. EP.No. 117 at 31.
115. American Life League, 47 F.3d at 647; see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154, 164-66
(1973) (holding that a right to privacy is founded in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and a woman's right to choose abortion is included in this right to
privacy, which is nonetheless qualified by the stage of pregnancy and subsequently compelling state interests), limited by Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989),
modified, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
116. The court referred specifically to the murder of Dr. David Gunn in 1993. American
Life League, 47 F.3d at 647.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 648.
120. Id.; see also supra note 48 and accompanying text.
121. American Life League, 47 F.3d at 648; see also supra note 49 and accompanying text.
122. American Life League, 47 F.3d at 648; see also supra note 50 and accompanying text.
123. American Life League, 47 F.3d at 648.
124. Id.
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erence to the content of the violator's message or point of view."12 1
The Act's motive requirement (i.e., the Act penalizes anyone who injures, intimidates, or interferes with a person "because that person is
... obtaining or providing reproductive health services") "simply narrows its reach, and this narrowing is within congressional
prerogative.

1 26

Because the Act was held to be content and viewpoint neutral,
the court applied a standard of intermediate scrutiny, first articulated
in United States v. O'Brien.1 27 According to O'Brien,a government regulation does not violate the First Amendment "if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest."12 ' The court in American
Life Leaguefound substantial governmental interests in (1) "protecting
public health, safety, and commerce,"12 9 and (2) "protecting women
and men from violence and threats in the exercise of their rights."13 °
In applying the next prong of the O'Brien test, the court reiterated its
holding that the Act was content and viewpoint neutral, and, therefore, did not serve as a pretext to suppress freedom of expression.1 "'
To support the "narrowly tailored" prong of the test, the court found
that "the Act leaves open ample alternative means for communication."'1 2 The court thus concluded that the Act passes the O'Brien
13
test. 3
125. Id. at 649; see generally supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
126. Id. at 650. The court also discussed Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993)
(9-0 decision), discussed supra note 48, and R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota, 505 U.S.
377 (1992), discussed supra notes 51, 57 and accompanying text, to support its argument
that there is a distinction between legislation aimed at expressive elements of conduct and
legislation aimed at proscribable elements. American Life League, 47 F.3d at 650.
127. 391 U.S. 367 (1968); see supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
128. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
129. American Lfe League, 47 F.3d at 651.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 652.
132. Id. The Fourth Circuit failed to mention explicitly a fourth prong to the O'Brien
test: the regulation must be "within the constitutional power of the Government." O'Brien
391 U.S. at 377; see supra note 56 and accompanying text. The court dealt with the constitutional power of Congress to enact the law in its separate discussion of the Commerce
Clause. AmericanLife League, 47 F.3d at 647; see also supra notes 107-119 and accompanying
text. However, the connection between the Commerce Clause and the First Amendment is
significant in this case. See infra notes 188-205 and accompanying text.
133. American Life League, 47 F.3d at 652.
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The court also addressed the issues of the Act's alleged overbreadth and vagueness, which the plaintiffs asserted would have a
"chilling effect" on their peaceful demonstration activities. 1 3' Applying the principles of Houston v. Hill1 5 Broadrick v. Oklahoma,"3 6 and
Grayned v. City of Rockford,'1 7 the court examined the Access Act to see
if the scope of the proscribed activities was unjustified, and if the Act
provided a "'person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity
to know what is prohibited .... ,,13a The court compared the Access
3 9 Finding
Act to the antipicketing law upheld in Cameron v. Johnson."
14
the Access Act to speak "in clear, common words,"
and indeed, to
define its important terms,14' the court held that it "is neither overbroad nor vague."' 4 2
The plaintiffs' final freedom of speech challenge addressed by
the court was the claim that the Act's civil damage provision was unconstitutional. 4 Under the Act, an injured party "may elect, at any
time prior to the rendering of final judgment, to recover, in lieu of
actual damages, an award of statutory damages in the amount of
$5,000 per violation."'" The court flatly rejected the plaintiffs' reliance on NAACP v. Claiborne HardwareCo.,145 and asserted knowing "of
134. Id.
135. 482 U.S. 451 (1987); see supra note 68 and accompanying text.
136. 413 U.S. 601 (1973); see supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
137. 408 U.S. 104 (1972); see supra notes 61-66 and accompanying text.
138. American Life League, 47 F.3d at 653 (quoting Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108).
139. Id. (citing Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968)); see also supra note 50 and
accompanying text. The court explained that "[t]he Supreme Court rejected the vagueness challenge [in Cameron] on the grounds that the terms 'obstruct,' 'unreasonably,' and
'interfere with' were perfectly clear, widely used, and well understood." American Life
League, 47 F.3d at 653.
140. American Life League, 47 F.3d at 653.
141. Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 248(e) (1994). Definitions include:
(2) INTERFERE WrrH.-The term "interfere with" means to restrict a person's freedom of movement.
(3) INTIMiDATE.-The term "intimidate" means to place a person in reasonable
apprehension of bodily harm to him- or herself or to another.
(4) PHSICAL OBsmucnoN.-The term "physical obstruction" means rendering
impassable ingress to or egress from a facility that provides reproductive health
services or to or from a place of religious worship, or rendering passage to or
from such a facility or place of religious worship unreasonably difficult or
hazardous.
Id.
142. American Life League, 47 F.3d at 653.
143. Id. at 653-54.
144. 18 U.S.C. § 248(c)(1)(B).
145. 458 U.S. 886, 920, 925-26, 929 (1982) (holding, inter alia, that an individual may
not be held liable because some of the members of a group to which he belonged advocated or committed violent acts).
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no rule prohibiting a liquidated damages provision that may in a particular case impose more than actual damages for unprotected
activity. " "'
By using an argument analogous to its freedom of speech argument, the court concluded that the Access Act did not violate the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment: the Act "punishes conduct
for the harm it causes, not because the conduct is religiously motivated." 4 7 Finally, the court examined the plaintiffs' claim that the
Access Act violated RFRA. 4 The court held that even assuming that
the Access Act places a substantial burden on the plaintiffs' exercise of
religion, the Act nonetheless serves compelling governmental interests and is the least restrictive means available to further those
interests. 149

4. Analysis.-In American Life League, the Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit held that the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994 is a constitutional exercise of Congress's commerce power and does not violate the First Amendment.1 5 ° Although
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin
subsequently held the Act unconstitutional under the Commerce
Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment,15 1 the Seventh, Eighth, and
Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals rejected the Wisconsin district

146. American Life League, 47 F.3d at 653-54.
147. Id. at 654. The court rejected the plaintiffs' reliance on Church of Lukumi Babalu
Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993); see supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
148. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (Supp. V 1994); see supra text accompanying notes 76-79 for an
explanation of RFRA.
149. American Life League, 47 F.3d at 656.
150. Id. at 647-48, 652.
151. United States v. Wilson, 880 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Wis.), rev'd, 73 F.3d 675 (7th Cir.
1995).
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152 and chose instead to follow the Fourth Circuit
court's argument,
3
15

decision.

The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari to American
Life League.'15 Because only four circuits have ruled on the Act's constitutionality, it is too soon to predict conflict among the circuits-a
situation that ultimately could compel Supreme Court intervention.' 5 5
The decision in American Life League is based upon well-established
principles of First Amendment jurisprudence, 156 and is sound in its
Commerce Clause analysis as well.15 7 But the intellectual foundation
of and political support for these principles are shifting.' 8 While the
Fourth Circuit's decision and the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari
suggest these doctrines are settled, a closer examination of intellectual
and political debate reveals intriguing enigmas that may lead to future
challenges.
152. Wilson, 73 F.3d at 680; United States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913, 921 (8th Cir. 1996);
Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1520 (11th Cir. 1995); see supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text. Because Wilson, Dinwiddie, and Cheffer were decided after both American Life
League, 47 F.3d 642, and United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995), see supra notes 19,
44-47 and accompanying text, these courts distinguished the Freedom of Access to Clinic
Entrances Act from the Gun-Free School Zones Act, as discussed supra in note 19. Wilson,
73 F.3d at 683-84; Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d at 921: Cheffer, 55 F.3d at 1520. These courts disagreed with the Wilson district court's reasoning:
We are not persuaded by the Wilson court's reasoning that the Access Act is beyond Congress' Commerce Clause authority because the Act does not regulate
commercial entities, i.e. the reproductive health providers, 'but rather regulates
private conduct affecting commercial entities.' ... The Wilson court cites no authority, nor can we find any, for the proposition that Congress' Commerce Clause
authority extends only to the regulation of commercial actors, and not private
individuals who interfere with commercial activities in interstate commerce.
Id. at 1520 n.6 (citing Wilson, 880 F. Supp. at 628). The Seventh Circuit agreed: "There is
no authority for the proposition that Congress's power extends only to the regulation of
commercial entities." Wilson, 73 F.3d at 684; accordDinwiddie, 76 F.3d at 921.
153. Wilson, 73 F.3d at 677; Cheffer, 55 F.3d at 1520. Dinwiddie followed Wilson, 73 F.3d at
682-89, and Cheffer, 55 F.3d at 1520-21, for its Commerce Clause holding, Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d
at 921 n.4, and American Life League, 47 F.3d at 648-53, and Cheffer, 55 F.3d at 1521-22, for
its First Amendment holding. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d at 924 n.8.
154. 116 S. Ct. 55 (1995).
155. Conflicting decisions among the circuit courts on the constitutionality of the Access Act would indicate confusion in First Amendment and Commerce Clause interpretation, and a need for the Supreme Court to clarify or resolve these constitutional principles
as they function within the context of the Act.
156. Kathleen Sullivan explains that "[f]ree speech issues in recent years have commanded a rare judicial consensus, uniting Justices from Brennan to Scalia." Kathleen M.
Sullivan, Discrimination,Distributionand Free Speech, 37 ARIz. L. REv. 439, 439 (1995) [hereinafter Sullivan, Discrimination].
157. The Fourth Circuit's reasoning harmonizes with the recent Supreme Court decision in United States v. Lopez, 115 S. CL 1624 (1995). See supra notes 19, 152-153 and
accompanying text.
158. Sullivan, Discrimination,supra note 156, at 439-40.
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a. Questioning the Principles of Free Speech. -In American Life
League, the distinction between proscribable elements of conduct and
protected expressive elements of conduct provides one of the bases
for the court's First Amendment reasoning.1 59 Government "may
properly regulate the clash of bodies but not the stirring of hearts and
minds."" 6 In the debate over First Amendment principles, "new critics" would dispose of this distinction and have government regulate
both, given that "speech constructs us and conditions our actions ....
[I]f we are socially malconstructed, government should be free to reconstruct us in a better light by regulating not only our actions, as it
already does, but our speech as well."' 6 '
American Life League analyzed the Access Act for possible violation
of such a distinction between "mind and body,"' 6 2 and noted that the
Act potentially could restrict protected expressive elements of conduct. 163 Consequently, the court examined the Act for content and
viewpoint neutrality and concluded that expressive elements were not
targeted." 6 The court then applied intermediate scrutiny and held
that speech was sufficiently protected. 6 Closer analysis reveals that
the new critics may have won: not only is violent and obstructive con-

159. American Life League, 47 F.3d at 648-51.
160. Kathleen M. Sullivan, ResurrectingFree Speech, 63 FoRDHAM L. REv. 971, 976 (1995)

[hereinafter Sullivan, Resurrecting].
161. Id. at 977. Stanley Fish asserts that
[t]here is an entire book to be written about the stigmatization and devaluation
of the body in First Amendment jurisprudence, but for the moment I will point
out that First Amendment jurisprudence works only if you assume that mental
activities, even when they emerge into speech, remain safely quarantined in the
cortex and do not spill over into the real world, where they can inflict harm. This
assumption is crazy, and the frantic and sometimes comical manipulation of the
speech/action distinction by courts is an involuntary and unwitting acknowledgment of just how crazy it is.
STANLEY FISH, THERE'S No SUCH THING As FREE SPEECH, AND IT'S A GOOD THING, Too 12526 (1994).
162. Sullivan claims that "the now-conventional free speech consensus can be boiled
down to three basic and fundamental distinctions: the distinction between mind and body,
the distinction between public and private, and the distinction between government's purpose in enacting laws and government's effect." Sullivan, Resurrecting, supra note 160, at
976.
163. The court stated that "[t]he Act might incidentally affect some conduct with protected expressive elements, such as peaceful but obstructive picketing." American Life
League, 47 F.3d at 648.
164. Id. at 649-51.
165. Id. at 652.
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duct proscribed, but oppositional 166
speech expressed through peaceful
conduct also might be restricted.
Because the Act allows for peaceful protest in the form of, for
example, prayer, chants, counseling, picketing, and handbill distribution, 167 the Fourth Circuit did not hold that the Act targets the antiabortion viewpoint, even though the Act specifically provides that a
violator must commit the proscribed conduct "because ... [the victim] is... obtaining or providing reproductive health services." 16 To
justify its holding that the Act is content and viewpoint neutral,'16 9 the
court compared the Act to a Wisconsin statute enhancing the penalty
for a crime committed "because of the victim's race"; 17 to Title VII,
which prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee
"'because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin'"; 171 and to the Fair Housing Act, which "prohibits using force or
the threat of force to injure, intimidate, or interfere with a person
'because' he is participating in certain housing programs."172
The Wisconsin statute, Title VII, and the Fair Housing Act all target proscribable conduct, but not on the basis of the viewpoint (i.e.,
bias) expressed by the conduct. 17 The American Life League court
166. This relates to a paradox that has bedeviled First Amendmentjurisprudence: some

content-neutral laws restrict more speech than content-based laws. Geoffrey Stone gives an
example:
[A] law banning all billboards restricts more speech than a law banning Nazi
billboards, and a law limiting the political activities of public employees restricts
more speech than a law limiting the Socialist political activities of public employees. Under current doctrine, however, the Court subjects the content-based restrictions to a more stringent standard ofjustification than the more suppressive
content-neutral restrictions. Why?
Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the FirstAmendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 189,
197 (1983). See generally id. at 201-52.
Stone answers the question he poses by analyzing four considerations that the Court
takes into account when applying different scrutiny to content-neutral and content-based
restrictions: "equality," "communicative impact," "distortion of public debate," and "motivation." Id. at 201-33. Stone also analyzes "ambiguous restrictions" that do not fit neatly
into content-neutral or viewpoint-based restrictions. I& at 233-51.
167. See American Life League, 47 F.3d at 650.
168. 18 U.S.C. § 248(a)(1) (1994).
169. American Lfe League, 47 F.3d at 651.
170. Id. at 650 (discussing Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993)); see supranotes
48, 126 and accompanying text.
171. American Life League, 47 F.3d at 650 (quoting and adding emphasis to 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a) (1) (1994)).
172. Id. (discussing and emphasizing a "because" provision of 42 U.S.C. § 3631(a)
(1994)). The Fourth Circuit referred to § 3631 in its entirety. Id.
173. "Where the government does not target conduct on the basis of its expressive content, acts are not shielded from regulation merely because they express a discriminatory
idea or philosophy." R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota, 505 U.S. 377, 390 (1992).
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claimed that the Access Act similarly targets conduct resulting from an
anti-abortion viewpoint, but that the Act does not target the anti-abortion viewpoint itself.17 4
Indeed, laws discriminating on the basis of viewpoint are so much
"the cardinal First Amendment sin that legislatures now will take pains
not to be caught at it."' 7 5 Content-neutral regulations that happen to
restrict speech almost always are upheld.17 6 Less speech, however, is
the ultimate effect of such content-neutral laws. 7 7 Although other
peaceful forms of protest remain a viable option to abortion protestors, protestors' fears that the Act will have a chilling effect on their
speech cannot be discounted entirely.
In First Amendment jurisprudence, the distinction between what
a law targets and what it actually hits has been referred to as the "purpose/effect" distinction. 7 ' In American Life League, the court found
that the purpose of the Access Act was not to prohibit expression of a
particular message or a point of view, but rather, to protect public
safety and interstate commerce.' 79 Some critics of the traditional distinction between the purpose and effect of a law may, depending
upon their political inclinations,' view the effect of the Access Act as
more important than its purpose: 8 ' "[s]uch a view sees free speech as
174. American Life League, 47 F.3d at 649-51.
175. Sullivan, Discrimination,supra note 156, at 446.
176. Sullivan asserts, "[If a challenged regulation aims at something other than content, then the government nearly always wins." Id. at 447; see also CAss R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 11-12 (1993). Sunstein explains that "[w ] e need to
distinguish among three possible kinds of restrictions on speech: content-neutral restrictions; viewpoint-based restrictions; and content-based restrictions." Id. at 11. Viewpointbased restrictions impose a penalty based upon the speaker's expressed viewpoint. Id. at
12. Viewpoint-neutral restrictions may be content-based, e.g., the government bans "all
political speech in a certain place," but the government does not ban only Fascist political
speech. Id. Sunstein asserts that "[tihe key difference between a content-based and a viewpoint-based restriction is that the former need not make the restriction depend on the
speaker's point of view." Id.
177. Sullivan, Discrimination,supra note 156, at 447; see also Stone, supra note 166, at 189.
178. See Sullivan, Discrimination,supra note 156, at 443; Sullivan, Resurrecting,supra note
160, at 978.
179. American Life League, 47 F.3d at 648-49.
180. In recent years, the political attractiveness of the First Amendment has shifted from
the liberal left to the conservative right. See Sullivan, Discrimination,supra note 156, at 43940. Sullivan remarks that calls for regulation now come from the left; calls for greater
freedom, from the right. Id. at 440. Fish makes similar observations when he discusses the
differences between "consequentialist" and "non-consequentialist" positions on free
speech: "'Free speech' always means for consequentialists 'free speech so long as it furthers rather than subverts our core values'." FISH, supra note 161, at 14. Non-consequentialists believe that "freedom of speech is not subordinate to some other value or tied to the
calculation of empirical effects but is asserted and honored simply for itself." Id.
181. See Sullivan, Resurrecting, supra note 160, at 978.
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valuable because it is instrumental to some other end-truth, self-government, individual autonomy, collective tolerance, or, as some new
free speech regulators urge, deliberative public discourse."182 Antiabortion activists would not be consoled by the Access Act's rule of
construction proclaiming that the Act may not be construed as
prohibiting "any expressive conduct"' because their expressive con1 4
duct includes peaceful, but obstructive picketing.
Notwithstanding the distinction between a law's purpose and effect, content-neutral laws that incidentally restrict protected speech
have been found justifiable when substantial governmental interests
are served. 18 5 Indeed, although the means of abortion protestors to
communicate their message has been restricted by the Access Act, substantial governmental interests are served by the Act,18 6 and ample
"opportunities and outlets for expression" remain available.' 8 7 The
integrity of the Fourth Circuit's decision, therefore, may rest most
firmly on these conclusions.
b. The Commerce Clause: A Means to Regulate Speech and Religion.--Opportunities for expression are available in both public and
private realms. 1 88 The distinction between public and private regulation of speech was addressed implicitly by the Fourth Circuit in its
consideration of Congress's power to enact the Access Act pursuant to
the Commerce Clause. Indeed, debate rages over the need for
greater regulation of the "marketplace of ideas."18 9 Although speech
and commodities have been analogized," 9 there may be reason to
182. Id.
183. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
184. American Life League, 47 F.3d at 648.

185. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968); see alsoStone, supra note 166, at
190-93.
186. See supra text accompanying notes 129-130.
187. See supra text accompanying notes 132, 167.
188. The distinction between public and private regulation of speech is the third distinction that is prevalent in First Amendment jurisprudence. See Sullivan, Discrimination, supra
note 156, at 443; Sullivan, Resurrecting, supra note 160, at 978.
189. See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, Free Speech and Unfree Markets, 42 U.C.L.A. L. REv.

949 (1995) [hereinafter Sullivan, Free Speech]. The "marketplace of ideas" concept derives
from Justice Holmes's dissent in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (upholding convictions of Russian immigrants for conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act by
passing out leaflets in favor of Russia and in opposition to United States intervention in
Russia).
190. In defending what she calls an "asymmetry" in government regulation of speech
and products, Sullivan offers three reasons for maintaining the status quo:
First, one might see speech as indeed a product, but one with sufficiently different properties from other products as to warrant a very different kind of regulatory regime. Second, one might see speech as a product much like other
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feel greater skepticism and mistrust of government regulation of
speech than of commodities,19 1 which may account for the disparity in
192
federal government regulation of commerce and speech.
Congressional opponents of the Access Act argued that the majority exaggerated the dangers of abortion protest.' 3 Justice Scalia
employed a similar argument in his partial dissent in Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc.'9 4 Abortion opponents assert that "loose predictions that protest will turn violent should no more stop Randall
Terry from peaceful protest than they once did civil rights
demonstrators." 95
However, only the means of anti-abortion activist expression has
been restricted by the Access Act.' 9 6 Limits have been placed on their
demonstrations. The restriction on the means of their protest "is connected to legitimate, neutral justifications": 97 preserving the peace
and protecting access to health facilities, constitutional rights, and interstate commerce. 9 ' These justifications for the Access Act-an Act
that the court noted may potentially restrict expressive elements of
conduct," m and place a substantial burden on religious exercise211_
satisfy both the substantial interest test of First Amendment intermediate scrutiny,2 ° ' and the compelling interest test of RFRA. 2 The
Fourth Circuit decision thus exposes an intriguing difference between
products, but distrust government more in speech than in economic markets,
based on the prediction that risks of majoritarian error or self-dealing will be
greater in the former than in the latter. Third, and most dramatic, because it
involves a certain heresy against that canonical passage by Holmes, one might
decide that the analogy between speech and economic markets is misguided, and
that freedoms of speech and economic transactions are different at the core.
Sullivan, Free Speech, supra note 189, at 959.
191. Sullivan, Resurrecting, supra note 160, at 981.
192. See Sullivan, Free Speech, supra note 189, at 949-50, 961-62.
193. See supra notes 94-103 and accompanying text.
194. 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2534-37 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
195. Sullivan, Discrimination, supra note 156, at 441.
196. Sunstein distinguishes between viewpoint-based restrictions and restrictions on the
means of expressing a viewpoint. SUNStEIN, supra note 176, at 189.
197. See id. "Viewpoint discrimination is not established by the fact that in some hypotheticals, one side has a greater means of expression than another, at least-and this is
the critical point-if the restriction on means is connected to legitimate, neutral justifications." Id.
198. American Life League, 47 F.3d at 64748, 652.
199. Id. at 648.
200. Id. at 655.
201. Id. at 652.
202. Id. at 656.
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the standards applied to preserve freedom of speech and those applied to preserve freedom of religious exercise.
In essence, the Access Act demonstrates how Congress may regulate the "marketplace of ideas"2"' through its power to regulate "commercial intercourse."20 4 The controversy over disparate federal
government regulation of commerce and speech20 5 is thus ironically
illuminated in a decision that makes restrictions on speech and religion dependant upon substantial commercial interests.
5. Conclusion.-The implications of the Fourth Circuit's decision in American Life League, Inc. v. Reno are subtle, but compelling.
Speech and religious exercise may indeed be restricted through the
federal government's power to regulate commerce. The court concluded that the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act is content
neutral, yet conceded that some protected expressive elements of conduct may be proscribed by the Act. Less speech is the result of these
incidental restrictions. Attempts to distinguish between speech and
conduct are thus sometimes unconvincing. The current intellectual
and political debate over First Amendment doctrine reveals this paradox, which is manifest in the Fourth Circuit's decision. Nevertheless,
the court properly held that the Act's incidental restrictions on speech
are no greater than necessary to further the substantial governmental
interests of protecting public health, safety, and commerce, and the
constitutional and statutory rights of citizens. In essence, the court's
decision rests most soundly on its conclusions that protected speech
was not targeted, substantial governmental interests are served, and
adequate alternatives for expression remain available.
BETTY

B.

S.

DIENER

Reaffirming a Narrow Interpretation of the Perez "Manifest
Necessity" Doctrine

In United States v. Sloan,1 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that Willie E. Sloan could not be retried after the trial
203. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
204. Justice Marshall's definition of commerce in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
1, 189-90 (1824), when viewed in the context of federal restrictions on conduct at reproductive health services, offers a rather ironic pun: "Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but
it is something more: it is intercourse. It describes the commercial intercourse between
nations, and parts of nations, in all its branches, and is regulated by prescribing rules for
carrying on that intercourse." Id.
205. See generafly Sullivan, Free Speech, supra note 189.
1. 36 F.3d 386 (4th Cir. 1994).
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court's sua sponte declaration of a mistrial during his first trial on
charges of embezzlement, mail fraud, and violation of the Taft-Hartley
Act. 2 The trial judge declared a mistrial when, late in the defense's
case-in-chief, Sloan decided not to testify on his own behalf.' After
the United States rescheduled Sloan for trial, the Fourth Circuit held,
on double jeopardy grounds,4 that Sloan could not be retried because
no "manifest necessity"5 existed for the trial court's declaration of a
mistrial.6 To determine whether a "manifest necessity" existed, the
court applied a standard first set forth over 170 years ago in United
States v. Perez.7 Under Perez, a defendant may be retried if "manifest
necessity" or the "ends of public justice" required a mistrial.8
In prohibiting a retrial of Sloan, the court failed to consider the
"public justice" component of the Perez formulation,9 and instead,
only examined whether manifest necessity required a mistrial. 10 The
Supreme Court, however, has held that the ends of public justice may,
in limited circumstances, take precedence over a defendant's right to
trial by a single tribunal. 1 The vague concept of public justice has
been interpreted to mean either the public's interest in fair, unbiased
2. Id. at 388-89. Sloan allegedly violated the Taft-Hardey Act, 29 U.S.C. § 186(b)(1),
(d)(2) (1994). Sloan, 36 F.3d at 389. Sloan's embezzlement charges stemmed from alleged violations of 29 U.S.C. § 501(c) (1994); his alleged mail fraud violated 18 U.S.C.
§ 1341 (1994). Sloan, 36 F.3d at 389.
3. Sloan, 36 F.3d at 388.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. V. "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb. . . ." Id.
5. See infra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
6. Sloan, 36 F.3d at 401.
7. 22 U.S. 579, 580 (1824) (holding that a defendant may be retried when a jury is
discharged from giving a verdict for reasons of "manifest necessity," or because the "ends
of public justice would otherwise be defeated").
8. Id. at 580; see also infra text accompanying notes 58-66.
9. Perez, 22 U.S. at 580.
10. Sloan, 36 F.3d at 401. The court concluded that "[t]here was no manifest necessity
for the district court's sua sponte declaration of a mistrial over Sloan's objections. Thus,
when the Government sought to retry Sloan, his motion to dismiss the indictment on
double jeopardy grounds should have been granted." Id.
11. See Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 505 (1978) (holding that a trial judge's
decision to declare a mistrial based on improper argument must be accorded great deference, and that there is public interest in the prosecutor having "one full and fair opportunity to present his evidence to an impartial jury"); Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 471
(1973) (holding that a mistrial met the standard of manifest necessity when the ends of
public justice would not be served by allowing a trial to continue under an insufficient
indictment); United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 484 (1971) (holding that while a defendant cannot be guaranteed "a single proceeding free from harmful governmental orjudicial
error," a trial judge must make every effort to exercise sound discretion when discharging
ajury); Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364, 367-68 (1961) (holding that a mistrial granted
in the interest of the defendant and based upon sound judicial discretion does not prevent
a retrial); Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689 (1949) (holding that under certain circum-
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judicial administration1 2 or the public's interest in the complete prosecution of those accused of felonies."i In Sloan, the court did not consider the impact of either meaning on the trial judge's decision to
declare a mistrial. Had the court more broadly interpreted the Perez
standard, Sloan likely would have been retried.
1. The Case.-On April 13, 1993, the grand jury for the Eastern
District of North Carolina returned a ten-count indictment against
Willie E. Sloan for acts Sloan allegedly committed while serving as
president of Local 1426 of the International Longshoreman's Association.'" His trial began on December 6, 1993.15 Opening statements
by defense counsel included what the government called a "'Horatio
Alger-like' account of 'the long history of Willie E. Sloan's rise from
humble origins to that of a union President."'1 6 In its appellate brief 7
the Government asserted that this portion of the opening statement
was improper because the defense "'was unable to produce the testimony via the defendant'" to support it."
In reviewing the trial transcript, the court noted five occasions
that defense counsel represented that Sloan would testify.' 9 Defense
counsel's first representation occurred while the Government's eighteenth witness, James Earl Carroll, testified.2 ° When defense counsel
attempted to impeach Carroll with evidence of Carroll's prior conviction for bribery and racketeering, 2' the trial judge asked defense
counsel if Sloan would testify. 2 2 After counsel indicated that he

would, the judge ruled that the impeachment information could only
stances, the public's interest in a fair trial outweighs the defendant's right to a complete
trial by a single tribunal).
12. Hunter, 336 U.S. at 689 ("[A] defendant's valued right to have his trial completed
by a particular tribunal must in some instances be subordinated to the public's interest in
fair trials designed to end in just judgments.").
13. Somervile 410 U.S. at 463. The Court has asserted that "the defendant's interest in
proceeding to verdict is outweighed by the competing and equally legitimate demand for
public justice." Id. at 471; see also Hunter, 336 U.S. at 689.
14. Sloan, 36 F.3d at 389. The government charged Sloan with accepting payment
from an employer in violation of the Taft-Hartley Act, embezzling from the union, and
mail fraud. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. After the mistrial, defense counsel filed an affidavit and the Government filed a
response to that affidavit. See id.at 392 n.5. The Court of Appeals relied upon those documents and the trial transcript, as well as the appellate briefs. See, e.g., id. at 392, 397.
18. Id. at 389 (quoting the Government's brief); see also id.at 397.
19. Id. at 396-97.
20. Id. at 389.
21. Id.
22. Id.
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be admitted into evidence through the testimony of Sloan.2 1 In accordance with this ruling, defense counsel did not refer to Carroll's
previous conviction during cross-examination. 24
The issue of Sloan testifying arose again during the defense's
cross-examination of Government witness Scipio Hawkins. 25 After
Hawkins denied knowing of certain threats and attacks on Sloan, defense counsel attempted to impeach Hawkins by introducing evidence
that demonstrated Hawkins's knowledge of such incidents. 2 6 The
court ruled that counsel could ask Hawkins to identify the incriminating documents, thereby permitting counsel to enter the documents
into evidence. 27 The court, however, stated that Sloan would have to
testify as to the documents' contents.2 Despite the court's ruling-to
which the Government did not object O-defense counsel never asked
Hawkins about the documents.3 0
The record indicates that the issue of Sloan testifying occurred a
third time when the Government announced that it planned to impeach Sloan with information about false affidavits he filed in previous litigation." Noting that defense counsel "'says his client's going
to testify,' 3 2 the Government explained that it planned to question
any witness accused of filing false affidavits about such incidents.3 3
The district judge refused the Government's request to use the information to impeach defense witnesses.3 4
When defense counsel attempted to question its witness Andrew
Canoutas, Sloan's former attorney, about a deed of trust he prepared
for Sloan, 5 the court sustained the Government's objection on the
grounds of hearsay.3 6 Although defense counsel argued that Sloan's
testimony would corroborate Canoutas's answer, the court neverthe23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 389-90.
27. Id. at 390.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. (quoting from trial court transcript).
33. Id.
34. Id. The districtjudge, before whom the matter of the false affidavits had occurred,
initially noted that he did not "recall" the prior case. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 390-91 ("[Dlefense counsel argued that the government had been permitted
to ask about the deed of trust on cross-examination 'for the purpose of making it look as if
there was something strange about Mr. Canoutas doing it.'").
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less upheld the objection noting that there was "'nothing to corroborate ...

at this point.'""7

The fourth representation that Sloan would testify occurred when
the Government again mentioned the false affidavits.18 The trial
judge indicated that the Government would "probably" be able to impeach Sloan and other witnesses with them. 9 Thereafter, defense
counsel asked the court for a recess to look into the matter of the false
affidavits.4" The court recessed for the weekend.4 1
At a pretrial meeting on the following Tuesday, Sloan's counsel
revealed that "'unless things changed'" Sloan would not testify.42 According to defense counsel's affidavit,4 3 the court "'immediately'" declared a mistrial because "'it had relied on counsel's statement that
Mr. Sloan would be a witness when it made certain rulings and felt
sure the Government was prejudiced because it might have offered
other objections or witnesses had it known the defendant would not
testify.'" '
Despite the defense's objection, when the court reconvened the judge informed the jury of the mistrial.4'
A written order, issued fifteen days later, revealed the court's reasons for declaring a mistrial:
[D]efense counsel's representations to [the court] and to
the United States preempted a fair determination of the issues.... In the court's view, reliance upon defense counsel's
unequivocal assertion that defendant would testify rendered
the trial fundamentally unfair to the United States. The integrity of the judicial process demands that the court and the

37. Id. at 391 (quoting the trial court transcript).
38. Id. ("During the testimony of the ninth defense witness, Buster Smalls, the question
of Sloan's filing a false affidavit and whether he would testify again arose.").
39. Id. At this moment in the trial, the judge noted that he remembered the issue of
the false affidavits and commented: "I'll tell you what happened. There were affidavits
filed by both the employers and the union . . . and both . . . were false." Id.
40. Id. Defense counsel asserted that the United States had not given him notice of the
false affidavits and that he had only learned of them through a newspaper article. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 392 (quoting defense counsel's affidavit). Following the mistrial declaration,
defense counsel filed an affidavit that stated that over the weekend Sloan decided not to
testify in light of the possible damage that could result from cross-examination regarding
the false affidavits. Id. at 391.
43. The court relied on defense counsel's affidavit and the Government's response and
appellate brief, as no transcript was taken over the weekend. Id. at 391-92.
44. Id. at 392 (quoting defense counsel's affidavit).
45. Id.
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attorneys who appear before it as its officers be able to rely
upon the others' respective representations. 4'
When the court scheduled the case for retrial, "Sloan moved to
dismiss the indictment on the 'grounds of double jeopardy.'"4 7 The
court denied the motion, "stating that to 'preclude a retrial in this
matter would be manifestly unjust and unfairly would exalt form over
49
substance."' 48 From this order, Sloan filed this interlocutory appeal
and the district court stayed the trial. 50
2.

Legal Background.-

a. Double Jeopardy Jurisprudence: Balancing the Defendant's
Rights with the Public's Rights.-The Double Jeopardy Clause of the
Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall "be subject for the
same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."5 ' Jeopardy
attaches "in a jury trial when the jury is impaneled and sworn."5"
From that point on, the defendant has a constitutional right, subject
to limited exceptions, to have his case decided by that particular
jury.5 " In limited circumstances, however, this right may be
46. Id. at 392-93. In its written order, the court noted that it did not "fault" or "blame"
defense counsel, nor did it consider the late decision that Sloan would not testify a "premeditated ploy." Id. at 393.
47. Id.; see supra note 4.
48. Sloan, 36 F.3d at 393 (quoting the trial court's denial of motion to dismiss on the
basis of double jeopardy).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See supra note 4. The policy behind the clause is the recognition that
[t]he State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting
him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that
even though innocent he may be found guilty.
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957) (holding that defendant found guilty
of second degree murder, when jury had a choice of first degree murder, could not be
retried on charge of first degree murder).
52. Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 36 (1978); see also Eric Loeb et al., Project: Twenty-Fourth
Annual Review of CriminalProcedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 19931994, 83 GEO. L.J. 1037, 1040 (1995).
53. E.g., Crist, 437 U.S. at 36 (holding that defendant's "valued right to have his trial
completed by a particular tribunal" is now within the protection of the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy); United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479 (1971) (holding
that society's awareness of heavy personal strain of a criminal trial is manifested in its willingness to limit the State to a single criminal proceeding); Harris v. Young, 607 F.2d 1081,
1086 (4th Cir. 1979) (holding that noncompliance with discovery orders did not constitute
manifest necessity to order a mistrial), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1025 (1980).
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subordinated to the public's interest in fair andjustjudgments.5 4 The
Supreme Court reconciled this conflict between the defendant's
rights and the public's rights 170 years ago in United States v. Perez.55
Under Perez, a criminal defendant can be retried only if manifest necessity or the ends of public justice required the trial judge to declare
a mistrial.5 6 Justice Story, writing for the Perez Court, declared:
We think, that in all cases of this nature, the law has invested
Courts of justice with the authority to discharge a jury from
giving any verdict, whenever, in their opinion, taking all the
circumstances into consideration, there is a manifest necessity for the act, or the ends of public justice would otherwise

be defeated. They are to exercise a sound discretion on the
subject; and it is impossible to define all the circumstances,
which would render it proper to interfere ....

[B]ut, after

weighing the question with due deliberation, we are of the
opinion, that such a discharge constitutes no bar to further
proceedings, and gives no right of exemption to the prisoner
from being again put upon trial. 7
(i) Manifest Necessity.-The Fourth Circuit consistently has
followed Perez.5" However, because of the many factual situations in
which courts declare mistrials, "the Supreme Court has refused to apply the manifest necessity standard in a mechanical fashion."5 9 Nevertheless, the Perez rule permits retrial if the trial judge declares a
mistrial after finding that the jury is "deadlocked, biased, or unduly
54. See Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689 (1949) (discovery of possible juror bias);
United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. 579, 580 (1824) (hung jury).
55. 22 U.S. at 579; see supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
56. Perez, 22 U.S. at 580; see also infra text accompanying notes 58-66.
57. Perez, 22 U.S. at 580.
58. See, e.g., United States v. Shafer, 987 F.2d 1054, 1057 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that
motive for mistrial was improper and other alternatives to a mistrial were available); United
States v. Council, 973 F.2d 251, 255 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding that acquittal on two counts
was actually a dismissal and could be retried, while other counts were barred from rehearing by double jeopardy); United States v. Sartori, 730 F.2d 973, 975 (4th Cir. 1984) (holding that circumstances surrounding recusal of trial judge did not warrant manifest
necessity for calling a mistrial); Whitfield v. Warden of Maryland House of Correction, 486
F.2d 1118, 1120-21 (4th Cir. 1973) (holding that both prongs of the Perez test were met in
declaration of a mistrial due to the circumstances surrounding suspected juror bias), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 876 (1974).
59. Sartori, 730 F.2d at 975; see also Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 506 (1978)
(holding that Perez does not "describe a standard that can be applied mechanically or without attention to the particular problem confronting the trial judge"); Illinois v. Somerville,
410 U.S. 458, 462 (1973) (holding that the Perez formulation "consistenty adhered to by
this Court ... abjures the application of any mechanical formula by which to judge the
propriety of declaring a mistrial").
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influenced."" ° Courts also recognize manifest necessity "when the behavior of the defendant or her counsel triggered the mistrial," or if
mistrial resulted from a defense motion.6 ' On the other hand, the
Supreme Court has held that double jeopardy forbids the court from
granting a mistrial to give the prosecution "another opportunity to
62
supply evidence which it failed to muster in the first proceeding."
(ii) The "Endsof PublicJustice."-In Illinois v. Somerville,6 the
Supreme Court attempted to define Perez's "ends of public justice"
component. The Court noted that the
interests of the public in seeing that a criminal prosecution
proceed to verdict. . . need not be forsaken by the formulation or application of rigid rules that necessarily preclude
the vindication of that interest. This consideration, whether
termed the "ends of public justice," or, more precisely, "the
public's interest in fair trials designed to end in just judgments," has not been disregarded by this Court."
The Court held that the need for a mistrial may "yield . . .to 'the
public's interest in fair trials designed to end in just judgments."'65
Therefore, the public's interest in secure, unreversible judgments fits
within Perez "ends of public justice" component."
Most recently, in Arizona v. Washington67 the Supreme Court considered society's interest in final judgments. The Court emphasized
the need to balance a defendant's right to be tried by a particular jury
with the public's interest in providing the Government with a full opportunity to try its case.68
Although the Sloan court did not follow the Supreme Court's
broad interpretation of Perez,69 it did follow Fourth Circuit precedent
regarding double jeopardy. While the court in Whiyield v. Warden of
Maryland House of Correction7° applied a balancing test reminiscent of
the Supreme Court's7 1 approach, in the four most recent cases decided by the Fourth Circuit the court focused solely on whether mani60. Loeb et al., supra note 52, at 1041.
61. Id. at 1041-43.
62. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 11 (1978).
63. 410 U.S. 458 (1972).

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 463 (citing Perez, 22 U.S. at 580; Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689 (1949)).
Id. at 469-71 (quoting United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 480 (1971)).
Id. at 471.
434 U.S. 497 (1978).
Id. at 505; see also Wade, 336 U.S. at 689.
See supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text.
486 F.2d 1118 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 876 (1974).
Id. at 1121.
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fest necessity existed for the declaration of the mistrial.72 In each of
these cases, the court failed to balance the defendant's right to a trial
in a single tribunal with the requirements of evenhanded
judicial ad73
ministration and the needs of law enforcement.
b. Standard of Review for MistrialDeclarations.-The abuse of
discretion standard is used to review a trial court's decision to declare
a mistrial based on manifest necessity or the ends of public justice.7 4
In Arizona v. Washington,75 the Supreme Court explained that the
"spectrum of trial problems"76 and the varying degree to which those
problems can be assessed by a reviewing court demand that "the trial
judge's determination [be] . . . entitled to special respect."7 7 However, a judge need not make an explicit finding of manifest necessity
for a reviewing court to find that it existed.78
In determining whether the trial judge exercised sound discretion in declaring a mistrial, reviewing courts look at different factors.
In a case of possible jury bias or prejudice, the Supreme Court in Illinois v. Somervil 7 9 applied "a general approach, premised on the 'public justice' policy enunciated in United States v. Perez."" ° Under this
standard, a trial judge has properly exercised his discretion to declare
a mistrial if an impartial verdict could not have been reached or if an
81
error would have made reversal on appeal a certainty.
More helpful for reviewing a judge's decision are the factors set
forth in Arizona v. Washington."2 The factors include: (1) whether the
judge acted precipitately; 3 (2) if both the defense and prosecution
72. See, e.g., United States v. Shafer, 987 F.2d 1054, 1059 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that
there was no manifest necessity for mistrial where Government belatedly produced exculpatory documents); United States v. Council, 973 F.2d 251, 256 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding
that manifest necessity for mistrial did not exist where "the trial court cited fairness to the
defendant as a reason for its ruling"); United States v. Von Spivey, 895 F.2d 176, 178 (4th
Cir. 1990) (holding that under the circumstances defense counsel's illness constituted
manifest necessity for mistrial and reenactment was not a violation of double jeopardy);
United States v. Sartori, 730 F.2d 973, 977 (4th Cir. 1984) (holding that circumstances

surrounding recusal of trial judge did not warrant manifest necessity for calling a mistrial).
73. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text and note 72.
74. See, e.g., United States v. Shafer, 987 F.2d 1054, 1058 (4th Cir. 1993); Harris v.
Young, 607 F.2d 1081, 1085 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. deni/Ad 444 U.S. 1025 (1980).
75. 437 U.S. 497 (1978).
76. Id. at 510.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 517.
79. 410 U.S. 458 (1973).
80. Id. at 464; see also United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. 579, 580 (1824).
81. Somerville, 410 U.S. at 464.
82. 434 U.S. 497 (1978).
83. Id. at 515.
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had a full opportunity to explain their positions; 84 and (3) whether
the judge "accorded careful consideration to [the defendant's] interest in having the trial concluded in a single proceeding."8 5 Many
courts also look at whether the trial judge considered alternative remedies, such as curative instructions, before declaring a mistrial.8 6
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Sloan, the trial judge declared a
mistrial because the court "'relied upon . . . representations [that
Sloan would testify] in its rulings upon evidentiary issues in both the
Government's and the defendant's cases-in-chief, [and] admitt[ed]
evidence presumed to be corroborative of defendant's anticipated testimony."' 87 Writing for the majority, Judge Motz found this reasoning
unconvincing, noting that
there is simply no support in the record for the district
court's finding that reliance on defense counsel's representations that Sloan would testify caused it to make evidentiary
rulings and the government to make or fail to make objections, which rendered the trial fundamentally unfair to the
United States when Sloan ultimately decided not to testify.
In other words, no reason, let alone a manifest necessity, is
apparent in the record to justify a mistrial on the ground set
forth by the court.8 8
The Fourth Circuit also found it significant that the issue of Sloan
testifying was not mentioned in the record "until the trial was half
over and defense counsel was cross-examining the Government's
eighteenth witness."8 9 Furthermore, the court noted that in the two
instances in which the issue of Sloan testifying was raised during the
Government's case-in-chief, the trial judge made rulings that "did not
affect [the Government's] portion of the trial in any way." 90 In the
case of Government witness Carroll, the trial judge prohibited defense
84. Id. at 515-16.
85. Id. at 516.
86. See, e.g., United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 487 (1971) ("[N]o consideration was
given to the possibility of a trial continuance.... ."); see also United States v. Von Spivey, 895
F.2d 176, 178 (4th Cir. 1990) ("[The] district court considered every reasonable resolution
to the situation posed by defense counsel's illness."); United States v. Sartori, 730 F.2d 973,
976 (4th Cir. 1984) ("[O]ther obvious and adequate alternatives to a mistrial were available
in this case."); Harris v. Young, 607 F.2d 1081, 1085 (4th Cir. 1979) ("In determining
whether the trial judge exercised sound discretion in declaring a mistrial, we must consider
if there were less drastic alternatives to ending the trial."), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1025
(1980).
87. Sloan, 36 F.3d at 392 (quoting the trial court's written order).
88. Id. at 397.
89. Id. at 396.
90. Id.
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counsel from impeaching Carroll with information about a previous
conviction because Sloan could testify about the conviction.9 1 As for
Government witness Hawkins, the court allowed the defense to crossexamine Hawkins only about the identity, not the contents, of four
grievances and
a letter. 92 The defense never actually pursued this
93
opportunity.
The court also found that the two representations relating to
Sloan's testimony that occurred during the defense's case-in-chief did
not affect the admission of evidence in the trial.9" In the first instance, the trial judge prohibited Andrew Canoutas from testifying
about Sloan's deed of trust, which was "'presumed to be corroborative
of defendant's anticipated testimony."' 9 5 In the second, a mistrial was
declared before the court had even decided whether or not it would
allow the Government to cross-examine defense witnesses about
Sloan's false affidavits.96
Although the Government did not request a mistrial,9" it did argue that the defense's opening statement, which contained the "Horatio Alger-like" account of Sloan's life, justified a mistrial.9" The
Fourth Circuit, however, found nothing in the trial court's order to
support this contention.9 9 In fact, the court of appeals noted that the
district judge's order did not even mention the defense's opening
statement.1 0 0 Furthermore, the court maintained that if the trial
judge's declaration of a mistrial resulted from defense's opening state91. Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 20-24.
92. Sloan, 36 F.3d at 389-90, 396.
93. Id. at 396; see also supra text accompanying notes 25-30.
94. Sloan, 36 F.3d at 396.
95. Id. (quoting the trial court's written order); see also supra text accompanying notes
35-37.
96. Sloan, 36 F.3d at 396; see also supra text accompanying notes 38-44.
97. The Government claimed it "merely acceded to what the Court was clearly going to
do." Sloan, 36 F.3d at 392; see also id.
at 392 n.4.
98. Id. at 397.
99. Id.

100. Id. Nonetheless, the court briefly addressed the Government's core argument that,
"while... not improper when given, the defense opening statement necessitated a mistrial
'when the defense was unable to produce testimony via the defendant to support the Horatio Alger-like statements made to the jury.'" Id. (quoting the Government's brief). The
court noted that the Government failed to take into account the "well-established principle
that when 'an opening statement is an objective summary of evidence [counsel] reasonably
expects to produce, a subsequent failure in proof will not necessarily result in a mistriaL'"
Id. at 398 (quoting United States v. Wright-Barker, 784 F.2d 161, 175 (3d Cir. 1986) (alteration in original)). The court explained that a different result might have issued if the
objectionable material in the opening statement was highly prejudicial and unable to be
cured by instruction or other remedy. In this case, however, even the government conceded that the statement was not "'per se objectionable.'" Id. (citation omitted).
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ment, the judge should have considered other readily available alternatives to mistrial, such as curative instructions.1 0 1
Although the majority accepted the trial court's assertion that the
trial transcript did not reflect off-the-record comments that affected
the trial judge's rulings, the court nevertheless concluded that the
trial judge failed to exercise sound discretion in declaring a mistrial." 2 While acknowledging the sanctity of a trial court's discretion,
the court noted that it had "carefully, indeed painstakingly, examined
the record"' and found nothing to support even an implied finding
of manifest necessity.10 4 Thus, the court held that, in the absence of
manifest necessity for a retrial, Sloan's "motion to dismiss the indictment on double jeopardy grounds should have been granted.""0 5
In his dissent, Judge Niemeyer argued that the trial judge did not
abuse his discretion in declaring a mistrial.'0 6 He asserted that
"[b] eyond circumstances where the defendant has been acquitted, or
might have been acquitted because of an inadequacy of the government's evidence," the Supreme Court generally has given broad discretion to the trial judge to retry a defendant, even when a mistrial
ruling may appear hasty or unclear.'0 7 Judge Niemeyer asserted that
the double jeopardy protections
fall into two categories: (1) an absolute protection, where
the defendant has been acquitted (or convicted) or would
have been acquitted... and (2) a discretionary grant of protection at issue here, where the trial is aborted because of
trial error or some other event tending to defeat the ends of
public justice.'
As it is impossible to define all the circumstances in which double
jeopardy protection applies, Judge Niemeyer argued that a trial
judge's discretion must be broad. 10 9
Judge Niemeyer also concurred with the trial judge's assertion
that the trial transcript could not reveal the instances in which the
court remained silent based on defense counsel's representation that
Sloan would testify." ° Finding that the defendant's decision not to
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at

399-400.
400-01.
401.
405-06 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting).
404.
404-05.
405.
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testify was abrupt,"' that this decision changed the "trial's structural
assumption,"" 2 and that a written record was unavailable to the district court when it prepared its order,' Judge Niemeyer concluded
that while the court might be "inclined to question the wisdom of the
district court's order based on the bare record.... speculation does
not require us to find that the district court abused its broad
discretion." 1 4
Finally, Judge Niemeyer asserted that the "public justice" aspect
of the Perez formulation demands that "the government be given the
opportunity to complete a prosecution, unless its own actions preclude such an opportunity and as long as a district court did not act in
bad faith or otherwise abuse its discretion." 1 1 Judge Niemeyer urged
the court not to "deny the public its right to prosecute fully and fairly
those accused of felonies. "116
4. Analysis.a. Perez Misinterpreted.-Sloan does not represent a fundamental shift from prior Fourth Circuit decisions relating to double
jeopardy. Nonetheless, the case does provide an opportunity to scrutinize the court's misapplication of Perez and to comment on the incorrect standard of review employed by the appellate court.
Under current Fourth Circuit jurisprudence, the court will not
overturn a trial judge's determination that a defendant may be retried
if analysis of the trial transcript reveals that a mistrial was absolutely
necessary and that no alternatives to mistrial existed." 7 By using such
a strict, inflexible standard of review, the court applied the Perez standard in precisely the "mechanical fashion" that the Supreme Court
has rejected."' As the Supreme Court in Washington explained, "[the
language of Perez does] not describe a standard that can be applied
mechanically or without attention to the particular problem confronting the trial judge. Indeed, it is manifest that the key word 'necessity' cannot be interpreted literally."' 1 1 9
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id.; see also United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. 579, 580 (1824).
Sloan, 36 F.3d at 405.
See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 506 (1978).
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The Sloan court did not affirmatively reject the balanced reasoning of the Supreme Court in Arizona v. Washington,120 Illinois v. Somerville,12 1 and Gori v. United States12 2 in favor of a stricter approach. In
23
fact, the court actually recited the history of Perez and its progeny.1
In practice, however, the Fourth Circuit's application of a single factor
test-whether the mistrial was absolutely necessary12 4-indicates that
the court misinterpreted the Supreme Court holdings relating to
Perez.
The Fourth Circuit's rigid interpretation of Perez is problematic
for several reasons. First, an inflexible interpretation of Perez may inhibit judges in the execution of their duties. 1 25 The Supreme Court
noted in Gori that requiring judges to apply "formalistic artificialities"
could make them "unduly hesitant conscientiously to exercise their
most sensitive judgment-according to their own lights in the immediate exigencies of trial-for the more effective protection of the
criminal accused."' 26 Expressing the same concern, the Court in
Washington noted that "[t]he adoption of a stringent standard of appellate review in this area.., would seriously impede the trial judge in
the proper performance of his 'duty .... 127
Under the Fourth Circuit's current interpretation of the Perez
doctrine, if a trial judge believes that an incident during trial
prejudiced a party, the judge might hesitate to declare a mistrial if the
trial transcript alone would not adequately support the judge's determination. 12 On the same basis, ajudge may delay a mistrial determination until certain that the trial transcript reveals the prejudicial
event.' 29 A trial judge in the Fourth Circuit also may hesitate to declare a mistrial if any alternatives, even possibly inadequate alternatives, to mistrial existed. These effects are especially problematic in
light of the judiciary's desire to expedite trials and avoid delay. Any
result that creates unwarranted expenses and burdens litigants or the
court runs contrary to the "ends of public justice" component of Perez.
Further, any result that additionally burdens a criminal defendant
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id.
410 U.S. 458 (1973).
367 U.S. 364 (1961).
Sloan, 36 F.3d at 393-95.

124. See infra text accompanying notes 153-154.
125. Gori 367 U.S at 369-70.
126. Id.

127. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 513 (1978) (quoting United States v. Dinitz,
424 U.S. 600, 612 (1976)).

128. See supra text accompanying note 117.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 125-127.
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clearly violates the principles underpinning the purpose of double
jeopardy protections.1 3 0
b. Lack of Deference to the DistrictJudge's Discretion.-Asecond
problem with the Sloan decision is the court's failure to defer to the
discretion of the trialjudge. The Supreme Court's ruling in Washington13 explains why a mistrial determination is left to the discretion of
the trial judge.132 In Washington, the trial judge granted the prosecutor's motion for a mistrial based on improper and prejudicial comments made during defense counsel's opening statement.13 3 In that
case, the Supreme Court noted that "the extent of the possible bias
cannot be measured,"1 3 a that "some trial judges might have proceeded with the trial after giving the jury appropriate cautionary instructions, " 13 ' and that a mistrial was not "in a strict, literal sense...
necessary." 13 6 The Court, however, allowed a retrial of the defendant
and commented that "[n]evertheless, the overriding interest in the
evenhanded administration of justice requires that we accord the
highest degree of respect to the trial judge's evaluation."137
The issues before the Fourth Circuit in Sloan were substantively
similar to those before the Supreme Court in Washington: the difficultly in measuring the extent of prejudice to the prosecutor; the
availability of alternatives to a mistrial; and the public's interest in
evenhanded judicial administration. Despite the fact that in reviewing
Sloan the court purported to follow Washington,1 3 8 the Sloan court actually applied a far more inflexible interpretation of Perez. In prohibiting a retrial, the Sloan court focused solely on the bare requirement
that a mistrial be absolutely necessary for a defendant to be retried.13 9
In United States v. Goi, 14 a case that, like Sloan, involved possible
prejudice to a party, the Supreme Court read Perez as allowing a flexible, balanced approach to the determination of whether a defendant
130. The Gori Court noted that cases requiring the "safeguard of the Fifth Amendment"
are those cases "in which the defendant would be harassed by successive, oppressive prosecutions, or in which a judge exercises his authority to help the prosecution, at a trial in
which its case is going badly, by affording it another, more favorable opportunity to convict
the accused." Gori, 367 U.S. at 369.
131. Washington, 434 U.S. at 497.
132. See generally id. at 509-14.
133. Id, at 498-501.
134. Id. at 511.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Sloan, 36 F.3d at 393-95.
139. Id. at 388-89.
140. 367 U.S. 364 (1961).
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could be retried. 4 1 In that case, the trial judge declared a mistrial
when he inferred that the prosecutor's line of questioning would soon
lead to inappropriate statements about the defendant's criminal record.'1 Although the Court found that the judge's action showed "an
overeager solicitude" to the accused, 43 the Court held that the defendant could be retried." 4 The Court determined that the mistrial
declaration was hasty and the reason for it "not 'entirely clear,"" 4 5 but
nevertheless held that the fundamental concepts of judicial administration give broad discretion to a judge, a responsibility "which 'is
particularly acute in the avoidance of prejudice arising from nuances
in the heated atmosphere of trial, which cannot be fully depicted in
the cold record on appeal." ' 146
In Sloan, the court failed to consider the special position of a trial
judge in determining whether a party has been prejudiced during
trial. Although, admittedly, the record offered little support for the
trial judge's decision, 147 even the majority acknowledged that intangible off-the-record factors likely provided additional support.14 And
in overturning the trial judge's decision, the court failed to consider
the underlying reason for the judge's action-the desire to prevent
prejudice to a party.1 49 More important, however, the court seemed
to ignore the very reason that a mistrial determination rests within a
judge's discretion-that the trial judge occupies a special position in
the "'heated atmosphere"' of the courtroom.15 0
As Judge Niemeyer pointed out, the transcript from Sloan's trial
indicated that a basis did exist for the trial judge's action.' 5 1 The record revealed that the trial court decided several evidentiary rulings
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at

366-70.
365-66.
367.
365.
366 (quoting United States v. Gori, 282 F.2d 43, 46, 48 (2d Cir. 1960)).

146. Id. (quoting Gori, 282 F.2d at 47).
147. Judge Niemeyer noted that the Court of Appeals "might be inclined to question
the wisdom of the district court's order based on the bare record" but urged the majority
to go beyond the transcript in making its determination. Sloan, 36 F.3d at 405 (Niemeyer,

J., dissenting).
148. See supra text accompanying note 102.
149. The trial judge declared that "[d]efense counsel's unequivocal assertion that defendant would testify rendered the trial fundamentally unfair to the United States. The
integrity of the judicial process demands that the court and the attorneys who appear
before it as its officers be able to rely upon the others' respective representations." Sloan,
36 F.3d at 393 (quoting the trial court's written order).
150. Gori, 367 U.S. at 366 (quoting Gori, 282 F.2d at 47).
151. Sloan, 36 F.3d at 405 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting).
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based on the assumption that Sloan would testify.'
Whether Sloan's
decision not to testify actually influenced the admittance of evidence
or resulted in prejudice to a party is a separate issue. It can be inferred from the transcript that the Government and the court thought
and received reassurances that Sloan would testify until they learned
late in the trial that he would not. Under these facts, the trial judge
was in the best position to decide to what degree defense counsel's
representations that Sloan would testify influenced the structure of
the trial. The judge also was best able to determine whether an alternative to mistrial would have cured the damage wrought by Sloan's
decision not to testify. The trial judge's decision should have been
respected.
5. Conclusion.-The first sentence in the Sloan majority opinion
states that "[t] he sole question presented here is whether the declaration of a mistrial was justified by 'manifest necessity."'"" 3 The court
concluded that "[b]ecause Sloan's decision not to testify did not create a 'manifest necessity' requiring declaration of a mistrial, we must
reverse."15 4 This language makes clear that the Fourth Circuit adhered to an unduly formalistic interpretation of Perez that directly contradicts the flexible, balancing approach encouraged by the Supreme
Court. Most important, the Fourth Circuit's approach ignores the
"ends of public justice" component of Perez, thereby exposing defendants to the burdens of successive, oppressive prosecution that the
double jeopardy clause of the Constitution intended to prevent.
VIRGINIA

M. ROwTHORN

C. Permitting the Use of Videoconferencing in Civil Commitment Hearings
In United States v. Baker,' a divided panel of the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit held that the use of videoconferencing procedures in a civil commitment hearing2 does not violate an inmate's pro152. See supra text accompanying notes 19-40.
153. S1oan, 36 F.3d at 388.

154. Id. at 389.
1. 45 F.3d 837 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 194 (1995).
2. The relevant statutory provision is 18 U.S.C. § 4245 (1994), which permits the federal government to involuntarily commit federal prisoners for psychiatric care in an appropriate institution under certain circumstances. See also Baker, 45 F.3d at 840 (discussing the
criteria that the Government must satisfy to justify involuntary commitment under § 4245).
Also relevant for purposes of this Note is 18 U.S.C. § 4247(d) (1994), which provides for
certain procedural rights at a civil commitment hearing. Other statutory provisions exist
that provide for similar commitment of federal prisoners. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 4241-4246
(1994).
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cedural due process and confrontation rights.' This holding is
consistent with existing Supreme Court constitutional law, and reflects
increasing judicial acceptance of the use of technology in the courtroom. The reasoning of the court is flawed, however, because of the
difficulties arising from the application of the Supreme Court's procedural due process test enunciated in Mathews v. Eldridge.4
1. The Case.-Leroy Baker was serving a fifteen-year federal sentence for bank robbery when the government transferred him to the
Federal Correctional Institution at Butner, North Carolina ("FCI
Butner") for voluntary psychiatric treatment.' The staff diagnosed
Baker as a paranoid schizophrenic, and he subsequently began refusing all medication. 6 Eventually, he required continuing seclusion because of inappropriate behavior and psychoses, and the staff
determined that Baker should be placed in a facility for involuntary
7
treatment.
On July 22, 1993, the United States moved that the District Court
for the Eastern District of North Carolina, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 4245,8 determine "the present mental condition of Leroy Baker."9
The government also moved to conduct the hearing by videoconference, pursuant to a pilot program involving the use of videoconferencing to conduct commitment hearings."0 On July 30, 1993, the
district court granted the Government's motion to hold the hearing
by videoconference. 1 1 Shortly thereafter, Baker's appointed counsel
objected to the use of the videoconferencing procedures. 12 Specifically, Baker argued that the use of videoconferencing violated his
Fifth Amendment procedural due process rights, his Sixth Amend3. Baker, 45 F.3d at 840.
4. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
5. Baker, 45 F.3d at 841.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 4245 (1994).
9. Baker, 45 F.3d at 841. FCI Burner is located in the Middle District of North Carolina, but is defined statutorily as part of the Eastern District of North Carolina. 28 U.S.C.
§ 113(a) (1988 & Supp. 1993); see also Baker, 45 F.3d at 841 n.2. 18 U.S.C. § 4245 permits
the involuntary commitment of federal inmates to psychiatric facilities if the government
proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the inmate is suffering from a mental
disease or defect that requires care in such a facility. 18 U.S.C. § 4245.
10. Baker, 45 F.3d at 841. In March of 1993, the Judicial Conference of the United
States authorized the District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina to conduct
commitment hearings via teleconferencing as part of a pilot program.
11. Id.
12. Id.
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ment right to effective counsel, and his statutory rights to counsel and
confrontation under 18 U.S.C. § 4247(d). 15
The district court held Baker's competency hearing on August
13, 1993, using the videoconference procedure.' 4 Baker's image was
transmitted from FCI Butner, where he remained, to the courthouse
in Raleigh via live television broadcast.' 5 According to the district
court, video and audio transmission were clear, the court reporter had
no apparent difficulty transcribing the proceedings, and facial expressions and demeanor were easily observable.' 6 Baker, however, complained that neither video nor audio transmission quality were
sufficient, that the constant switching between images prohibited witnesses from seeing their questioners and prevented the judge from
viewing Baker and his attorney during cross-examination, and that the
setup prevented Baker's attorney from effectively observing the judge
during cross-examination. 7
At the close of the hearing, the court found that the Government
had established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Baker suffered from a mental disease or defect requiring custody for treatment. i" Baker did not challenge this determination on appeal. 9
After the competency hearing, the district court allowed both
sides to present evidence and arguments concerning Baker's objec13. Id. at 840; see aLso United States v. Baker, 836 F. Supp. 1237, 1240 (E.D.N.C. 1993),
affd, 45 F.3d 837 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 194 (1995).
14. Baker, 45 F.3d at 841. Apparently, this was the first such hearing to employ the
videoconferencing technology. See Baker, 836 F. Supp. at 1238 ("What is unusual about the
proceeding.., is that it was conducted through the medium of video conference technology, or 'teleconferencing.'") (footnote omitted).
15. Baker, 45 F.3d at 841. Present at FCI Burner were Baker, his attorney, the Government's witness, two security officers, Baker's counselor, and observers. Id. At the Raleigh
courthouse were District Judge Britt, an assistant United States attorney, the court reporter, the deputy clerk of court, a federal public defender, and spectators. Id.
16. Id. at 842; see aLso Baker, 836 F. Supp. at 1239.
17. Baker, 45 F.3d at 842. Baker argued that the technical equipment arrangement was
not an adequate substitute for being physically present at the hearing. Id. at 841-42. Two
cameras and various monitors were installed at both FCI Butner and the courthouse. Id. at
841. At FCI Butner, one camera focused on Baker and his attorney, and could zoom in on
Baker. Id. The other focused on the witness stand. Id. The courtroom had a monitor for
the judge and one positioned in front of Government counsel's table, facing the rear of
the courtroom. Id. One camera focused on the judge, and the other on the assistant U.S.
attorney. Id. At each location, the monitors could only display the images from one of the
two cameras at the other location. Id. at 841-42. Remote controls allowed the judge and
Baker's attorney to switch between images at their respective locations. Id. Baker's complaints about "constant switching" of images resulted from this setup. Id. at 842.
18. Id. at 841; see also Baker, 836 F. Supp. at 1238. The only witness to testify at the
hearing was a psychologist with FCI Burner on behalf of the Government. Baker, 45 F.3d at
842.
19. Baker, 45 F.3d at 841.
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tions to the videoconferencing procedure." ° Baker introduced documentary and expert testimonial evidence to illustrate the potential
dangers of the videoconferencing procedures."1 The district court
held that the videoconference procedures did not violate Baker's constitutional or statutory rights." Baker appealed this ruling to the
23
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.

2.

Legal Background.-

a. ConstitutionalProceduralDue Process Rights in a Commitment
Hearing.-In holding that the videoconferencing hearing did not violate Baker's procedural due process rights, the Fourth Circuit relied
heavily on Mathews v. Eldridge24 and its progeny. In Mathews, the
Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment2 5 required an evidentiary hearing
before the Social Security Administration terminated disability benefits.26 Justice Powell, writing for the Court, held that the Due Process
Clause did not require such a hearing, 27 and that existing agency procedures were adequate.2 ' To reach this result, the Court enumerated
a three-pronged balancing test to determine what procedural due process rights attach when government action threatens an individual's
life, liberty, or property interest.' The Court considered:
[f] irst, the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedure used, and the probable
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens
that the additional or substitute procedural requirements
would entail."0
Significantly for the Fourth Circuit, the Mathews Court noted in
its analysis of the second prong that the decision whether to discon20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.; see also Baker, 836 F. Supp. at 1246.

23. Baker, 45 F.3d at 841.
24. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
25. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment states: "No person shall ... be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law...." U.S. CONST. amend.
V.
26. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 323.
27. Id. at 349.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 335.
30. Id.
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tinue the disability benefits turns in most cases on "routine, standard,
and unbiased medical reports by physician specialists,"
thus substan31
tially reducing the value of an evidentiary hearing.
32
Three years after the Mathews decision, in Addington v. Texas,
the Supreme Court considered the standard of proof that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause"3 required in a civil commitment proceeding.'M The Court reasoned that although "state power is
not exercised in a punitive sense" in a civil commitment hearing,31
such hearings can deprive the respondent of a significant liberty interest. 6 Therefore, due process protections attach to respondents in
37
civil commitment hearings.
The Court in Addington applied the Mathews test 8 and held that
the "clear and convincing evidence" standard satisfied the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 9 In analyzing the "erroneous deprivation of liberty" aspect of the test's second prong, the
Court noted that the basic inquiry in a civil commitment hearing of
whether a person is mentally ill and dangerous turns on expert medical testimony.4 ° Expert testimony, according to the Court, requires a

31. Id. at 344 (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 404 (1971)).
32. 441 U.S. 418, 428 (1979); see also United States v. Copely, 935 F.2d 669, 672 (4th
Cir. 1991) (holding that a defendant has a right to a hearing "to determine by clear and
convincing evidence if the defendant is dangerous before being civilly committed").
33. The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause states in part: "[N] or shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law...." U.S.
CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
34. Addington, 441 U.S. at 419-20. In Addington, the defendant was arrested for threatening his mother. I& at 420. Prior to the arrest, he had been committed to various hospitals on seven occasions because of his emotional and mental difficulties. Id. Addington's
mother petitioned the Texas trial court for Addington's involuntary commitment, pursuant to Texas law. I& After trial, the jury found, by clear and convincing evidence, that
Addington was mentally ill and that he required hospitalization for his own or for others'
welfare. Id. at 421. Addington had objected to the judge's instructions, and appealed. Iii
The intermediate state appellate court reversed, holding that procedural due process required a standard of proof of "beyond a reasonable doubt." Ii at 421-22. The Texas
Supreme Court reversed the intermediate court, holding that a "preponderance of the
evidence" standard adequately comported with due process. Id. at 422. The United States
Supreme Court vacated the judgment and held that a "clear and convincing evidence"
standard was required. Id. at 433.
35. Id. at 428.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 425.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 427.
Id. at 429.
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subjective analysis instead of the factual determination required in a
criminal trial.4 1
A year later, the Supreme Court held in Vitek v. Jones4 2 that certain procedural due process protections are available to respondents
in federal and state commitment hearings.4" The minimum procedural protections that attach are: (1) written notice to the person that
transfer to a mental hospital is being considered; (2) a hearing at
which evidence is presented and the respondent has a chance to be
heard and to present evidence; (3) absent a showing of good cause,
the right to confront witnesses; (4) an independent decisionmaker;
(5) a written, reasoned decision; (6) access to an independent advisor,
not necessarily an attorney; (7) and timely notice of the hearing and
of these rights." The Court noted in Vitek, as in Addington, that "adverse social consequences" can attach to the committed individual,4 5
and that although the question of a person's mental state is essentially
medical and turns on expert testimony, it is precisely "[t] he subtleties
and nuances of psychiatric diagnoses" that necessitate an adversarial
hearing. 46
The final Supreme Court case that the Baker court looked to was
4 7 In Craig,the Court addressed whether permitting
Maryland v. Craig.
a child witness in a child abuse case to testify via closed-circuit television violated the defendant's Confrontation Clause rights.48 The
Court held that it did not,49 reasoning that although face-to-face confrontation is a fundamental aspect of the Confrontation Clause, it is
not an absolute right.5" The central purpose of the Confrontation
Clause, according to the Court, "is to ensure the reliability of the evidence against a criminal defendant by subjecting it to rigorous testing
in the context of an adversary proceeding before the trier of fact." 51 If
this "core" purpose is satisfied, and if the State has an important inter41. Id. at 429-30. Because of the subjectivity involved in psychiatric diagnoses, the
Court found as a practical matter that proof beyond a reasonable doubt would be inappropriate in a civil commitment proceeding. Id. at 430.
42. 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
43. Id. at 489-90.
44. Id. at 494-95.
45. Id. at 491-92 (quoting Addington, 441 U.S. at 425-26).
46. Id. at 495 (quoting Addington, 441 U.S. at 430).
47. 497 U.S. 836 (1990).

48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 840.
Id. at 857.
Id. at 844.
Id. at 845.

1996]

FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS1

1007

est at stake that necessitates dispensing with face-to-face confrontation, the defendant's rights are not violated.5 2
b. Statutory Rights Under 18 U.S.C. § 4247(d).-The Fourth
Circuit considered the Eighth Circuit's decision in United States v. Veltman" in addressing Baker's statutory rights.'M The Veltman court, in
determining how to evaluate a civil commitment respondent's waiver
of his § 4247(d) right to counsel, noted that Congress had decided
not to offer the full panoply of procedural protections available to
criminal defendants.55 According to the Eighth Circuit, Congress apparently sought merely "to satisfy the Supreme Court's holding in
Vitek v. Jones... requiring certain due process protections for prisoner
transfers to mental hospitals."56
3. The Court's Reasoning.-A divided panel of the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's holding that the use of
teleconferencing in Baker's involuntary commitment hearing did not
violate his constitutional or statutory rights.5 7
a. Constitutional Rights in an Involuntary Commitment Hearing.-The majority first noted that "[a] commitment hearing is a civil
matter"" because "state power is not exercised in a punitive sense." 59
Therefore, the respondent in such a hearing is not entitled to the
same constitutional rights as a criminal defendant."° However, the
court recognized that a commitment hearing can result in significant
impairment of a liberty interest,6" and that certain procedural due
process protections are available to respondents in federal and state
commitment hearings. 62 The court reasoned that the videoconference procedures did not preclude these rights.6" Thus, the only constitutional issue before the court was whether the videoconference
52. Id.at 857.

53. 9 F.3d 718 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1572 (1994).
54. Baker, 45 F.3d at 848.
55. Veltman, 9 F.3d at 721.
56. Id.

57. Baker, 45 F.3d at 847.
58. Id. at 842.
59. Id. (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 428 (1979)).
60. Baker, 45 F.3d at 842-43 ("Thus, the constitutional rights to which a defendant in a
criminal trial is entitled do not adhere to a respondent in a commitment hearing.").
61. Id. at 842; see also Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
62. Baker, 45 F.3d at 843; see also supra text accompanying notes 42-44.
63. Baker, 45 F.3d at 842.
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procedure adequately preserved the essence of Baker's procedural
due process rights.'
To answer this question, the majority turned to the Supreme
Court's three-pronged Mathews analysis.65 In applying the "private interest" prong, the court reasoned that the curtailment of liberty resulting from a commitment hearing is less than that resulting from a
criminal proceeding, because the latter involves the exercise of government power in a punitive sense.6 6 Further, civil commitment is
temporary, and ceases when the person committed no longer suffers
from the mental disease or defect that renders him dangerous to
others.6 7 The court expressly rejected Baker's arguments that the indefinite duration of civil commitment, and its accompanying stigma,
renders such a distinction meaningless.6" The court believed that this
distinction is valid, and pointed to the differing burdens of proof as
evidence. 6 9 Nevertheless, the court concluded that the private interest at stake was great. Therefore, in order to uphold the use of videoconferencing, the Government's interest in the use of
videoconferencing also must be great while the risk of erroneous deprivation of liberty must be small.7 °
The court then applied the second prong of the Mathews test: the
risk of erroneous deprivation of Baker's liberty interest through the
use of videoconferencing procedures, and the added value, if any, of
further procedural safeguards. 71 The court based its analysis on the
differing goals of a criminal proceeding and a civil commitment hearing.72 Specifically, the court reasoned that the purpose of the former
is to discover the truth through rigorous examination of the evidence,

64. Id.

65. Id. at 845; see also supra text accompanying notes 24-31.
66. Baker, 45 F.3d at 845; see also Heller v. Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637, 2645 (1993)
in prison is punitive and hence more onerous that confinement in a
mental hospital.").

("[C]onfinement

67. Baker, 45 F.3d at 844.
68. Id.
69. Id. With respect to the differing burdens of proof, the court referred again to
Heer, 113 S. Ct. at 2645: "'[B]ecause confinement in prison is punitive and hence more
onerous that confinement in a mental hospital .... the Due Process Clause subjects the
former to proof beyond a reasonable doubt... whereas it requires in the latter case only
clear and convincing evidence.'" Baker, 45 F.3d at 844 (citations omitted in original).
70. Baker, 45 F.3d at 844.
71. Id.
72. Id. The court indicated in a footnote that it assumed, without deciding, that the
use of videoconferencing in a criminal trial would violate one or more constitutional rights
of the defendant. Id. at 844 n.4.
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followed by extensive fact finding."3 Therefore, a criminal proceeding
requires confrontation lights and effective assistance of counsel. 74 In
contrast, the purpose of a civil commitment hearing is to determine
whether the respondent should be committed.7 5 This determination
is essentially medical, and is based largely on expert testimony whose
persuasiveness depends not on the experts' demeanor, but on their
qualifications. 76 Thus, the goal of cross-examination changes from
"poking holes" in a witness's testimony in the former, to determining
the basis and limits of experts' opinions in the latter.77 Providing a
respondent in a civil commitment hearing with confrontation rights
less expansive than those afforded by the Sixth Amendment runs less
risk of erroneous deprivation of liberty than affording the same limited rights to a criminal defendant because of the distinctly different
7
nature of cross-examination in the context of commitment hearings. 1
The court rejected Baker's arguments that the videoconference
procedure unduly risked erroneous deprivation of his liberty.7 9 The
court first indicated that the expert testimony, not the respondent's
impression on the judge, was the relevant factor in a competency determination due to the unique nature of the hearing."0 Next, the
court indicated that Baker did not react adversely to the videoconferencing procedure, l and that loss of confidence in the hearing was
irrelevant: "there is no constitutional right to a hearing in which the
participants have confidence."

2

Baker also claimed that requiring defense counsel to address the
court via videoconference, while allowing the Government to argue
"live" before the judge, impaired Baker's attorney from presenting an
effective defense. 3 The court noted that this argument went to the
question of "counsel's ability to ascertain the facts on direct and cross73. Id. at 844 (citing Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845 (1990) ("The central concern of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure the reliability of the evidence against a criminal defendant by subjecting it to a rigorous testing in the context of an adversary
proceeding before the trier of fact.")).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 844-45 (citing Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980)).
76. Id. at 845.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Baker argued that the procedure interfered with his ability to present an effective
defense because: (1) it impeded his ability "to make a favorable impression on the court";
(2) it impaired his ability to understand and appreciate the importance of the hearing; and
(3) it reduced his confidence in the hearing's fairness and impartiality. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 845-46.
82. Id. at 846.
83. Id.
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examination," which is not an essential part of a commitment proceeding.84 The court also indicated that counsel's "decided preference" for arguing "live" had no bearing on videoconferencing's
constitutionality. 5
. The Baker court then applied the "government interest" prong of
the Mathews test, and indicated that fiscal and administrative concerns
may be taken into account.8 6 The district court had found that videoconferencing would be far less expensive than an in-person hearing.8 7 The court also noted the administrative difficulties of
transporting mentally unstable persons to court, the burdens of supervising them, and safety concerns "inherent in transporting a potentially mentally unstable person to a courthouse."8 8 The court
reasoned that the Government's interests were substantial.8 9 Because
these interests are substantial, and the risk of erroneous deprivation of
liberty is small, the court held that the videoconference procedure did
not violate Baker's constitutional due process rights despite the substantial curtailment of liberty that could result.90
b. Statutory Rights Under 18 U.S.C. § 4247(d).-Baker also
claimed that the videoconferencing procedure violated his statutory
rights under 18 U.S.C. § 4247(d). 9" Because a statute cannot grant
rights less expansive than those granted by the Constitution, the court
reasoned that the only relevant question was whether section 4247(d)
granted any additional rights not provided by the Fifth Amendment's
Due Process Clause.9 2 To answer this question, the Baker court first
turned to the Eighth Circuit's decision in United States v. Veltman.9"
The Baker court also noted that the legislative history of section
4247(d) indicated that it was intended "to meet certain due process
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 847.
87. Id.; see also United States v. Baker, 836 F. Supp. 1237, 1242 (E.D.N.C. 1993), affd,
45 F.3d 837 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 194 (1995).
88. Baker, 45 F.3d at 847. The court noted that "[m)any such persons require medication and supervision. Thus, any such transport is both hazardous to the respondents and a
burden to prison and courthouse officials." Id. The court indicated that such concerns
would be "substantially alleviated" with the videoconferencing procedure. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 847-48.
93. 9 F.3d 718 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1572 (1994); see also supra notes 5356 and accompanying text.
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requirements." 94 Therefore, the court held that section 4247(d) afforded no greater due process protections than those provided by the
Constitution, which effectively disposed of Baker's argument. 95
Judge Widener dissented in a brief opinion objecting not to the
decision per se, but rather to the vehicle that brought it before the
court. 96 He first noted that this case was obviously a test case brought
to determine whether the videoconferencing procedures sufficiently
preserved the due process rights of the respondent. 97 After summarizing the testimony presented at the hearing,9" Judge Widener pointed
out that it was uncontested that Baker was suffering from a mental
disease or defect, and that he should be taken into custody for treatment.9 9 Therefore, the court should not resolve the important issues
surrounding the videoconference procedure because of the uncontested nature of the hearing.1"' Rather, a contested case is needed
"before we should ascertain whether a man should be deprived of his
liberty by a merely televised witness and whether a man should be so
deprived of the opportunity to be present and face and address the
court."101
4. Analysis.-The Baker court held that the use of videoconferencing procedures in a civil commitment hearing did not violate conThis holding is
stitutional or statutory due process rights.'
94. Baker, 45 F.3d at 848 (quoting S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 249 (1984),
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.CAN. 3182, 3431). The legislative history of § 4245 makes it clear
that Congress made the procedural safeguards of § 4247(d) applicable to § 4245 in order
to satisfy the Supreme Court's holding in Viek v. Jone.
One major change the Committee has made in existing law is to require a court
hearing before a prisoner may be transferred to a mental hospital if he objects to
such a transfer. The necessity for such a hearing in State cases was made clear by
the Supreme Court in Vitek v. Jones .... It is to insure that Federal prisoners
continue to receive fair and just treatment that the Committee has included the
protective procedures of section 4245.
1984 U.S.C.CAN. 3429 (footnote omitted).
95. Baker, 45 F.3d at 848.
96. Id. at 850 (Widener, J., dissenting).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 848-50.
99. Id. at 850.

100. Id.
The issues in this case are profound. They are directly concerned with human
liberty, which, of course, other than life, is the most important value the law protects. I think we unnecessarily fall into error by accepting, deciding, and, by publication, putting our stamp of approval on a procedure of the most profound
importance in a case which is essentially uncontested.
Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 840.
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consistent with recent Supreme Court and federal procedural due
process jurisprudence with respect to civil commitment. Additionally,
the holding is consistent with a gradual acceptance of the use of new
technologies in courtrooms around the country.
a. The Baker Court's Reasoning on Its Own Terms.-In reaching its result, the Baker court correctly reasoned that the Supreme
Court's due process analysis enumerated in Mathews v. Eldridge'03 applied to this case.1" 4 However, the Fourth Circuit's application of Mathews to determine whether the use of videoconferencing in a civil
commitment proceeding violated Baker's procedural due process
rights is troublesome. The court, in analyzing the nature of the private interest at stake, reasoned that the liberty interest affected in a
commitment proceeding is great, but not as great as imprisonment
resulting from criminal prosecution. 10 5 The court relied on two propositions to reach this conclusion: first, that civil commitment is not
punitive in nature, 10 6 and second, that commitment only lasts until
the person committed recovers from his mental illness.'0 7 However,
this reasoning ignores concrete realities of civil commitment: the social stigma that attaches to the person committed,'
the indefinite
nature of commitment, 10 9 and the sometimes lackluster conditions of
mental institutions.' 10
The Fourth Circuit also pointed to the therapeutic, rather than
punitive, nature of civil commitment as a justification for finding that
the private interest at stake in this case is different from that of a criminal proceeding."' The court looked to the differing burdens of
proof between a civil commitment proceeding and a criminal prosecution as evidence that the liberty interests involved in each are not
merely "theoretically" different, but are actually different." 2 By using
103. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
104. Baker, 45 F.3d at 843.

105. Id. at 844.
106. Id.; see supra note 69.
107. Baker, 45 F.3d at 844.
108. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 492 (1980) ("It is indisputable that commitment to a
mental hospital 'can engender adverse social consequences to the individual' and that
'[w]hether we label this phenomena "stigma" or choose to call it something else.., we
recognize that it can occur and that it can have a very significant impact on the
individual.'").
109. Baker, 45 F.3d at 844.
110. See Adam Cohen, A Governor with a Mission, TimE, Sept. 4, 1995, at 32 (noting that
federal and state judges have declared Alabama mental institutions constitutionally
inadequate).
111. Baker, 45 F.3d at 844.
112. Id.
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one distinction to support another, the Baker majority never directly
addressed why different procedural due process protections attach to
an inmate in a civil commitment proceeding than to a defendant in a
criminal prosecution. Although it is true, as the Baker majority indicated, that the Supreme Court recognized such a distinction,' 1 3 the
Supreme Court also recognized that there is, in fact, a stigma that
attaches to those who are involuntarily committed.' 4 While the Baker
majority purported to follow Supreme Court precedent, there is little
in the opinion that directly supports the proposition that the Baker
court advanced.
The Baker court's application of Mathews's second prong is
equally problematic. The court pointed to the differing purposes of a
criminal trial and an involuntary commitment hearing to conclude
that the latter proceeding requires less extensive procedural due process rights." 5 This reasoning is consistent with other cases that determine what procedural due process and confrontation rights are
required in a given case," 6 and reflects courts' growing acceptance of
technology to streamline procedures." 7 However, merely classifying
the determination made in an involuntary commitment hearing as
medical does not per se decide what process is due. Rather, this distinction is technical and formalistic, and overlooks the truth-finding
function of an involuntary commitment hearing. Even though the
Supreme Court has classified the determination as "medical,""' it also
admonished that "[i ] t is precisely '[t]he subtleties and nuances of psy113. United States v. Addington, 441 U.S. 418, 428 (1979).
114. Id. at 429.
115. Baker, 45 F.3d at 844-45.
116. See, e.g., Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990) (holding that in a criminal child
abuse case, the child's closed-circuit testimony did not violate the defendant's Confrontation Clause rights when its use was necessary to protect a child witness from trauma); Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730 (1987) (explaining that the proper inquiry is whether
defendant had opportunity for effective cross-examination); Wayne K McNeil, Note, Maryland v. Craig- The Demise of Face-to-Face Confrontation, 36 Loy. L. REv. 1137 (1991) (discussing the increasingly narrow approach to criminal defendants' confrontation rights).
Similarly, a great deal of case law at the federal and state levels has applied the Mathews due process analysis to determine what process is due in a civil proceeding, and has
reached similar results. See, e.g., Doolin Sec. Sav. Bank v. FDIC, 53 F.3d 1395, 1403 (4th
Cir.) (holding that FDIC procedures for assessment of risk classification did not violate
procedural due process according to the Mathews analysis), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 473
(1995); Guinan v. State, 769 S.W.2d 427, 431 (Mo.) (en banc) (holding that the use of twoway, closed-circuit television in postconviction hearing did not violate defendant's right to
a fair trial), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 900 (1989); Ohio Ass'n of Pub. Sch. Employees v. Lakewood City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 624 N.E.2d 1043, 1045 (Ohio 1994) (holding that there
were no absolute confrontation rights in pretermination hearing).
117. See infra notes 131-154.
118. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 495 (1980).
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chiatric diagnoses' that justify the requirement of adversary hearings"
in these cases.1 19 Additionally, the inherently subjective nature of the
evidence presented in a commitment proceeding 2° also supports the
need for increased procedural due process. The Baker court overlooked these points.
Furthermore, the court overstated the benefits afforded to the
Government by videoconferencing procedure. The court believed
that the procedure will reduce substantially the costs of hearings, reduce administrative burdens of transporting mentally unstable persons to the courthouse, and eliminate security concerns.1 2 1 However,
neither the Fourth Circuit nor the district court made any statistical
comparison of the costs of the procedure and its savings; the court
merely stated that there are savings but provided no evidence of the
type or magnitude of such savings. Additionally, the court may have
overstated the administrative savings, given that the use of closed-circuit television may simply transfer the travel burdens to private de22
fense attorneys and public defenders.1
The district court also pointed to the increased comfort of inmates, who can remain in familiar surroundings.1 2 ' Although in some
cases the inmates may feel more comfortable participating from their
facilities, in others the use of this procedure may simply increase the
alienation and dehumanization that some inmates feel towards the
justice system. 12 The court's analysis under Mathews's third prong
does not rest on a solid basis of evidence.
The inconsistencies in the court's reasoning are ultimately linked
to the inherent flaws of constitutional balancing tests. As one commentator has noted, a frequent problem with balancing as a method
of constitutional interpretation is the lack of an external scale to compare competing interests; there is no "common currency for comparison."1 25 The result is often an inability to adequately compare
competing constitutional interests, and the adoption of a "seat-of-thepants approach." 126 Thus, in Baker the court weighed the three fac119. Id.
120. SeeAddington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429 (1979) (noting the "lack of certainty" and
"fallibility" of psychiatric diagnosis).
121. Baker, 45 F.3d at 847.
122. Ronnie Thaxton, Note, Injustice Telecast: The Illegal Use of Closed-Circuit Television
Arraignments and Bail Bond Hearings in Federal Court, 79 IowA L. REv. 175, 195 (1993).
123. United States v. Baker, 836 F. Supp. 1237, 1244 (E.D.N.C. 1993), aff'd, 45 F.3d 837
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 194 (1995).
124. Thaxton, supra note 122, at 196-98.
125. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, ConstitutionalLaw in the Age of Balancing,96 YALE LJ. 943,
973 (1987).
126. Id. at 974.
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tors expressed in Mathews, and arrived at the conclusion that the videoconferencing procedure is constitutional, while having no way to
assign these interests relative weights, and therefore no qualitative or
quantitative basis for its determination. Additionally, no reason was
given as to why only the three Mathews factors should be taken into
account. This reflects another weakness of constitutional balancing:
the tendency to neglect the "full inventory of relevant interests" in
27
favor of a mysteriously important few.1
Perhaps the Fourth Circuit ought to make a fundamental inquiry
into whether a given procedure affords the aggrieved party a fair opportunity to present his case."' Such an inquiry is far from unprecedented,"
and can minimize the difficulties of balancing while
reaching a fair result. However, notwithstanding the weaknesses of
constitutional balancing tests, the structure of the Baker court's procedural due process analysis is unquestionably loyal to Mathews. Additionally, the Baker court's reasoning is consistent with other Fourth
30
Circuit procedural due process jurisprudence.1
b. The Integration of Technology in the Courtroom.-As one
judge has noted, were Daniel Webster alive today, he would experience little difficulty arguing before a modem judge in a modem
courtroom.

3

While other professions have changed dramatically

since Webster's death, the legal profession has changed very little."'
The electronic and information ages have revolutionized American
life, yet the courts barely have begun to bring these technologies into
the courtroom.' 33 Until 1965, for example, the use of a video camera
127. Id. at 977.
128. Id. at 994-95.
129. See id. at 996-98.
130. See, e.g., Ritter v. Cecil County Office of Housing & Community Dev., 33 F.3d 323,
330 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that procedural due process protections depend on "time,
place, and circumstances" of deprivation); Jordan v. Jackson, 15 F.3d 333, 345-53 (4th Cir.
1994) (holding that Virginia statute permitting emergency removal of child from parents'
custody and allowing delay ofjudicial review for up to 65 hours was not violative of procedural due process); Plumer v. Maryland, 915 F.2d 927, 932 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that
Maryland procedures for revocation of driver's license comported with procedural due
process requirements).
131. Hon. Donald G. Alexander, Let's Kick Abe Lincoln Out of the Courtroom, or New Approaches to Conducting Trials, 10 ME. B.J. 148, 148 (1995).
132. Id.
133. For a general overview of the electronic media's struggle to gain access to the
courtroom, see Kathleen M. Krygier, Comment, The ThirteenthJuror: Electronic Media'sStruggle to Enter State and Federal Courtrooms, 3 COMMIAw CONSPECrUS 71 (1995). But seeAlexander, supra note 131 (arguing that the primary effect of new technology in courts has been
to increase costs and delay, rather than convenience).
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in the courtroom was considered a per se violation of due process.134
In recent years, however, courts have begun to experiment with new
technologies in response to increasingly crowded dockets.'
The
Baker decision falls squarely within this trend.
(i) Telephone Hearings and Telephone Conferencing.-A number
of courts have experimented with the integration of telephone technology. Several states have considered using telephone conferencing
in interstate child support cases,13 6 and some states employ telephone
conferencing for intrastate child administrative hearings.13 7 A
number of other states have used or are using telephone hearings for
38
depositions, evidentiary matters, and the issuance of orders.'
Although coordination of the parties can be difficult,3 9 the technique
has several advantages. Telephone conferencing permits out-of-state
parties to be "present" when otherwise unable to attend the hearing."4 The technology is inexpensive and easy to use.14 1 Its use can
eliminate wasteful attorney transit time, traffic delays, and parking
problems, especially when the matter is minor or uncontested. 4 2
This technology is perhaps most useful in large states with relatively
small populations. 4 3 Drawbacks include the inability to observe the
134. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 538 (1965). Before the Estes decision, most states had
adopted rules that virtually banned cameras, and later, the electronic media from the
courtroom. This trend is traceable to the massive publicity that surrounded the Bruno
Hauptmann trial. See Krygier, supranote 133, at 72-75. Since 1981, the Supreme Court has
liberalized the electronic media's ease of access to court. See, e.g., Globe Newspaper Co. v.
Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 608 (1982) (indicating that the exclusion of the electronic
media to protect ajuvenile victim must be determined on a case-by-case basis); Chandler v.
Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 573-74 (1981) (holding that there was no absolute ban on cameras in
court, and that the states were free to experiment with their use). Today, 47 states permit
television cameras in their courtrooms, but the federal courts continue to restrict their
access. See Krygier, supra note 133, at 76.
135. See Fredric I. Lederer, Technology Comes to the Courtroom, and...., 43 EMORY LJ. 1095,
1096 (1994) (providing an overview of recent efforts to integrate technology into the
courtroom).
136. Hon. Susan F. Paikin, Use of Teleconferencing in Interstate Child Support Cases,
FAIR$HARE: THE MATRIMONAL MONTHLY, July 1993, at 12.
137. Id.
138. SeeJ. Allison DeFoor H & Robert N. Sechen, Telephone Hearings in Florida, 38 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 593, 597-601 (1984) (discussing the increased use of telephone hearings in
the United States and specifically in Florida); see also Jerome R. Corsi et al., Major Findings
of the New Mexico Experiment of Teleconferenced Administrative Fair Hearings, 38 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 647 (1984) (discussing New Mexico's use of telephone hearings in unemployment
insurance and welfare administrative appeals).
139. Paikin, supra note 136, at 13.
140. Id. at 13-14.
141. Id.
142. DeFoor & Sechen, supra note 138, at 595-96.
143. Id.at 597.

1996]

FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS

1017

speaker, the difficulty of handling complex matters, and the depersonalization of legal proceedings."' Many courts in states employing
telephone conferencing hearings have held that the procedure does
not offend constitutional due process. 4 5
(ii) Televised Court lroceedings.--Similarly,a number ofjurisdictions have begun to integrate television into the courtroom to facilitate many matters. Perhaps the most common use of televised
proceedings is the use of closed-circuit testimony of child abuse victims, such as the Maryland procedure held constitutional in Maryland
v. Craig." Additionally, a number ofjurisdictions have experimented
with television in other contexts. Phoenix; Philadelphia; Suffolk
County; New York; Boise; Las Vegas; Santa Barbara; Los Angeles
County; and Miami all have experimented with video arraignments of
misdemeanor defendants, with varying degrees of success.147 The use
of closed-circuit television arraignments appears to be increasingly
popular.' 48 One commentator has estimated that approximately 160
to 200 such systems are currently in place across the United States.' 49
The advantages of remote arraignment include a substantial reduction in cost, streamlined procedures, and increased security. 150 Its disadvantages include decreased personal contact between defendant
and judge,' 5 ' and the possible alienation of the defendants from the
criminal justice system.15 2 It appears that no court has addressed
whether these procedures are constitutional under the Fifth or Sixth
144. Id. at 607-08; Lederer, supra note 135, at 1121.
145. See, e.g., Sterling v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 513 A.2d 253,
255 (D.C. 1986) (holding that telephonic unemployment compensation hearings are permissible and do not per se violate due process); State ex rel Human Servs. Dep't. v. Gomez,
657 P.2d 117, 123-24 (N.M. 1983) (holding that telephonic hearing regarding AFDC benefits did not deprive claimant of due process); Babcock v. Employment Div., 696 P.2d 19, 2122 (Or. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that telephonic unemployment compensation hearing did
not violate claimant's due process, equal protection, or fair hearing rights under state and
federal constitutions).
146. 497 U.S. 836 (1990). See id.at 853-54 nn.2-4 for a listing of states that employ
various video technologies to facilitate victim testimony in child abuse cases. The relevant
Maryland provision is located at MD. CODE ANN., CTs. & JUD. PROC. § 9-102 (1995).
147. Ray Surette & W. Clinton Terry III, The Casefor VideotapingMisdemeanorDefendants,
JUDGES' J., Summer 1991, at 21-24.
148. Lederer, supra note 135, at 1102 (citing Rorie Sherman, Courts Give Technology a
Mixed Greeting NAT'L LJ.,Jan. 10, 1994, at 1 (listing cases); Saundra Torry, Courtrooms Boost
Use of Vueo Camera Technology, WASH. POST, Sept 20, 1993, at F7).
149. Id. Professor Lederer's information comes from data at the National Center for
State Courts. Id. at 1102 n.33.
150. Patricia Raburn-Remfry, Due Process Concerns in Video Production of Defendants, 23
STETSON L. Rxv. 805, 810-12 (1994).
151. Thaxton, supra note 122, at 195-96.
152. Id.
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Amendments in a criminal case,153 but, as the Ninth Circuit has
15 4
noted, they do violate the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
A survey of these developments strongly suggests that the Fourth
Circuit's Baker decision fits squarely within the courts' increasing use
of and confidence in telephone and television technologies. The
clear, modem trend of the courts is to find such procedures constitutional. Certain risks may inhere in videoconferencing procedures
generally, but the courts' increasing dockets and scarce resources inevitably are leading them to adopt these procedures for the sake of
administrative convenience and efficiency. Thus, it is hardly surprising that the Fourth Circuit extended the availability of such procedures to civil commitment hearings.
5. Condusion.-The Fourth Circuit's holding in United States v.
Baker upholding the constitutionality of the use of videoconferencing
in a civil commitment hearing loyally follows existing Supreme Court
due process doctrine, as enumerated in Mathews. In this sense, the
decision is correct in that it follows and applies legal precedent.
Although the court's reasoning is flawed to some extent, many of
these flaws are likely due to the inherent problems associated with the
Supreme Court's due process balancing test. Furthermore, the decision is consistent with the judicial trend of incorporating audiovisual
technology into the courtroom to streamline procedures or to serve
other important goals, such as protecting child abuse victims. Given
the increasing strains on judicial dockets without a corresponding increase in judicial resources, this acceptance is to be expected. Concurrently, judicial concepts of what procedures adequately preserve
due process and other important constitutional rights likely will con-

153. See Valenzuela-Gonzalez v. United States Dist. Ct., 915 F.2d 1276, 1280 (9th Cir.
1990) (stating in dicta that it "is not immediately apparent" if the Fifth or Sixth Amendments prohibit the use of closed-circuit television arraignment).
However, some remote arraignments do appear to have survived legal challenge. Professor Lederer notes that such procedures survived legal challenge in Pennsylvania. See
Lederer, supra note 135, at 1104 (noting Commonwealth v. Terebieniec, 408 A.2d 1120,
1124 (Pa. Super. 1979) (holding that closed-circuit arraignment did not unconstitutionally
prejudice the proceeding)).
154. Valknzuek-Gonzaz, 915 F.2d at 1280. FED. R. CuM. P. 43(a) states: "Presence Required. The defendant shall be present at the arraignment, at the time of the plea, at every
stage of the trial including the impaneling of the jury and the return of the verdict, and at
the imposition of sentence, except as otherwise provided by this rule." Id.; see also
Vaenzuela-Gonzak, 915 F.2d at 1281 (holding that arraignment by closed-circuit television
violates FED. R. CRiM. P. 43(a)).
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tinue to evolve in a direction that facilitates such incorporation. The
Baker decision is part of this evolution.
MICHAEL A. STODGHILL
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CRIMINAL LAW

Limiting the Self-Representation Right in Child Sex Abuse Cases

In Fields v. Murray,1 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc, considered a criminal defendant's assertion of the right to self-representation in a child sex abuse case. 2 In
a seven-to-five decision,3 the court upheld the lower court's ruling that
one letter indicating an intention to proceed pro se--out of several
communications between the defendant and the court-did not rise
to the level of a "clear and unequivocal" assertion of the self-representation right.4 In denying the defendant's petition for federal habeas
corpus relief, the Fields court held alternatively that even if the defendant had properly invoked his right to self-representation, the trial
court was entitled to deny the right because the defendant's sole purpose was to cross-examine personally the child witnesses whom he had
been charged with sexually abusing.'
Fields permits a trial court to deny alleged child sex offenders the
opportunity to cross-examine their accusers personally, thus extending the rule of Maryland v. Craig, which allows courts to prevent
face-to-face confrontation between a defendant and child witnesses in
sexual abuse cases upon a proper showing of necessity.7 In the context of a pro se defendant, however, Fields establishes a lower threshold of necessity.' Additionally, Fields allows a trial court to deny the
self-representation right entirely if the defendant's sole purpose is to
cross-examine child witnesses. In so ruling, the Fourth Circuit suggested that denial of the pro se right, although clearly and unequivocally invoked, may in some circumstances constitute harmless error.
The court also implied that a trial court may deny a defendant's right
to self-representation based upon the defendant's reasons for invoking it.
1. The Case.-In 1988 Gary Fields was charged in Newport News,
Virginia, with sexually abusing his daughter and a number of her
1. 49 F.3d 1024 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cerL denied, 116 S. Ct. 224 (1995).
2. Id. at 1025.
3. Id. at 1024.
4. Id. at 1033-34.
5. Id. at 1037.
6. 497 U.S. 836, 860 (1990) (holding that when the state makes an adequate showing
of necessity, child abuse victims may testify against their alleged abuser via closed-circuit
television).
7. See infra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
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friends. 9 The Circuit Court for the City of Newport News appointed
two attorneys to represent Fields.' ° Prior to his trial, Fields sent three
letters to the presiding judge." In the first letter, Fields asked to be
appointed co-counsel so that he could question the child witnesses at
trial. 2 Fields believed that the children lied at his preliminary hearing, and he believed they could not "look [him] in the eye and lie to
[him]."l" In his second letter to the judge, Fields asked the court to

appoint new counsel because he disagreed with the defense strategy of
his court-appointed attorneys, again noting that he wanted to question the child witnesses himself at trial. 4 Two weeks later, in his third
letter to the judge, Fields stated that he had "no choice left but to
dismiss" his court-appointed attorneys and to "act as [his] own council
[sic] at the trial."' 5 In this third letter, Fields severely criticized one of
his attorneys and indicated that he never wanted to see the lawyer
"again under any circumstances." 6 Fields wrote, "I regret taking this
action, but I am convinced I have no choice.... Without the opportunity to personally defend myself justice will not be served."' 7 Fields
also asked the judge to "have a law clerk or someone appropriate"
contact him so that he could give them a "list of evidence and witnesses" that he needed.'
Less than two weeks after receiving Fields's third letter, the judge
held a pretrial hearing in which he talked to Fields about his letters.' 9
Part of the discussion focused on Fields's insistence that he be permitted to conduct cross-examination of the child witnesses."0 In addition,
one of Field's lawyers, Oldric Labell, informed the judge that Fields
"would like to represent himself with us as mere legal advisors."21 The
judge told Labell that he was "going to keep both of you in as attorneys." 22 The judge explained that he would allow Fields to submit
9. Fields, 49 F.3d at 1026. Fields was charged with six counts of aggravated sexual
battery, one count of forcible sodomy, and one count of rape. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 1026-27.
12. Id. at 1026.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1026-27.
15. Id. at 1039 (Ervin, CJ., dissenting).
16. Id. Fields accused his attorney, OldricJ. Labell, of incompetence and procrastination and criticized him for having "never kept a promise to show up on schedule either,
which leads me to believe he has a certain lack of intestinal fortitude." Id
17. Id
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1027.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1043 (Ervin, C.J., dissenting).
22. Id.
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questions through his attorneys, but that Fields himself would not be
allowed to cross-examine the children "under any circumstance. "23
After a bench trial,2 4 Fields was convicted on five counts of aggravated sexual battery.25 He appealed his conviction to the Court of
Appeals of Virginia, arguing, inter alia, that the trial court violated his
right to self-representation. 2 6 The Virginia court affirmed the trial
court, and the Supreme Court of Virginia denied Fields's petition for
review. 27 In 1991 Fields filed a federal habeas corpus petition in the
Eastern District of Virginia, again claiming that his right to self-representation had been improperly denied.2 8 The district court referred
the issue to a magistrate who, after de novo review, 9 recommended
that the petition be denied.3 0 The district court accepted the magistrate's recommendation and denied the writ. 3 1 A three-judge panel
for the Fourth Circuit reversed the lower court, and upon de novo
review3 2 held that Fields had properly invoked his right to self-representation.3 1 Subsequently, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated the opinion of the three-judge panel and granted
rehearing en banc."4

23. Id. at 1040.
24. Fields v. Murray, No. 91-7169, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 3138, at *3 (4th Cir. Feb. 17,
1994), reh'g en banc granted and opinion vacated (May 3, 1994), habeas corpus denied, 49 F.3d
1024 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 224 (1995).
25. Fields, 49 F.3d at 1028. Fields was acquitted on the sodomy and rape counts; the
sixth aggravated sexual battery count on which Fields was charged originally was stricken
from the indictment. Id. n.6.
26. Fields v. Virginia, No. 1697-88-1, slip op. at 3 (Va. Ct. App. Aug. 21, 1990).
27. Fields v. Virginia, No. 901282 (Va. Nov. 26, 1990) (order denying petition for
appeal).
28. Fields v. Murray, 90-100-N, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21142 (E.D. Va. June 10, 1991)
(finding that the question of whether Fields had effectively asserted his right to self-representation was a question of law and therefore subject to de novo review), approved, adopted,
habeas corpus dismissed, No. 91-100-N, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21140 (E.D. Va.July 10, 1991),
rev'd, No. 91-7169, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 3138 (4th Cir. Feb. 17, 1994), reh'gen banc granted
and opinion vacated (May 3, 1994), habeas corpus denied, 49 F.3d 1024 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 224 (1995).
29. Id. at *8.
30. Id. at *11.
31. Fields, No. 91-100-N, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21140, at *3.
32. Fields, No. 91-7169, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 3138, at *4 (concluding that the waiver
of the constitutional right to counsel is not a question of fact, but rather application of law
to fact and therefore was subject to de novo review).
33. Id.
34. Fields, 49 F.3d at 1025.
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Legal Background.-

35
a. The Right to Self-Representation.-In Faretta v. California,
the Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to self-representation. 6 Although this right is not explicit
in the Sixth Amendment,3 7 the Farettamajority found the right "necessarily implied by the structure of the Amendment," 38 noting that
"[t]he right to defend is given directly to the accused; for it is he who
suffers the consequences if the defense fails."3 9 Because the right to
self-representation involves waiver of the right to counsel,' the right
to proceed pro se must be made "knowingly and intelligently."4 1 The
Court did not provide a framework to assist in determining whether a
42
defendant's waiver of the right to counsel is knowing and intelligent.
The Fourth Circuit, however, has held that to trigger the self-representation right, a defendant must assert it "clearly and unequivocally"
before trial.4' Due to the competing nature of the right to counsel
and the right to self-representation, the court has acknowledged that
the right to counsel is "preeminent"' and therefore a trial court

35. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
36. Id.at 836.
37. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (providing that "[i] n all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right... to be confronted with the witnesses against him.., and to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence").
38. Faretta,422 U.S. at 819.
39. Id. at 819-20.
40. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (holding that pro se defendant who
knowingly and intelligently waives the right to counsel may not contest the conviction
claiming denial of the right to counsel).
41. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835 (quotingJohnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-65 (1938)).
The FarettaCourt stated that although the pro se defendant need not "have the skill and
experience of a lawyer... he should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of
self-representation, so that the record will establish that 'he knows what he is doing and his
choice is made with eyes open.'" Id. (quoting Adams v. United States ex reL McCann, 317
U.S. 269, 279 (1942)).
42. See United States v. Gallop, 838 F.2d 105, 109 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1211
(1988). The court observed in Gallop that Fareua "did not lay down detailed guidelines
concerning what tests or lines of inquiry a trial judge is required to conduct to determine
whether the defendant's decision was 'knowing and intelligent.'" Id.
43. United States v. Lawrence, 605 F.2d 1321, 1325 (4th Cir. 1979) (holding that a trial
court may deny a defendant's pro se request when it is made after the jury is selected but
not yet sworn), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1084 (1980); McNamara v. Riddle, 563 F.2d 125, 127
(4th Cir. 1977) (holding that the self-representation right must be requested by the defendant and that the right is not asserted when the defendant's court-appointed counsel
asks the court to be relieved because of a disagreement with the defendant).
44. United States v. Gillis, 773 F.2d 549, 559 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding that the trial
court properly balanced the defendant's right to counsel and the right to self-representation by appointing counsel to argue complex legal issues on appeal while also permitting
the defendant to submit a supplemental brief).
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should "indulge in every reasonable presumption against [its]
waiver."4 5
The self-representation right, however, is not absolute.'
The
Supreme Court has held that the pro se right may be terminated if a
defendant becomes disruptive or refuses to comply with courtroom
procedure,4 7 and that it does not carry over to appeal.4 8 Additionally,
the Fourth Circuit has held that the right may be waived if not invoked in a timely manner49 and may be restricted if the court believes
it is being used for purposeful delay.5"
b. Protectingthe Interests of Child Witnesses in Sex Abuse Cases.5 1 the Supreme
In Maryland v. Craig,
Court held that the State's interests in protecting child abuse victims may sufficiently outweigh a defendant's Confrontation Clause5 2 right to face her accusers in court.55
The Court upheld a Maryland statute permitting a child to testify over
closed-circuit television and outside the presence of the defendant.'
To invoke the use of closed-circuit testimony, the statute required a
finding by the judge that forcing the child to testify in front of the
defendant would "result in the child suffering serious emotional distress such that the child cannot reasonably communicate." 5 5
Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, observed that the
Court had never held that the Confrontation Clause guaranteed a defendant a face-to-face meeting with witnesses.5 6 Instead, restrictions
45. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977) (holding that a represented defendant did not waive the right to counsel when police elicited incriminating statements from
the defendant without asking whether the defendant wished to relinquish the right).
46. See, e.g., McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 176-77 (1984) (permitting appointment

of standby counsel to assist pro se defendant in case self-representation right is later waived
or terminated).
47. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.46 (1975).
48. Price v. Johnson, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948) ("[A] prisoner has no absolute right to
argue his own appeal or even to be present at the proceedings in an appellate court.").
49. See, e.g., United States v. Dunlap, 577 F.2d 867, 868 (4th Cir.) (holding that if the
self-representation right is not asserted before trial it is within the discretion of the trial
court whether to allow defendant to proceed pro se), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 858 (1978).
50. United States v. Gallop, 838 F.2d 105, 110 (4th Cir.) (stating that a trial court may
appoint standby counsel when defendant invokes self-representation right on the day
before trial), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1211 (1988).
51. 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
52. U.S. CONsr. amend. VI (providing that "[iin all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right. . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him").
53. Craig,497 U.S. at 853.
54. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 9-102 (1995).
55. I.§ 9-102(a) (2).
56. Craig,497 U.S. at 844. But cf.Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1020-21 (1988) (holding
that placing a screen between defendant and witness without individualized finding of necessity violated defendant's Confrontation Clause rights).
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on the right to confront one's accusers were valid if they satisfied a
two-pronged test: (1) the purpose of the Confrontation Clause-to
ensure the reliability of the testimony-was otherwise assured, and (2)
the denial of the face-to-face confrontation was necessary to further an
important public policy.5 7 Even though the Maryland statute restricted face-to-face confrontation, the Court found that it satisfied the
first prong because it preserved the other elements of confrontation-oath, cross-examination, and observation of demeanor by the
trier of fact.5" The statute satisfied the second prong because the
State had a sufficient interest in protecting child abuse victims from
testifying in front of their alleged abuser, so long as the trial court
determined "that the child witness would be traumatized, not by the
courtroom generally, but by the presence of the defendant."5 9 Such a
finding requires a court to hear evidence and to make a case-specific
finding as to whether the child would be traumatized by testifying in
front of the defendant.6" The Court did not define the minimum
level of trauma needed to permit use of the closed-circuit procedure,
but simply stated that the Maryland statute met constitutional standards. 6 The Supreme Court did not consider the scope of its ruling
in the context of self-representation because the Maryland statute expressly did not apply to pro se defendants.6 2
3. The Court's Reasoning.-The Fourth Circuit upheld the district
court's determination that Fields had not clearly and unequivocally
invoked his right to self-representation. 6" After analyzing Fields's let57. Craig,497 U.S. at 850.
58. Id. at 851.
59. Id. at 856.
60. Id. at 855.
61. Id.
62. MD. CODE ANN., CmS. &JuD. PROC. § 9-102(d) (1995). Section 9-102(d) states, "The
provisions of this section do not apply if the defendant is an attorney pro se." Id.
63. Fields, 49 F.3d at 1034. The Fields court found that a presumption-of-correctness
standard of review should be applied when considering whether a defendant has properly
invoked the right to self-representation. Id In reaching this result, the court first considered whether a defendant's assertion of the right to self-representation was a question of
fact or the application of law to fact. Id. at 1029-32. The court used the Supreme Court's
methodology in Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104 (1985), to determine whether the trial court
or the appeals court is in a better position to decide the issue. Fields, 49 F.3d at 1030. The
Fields court asked: (1) whether the legal standard being applied was complex or simple
and straightforward; (2) whether observing the state trial court proceeding is important in
resolving the question; and (3) whether allowing the state court to decide the question
poses an elevated risk of bias that the constitutional right in question will not be protected.
Id. The court found that the legal standard was simple and straightforward, that observing
the trial court proceedings was important in resolving the question, and that allowing the
state court to decide the issue did not pose an elevated risk that Fields's right to self-
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ters to the judge and the transcript of the pretrial hearing, the court
stated that "Fields only mentioned the possibility of proceeding pro se
at one point, in his third letter."6 4 Of particular significance to the
court was Fields's failure to raise the self-representation claim at the
pretrial hearing where the conversation focused on Fields's continued
desire to personally cross-examine the child witnesses.6 5 The court
concluded that "[t] he record taken as a whole . . .discloses only a
single statement in one letter from Fields that perhaps indicated a
desire to proceed pro se, although it is not entirely clear that Fields
intended it as such."6 6 The court also noted Fields's reference in his
third letter expressing "regret" about wanting to represent himself
and a remark in his second letter indicating a "reluctance" to act as
co-counsel.6 7 Consequently, the court concluded that these facts fairly
supported the district court's determination that Fields had not
68
clearly and unequivocally asserted his right to self-representation.
The court could have disposed of the case upon this determination,
but instead decided to consider an issue that was left unanswered in
Craig-whether pro se defendants have a constitutional right to en69
gage in face-to-face cross-examination of their alleged victims.
In deciding this issue, the court held in the alternative that even
if Fields had clearly and unequivocally asserted his self-representation
right, the state trial court committed no error. 70 The court analogized Fields's pro se rights to the Confrontation Clause rights at issue
in Craig and reasoned that the self-representation right to cross-examine witnesses personally could be restricted if (1)the purposes of
the right would have been otherwise assured, and (2) denial of the
right was necessary to further an important public policy.7 1 Noting
that the purposes of the self-representation right are to allow the defendant to affirm his dignity and autonomy and to present what he
representation would not be protected. Id. at 1032. Therefore, the court determined that
the question was one of fact to be reviewed under a presumption-of-correctness standard.
Id. The court noted that other courts that have faced the issue also have considered the
assertion of the self-representation right as a factual question. Id; see, e.g., Cain v. Peters,
972 F.2d 748, 749 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1310 (1993); Hamilton v. Groose,

28 F.3d 859, 862 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 741 (1995).
64. Fieds, 49 F.3d at 1033.
65. Id.

66. Id.
67. Id.

68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 1034.
See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
Fields, 49 F.3d at 1034.
Id. at 1035.
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believes to be his best possible defense, 2 the court recognized that
questioning witnesses is just one of many elements that comprise the
right. 73 Hence, as with the Confrontation Clause rights at issue in
Craig, the Fields court concluded that denying the right to cross-examine the children personally would have "inhibited Fields' dignity
and autonomy to some degree," but because he could have conducted
every other part of his defense,
his dignity and autonomy "would have
74
been 'otherwise assured.'

In considering whether the denial of Fields's right to cross-examine the child witnesses was necessary to further an important public
interest, the court essentially adopted the second prong of the Craig
analysis.75 In Craig,the Court found a sufficient State interest in protecting the psychological well-being of child sexual abuse victims to
prevent face-to-face confrontation. 76 The Fields court similarly concluded that the State's interest in protecting children "from the emotional trauma of being cross-examined by their alleged abuser is at
77
least as great as, and likely greater than, the State's interest in Craig."
In applying the second prong of the analysis, the Fields court declined
to extend the Craigrequirement that a trial court hear evidence and
make a case-specific finding that the child would be traumatized as a
result of testifying in the defendant's presence .7 The court distinguished the two cases, stating that "[i] t is far less difficult to conclude
that a child sexual abuse victim will be emotionally harmed by being
personally cross-examined by her alleged abuser than by being required merely to testify in his presence."79 Thus, the court created a
low threshold for finding that a child will be traumatized if her alleged abuser conducts the questioning.8" Whether the defendant can
overcome such a finding, and how, the court did not answer.
The court agreed with the trial court's decision to restrict Fields's
personal cross-examination of the child witnesses on the basis of: (1)
72. Id.
73. Id. The Fields court observed that "[t ] he elements of a defendant's self-representa-

tion right include 'control[ling] the organization and content of his own defense ...
mak[ing] motions .... argu[ing] points of law....

participat[ing] in the voir dire, .. .

question[ing] witnesses, and... address[ing] the court and the jury at appropriate points
in the trial.'" Id. (quoting McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 174 (1984)) (alterations in
original).
74. Id. (quoting Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 850 (1990)).
75. Id. at 1036.
76. Craig, 497 U.S. at 857.
77. Fields, 49 F.3d at 1036.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See infra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.

1028

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 55:921

the indictment that charged Fields with raping, sodomizing, and battering the children, one of whom was his daughter; (2) Fields's first
letter, which noted that all of the girls "call[ed] him dad," and that he
treated them as his own children; (3) an assertion in the first letter
that admitted "that one of the[ ] girls 'burst into tears' at a preliminary hearing 'because she was embarrassed' and that the same girl
'had wet the bed repeatedly"'; and (4) Fields's request, in the same
letter, that he would "not approach them closer than three feet" and
would request permission if for some reason he needed to get
closer."1 The court concluded that Fields intended to "intimidate"
the girls and that the trial court reasonably found that the girls would
suffer emotional harm if subjected to Fields's personal cross-examination." Thus, adequate justification existed for denying Fields's right
to cross-examine the girls personally because the girls would have suf83
fered emotional trauma.
After justifying the denial of Fields's personal cross-examination
of the children, the court found no error in denying Fields the right
to represent himself.8 4 The court concluded that "[b]ecause Fields
concedes that this personal cross-examination was his sole purpose in
representing himself, the trial court committed no error even if Fields
invoked his self-representation right clearly and unequivocally." 5
In his dissent, Judge Ervin,joined by four other judges, disagreed
with the majority's conclusion that Fields had not clearly and unequivocally asserted his self-representation right. 8 Judge Ervin observed
that a "steady progression" was apparent from Fields's letters, which
culminated in his request to defend himself.8 7 Judge Ervin further
criticized the majority's application of Craigto the self-representation
scenario as "wholly misguided."" The dissent acknowledged that
Craig may be invoked properly by a trial court to limit a defendant's

81. Fiel/,

49 F.3d at 1036.
82. 1&
83. Id
84. Id. at 1037.
85. Id.
86. Id. (Ervin, C.J., dissenting)
87. Id. at 1042. Judge Ervin noted that in Fields's first letter he indicated his dissatisfacdon with his court-appointed counsel and his desire to act as co-counsel. Id. Fields's second letter included more criticism of his lawyers and asked the court to appoint new
counsel and to permit Fields to act as co-counsel. Id. In the third letter, after having his
earlier requests denied, Fields announced that he was dismissing his court-appointed lawyers and wished to proceed pro se. Id.
88. Id. at 1037.
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self-representation
altogether." 9

rights,

but not

to

"eliminat[e]

the

right

4. Analysis.a. Invoking the Right to Self-Representation.-In Fields, the
Fourth Circuit engaged in a broad inquiry to determine whether the
defendant had properly invoked his right to self-representation.
Although, in his third letter, Fields had indicated a desire to proceed
pro se, the Fourth Circuit considered Fields's request in the context of
his previous letters and pretrial conversation with the court to deter9 °
mine whether he had asserted the right "clearly and unequivocally."
By concluding that Fields had not done so, the court broke with its
previous indication that receipt of a defendant's written request to
proceed pro se followed by a denial by the trial judge would constitute
a violation of the Farettaright.9 ' Instead, Fields demonstrates that to
be clear and unequivocal, a defendant must assert the pro se right
inside the courtroom, and the defendant must elicit a specific denial
from the trial court in order to create an adequate record for appeal. 92 Unless a defendant forcefully and persistently does so, 9 ' a trial
court remains justified in presuming that the right to counsel has not
been waived.94
b. Restricting a Defendant's Right to Conduct Cross-Examination.-In Craig,the Supreme Court recognized the necessary state interest in protecting victims of child abuse from the trauma associated
with having to testify in front of their alleged abuser.9 5 The Court
carefully balanced the government's interest with that of the defendant's confrontation right and permitted modification of that right
upon an adequate showing of necessity by the State and emotional
89. Id. at 1047; see supra text accompanying notes 57-58.
90. Fields, 49 F.3d at 1033-34; see supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text.
91. McNamara v. Riddle, 563 F.2d 125, 127 (4th Cir. 1977) (stating that unless a defendant makes a specific pro se request and a trial court rules on the request there is no
denial of the self-representation right).
92. In his dissenting opinion, Judge Ervin argued that Fields's third letter included a
specific request to represent himself and that the trial judge effectively ruled on the request when he told Fields's lawyers that he "was going to keep both of you in as his attorneys." Fields, 49 F.3d at 1040-41 n.1 (Ervin, C.J., dissenting); see supra text accompanying
notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
93. In his dissenting opinion, Judge Ervin observed, "Absent a Zen-like persistence in
uttering a single mantra, or the ability to spout crisp legalese with full citation to binding
authority, a defendant's desire to represent himself will not be respected." Fields, 49 F.3d at
1044 (Ervin, C.J., dissenting).
94. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
95. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 853 (1990).
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trauma to the child witnesses.9 6 In Fields, the Fourth Circuit recognized a similar need to protect children from emotional trauma when
subjected to questioning by their alleged abuser.9 7 However, Fields
permits a trial court simply to rely upon an indictment, the relationship between the victim and the accused, and any outward sign of
emotion on the part of the victim to satisfy the emotional trauma element required by Craig.8 Thus, Fields significantly dilutes the second
prong of the Craiganalysis to the extent that a sustainable finding of
necessity may simply be based upon a trial judge's personal aversion to
cross-examination of a child witness by her alleged abuser. 9 This aspect of the Fields analysis is difficult to reconcile with the Supreme
Court's observation in McKaskle v. Wiggins' that a "pro se defendant
must be allowed.., to question witnesses... at appropriate points in
the trial," which suggests that a Craig hearing is equally appropriate
when the constitutionally protected right to self-representation is at
stake.''
c. Denying the Self-Representation Right in Child Sex Abuse
Cases.-In Fields, the Fourth Circuit held, in the alternative, that because the defendant's sole purpose for wanting to proceed pro se was
to cross-examine the child witnesses personally, the trial court committed no error even if Fields had clearly and unequivocally invoked
96. See supra text accompanying notes 57-60.
97. Fie/ds, 49 F.3d at 1047. Even the dissent recognized the need to protect the welfare
of child witnesses and suggested that the trial court could employ a range of procedures to
accomplish this goal including:
installing a screen or other barrier between the defendant and the witnesses; conducting closed sessions out of the courtroom; placing the defendant and the witnesses in separate rooms; requiring the defendant to submit his questions to the
judge who, after scanning them, would read them aloud to the witnesses; and
requiring the defendant to remain seated at counsel table while questioning the
witnesses.
Id. 1047 at n.4 (Ervin, C.J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 1036.
99. Id. at 1040 (Ervin, C.J., dissenting). Judge Ervin observed that the trial judge was
determined to deny Fields the right to cross-examine his accusers under any scenario. He
quoted the trial judge in his pretrial exchange with the defendant:
To allow him to stand up here as a father and as a defendant, [and] question a
thirteen year old ...is inconceivable. I can't think of putting a child any more ill
at ease than to have her own defendant father who she's accused of sexually abusing her standing up here and questioning her.
Id.
100. 465 U.S. 168 (1984).
101. Id. at 174 (emphasis added); see also Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 861 (1990)
(Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia questioned, in the context of a custody dispute where
a parent has not seen a child for several months, whether society would desire denying a
parent the right to ask a child if the allegations of sexual abuse were true. Id.
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his self-representation right.1" ' The court offered no specific explanation as to why the trial court's refusal would not have resulted in error.
The court's analysis, however, suggests that because Fields's right to
cross-examine the children personally could have been restricted
under Craig, and because this cross-examination was his sole reason
for invoking the right, the trial judge did not deny Fields anything to
which he was otherwise entitled. 0 3 In essence, the Fourth Circuit suggested that, at worst, the trial court committed harmless error. Such
an analysis, however, cannot be reconciled with the Supreme Court's
pronouncement in McKaskle that the denial of the self-representation
right "is not amenable to 'harmless error' analysis. The right is either
respected or denied; its deprivation cannot be harmless.""'
Instead of being viewed as harmless error, the court's denial of
the pro se right in child abuse cases may be justified if viewed as a
waiver.1 5 Under this rationale, the defendant's personal cross-examination of the child witness could be equated to an abuse of court procedure, or threatened disruption of the courtroom. 10 6 Although the
Farettaright may be denied in such circumstances, generally such disruptive conduct "must occur before the court can deny a defendant
his right to pro se representation.""0 7 In these cases, the Court has
embraced the appointment of "standby counsel" to assist a pro se defendant in the event that the self-representation right is waived, either
voluntarily or involuntarily.1 0 ' Fields, however, suggests the Fourth
Circuit's willingness to allow a complete denial of the Faretta right
when a trial court determines that the defendant's sole purpose for
proceeding pro se might be to disrupt the court or to intimidate witnesses. In such circumstances, Fields may permit a trial court to "force
an attorney on to a defendant.., and say that the self-representation
right's underlying concern with defendant autonomy can be
preserved." 10 9
102. Fields, 49 F.3d at 1037.
103. ld,
104. McKask/le 465 U.S. at 177 n.8.

105. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
106. Wallace J. Mlyniec & Michelle M. Dally, See No Evil? Can Insulation of Child Sexual
Abuse Victims Be Accomplished Without Endangeringthe Defendant's ConstitutionalRights?, 40 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 115, 133 (1985).
107. id.;
see also United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The court
in Dougherty noted that the right of self-representation implies that a defendant will cooperate with the rules set by the trial court. 1l at 1126. "The possibility that reasonable cooperation may be withheld, and the right later waived, is not a reason for denying the right of
self-representation at the start." Id.
108. McKaskl, 465 U.S. at 176.
109. Fields, 49 F.3d at 1047 (Ervin, C.J., dissenting).
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5. Conclusion.-In Fields, the Fourth Circuit extended the protections afforded child sexual abuse victims under Maryland v. Craig'10
to cases in which a defendant intends to represent himself.1 1 But, by
eliminating the requirement that a trial court hear evidence to determine whether a child will actually be traumatized by the defendant's
personal cross-examination, the court has weighted the scales against
the pro se litigant. 112 Although Fieldseffectively eliminates any opportunity for a child sex abuse defendant to intimidate an accuser
through face-to-face cross-examination,"' the decision also denies a
defendant the chance to elicit the truth from a child accuser. 1 4
Beyond the context of child sex abuse cases, Fields indicates the
Fourth Circuit's willingness to make it more difficult for a defendant
to invoke the right to self-representation on two fronts. First, in order
to initially trigger the pro se right, Fields suggests doing so "clearly and
unequivocally" requires that a defendant personally assert the right in
the courtroom and persist in doing so until the trial court rules on the
request. 1 5 Second, the Fourth Circuit may have opened the door to a
dramatic erosion of the Farettaright by permitting a court to proscribe
the right entirely based upon the purpose for which the defendant
1 16
intends to use it.
PAUL A. FIoRAvANTI, JR.

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

497 U.S. 836 (1990).
See supra text accompanying notes 95-97.
See supra text accompanying notes 78, 98-99.
See Mlyniec & Dally, supra note 106, at 133.
See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 105-109 and accompanying text.

1996]

FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS

IV.

A.

1033

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

Federal Maritime Preemption of State Law ProtectingNatural
Oyster Bars

In Maryland Department of NaturalResources v. Kellum,1 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that federal maritime law preempted a Maryland statute imposing strict liability for
damages to natural oyster bars.' In reaching this conclusion, the
court reaffirmed the. rule stated in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen5 that
state law does not apply if it conflicts with or materially alters federal
maritime law.4 While many courts recently have applied preemption
analysis in a manner that gives more latitude to the states to apply
their own laws,5 in Kellum the Fourth Circuit declined to do so, applying Jensen formalistically.6
1. The Case.-On May 13, 1987, a tugboat pushing a barge
loaded with pea gravel left the Maryland Rock Facility at Lovers Point
and headed south on the Potomac River. 7 Both vessels were under
the command of appellant Captain Charles Kellum, and were owned
and operated by appellant C.G. Willis, Inc. (Willis).8 Almost an hour
after leaving the Maryland Rock Facility, the barge ran aground in
shallow water near the Huggins Point lighted day marker number two,
1. 51 F.3d 1220 (4th Cir. 1995).
2. Id. at 1221.
3. 244 U.S. 205 (1917). At its simplest, the rule from Jensen states that because of the
need for uniformity on our nation's waters, any state law that materially alters the general
maritime law of the United States will be preempted. Id. at 215-16; see also infta notes 45-48
and accompanying text.
4. Jensen, 244 U.S. at 215-16; see, e.g., Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 408-10
(1953) (holding federal comparative negligence standard applied to injured ship repairman rather than Pennsylvania strict contributory negligence rule); Chelentis v. Luckenbach Steamship Co., 247 U.S. 372, 384-85 (1918) (holding that the maritime rule of
damages-wages, maintenance, and cure-applied, not the more liberal common-law
rule).
5. See, e.g., Pacific Merchant Shipping Ass'n v. Aubry, 918 F.2d 1409, 1247 (9th Cir.
1990) (holding that California state labor law overtime provisions supplant federal law and
apply to California employees defined as "seamen"), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 979 (1992);
Brockington v. Certified Elec., Inc., 903 F.2d 1523, 1533 (1lth Cir. 1990) (holding state
interest in applying state workers' compensation law under police powers outweighs federal interest even though jurisdiction was based on maritime tort), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
1026 (1991); Green v. Industrial Helicopters, Inc., 593 So. 2d 634, 644 (La.) (ruling that
state strict liability statute rather than federal maritime negligence standard applied as
local concerns outweighed need for uniformity), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 65 (1992).
6. Kel/um, 51 F.3d at 1225-26.
7. Id. at 1221-22.
8. Id.
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at the mouth of Breton Bay in the Potomac River.9 At the time, Kellum was not using a navigation chart, 10 and the oyster bar upon which
the barge grounded was unmarked by buoy or other navigational
aids. 1
Kellum immediately activated the tug's two six-foot propellers in
an attempt to refloat the grounded barge. 12 Approximately an hour
and twenty minutes later, Kellum succeeded with the help of the rising tide, and he continued downstream."3 Twenty minutes later the
Maryland Natural Resources Police stopped Kellum and informed
him that he had damaged part of a natural oyster bar. 4 Kellum testified that, had he known the barge was stranded on an oyster bar, he
would not have activated the tug's propellers but would have waited
for the rising tide alone to free the boat so as to prevent damage to
the oyster bed.1 5
The Maryland Department of Natural Resources 6 (DNR) sued
Kellum and Willis in the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland.1 7 The complaint set forth two counts, one for strict liability
under section 4-1118.1 of the Natural Resources Code"8 and one
9. Brief for Appellants at 5-6, Maryland Dep't of Natural Resources v. Kellum, 51 F.3d
1220 (4th Cir. 1995) (No. 93-1030).
10. Brief for Appellees at 3, Kellum (No. 93-1030).
11. Brief for Appellants at 6, Kellum (No. 93-1030). The State of Maryland contended
that adequate notice of the location of the oyster bar is provided by Maryland law, which
allows the filing of oyster bar survey charts in the clerk's office of the applicable Maryland
county, in this case, St. Mary's County. Brief for Appellees at 27, Kellum (No. 93-1030); see
also MD. CODE ANN., NAT. REs. § 4-1102 (1989); id., REAL PROP. § 3-102 (1988). Such a
concept of constructive notice stretches reasonableness to its extreme. Every ship that
plies Maryland's navigable waters certainly cannot be expected to visit the clerk's office of
the circuit court of the applicable county to research which areas might have oyster bars.
Furthermore, failing to designate the location of oyster bars by buoy or map does not
reasonably comport with enforcing a strict liability standard. By not requesting the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) or any other federal agency to
mark the oyster bar on commonly used navigational charts, the State of Maryland virtually
kept secret the very oyster bars it wished to protect under the highest standard of care.
12. Kellum, 51 F.3d at 1222.
13. Id.
14. Brief for Appellants at 6, Kellum (No. 93-1030).
15. Kellum, 51 F.3d at 1222. The Maryland Department of Natural Resources claimed
that the sole cause of damage to the oyster bars arose from the churning of the propellers.
Brief for Appellees at 38-39, Kellum (No. 93-1030).
16. The Potomac River Fisheries Commission was co-plaintiff. Kellum, 51 F.3d at 1220.
17. Id. at 1222. The action was brought as an admiralty claim within the meaning of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the saving-to-suitors clause provided by federal
law. See FED. R. Cirv. P. 9(h); 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (1988).
18. MD. CODE ANN., NAT. RES. § 4-1118.1 (1989). The statute reads as follows:
Destroying natural oyster bars.
(a) Prohibited.-Except for normal harvesting activities, the dredging and
transplanting of oyster shell or seed oysters as part of the Department's Oyster
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based on negligence. 19 The court granted DNR's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability under the Maryland statute,
holding that federal maritime law did not preempt the statute. 20 The
district court then proceeded to hear evidence on damages only and
entered a judgment for $76,200, plus costs, against Kellum and Willis. 2 1' The defendants filed an appeal challenging the district court's
ruling that the federal maritime law did not preempt the Maryland
statute, and arguing that the evidence was not sufficient to support
the damage award. 2
2. Legal Background.-Federal jurisdiction over maritime cases
dates back to the origins of our judicial system. The Admiralty
Clause 2 1 of the Constitution provides that "all Cases of admiralty and
maritime Jurisdiction" fall under the judicial power of the United
States. 241 Congress first implemented this grant of subject-matter jurisdiction in the Judiciary Act of 1789,25 which gave the district courts
"exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction ... saving to suitors, in all cases, the right of a common law remedy, where the common law is competent to give it."26
The modem statute conferring maritime jurisdiction to the federal
district courts appears in the Judicial Code 27 and is commonly referred to as the "saving-to-suitors" clause.2" The provision endows fed-

Id.

Propagation Program, or as authorized in a State wetlands license, a person may
not destroy, damage, or injure any oyster bar, reef, rock, or other area located on
a natural oyster bar in the Chesapeake Bay that is not a leased oyster bottom.
(b) Civil tiability.-Any person who destroys, damages, or injures any oyster
bar, reef, rock, or other area referred to in subsection (a) of this section is liable
to the State in a civil action, as the Department considers appropriate, for the
restoration of, mitigation of, or monetary damages for any destruction, damage,
or injury that the person causes to resources on the natural oyster bar.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Kellum, 51 F.3d at 1222.
Id. at 1223.
Id.
Id.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.

24. Id.

25. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 76-77, revised by Act ofJune 25, 1948, ch.
646, 62 Stat. 931, amended by Act of May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 79, 63 Stat. 101.
26. Id.
27. 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1988). The section states: "The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of: (1) Any civil case of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are
otherwise entitled." Id.
28. 14 CHARLEs A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDuRE § 3672 (1985).
The saving-to-suitors clause has the effect of providing a plaintiff who has an in personam
claim with several ways to proceed. Id. A plaintiff who wishes to bring a claim for damages
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eral courts with the "authority to develop a substantive body of
general maritime law applicable to cases within the admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction."29

The congressional grant to the federal courts to develop a body
of general maritime law, however, does not foreclose state law on the
subject, as the saving-to-suitors clause leaves the states some latitude to
create their own maritime law." Just how far this latitude extends has
been described as "one of the most perplexing issues in the law."3 1 In
the body of admiralty decisions that the Supreme Court has decided
over the years, one guiding principle has been the basic presumption
that underlies the constitutional grant of federal admiralty jurisdiction: the governing law of the sea must be predictable and uniform
throughout the nation. 2 The Court articulated this principle as early
as 1875:
[T]he convenience of the commercial world, bound together, as it is, by mutual relations of trade and intercourse,
demands that, in all essential things wherein those relations
bring them in contact, there should be a uniform law
founded on natural reason and justice....
One thing, however, is unquestionable; the Constitution
must have referred to a system of law co-extensive with, and
operating uniformly in, the whole country. It certainly could
not have been the intention to place the rules and limits of
maritime law under the disposal and regulation of the several States, as that would have defeated the uniformity and
consistency at which the Constitution aimed on all subjects

for breach of a maritime contract, for example, has the following options. First, the claimant may bring the claim in a federal district court under the grant of original subject mat-

ter jurisdiction contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1333. Id. Neither diversity of citizenship nor a
minimum amount in controversy need be shown. Alternately, the plaintiff might also
bring a claim in a state court or United States district court by virtue of the saving-to-suitors
clause. Id. To pursue the latter option, however, the plaintiff must satisfy the amount in
controversy and diversity of citizenship requirements. Id.
29. 1 THOMASJ. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW § 4-1 (2d ed. 1987) (emphasis omitted).
30. States are generally free to create their own maritime laws and customs so long as
state provisions do not substantially alter the general maritime law. Application of state law
is especially robust in situations where state interests are deemed extremely important and
federal interests are minimal. See infra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
31. 1 SCHIOENBAUM, supra note 29, § 4-4.

32. See The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558, 575 (1875) (explaining the need for
uniformity in federal maritime law); Lizabeth L.Burrell, Current Problems in Maritime Uniformity, 5 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 67 (1992) (presenting historical view of uniformity doctrine in
maritime law).
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of a commercial character affecting the intercourse of the
States with each other or with foreign states.3 3
In order to attain the objective of uniformity that underlies admiralty jurisdiction, the aforementioned latitude that state courts and
state legislatures have to alter the general federal maritime law has
been limited.3 4 The resulting body of law generally does not allow the
application of state statutes that significantly modify the national substantive maritime law.33 The landmark case of Chelentis v. Luckenbach
Steamship Companys6 is illustrative.
In Chelentis, a seaman aboard ship injured his leg and was hospitalized for three months, during which time it became necessary to
amputate his leg.3 7 The seaman brought an action for negligence
against his employer under the saving-to-suitors clause, seeking full
indemnity for the injuries sustained.A When the case reached the
Supreme Court, Justice McReynolds ruled that because the seaman's
work was maritime in nature and his employment was pursuant to a
maritime contract, his injuries must be classified as maritime. 9
Therefore, the rights and liabilities of the parties fell under federal
admiralty jurisdiction.4 0
The principal legal issue in Chelentis involved the extent of damages available to the injured plaintiff.41 While the plaintiff was demanding full indemnity pursuant to the common law of his state,
under general maritime law, the owner of a vessel was liable only for
the maintenance, cure, and wages of an injured mariner.4" The Court
held that when a plaintiff brings an action under the saving-to-suitors
clause, whether in a state court or under the nonmaritime jurisdiction
of a federal court, the rights and liabilities of the parties are controlled by federal admiralty law.43 While states retain legislative power
over actions that arise within their borders, state legislation cannot
significantly alter the general admiralty law.'
33. The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 572-75.
34. 14 WRIGHT ET AL., supranote 28, § 3672 (providing overview of rationale for federal

maritime jurisdiction).
35. Id.

36. 247 U.S. 372 (1918).
37. Id. at 378.
38. Id. at 378-79.
39. Id. at 384.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 379-80.
42. Id. Congress passed the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. 688 (1988), in 1920 to overrule the
"maintenance and cure" rule. 14 WIrr
ET AL., supra note 28, § 3672.
43. 14 WIGHT ET AL., supra note 28, § 3672.
44. Cheentis, 247 U.S. at 384.
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One year earlier, in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen,45 the Court had
attempted to define the scope of permissible state modification of the
general maritime law.' In Jensen, the Court struck down a New York
workmen's compensation law as it applied to maritime workers on the
ground that additional relief available by such statutes is "of a character wholly unknown to the common law, incapable of enforcement by
the ordinary processes of any court and is not saved to suitors from
the grant of exclusive jurisdiction."4 7 The Court described the potential results of the application of the New York statute to foreign ships,
warning of what would ensue if state law at variance with federal maritime law controlled: "The necessary consequence would be destruction of the very uniformity in respect to maritime matters which the
Constitution was designed to establish; and freedom of navigation between the states and with foreign countries would be seriously hampered and impeded."4 8
Despite Jensen's apparent mandate of the supremacy of federal
maritime law, courts have nonetheless developed significant areas in
which state law controls.49 Thus, the general maritime law is not a
complete system devoid of gaps; indeed, in the absence of controlling
maritime law, state law is said to "fill in the gaps."5" In the years since
Jensen, the Supreme Court has tried to clarify the areas in which the

45. 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
46. Id. at 216.
47. Id. at 218. Specifically, in Jensen, a New York workmen's compensation statute conflicted with general maritime law. New York courts had interpreted the statute such that
no ship could load or discharge cargo in the state without fully complying with the statute.
The statute was successfully challenged on the ground that only Congress can create law on
maritime matters; if a state law affects the uniformity in the nation's waters as envisioned in
the federal scheme, it must yield to federal law. 14 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 28, § 3672.
48. Jensen, 244 U.S. at 217.
49. See supranote 5 and accompanying text. Courts have tended to rely on the concept
of state police power to suggest the applicability of a balancing test between local and
federal interests. This has, on occasion, led to a rejection of federal maritime laws, even in
cases that fall under maritime tort jurisdiction and that clearly establish federal maritime
rights. See, e.g., Brockington v. Certified Elec., Inc., 903 F.2d 1523, 1532-33 (11th Cir.
1990) (holding that state worker's compensation law rather than federal maritime law applied to personal injury claim of land-based electrician), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1026 (1991).
It is unclear, however, whether a balancing of the constitutional principle of uniformity
can occur without destroying the very principle itself.
50. Burrell, supra note 32, at 71. Burrell argues that some courts "seem to go out of
their way to find and widen such gaps, characterizing their use of state law as 'interstitial'
or as 'supplementing' the general maritime law." Id. But see David Currie, Federalism and
the Admiralty: "The Devil's Own Mess, "1960 S. Or. REv. 158, 168-69 (arguing that applicability
of state laws in maritime cases should be determined by balancing the state and federal
interests).
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application of state law does not offend the uniformity principle.5 1 In
doing so, members of the Court have at times questioned whether
determining the availability of state law based on the existence of a
gap in the federal maritime law is a properly reasoned theory of federalism in admiralty.5 2
In Hess v. United States,5" Justice Harlan stated that "[t]he true
inquiry thus becomes one involving the nature of the state interest...
[and] the extent to which such interest intrudes upon federal concerns."5 4 Hess pinpoints the conflict of interests often present in admiralty law: the fact that an occurrence is maritime in nature does not
deprive a state of its legitimate interest over such occurrences within
its borders; yet, the federal grant of jurisdiction in the Constitution
was made to preserve federal interests in maritime and commercial
affairs.5 5 Thus, the Court began to fashion a doctrine in the years
after Jensen, albeit a doctrine it did not always choose to apply, that
requires a balancing of state and federal interests.5 6
One year after Hess, the Court employed this balancing test in
Kossick v. United Fruit Co.57 The Kossick Court was faced with the question of whether to apply a state statute of frauds rule, which would
have rendered unenforceable an oral promise by an employer to pay
for an employee's injuries, or the federal rule, which would have resulted in the enforcement of the promise. 58 The Court balanced the
federal and state interests and held that a contract between a seaman
and his employer was not "peculiarly a matter of state and local concern"; consequently, the oral promise was enforceable.5 9
51. See, e.g., Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 742 (1961) (holding state statute
of frauds did not bar seaman's claim against employer); Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit
Co., 264 U.S. 109, 123 (1924) (holding maritime contract can be subject to state arbitration statutes); Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973) (holding
state oil pollution statute not be preempted by federal admiralty law).
52. See Currie, supra note 50, at 167-68. Currie comments that the gap theory was both
"difficult to apply" and "artificial" at best. Id. at 168. In particular, allowing state law to
apply only in the "gaps" in federal law created a situation where the result of a claim depended on whether the type of issue had been previously adjudicated in federal court. Id.

53. 361 U.S. 314, 321 (1960) (holding that a state wrongful death statute applied to an
independent contractor who drowned while making bridge repairs.).
54. Id. at 331 (Harlan, J., dissenting).

55. See Currie, supra note 50, at 169.
56. For a detailed example of a balancing theory of preemption analysis, see Brockington v. Certified Elec., Inc., 903 F.2d 1523, 1532-33 (11th Cir. 1990) (discussing factors in
giving effect to state law to the exclusion of a conflicting admiralty law), cert. denied, 498
U.S. 1026 (1991).
57. 365 U.S. 731 (1961).
58. Id. at 732.
59. Id. at 741.
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After Kossick, courts continued to balance state and federal interests such that a particular state law might govern in a case even when
national uniformity was impaired, on the theory that the predominant
interest was a local rather than federal matter.6" The application of
such a doctrine has been termed "maritime but local."6 1 For example,
in Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc.12 the Court upheld a
Florida statute that imposed strict liability for damages to private and
state property caused by oil spillage and noted that "[t] he Florida Act
imposes liability without fault. So far as liability without fault for damages to state and private interests is concerned, the police power has
been held adequate for that purpose."6" The Askew Court stated its
analysis of federalism directly:
[A] State, in the exercise of its police power, may establish
rules applicable on land and water within its limits, even
though these rules incidentally affect maritime affairs, provided that the state action does not contravene any acts of
Congress, nor work any prejudice to the characteristic features of the maritime law, nor interfere with its proper harmony and uniformity in its international and interstate
relations.6 4
On similar grounds, the Fourth Circuit upheld a Virginia oil pollution control statute in Steuart Transportation Co. v. Allied Towing
Corp. 5 The analysis in Steuart, like that in Askew, centered on the absence of an actual conflict between state and federal law, coupled with
no clear intention of Congress to preempt the field.' Askew and
Steuart reveal a trend in maritime jurisprudence to permit the states to
enforce local laws to protect and police their waters, so long as they do
not significantly alter federal law.
3. The Court's Reasoning.-Writingfor a unanimous panel, Judge
Widener's opinion6 7 quickly delivered its knockout punch to the
Maryland strict liability statute. After briefly reviewing the law concerning the stranding of vessels, the court concluded that strandings
60. See, e.g., Steelmet, Inc. v. Caribe Towing Corp., 779 F.2d 1485, 1488 (11th Cir.
1986) (citing Kossick as providing the appropriate test for balancing state and federal

interests).
61. Kossick, 365 U.S. at 738.
62. 411 U.S. 325 (1973).
63. Id. at 336.
64. Id. at 339 (internal quotations omitted).
65. 596 F.2d 609 (4th Cir. 1979).
66. Id. at 620-21.
67. Ke//um, 51 F.3d at 1221.

1996]

FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS

1041

uniformly have been treated as maritime torts subject to the rules of
decision provided by federal maritime law, both as to liability and
damages.68 Consequently, the plaintiff had to prove causation and
fault before liability was imposed. 69 The court stated, "Liability for
collisions . . . and other types of marine casualties is based upon a

finding of fault that contributed to the damage incurred. From earliest times, this rule has been consistently applied."7" Thus, the court
concluded that because section 4-1118.1 created liability without fault
for any party causing damage to a natural oyster bar in Maryland waters, it would be valid only if it did not substantially alter the federal
maritime law of torts.7
In assessing the validity of the Maryland statute, the court reviewed the finding of the district court7" that held section 4-1118.1 (b)
valid under Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc.7" DNR asked
the court to follow Askew, 74 in which the maritime-but-local doctrine
was employed by the court to uphold a state statute that significantly
modified federal law.75 Kellum, on the other hand, argued that the
traditional Jensen rule applied,7 6 which mandates that state law cannot
work material prejudice to general maritime law.77 The court noted
that the Florida strict liability statute challenged in Askew, unlike the
Maryland statute at issue in Kellum, was permitted by an explicit congressional waiver of preemption written into the Federal Water Pollu79
tion Control Act,7" the act with which the Florida statute
purportedly conflicted."0 The Maryland statute did not conflict with
any federal acts; rather, it conflicted with the general body of federal
maritime law that has developed over the years and that provided no
81
equivalent waiver.
68.
not be
69.
70.

Id. at 1223. Neither party presented any authority to suggest that the case should
regarded as a maritime tort. Id.
Id. at 1224.
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 1 SCHOENBAUM, supra note 29, at 444).

71. Id. at 1225.
72. Id.
73. 411 U.S. 325 (1973).
74. Brief for Appellants at 20, Maryland Dep't of Natural Resources v. Kellum, 51 F.3d
1220 (4th Cir. 1995) (No. 93-1030).
75. Askew, 411 U.S. at 338-39.
76. Kellum, 51 F.3d at 1223.
77. Southern Pac. Co. v.Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 216 (1917).
78. Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-224, § 11(o)(2), 84 Stat.
91, 97 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
79. Florida Oil Spill Prevention and Pollution Control Act, FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 376.011-.021 (West 1988).
80. Kellur, 51 F.3d at 1225-26.
81. Id.
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The court thus rejected the district court's reliance on Askew as
well as DNR's argument that Askew decided the case.8 2 Ironically,
while the court did not follow Askew's holding that favored state law, it
found language in Askew that provided guidance on how to dispose of
Kellum: "Jensenand Knickerbocker Ice have been confined to their facts,
viz., to suits relating to the relationship of vessels, plying the high seas
and our navigable waters, and to their crews."8"
Because Kellum involved a vessel plying the high seas, the court
reasoned, the Jensen rule applied.8 4 That rule mandates that a state
law that conflicts with or materially seeks to change the federal maritime law cannot stand;8 5 consequently, the court invalidated the Maryland statute because a strict liability standard materially alters the
general maritime standard of negligence. 86 Kellum was disposed of on
this single rule.8 7
In short, the court declined to characterize Maryland's interest in
protecting its oyster bars as maritime but local, opting instead for an
interpretation that promotes national uniformity of the law governing
navigable waters. 88 In the process, section 4-1118.1 was invalidated,
seven years after its adoption.
4. Analysis.-The State of Maryland's efforts to provide a remedy for damage to unleased oyster bars began more than ten years
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 1226.
Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325, 344 (1973).
Kellum, 51 F.3d at 1225-26.
See supra notes 3, 45-48 and accompanying text.
Kellum, 51 F.3d at 1226. The action in strict liability was vacated by the court and

remanded to the federal district court for further proceedings. Id. The federal district
court would be obligated to apply the general maritime negligence standard, which includes the rule of proportionate fault. Id.
87. Nonetheless, in the latter part of the opinion, the court assembled a thorough list
of cases in which state maritime law was invalidated due to impermissible conflict with
federal law. See, e.g., Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 62832 (1959) (holding state law regarding gratuitous licensees not permitted to substantially
alter federal maritime law); Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 409-10 (1953)
(holding state contributory negligence law may not deprive seaman of substantial federal
admiralty rights); Beard v. Norwegian Caribbean Lines, 900 F.2d 71, 73-74 (6th Cir. 1990)
(ruling federal standard of reasonable care applied rather than a state standard of a very
high degree of care in a suit involving a passenger injured at sea).
88. One highly unusual element of the opinion is that at no place is there any mention
of the need for national uniformity of the sea. One is hard pressed to find any preemption
case involving the rule ofJensen in which the court does not offer an analysis of the national
need for uniformity. The court did not address any of the uniformity arguments raised in
the appellants' brief to the Court of Appeals. See Brief for Appellants at 13-16, Maryland
Dep't of Natural Resources v. Kellum, 51 F.3d 1220 (4th Cir. 1995) (No. 93-1030). In this
context, the court's reliance on Jensen seems highly mechanical, merely applying the appropriate precedent without much analysis of the federalism concerns.
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ago. 89 In 1984, five years before the passage of section 4-1118.1, only
oyster bars leased by the state were protected by statute. The statutory
protection imposed criminal liability for a variety of acts, including
willful or unauthorized destruction of oyster bottoms, as well as catching or transferring of oysters on a leased bottom. 90 In the early 1980s,
a 500-ton barge grounded on a non-leased oyster bar on the Nanticoke River, leading the General Assembly to increased concern over
damage to non-leased oyster bottoms. 91 Especially troubling was the
absence of any statutory basis for legal action against persons who
damaged non-leased oyster bottoms. As a result, legislators enacted
section 4-1118.1 in 1989,92 and created a new statutory cause of action
intended to extend the protection given to public oyster bars and sub93
stantially increase the authority of DNR to protect resources.
Though well-intentioned, section 4-1118.1 was flawed from its inception in several ways. First, the drafters seem to have overlooked
the fact that any incident causing damage to oyster bars almost certainly would take place in navigable waters. Such a location immediately triggers admiralty jurisdiction, which in turn raises the possibility
of federal preemption.94 In order to avoid preemption, a state statute
must be drafted so that it does not conflict impermissibly with the
95
federal scheme of maritime law.
The Maryland statute presents several apparent conflicts with federal law. First, under general maritime law, damages arising from collisions and groundings require findings of fault and causation as
predicates to liability.96 Thus, any scheme of liability without fault

89. Brief for Appellees at 11-15, Maryland Dep't of Natural Resources v. Kellum, 51
F.3d 1220 (4th Cir. 1995) (No. 93-1030).
90. MD. CODE ANN., NAT. Ras. § 4-11A-15(a) (1989). Owners of leased oyster bottom
rights would have a common-law remedy, of course, such as trespass and negligence, without regard to statutory protection. Brief for Appellees at 11, Kellum (No. 93-1030).
91. Brief for Appellants at 10, Kelumn (No. 93-1030).
92. The proposed legislation was entitled "Oysters-Destroying Natural Oyster Bars."
Brief for Appellants at 9, Kelium (No. 93-1030). The State of Maryland, as owner of the
land under Maryland tidal waters had, and still has, the same right to bring an action for
damages as any other owner of land. See Maine v. M/V Tamano, 357 F. Supp. 1097, 110102 (S.D. Me. 1973) (holding state has standing to bring claim for damages to state-owned
land).
93. Brief for Appellees at 16-17, Kellum (No. 93-1030). The fiscal note describing the
impact of the bill is as follows: "The bill has no negative impact, but could provide funds
for site specific restoration in the event of any further damage to benthic resources." Ch.
622, 1985 Md. Laws 55.
94. See supra text accompanying notes 43-44.
95. This is theJensenrule on which Kellum is disposed. See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
96. See supra text accompanying notes 69-70.
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presents an immediate conflict with the federal system. Second, there
are problems with the allocation of fault. The language of section 41118.1 does not allow for a system of proportionate fault, nor was it so
interpreted by the district court in Kellum.9 7 Proportionate fault has
long been the accepted doctrine for allocation of damages in maritime torts, whereby each party may be held liable for the cost of the
damage for which it is responsible.9" In short, a strict liability standard conflicts with the accepted federal maritime scheme of comparative negligence.'
Liability without fault also undermines the uniform system of
rules that admiralty law attempts to create. An imposition of strict
liability upon mariners who damage oyster bars in Maryland waters for
whatever reason, without prior notice to those mariners of that possibility, affects more than merely local interests. It affects interstate and
international mariners, whose interest is at the very heart of the uniformity requirement of federal maritime law. 100 For example, it is
quite possible that navigators fearful of being hauled into court and
held strictly liable for damage to oyster bars would choose an alternate, most likely longer, shipping route, increasing the cost of freight
and goods carried through the stream of interstate commerce. 0 '
This could, in turn, give rise to higher insurance costs for vessels traveling through Maryland waters. 10 2 Such an outcome would place undue burdens on interstate commerce and create conditions that
0
federal maritime law specifically has attempted to avoid.'1
Such burdens are especially troubling in cases like Kellum, where
Maryland was lax in demarcating the oyster bar. The oyster bar in
Kellum extended into a channel marked for navigation by commercial
vessels,' 0 4 yet the oyster bar was not designated on navigation charts
typically relied upon by such vessels. 105 If Maryland wishes to hold ma97. Kellum, 51 F.3d at 1223.
98. For a discussion of the history of proportionate fault doctrine in maritime law, see
United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 400 n.1 (1975); Hercules, Inc. v. Stevens Shipping Co., 765 F.2d 1069, 1075 (lth Cir. 1985).
99. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
100. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
101. Brief for Appellants at 15, Maryland Dep't of Natural Resources v. Kellum, 51 F.3d
1220 (4th Cir. 1995) (No. 93-1030).
102. Id.
103. It is entirely conceivable that an endangered ship could drop anchor, for safety
reasons, and be held liable for any damage caused to oyster bars below the vessel. Section
4-1118.1 gives no quarter to those who cause damage, regardless of the amount of care
used by mariners.
104. Kellum, 51 F.3d at 1222.
105. Brief for Appellants at 16, Kellum (No. 93-1030); see also supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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riners to a higher standard of care in maritime navigation, it is essential, at the very least, that protected areas that extend into navigable
channels be marked by the state.
Underlying this case is the central theme in admiralty law: the
national need for uniformity."0 6 Addressing this theme, Kellum and
Willis aptly argued in their petition to the Fourth Circuit:
Passing through state to state and being subject to differing
standards of liability, without knowing which standard applies at which time, clearly destroys the uniformity sought by
federal maritime law. The fact that vessels do travel so frequently between different states' waters is a good reason to
keep the law of liability constant; otherwise, navigators and
vessel owners and operators are subject to the whims of each
state through whose waters they pass, with no practical advance notice of
which liability standard will apply at any par0 7
ticular place.1

The national need for uniformity is not incompatible with the State of
Maryland's legitimate interest in protecting her oyster bars. A comparative negligence standard allows Maryland full recovery in the
event that a defendant is completely at fault for damage to an oyster
bar, and a lesser share if Maryland contributes to the damage.1 08 A
strict liability standard skews the maritime scheme in the favor of the
State of Maryland, and potentially holds a mariner liable for occurrences completely out of his control.
Finally, the Kellum decision reinforces the delineation between
maritime cases that fall under the Jensen rule"° and those that fall
under Askew." 0 The court emphasized that Askew involved a scenario
in which a federal act presupposed a coordinated effort with the
states."' Thus, the federal law in Askew involved a congressional enactment that contained an explicit waiver of federal preemption,
thereby foreclosing the preemption issue." 2 Askew, in fact, states that
the Jensen rule may still apply in situations "relating to the relationship
106. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
107. Brief for Appellants at 16, Kellum (No. 93-1030).
108. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
109. See supra text accompanying notes 45-48.
110. See supra text accompanying notes 62-64.
111. Kellum, 51 F.3d at 1225. Unlike Kellum, Askew dealt with a situation where both the
State of Florida and the federal government were concerned with the availability of respective cleanup costs for oil spills. Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325,
326 (1973). In Kellum, damaged oysters are solely the property of Maryland, Kellum, 51
F.3d at 1224, and no such system of collaboration between the state and federal government is conceived, id. at 1225.
112. Askew, 411 U.S. at 329.
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of vessels, plying the high seas and our navigable waters, and to their
crews."1 13 In other words, incidents that occur on the high seas, as
opposed to the shoreside, are governed by Jensen, which emphasized
the need for uniformity in maritime law. 14 Incidents on the shoreside, the Kellum court went on to explain, may be governed by
Askew, 115 which allowed a state maritime statute that did not conflict
with federal law. 16
This distinction, although never referred to explicitly in either
Askew or Kellum, is apparently based on the fact that the need for national uniformity is greatest in navigable channels where interstate
commerce is frequent. Therefore, it seems certain that federal law
will apply to any incident involving a vessel navigating commercial
channels or the "high seas." 7 Less clear, however, are the situations
where a state law may be upheld in spite of countervailing federal law,
in the name of state police power. The Kellum decision makes no
mention of the maritime-but-local doctrine, nor does it even remotely
explore or weigh Maryland's interests in state resources.
Thus, Kellum leaves Maryland in the following position. The state
may enact legislation concerning commercial channels in state waters
provided that the law does not substantially alter the federal general
maritime law. For shoreside marine areas, however, the picture is less
clear. If the state's interests are sufficiently great, any judicial review
would probably, though not certainly, involve an Askew analysis. Such
an analysis should include a greater consideration of local interests,
perhaps under the rubric of the maritime-but-local doctrine."' As
these considerations were not at issue in Kellum, the outcome of any
such cases is open to conjecture.
5. Conclusion.-While the Jensen rule is becoming less pervasive,
the facts surrounding Kellum provide one example where its application is still sound. Though well-intended, Maryland's attempt to protect her natural oyster bars through a strict-liability statute was illconceived. The statute yielded an extremely limited measure of extra
protection to Maryland's oyster bars at best, and at worst, placed a
potentially great burden on vessels traveling Maryland's waters. While
the Fourth Circuit's analysis of federal maritime preemption gave lit113. Id. at 344.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

See supra notes 3, 45-48 and accompanying text.
Kelum, 51 F.3d at 1225.
See supra text accompanying notes 60-64.
See supra text accompanuing note 48.
See supra text accompanying notes 60-64.
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tie indication of a willingness to allow the states to develop laws that
diverge from the federal maritime law, the facts of Kellum seem to
have provided little temptation. Finally, while the court's application
of the Jensen doctrine comported with previous cases, the opinion in
Kellum failed to clarify what set of circumstances would lead the court
to relax its strict adherence to Jewen
SAMUEL C.

STEINBACH
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PROCEDURE

A Literal Interpretationof the Federal Rule Governing
Voluntary Dismissal

In Camacho v. Mancuso,' the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit considered whether the signature of only one party
on a stipulation of dismissal satisfies the requirements of Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 41 (a) (1) (ii) when both parties previously agreed to
dismiss the lawsuit.2 In considering this case of first impression, the
court ruled that the written stipulation of dismissal was invalid; such a
stipulation must contain the signatures of both parties even if both
parties orally agree to dismiss the cause of action.' Even though the
signature requirement is a safeguard that is in place to shield defendants, 4 the Camacho court properly rejected the opportunity to carve an
exception that arose, at least in part, because of the defendants' lack
of diligence.5
1. The Case.--OnJanuary 10, 1990, Montgomery County police
officers arrested Fernando Camacho, who later claimed that the arrest
was illegal and that it violated his rights under state and federal law.6
On April 8, 1991, Camacho and his wife filed an action in federal
district court against Montgomery County and three county officers,
seeking damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983' and under several state
common-law tort theories.' The defendants answered the complaint
and later filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, seeking a dismissal of the state law claims. 9 On September 15, 1991, the
1. 53 F.3d 48 (4th Cir. 1995).
2. Id. at 50.
3. Id. at 53.
4. Id. at 51.
5. Id. at 53.
6. Camacho v. Montgomery County, Md., No. MJG-91-969, slip op. at 1 (D. Md. June
17, 1994), aff'd sub nom. Camacho v. Mancuso, 53 F.3d 48 (4th Cir. 1995).
7. Id. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) states that:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to

be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Id.
8. Camacho, No. MJG-91-969, slip op. at 1.
9. Id. at 2. By the time the plaintiffs filed the state law claims in April 1991, the 180day period of limitations for notice to the defendants of the state claims had expired. Id.
The relevant Maryland statute provides that "an action for unliquidated damages may not
be brought against a local government or its employees unless the notice of the claim
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Camachos' attorney contacted opposing counsel to express their willingness to voluntarily dismiss the case." Counsel for the defendants
agreed to the dismissal." On December 16, 1991, the Camachos filed
a notice of dismissal without prejudice, signed only by their counsel,
in the district court." The court did not approve the dismissal, nor
did the defendants file any record of their assent to the stipulation.1
Moreover, the clerk did not officially docket the case as closed until
September 1, 1992.14 Even though the three-year statute of limitations for filing a § 1983 claim 15 expired onJanuary 10, 1993, the plaintiffs filed a motion to reopen or reinstate the action on March 22,
1993.16 The district court deferred ruling on the motion to reopen
until it resolved the defendants' 1991 motion for judgment on the
pleadings.1 The district court then granted the defendants' motion
as to the state tort claims" and granted the plaintiffs' motion to reorequired by this section is given within 180 days after the injury." MD.

CODE ANN., Crs. &

JUD. PROC. § 5-404 (1989).

10. Camacho, 53 F.3d at 50.
11. Id.
12. Id. It was undisputed that the attorney for the Camachos expressed the intent of
his clients by signing and filing the stipulation. Id.at 54 (Motz, J., dissenting). Neither
party alleged that the Camachos' counsel defeated the interest of his clients by signing the
dismissal. Id.
13. Id.at 50.
14. Id. Judge Garbis indicated in his memorandum opinion that he viewed reopening
the case as necessary to correct the faulty dismissal based on a notice that was inadequate
under Rule 41 (a) (1) (ii). Camacho v. Montgomery County, Md., No. MJG-91-969, slip op.
at 5 (D. Md.June 17, 1994), affid sub nom. Camacho v. Mancuso, 53 F.3d 48 (4th Cir. 1995).
Judge Garbis speculated that the 10-month delay in docketing the notice was due to a
processing error in the clerk's office. Id. at 4. The court concluded that the case was not
properly closed by the clerk because the parties failed to comply with the provisions of
Rule 41 (a). Id.
15. Historically, the courts have had to determine the appropriate period of limitations
for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions because it is not provided by federal statute. Stephen J. Shapiro, Choosing the AppropriateState Statute of Limitationsfor Section 1983 Claims after Wilson v.
Garcia: A Theory Applied to Maryland Law, 16 U. BALT. L. REv. 242, 243 (1987). Congress
instructed the federal courts to adopt state statutes of limitation when no federal rule exists. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988). In Maryland, most tort claims are subject to a three-year
period of limitations. See MD. CODE ANN., Crs. &JUD. PROC. § 5-101 (1989) (stating that
"[a] civil action at law shall be filed within three years from the date it accrues unless
another provision of the Code provides a different period of time within which an action
shall be commenced").
16. Camacho, 53 F.3d at 50.
17. Id.
18. Id.Judge Garbis ruled that the plaintiffs did not provide timely notice as to their
state law claims; thus, they were barred from bringing the claims. Camacho, No. MJG-91969, slip op. at 2; see supra note 9. Plaintiffs also filed a motion to waive the state notice
requirement; however, Judge Garbis stated that the plaintiffs failed to provide adequate
reasons for their waiver proposition. Camacho, No. MJG-91-969, slip op. at 3. The court
thus disregarded the plaintiffs' "excuses" for missing the state deadline. Id.
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pen as to the federal claim.' 9 However, the district court certified its
ruling on the plaintiffs' motion for interlocutory appeal 20 in recognition of the case's "unique posture. "21 On September 26, 1994, the
court of appeals agreed to hear the appeal.2 2
2. Legal Background.-Federal Rule 41(a) (1) permits a plaintiff
to voluntarily dismiss a case in two ways that do not require the court's
consent: by the unilateral dismissal of the plaintiff and by a signed
stipulation of the parties. 2 1 The first, and simplest, method permits
19. Camacho, 53 F.3d at 50.
20. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) provides in pertinent part:
When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of
opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the
ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order.
Id.
21. Camacho, 53 F.3d at 50-51. The court conceded that the issue was debatable in that
the defendants could contend that the reopening of the action effectuated an extension of
the statute of limitations. Camacho, No. MJG-91-969, slip op. at 5. The court considered
the permitted reopening to be a rectification of an erroneous closing. Id.; see also supra
note 14.
22. Camacho, 53 F.3d at 51.
23. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1) provides:
Subject to the provisions of Rule 23(e), of Rule 66, and of any statute of the
United States, an action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court
(i) by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service by the adverse party of
an answer or of a motion for summaryjudgment, whichever first occurs, or (ii) by
filing a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared in the
action. Unless otherwise stated in the notice of dismissal or stipulation, the dismissal is without prejudice, except that a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in any
court of the United States or any state an action based on or including the same
claim.
Id.
Prior to the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938, state statutes governed the right of dismissal according to the Conformity Act. 5 JAMES MooRE ET
AL., MooRE's FEDERAL PRACnCE, 41.02[1] (2d ed. 1995). Typically, state statutes permitted voluntary nonsuits as a matter of right at any time before the retirement of the jury.
Id.; see also In re Skinner & Eddy Corp., 265 U.S. 86, 92-93 (1924) (issuing a writ of mandamus to correct the lower court's vacating of the plaintiff's order of dismissal); Barrett v.
Virginian Ry. Co., 250 U.S. 473, 476 (1919) (sustaining the plaintiffs right to a voluntary
nonsuit even after the judge granted the defendant's motion for a directed verdict).
In the former equity courts, the plaintiff who was willing to pay costs possessed an
unqualified right of dismissal before the final hearing "unless the defendant could point to
some prejudice over and above the mere vexation of possibly being sued again." Leach v.
Ross Heater & Mfg. Co., 104 F.2d 88, 90 (2d Cir. 1939); see also McGowan v. Columbia
River Packers' Ass'n, 245 U.S. 352, 357-58 (1917) (ruling that the plaintiff should have
been permitted to dismiss the action after an intervening decision in another case proved
that the plaintiff had no grounds for complaint on a particular issue). In addition, the
equity courts recognized the limitation to the plaintiffs unilateral right of dismissal, if the
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the plaintiff to file a notice of dismissal before the adverse party serves
an answer or a motion for summary judgment.2 4 Generally, courts
protect the plaintiffs right to unilaterally file a notice of dismissal
prior to the opposing party's response.2 5 However, in Harvey Aluminum, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 26 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a hearing on the plaintiffs motion for a
preliminary injunction involved the merits of the suit and the plaintiff
was precluded from unilaterally terminating the suit even though the
defendant had not yet made a responsive pleading. 27 Subsequent de28
cisions have limited the Harvey holding to its facts.

defendant was entitled to a decree on the merits or sought affirmative relief, if the new suit
would somehow bar the defendant's relief, or if the parties agreed to forward any issue to
the master. 5 MOORE Er AL., supra, 41.0211]; see a/so Prudential Ins. Co. of America v.
Stack, 60 F.2d 830, 831 (4th Cir. 1932) (holding that removal of an action to federal court
does not empower the defendant with a substantial right that would prevent the trial judge
from permitting a plaintiff's voluntary nonsuit).
24. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(i).
25. 5 MOORE ET AL., supra note 23,

41.02[1]; see also American Cyanamid Co. v. McGhee, 317 F.2d 295, 297 (5th Cir. 1963). The court in McGhee stated that
Rule 41(a)(1) is the shortest and surest route to abort a complaint when it is
applicable. So long as plaintiff has not been served with his adversary's answer or
motion for summary judgment he need do no more than file a notice of dismissal
with the Clerk. That document itself closes the file. There is nothing the defendant can do to fan the ashes of that action into life and the court has no role to
play. This is a matter of right running to the plaintiff and may not be extinguished or circumscribed by adversary or court. There is not even a perfunctory
order of the court closing the file. Its alpha and omega was the doing of the
plaintiff alone.
Id.; cf Safeguard Business Sys., Inc. v. Hoeffel, 907 F.2d 861, 863 (8th Cir. 1990) ("Rule 41
provides that the plaintiff loses the right [to unilaterally dismiss an action] when an answer
or a motion for summaryjudgment is filed."); Hamilton v. Shearson-Lehman Am. Express,
Inc., 813 F.2d 1532, 1534 (9th Cir. 1987) (affirming the plaintiffs unencumbered right to
dismissal prior to the defendant's response); Thorp v. Scarne, 599 F.2d 1169, 1176 (2d Cir.
1979) (holding that if the defendant does not exercise either option to terminate the
plaintiff's right to dismiss voluntarily, the plaintiff is entitled to dismiss the action without
prejudice); D.C. Elecs., Inc. v. Nartron Corp., 511 F.2d 294, 298 (6th Cir. 1975) (stating
that the defendant can protect himself from the plaintiff's capricious dismissal by merely
filing an answer or motion for summary judgment).
26. 203 F.2d 105 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 964 (1953).
27. Id. at 107-08.
28. 9 CHARLEs A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 2363 (1995); see alo In re Piper Aircraft Distrib. Sys., 551 F.2d 213, 220 (8th Cir. 1977)
(indicating that the "point at which the resources of the court and the defendant are so
committed that dismissal without preclusive consequences can no longer be had as of
right" is when the defendant first answers or files a motion for summary judgment); D.C.
E/ecs., Inc., 511 F.2d at 298 (holding that the language of Rule 41(a) (1) (i) is clear and
unambiguous and bars judicial discretion except in the determination of whether the defendant's response was filed prior to the filing of a notice of dismissal).
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The plaintiffs right of unilateral dismissal terminates when the
defendant files an answer or a motion for summary judgment.' At
that point, the plaintiff may dismiss the cause of action "by filing a
stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared in the
action." ° Most courts that have interpreted Federal Rule 41(a)(1)
have required the signatures of both sides of the action to appear on a
notice of voluntary dismissal."1 In Morris v. City of Hobart,12 for example, the Tenth Circuit determined that a document entitled "Dismissal
with Prejudice" failed to satisfy Federal Rule 41(a) (1) (ii) because it
contained only the signature of the plaintiff."' The Fifth Circuit also
maintained the multiple signature requirement in Wheeler v. American
Home Products Corp. (Boyle Midway Division).34 In that case, in light of
the fact that the lower court had denied the plaintiffs' motion for class
action status, the court ruled that the stipulation of dismissal with the
signatures of the original plaintiffs was not sufficient to dismiss the
case because it did not include the signatures of the plaintiff-intervenors.3 5 The court stated that Federal Rule 41 (a) (1) did not authorize
dismissal as to the intervenors because the stipulation was not signed
by all the parties involved in the suit.3 6
In McCall-Bey v. Frazen, 7 the Seventh Circuit noted that the requirement to file a stipulation is not simply a technicality.3 8 Rather,
"[i]t provides a permanent record that facilitates the application of
the doctrine of res judicata to subsequent related litigation." 9 The
McCall-Bey court indicated that the proper filing of notices of dismissal
assists in the management of dockets by apprising the court of its case
backlog.'
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
.34.

FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a) (1) (ii).
Id.
See infra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
39 F.3d 1105 (10th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 1109.
582 F.2d 891 (5th Cir. 1977).
35. Id. at 896. In Wheeler, the original four plaintiffs brought suit as a class action under
Tide VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 claiming sexual discrimination. Id. at 893. Eight
additional employees were permitted to intervene. Id. The original plaintiffs agreed to
settle the case without consulting the intervenors who, therefore, did not sign or consent
to the agreement. Id. Although the lower court dismissed the case with prejudice, the
Fifth Circuit reversed the dismissal based on the failure to meet the signature requirement.
Id. at 894.
36. Id. at 896.
37. 777 F.2d 1178 (7th Cir. 1985).
38. Id. at 1185.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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On the other hand, other circuits have refused to take "a purely
mechanistic approach"4" to interpreting Federal Rule 41 (a) (1) (ii).42
For example, a few circuits have held that an oral stipulation before
the court will suffice in place of a written stipulation signed by both
parties.4' However, in each of these cases, the presiding judge had an
opportunity to certify that both parties agreed to the dismissal. In
Pipeliners Local 798 v. Ellerd,4" for instance, the court held that the
plaintiffs explicit oral stipulation in open court met the requirements
for voluntary dismissal. 45 Likewise, in Eitel v. McCoo446 the court concluded that a mutual intent to dismiss with prejudice existed after
hearing the parties' oral arguments by telephone.4 7 Moreover, in
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. M.T.S. Enterprises, Inc.,4 the court dismissed an
action after counsel for the appellee confirmed that a statement he
made in open court was intended to dismiss all claims against two particular defendants.4 9 The Ninth Circuit held on appeal that the oral
dismissal sufficed to meet Federal Rule 41(a) (1) (ii), thus adopting
the Pipelinersexception to the requirement of a written stipulation.5"
Furthermore, in Oswalt v. Scripto, Inc.," the Fifth Circuit criticized a
strict requirement of a formal dismissal document.5 2 The Oswalt court
41. Camacho, 53 F.3d at 51.
42. Id.
43. Id.; see, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. M.T.S. Enters., Inc., 811 F.2d 278, 279 n.1 (9th
Cir. 1987) (ruling that voluntary dismissal during the course of a trial is acceptable); Eitel
v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1472 n.3 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that after hearing parties' oral
argument by telephone, the district court properly dismissed the case); Pipeliners Local
798 v. Ellerd, 503 F.2d 1193, 1199 (10th Cir. 1974) (holding that verbal stipulation in open
court constituted a voluntary dismissal of complaint).
44. 503 F.2d at 1193.
45. Id. at 1199. The appellee in Pipelinersannounced in open court that he dismissed
all actions against all parties except those in the counterclaim. The court held that his
statement constituted a dismissal "even though no formal stipulation of dismissal was
signed by all of the parties to the action as contemplated by Fed. R. Civ. P., Rule 41 (a), 28
U.S.CA" Id.
46. 782 F.2d at 1470.
47. Id. at 1472 n.3.
48. 811 F.2d 278 (9th Cir. 1987).
49. Id. at 279 n.1.
50. Id. The same court later held in Carter v. Beverly Hills Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 884 F.2d
1186 (9th Cir. 1989), that the district court had no basis for dismissing an action in which
the parties had not stipulated to a dismissal either orally or in writing. Id. at 1191. In
Caner, the attorneys for both parties stipulated to the court's vacating of the scheduled
pretrial conference and trial dates because the parties had initially agreed upon a settlement. Id. The lower court dismissed the lawsuit although the parties did not make such a
request. Id.
51. 616 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1980).
52. Id. at 194. In Oswat, the plaintiff brought suit against ajapanese cigarette lighter
manufacturer and an American lighter distributor alleging that the lighter malfunctioned.
Id. at 192. The plaintiffs and the American distributor, Scripto, Inc., reached a settlement
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held that although the parties did not formally file a notice of dismissal, the court would regard a settlement agreement presented to the
court as a stipulated dismissal of the action."
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Camacho, the Fourth Circuit for the
first time confronted the issue of whether a stipulation of dismissal
signed by only one party is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of
Federal Rule 41 (a) (1) (ii) where both parties had clearly intended to
dismiss the case. 54 The court held that when only one party signs and
files a stipulation for dismissal, the requirements of Federal Rule
41 (a) (1) (ii) have not been met.5" The court expressed its belief that
the underlying reason for the rule governing voluntary dismissal is to
prevent the plaintiff from summarily dismissing a case without approval from the adverse party.5 6 In order to verify that both parties
agree to the finality of such a measure, the rule requires tangible acknowledgment of the stipulation.
The Camacho court recognized that other circuits have not taken
a rigid approach to applying Federal Rule 41(a) (1).58 However, the
court also realized that deciding the case in favor of the defendants
would further liberalize the interpretation of the rule. The Fourth
Circuit was not willing to do so.5 9 The court reasoned that upholding
the integrity of the rule outweighed the significance of granting the
parties' initial intent to dismiss this case.6 ° In making its decision, the
court championed the rights of defendants who have a "strong interagreement whereby the plaintiffs agreed not to prosecute the company in exchange for
$125,000. Id. at 193. The agreement also stated that the plaintiffs would indemnify
Scripto, Inc., for the amount of any recovery they received from the Japanese manufacturer, Tokai-Seiki KK Id. When the district court determined that it did not have personal
jurisdiction over Tokai-Seiki KK the plaintiffs and Scripto filed an appeal and presented
the settlement agreement. Id.
53. Id. at 194. In Furlong v. Havee, 885 F.2d 815 (1 lth Cir. 1989), the court adhered to
the bright-line rule by invalidating a plaintiff's argument that the parties stipulated to a
dismissal. Id. at 818. Nevertheless, the court made clear that if both parties had signed the
stipulation or had represented to the court that they had settled their dispute, the parties
would have "satisfied the spirit of the rule" and thus the court would have regarded the
case as having been terminated. Id. Although the Eleventh Circuit cited Oswalt as authority, it also referred to United States v. Transocean Air Lines, Inc., 356 F.2d 702 (5th Cir.
1966), which indicated that only a stipulation signed by all of the parties can effect a dismissal. Id. at 705.
54. Camacho, 53 F.3d at 50.
55. Id. at 53.
56. Id. at 51.
57. Id.
58. Id.; see also supra notes 41-53 and accompanying text.
59. Camacho, 53 F.3d at 51.
60. Id.
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est in the resolution of an action, especially after [they have] taken
the time and spent the money to file a responsive pleading."61 Allowing a plaintiff to dismiss a case without properly adhering to the
rule could subvert defendants' right to clear their name or eradicate
possible stains on their reputation.6 2
In addition, the Camacho court posited that Rule 41 (a) (1) (ii) permits the judiciary to gauge its caseload.63 The majority opinion
adopted the reasoning set forth in McCall-Bey v. Frazen. The McCallBey court determined that the rule is not "merely a technicality,"65 and
stated that "[i]f [the] parties did not have to notify the court that they
had ended their dispute, the court would have no idea of the size of
its backlog without inquiring into the status of every inactive case."66
The court in Camacho also cited decisions from other circuits that adhered to the signature requirement of the rule.6 7
Judge Motz dissented, criticizing the majority's underlying reason
for permitting the plaintiffs to reopen the case. 68 Judge Motz conceded that the reason for Federal Rule 41 (a) (1) (ii) is to protect the
defendant against arbitrary dismissals.69 However, she stressed that in
this case both parties had agreed that the cause of action should be
dismissed.7" Judge Motz further pointed out that a Federal Rule
41 (a) (1) (ii) stipulation does not require court approval in order to be
effective.7" Therefore, Judge Motz believed the court was penalizing
the defendants because the plaintiffs filed an improper stipulation.7 2
Her dissent expounded that the court's strict interpretation of the
61. Id.
62. Id. Even former equity courts recognized that some limits should restrain the
plaintiff's power to dismiss an action. In Chicago & Alton R.R. v. Union Rolling Mill Co.,
109 U.S. 702 (1883), the Court noted:.
"The propriety of permitting a complainant to dismiss his bill is a matter within
the sound discretion of the court ....
After a defendant has been put to trouble
in making his defence, if in the progress of the case rights have been manifested
that he is entitled to claim, and which are valuable to him, it would be unjust to
deprive him of them merely because the complainant might come to the conclusion that it would be for his interests to dismiss his bill. Such a mode of proceeding would be trifling with the court as well as with the rights of defendants."
Id. at 714 (quoting Conner v. Drake, 1 Ohio St. 166, 170 (Ohio 1853)).
63. 53 F.3d at 51.
64. 777 F.2d 1178 (7th Cir. 1985); see supra text accompanying notes 37-40.
65. McCall-Bey, 777 F.2d at 1185.
66. Id.
67. 53 F.3d at 52.
68. Id. at 53 (Motz, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 53-54.
70. Id. at 54.
71. Id. at 53; see infra note 96.
72. Camacho, 53 F.3d at 54 (Motz, J., dissenting).
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rule, in light of the parties' undisputed agreement to dismiss the case,
was an elevation of "form over substance."7 3
4. Analysis.-The Camacho court made an appropriate decision
that remains true to the dual purposes of Federal Rule 41 (a) (1). The
rule was designed to "facilitate the plaintiffs ability to take a voluntary
dismissal of an action, while limiting abuse of the practice by restricting the right to the early stages of the action. "7 After the issue has
been joined, the plaintiffs unqualified right to dismiss is limited in
order to protect the defendant's entitlement to a decree on the
merits.

75

The court was clear that it could have ruled in the defendants'
favor by allowing the incomplete stipulation of dismissal to terminate
the lawsuit, yet the court expressed legitimate concern about the future ramifications of such a decision.7 6 The majority considered not
only the immediate gratification of the parties to the instant action,
but also the rights of future parties who may present similar circumstances.7 7 The court determined that "[a] Ithough in this case [dismissal] would not subvert the parties' original intent, we believe that in
future cases it would compromise the interests that Rule 41's procedural hurdles safeguard: the defendant's interests 7in the cause of action and the court's interest in judicial efficiency." 1
The court expressed concern that by removing the requirement that
both parties' signatures appear on a written stipulation, Federal Rule
41 (a) (1) (ii) would be transformed into a vehicle by which a plaintiff
could summarily dismiss an action at any time.7 9
The majority considered that other circuits have not used a
bright-line test for compliance with the rule and have in some instances totally deviated from the literal meaning of the rule by allowing an oral stipulation of dismissal to suffice."0 However, in those
cases, the oral stipulation was made in open court or in conference
with the trial judge. Thus, at a minimum, the presiding judge "ensure[d] that the parties agreed to the dismissal as per Federal Rule
41 (a) (1) (ii)."" l The Camacho court was justifiably concerned that rul73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 53.
5 MOORE ET AL., supra note 23, 1 41.02[1].
Id.; see also supra notes 29-30, 55-57, 61-62 and accompanying text.
Camacho, 53 F.3d at 51.
Id.
Id.
Id.

80. Id.; see also supra notes 42-53 and accompanying text.
81. Camacho, 53 F.3d at 51.
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ing in the defendants' favor here would force the court to venture
beyond the scope of the rule and beyond the exceptions that already
existed.8 2
The dissent saw the literal application of the rule in this case as a
violation of the rule's purpose because the court's decision created a
"means for plaintiffs to avoid by a technicality the dismissal of an action which they initially ... unequivocally sought to dismiss."" The
majority correctly responded that counsel for both parties bore the
responsibility to ensure that the stipulation complied with the requirements of the rule.8 4 The Fourth Circuit opined that while the plaintiffs were at fault for failing to secure the defendants' signatures on
the notice of dismissal, the defendants also failed to ensure that their
signatures appeared on the notice of dismissal or that their consent to
the dismissal was placed on the record.8 5 Even though the rule was
created to protect the rights of defendants, the defendants in this case
did not take the necessary steps to effectuate such protection.
The dissent conceded that if the oral dismissal had been with
prejudice, or if the written notice had not been timely, the court
would have been justified in finding that an out-of-court oral stipulation did not meet the requirements of the rule.86 Generally, the filing
of a notice or stipulation of dismissal is without prejudice, unless the
plaintiff previously dismissed the same cause of action.8 7 Hence, the
dissent suggested that if the lower court had dismissed the action without prejudice, the plaintiffs would have been able to bring a new com8
plaint on their claim.
Yet, if the court had permitted the plaintiffs' notice of dismissal to
take effect, the Camachos would have been barred from instituting
another suit on the same grounds because the three-year statute of
limitations already had expired.8 9 Moreover, the fact that the stipulation was contemporaneous and timely does not compensate for the
fact that it was also faulty. The majority correctly refused to examine
whether the plaintiffs had an opportunity to commence another suit
on the same cause of action in order to decide whether the parties
sufficiently complied with the rule to effectuate a dismissal. Hinging
the efficacy of a dismissal upon its prejudicial status would create a
82. Id.

83. Id. at 53 (Motz, J., dissenting).
84. Id. (majority opinion).
85. Id.

86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 54 (Motz, J., dissenting).
5 MOORE ET AL., supra note 23,

41.02[2].

Camacho, 53 F.3d at 54 (Motz, J., dissenting).
See supra note 15.
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level of judicial involvement that Federal Rule 41(a)(1) did not
intend.90
Furthermore, the dissent's reliance upon Oswalt v. Scripto, Inc.9
as an example of how the Camacho decision epitomized the elevation
of form over substance is misplaced.92 Oswalt is distinguishable from
Camacho because, although the Oswalts did not formally file a written
stipulation of dismissal, both parties made representations to the district court regarding their signed settlement agreement.93 Thus, the
lower court in Oswalt had written proof that afforded the court an
opportunity to verify that both parties agreed to dismissal.9 4 The trial
court in Camacho had no such proof.
Although permitting the dismissal of this case would seem to create only a narrow exception to Federal Rule 41 (a) (1), close examination reveals vast possible consequences. Denying the plaintiffs'
motion to reopen the case would permit the filing of a notice of dismissal signed by one party on the condition that both parties agreed
to terminate the case. Such a ruling would create enormous problems
for the courts, as there would be no efficient means for the court to
ensure that the parties had in fact reached an agreement. 95 Moreover, if the agreement was disputed, it would require subsequent
court involvement to reach a determination as to its validity.96 Currently, the rule requiring both signatures, or at least only permitting
an oral stipulation presented before the court, circumvents that prob90. See supra note 23; infrta note 96.

91. 616 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1980).
92. Camacho, 53 F.3d at 53 (Motz, J., dissenting).
93. Oswalt, 616 F.2d at 194-95.
94. Id.; see also supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
95. See Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co. v. Mont Boat Rental Servs., 799 F.2d 213 (5th
Cir. 1986) (invalidating the plaintiffs contention that the parties orally agreed to dismiss
only a portion of the claim because the record contained no evidence of the alleged stipulation). The court reasoned that
[a] Ithough Rule 41 expressly requires a written stipulation, the courts have not
insisted on a writing when it is clear that the parties have in fact entered into the
contemplated stipulation. The evidence must, however, be unequivocal and in
the record to satisfy the patent purpose of the requirement-to avoid later dispute. An off-the-record oral stipulation, even if proved, would not satisfy the requirements of Rule 41 for it would lead to the very problems here presented,
problems the requirement was designed to avert.
Id. at 218.
96. Undoubtedly, court approval is not necessary under Rule 41 in order for a stipulation of dismissal to be effective. Camacho, 53 F.3d at 53 (Motz, J., dissenting); see, e.g.,
Safeguard Business Sys., Inc. v. Hoeffel, 907 F.2d 861, 863 (8th Cir. 1990) ("Because the
rule permits dismissal as of right, it requires only notice to the court, not a motion, and
permission or order of court is not required."); 5 MOORE ET AL., supra note 23, 41.02[1]
(asserting that Rule 41(a) (1) does not necessitate the consent of the court).
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lem. In both instances, the rights of the defendant are protected.
The rule's language is unambiguous and finding "narrow" exceptions
to mend the mistakes of each party would erode the very purpose of
the rule.
5. Conclusion.-Although allowing an exception to Federal Rule
41(a) (1) (ii) would have met each parties' original goal of dismissing
the case, the court in Camacho eschewed the opportunity to stray further from the language of the rule. In ruling on an issue of first impression for the circuit, the court took the conservative route and
upheld the stated requirements of the rule. The majority's refusal to
create a novel exception properly avoided the creation of precedent
that would have permitted a plaintiff to terminate a cause of action
with a faulty notice of dismissal. Although allowing an exception in
the instant case would not have caused undue prejudice, the court
took an appropriately forward-looking stance and determined that the
risks of such an exception were too high.
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